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Arms Raids, Elections, and the Border Campaign

1955–1956

AS TOMMY MCDERMOTT and Ruairí Ó Brádaigh were building up the IRA in Longford and Roscommon, similar progress was under way throughout the country. In order to get weapons and publicity, the IRA raided British Army barracks in the Six Counties of Northern Ireland (Antrim, Armagh, Derry, Down, Fermanagh, and Tyrone) and in England. The first raid was in June 1951 at Ebrington Barracks in Derry; it netted rifles, machine guns, and ammunition. A raid in England in July 1953 went less well. Three volunteers, Cathal Goulding, Manus Canning, and Sein Stephenson, sneaked into Felstead School Officers’ Training Corps in Essex and loaded a van with rifles and machine guns, including a Browning machine gun and an anti-tank gun. The van, which was overloaded and traveling poorly, aroused the curiosity of police. The IRA team was stopped, arrested, and subsequently sentenced to eight years in prison. The loss of Goulding was especially important, as he was in the thick of the IRKS reorganization.

The failure at Felstead was followed by a successful raid on Gough Barracks in Armagh. An IRA training officer, Leo McCormack, noticed that there were no magazines or ammunition in the guns of the barracks guards. He passed this information on to general headquarters in Dublin, who investigated further. The raid was primarily planned by Charlie Murphy, Tony Magan’s adjutant general. Among other things, Murphy had SeAn Garland from the Dublin IRA enlist in the British Army at Gough Barracks, which enabled Garland to supply inside information. In June 1954, the IRA seized an armed sentry whose weapon was not loaded, replaced him with a uniformed and fully armed IRA man, and backed up a truck to the armory. The truck was filled with weapons and driven off through the gate, picking the IRA sentry up on the way out (Garland remained behind, “deserting" back to the IRA later). In October 1954, the IRA raided the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers barracks in Omagh, scaling the walls at 3:30 A.M. A sentry, with a knife to his throat, screamed out and raised the alarm. Shots were exchanged and two IRA volunteers, Joe Christle and Joe Mac Liathiin, were shot. Five British soldiers were wounded. The camp’s lights were turned on and the IRA, including Christle and Mac Liathbin, retreated. IRA men jumped into waiting cars that sped off, leaving a number of volunteers behind who were captured by the local police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and the B Specials, Northern Ireland’s armed militia. After the Omagh raid, the IRA leadership, aware that their activities in the north would raise concerns with the Dublin government, instituted General Order No. 8, which directed volunteers about to be caught with arms in the south to dump them or destroy them. It proscribes defensive action. It was a pragmatic decision, taken by people leading an organization that had almost been destroyed by Fianna Fáil in the 1940s. Throughout the 1950s, the leadership was at pains to not antagonize the Dublin government.

Map of Northern Ireland

Concurrent with this military activity, the leadership also built up Sinn FCin. Paddy McLogan, Michael Traynor, and another Republican, Frank MacGlynn, drew up far-reaching amendments to its Constitution which were accepted at the 1950 Ard Fheis. Sinn Féin remained committed to the Irish Republic that had been proclaimed in 1916, but it also sought to establish “social justice, based on Christian principles, by a just distribution and effective control of the Nation’s wealth and resources.” As it was in the 1930s, when Matt Brady supported those accused of killing Richard More O’Ferrall, a fundamental element of Irish Republicanism is a commitment to social change in favor of people who have been underprivileged, oppressed, and victimized by the powers that be, whether they be landlords, employers, or Irish and British politicians. There is among Republicans a gut-level understanding that a commitment to social justice is embedded in their fight for national liberation. This commitment resonated with Ó Brádaigh. His father publicly supported the underdog, and Ruairí had chosen a career teaching teenaged students in a vocational school rather than the university-bound children of wealthy people. As part of Sinn FCin’s political development, the party put forth an abstentionist candidate in a 1954 by-election in Louth for a vacancy in the DGlILeinster House. Ó Brbdaigh, among others, worked for Sinn FCin in the election.

Because it is an all-Ireland political party, Sinn Féin was keenly interested in building a constituency in the North. Unionists-who are largely Protestant and support the union between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom-constituted roughly two-thirds of the northern population. Nationalists-who are largely Catholic and support a united and free Ireland-constituted roughly one-third of the population and suffered at the hands of Unionists, who viewed them as traitors. Sinn Féin saw the May 1955 Westminster election as an opportunity to present itself to its natural constituency, the second-class citizens of Northern IrelandIrish Nationalists. Sinn Féin nominated candidates in all twelve constituencies, half of whom were in jail following the Omagh raid. The moderate Nationalist Party was caught by the move. If it put forward candidates, it would split the Nationalist vote and guarantee Unionist Party success. Such a move would also challenge IRA prisoners who were in jail in support of Northern Nationalists. The Nationalist Party skipped the election.

On weekends, southern Republicans, including Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, went north in support of Sinn Ftin’s campaign. The Sinn Féin candidates, who were abstentionists, pledged to take their seats only in an All-Ireland Parliament and received more than 150,000 votes. Two IRA prisoners from the Omagh raid, Phil Clarke for Fermanagh-South Tyrone and Tom Mitchell for Mid-Ulster, were elected. This was a slap in the face to the Stormont and British governments and set off maneuvering to overturn the elections. As convicted felons, Clarke and Mitchell were not eligible to hold their seats. Clarke’s opponent filed a petition and was declared the victor. The Irish Times commented that only Sinn Féin welcomed the petition, for it allowed the party to claim that the majority of voters in Fermanagh-South Tyrone were disenfranchised. Mitchell’s situation was less clear cut. His opponent did not file a petition and the seat was declared vacant. In an August 1955 by-election, Mitchell won again and his margin of victory increased. A petition was filed and Mitchell was disqualified, but further investigation led to the disqualification of the Unionist candidate. In a second by-election, a Nationalist Party candidate entered the contest and split the Nationalist vote, and a Unionist was elected.

Sinn Féin also stepped up its activity in the south. In June 1955, a number of candidates contested the 26-county local elections, and not as abstentionists. The party adopted the view that participation in a County Council was not tantamount to recognizing the state. There would be County Councils in the All-Ireland Republic and participating in them offered Sinn Féin members an opportunity to serve constituents and build the political side of the Republican Movement. Among those working for Paddy Ruane, a candidate for the Galway County Council, was a young Republican from Milltown, Frank Glynn, and Ruairí Ó Brádaigh. Glynn remembers Ó Brádaigh as someone who “never took no for an answer.” When people complained that something was not getting done, Ó Brádaigh’s view was that the person should “just get out and do it.” Ó Brádaigh “led from the front.” Sinn Ftin’s efforts in Galway were successful, and Ruane was one of seven Sinn Ftiners elected to county or city councils.

North and south in the mid-1950s, Sinn Ftin, the IRA, and Irish Nationalism in general were on the rise. Southern politicians were concerned but took no direct action against Republicans. In the north, the Stormont government saw trouble brewing and acted. In July 1955, Nationalists in Newtownbutler organized the County Fermanagh Feis, an annual festival celebrating Irishness. The feis was an affront to those who claimed Northern Ireland for Britain. That the prime organizer of the feis, Canon Tom Maguire, was joined on a platform in the feis field by TomLs Mac CurtLin of Sinn Féin and the IRA demonstrated that the feis was a cultural and political event. It was a day filled with clashes with the RUC. Stormont had banned any parades or processions associated with the event. Following Mass, a group of people wearing white shirts with green armbands and carrying a banner with a picture of Patrick Pearse, the 1916 leader, set off for the field. A group of about twenty police officers tried to stop them, and the two groups fought for 300 yards, until the marchers folded their banner and were allowed to proceed unhindered. About an hour later, police arrested a man at the railway station next to the field, and part of the crowd responded by stoning the police. The police countered with pressure hoses but were met with a hail of stones, which drove them back from the field. Outfitting themselves with steel helmets, the police drew their batons and charged. The melee ended when Canon Maguire left the platform and called for peace. He was sprayed by water cannons. The RUC later issued a statement that they were simply enforcing an order prohibiting processions.

Around this time, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh moved into the IRA leadership. In June 1955, the IRA convention met at a hall in Parnell Square, Dublin. The delegates were enthusiastic. Arms raids had raised the IRA’S profile. The votes for Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland were amazing. The Clarke and Mitchell elections showed the hypocritical nature of democracy in Northern Ireland and demonstrated a large amount of support for the Republican cause. The local elections in the Twenty-Six Counties showed that Sinn Féin had a smaller but still significant constituency there. The movement was building itself into something formidable. At least it seemed that way to the delegates. The leadership had recognized Ó Brádaigh’s commitment and his competence, and as a complement to his responsibilities as a training officer in Roscommon he had been attached to IRA general headquarters as a staff officer. At the convention, he was elected to the IRA’S Executive. He was also placed in charge of an IRA raid in Britain.

In late 1954, Frank Skuse, who was from West Cork, was serving with the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers of the British Army. He sent word to the IRA that he was willing to help arrange a raid. Tony Magan turned the case over to Charlie Murphy, who visited Skuse in Wales. They determined that a raid in Wales was not feasible, but when Skuse was transferred to Arborfield, which is not far from London, Murphy paid him another visit and began planning a raid. Because of problems with previous raids in Britain, Magan bypassed IRA members in London and created a special seven-man team. Murphy, who was a logical choice to lead the raid, was deemed too valuable to risk. Magan, recognizing his talents, selected Ó Brádaigh as the commanding officer for the special operation.

Ó Brádaigh was briefed by Magan and Murphy, and in July he traveled to London and met with Skuse. Skuse, who was serving at a British base at Blandford, arranged for Ó Brádaigh and himself to tour the Arborfield base, posing as off-duty members of the British Army. When he first met Ó Brádaigh, Skuse was disappointed. Murphy was outgoing, flamboyant. Ó Brádaigh was quiet, reserved. He was also a potential security problem; Ó Brádaigh laughed too much, thought Skuse. During the initial tour of Arborfield they came across Irish Army officers in uniform who were attending a training school. Ó Brádaigh joked that they would get credit for the raid, prompting Skuse to caution him. Yet over the next several weeks, he found Ó Brádaigh’s sense of humor contagious and learned that he was a meticulous soldier and someone he could trust. Ó Brádaigh carefully checked every detail of the camp, every routinethe times of local pubs, the soldiers’ drinking habits, the local bus schedules, the names and times of films at local theaters, and so forth.

Back in Dublin, Ó Brádaigh organized a special training course for those involved in the raid. Maps, drawings, and photographs were pored over. Nothing was taken for granted. As far as he was concerned, there was no such thing as a dumb question, from him or anyone else. Each volunteer was given detailed instructions on how to travel to England, how they would meet up, and what they would do on the raid. A group of them traveled to England in early August to make final arrangements. They rented a dilapidated shop in London; the arms were to be stored there and later shipped to Ireland. Ó Brádaigh and a few others familiarized themselves with the roads by driving from the shop to Arborfield and back several times. On one trip, they gave hitchhiking British soldiers a lift to the barracks. Discreetly, they asked the soldiers questions about their surroundings. On Thursday, August 11, 1955, the rest of the raiding party arrived and registered in a London hotel.

The raiders had detailed information on Arborfield, to the point that they knew the numbers of the keys for the armory and the magazine. In discussing the plans with Magan, Ó Brádaigh asked what he should do if the keys were not where they were supposed to be. Magan told him to get a “jemmy" and go straight into the lock. On the morning of the 12th, Ó Brádaigh visited a tool shop in North London. He picked up various instruments for the raid, including a hacksaw and spare blades, and asked the man behind the counter for a jemmy. Picking up on Ó Brádaigh’s accent, the shopkeeper was amused. He laughed and turned to his apprentice, saying, “Paddy wants a jemmy.” Ó Brádaigh replied that he needed it for “bursting bales or opening wooden containers, that type of thing.” “Ah,” the shopkeeper replied, “what you want is a case opener.”“Yes,” Ó Brádaigh agreed, he wanted a case opener. The shopkeeper produced two, one big, one small, and asked, “Which of them, now?" Ó Brádaigh pointed to the big one. “Ah,” said the shopkeeper, “I thought so.” He wrapped it up in paper, looked at Ó Brádaigh and, performing for his apprentice, said, “Now, you catch it like this and you bonk him over the head like that.” Ó Brádaigh ignored the quip and gathered up his purchases. When he got to the case opener, he slid it up the sleeve of his sports coat. The shopkeeper commented, “Ah, see where Paddy hides his jernmy.” At this Ó Brádaigh laughed along with him, bade him farewell, and left the shop. Outside, he said to himself, “That was bad.” Undeterred, he went on and hired two vans and a car for the raid. Aware of what could happen, he also found time to go to confession.

Early in the morning of Saturday, August 13th, the IRA team, including Frank Skuse, traveled from London in two large vans and a car, arriving on the outskirts of Arborfield. The raid was scheduled to begin at 2: 10 AM, just after the sentries were changed. The driver in each van had instructions to enter the barracks at a prearranged time. The car was parked nearby. Six members of the team walked to the barracks entrance. 6 BrQdaigh and two others, one in uniform, led the way. The sentry, assuming they were soldiers returning from a night out, said “Right" as he left his box and lifted a barrier for them. “Right,” they replied as they passed under. Inside the camp, the guardroom was on the left, the armory on the right. They went straight to the guardroom. As they entered, guns drawn, a second group of IRA men reached the barrier, grabbed the sentry, and dragged him into the guardroom. A Dublin volunteer in British uniform took the sentry’s place. They had less than two hours to complete their work-a patrol check and a new sentry were due to arrive at the guardroom at 4 AM.

In the guardroom, the sergeant jumped up from his table to the words, “Get up your hands.” He and the sentry were spread-eagled against a wall. IRA men moved into the sleeping quarters of the guardroom, awakened the soldiers, and hustled them into the largest room in the complex. Just to be sure, they searched toilets and the area behind the building. The sergeant, who was responsible for camp security, was bound and gagged and held in a separate room. Two volunteers sought out the duty clerk in charge of the telephone exchange. He awoke with the question, “Who sent you?” They put him in handcuffs. In all, the IRA captured nineteen soldiers. Each was bound at the hands and the ankles and then they were all bound together and gagged. As this was happening, the vans were driven past the IRA sentry and backed up to the armory.

As feared, the keys to the magazine and armory could not be found. They forced the doors with the case opener. At 2:50 AM, they began loading the first van with literally tons of guns and ammunition; its springs sagged from the weight. Ó Brádaigh was concerned, but about 3: 15 AM he sent it off to London. A half an hour later, the second van was on its way. In the two vans were 55 Sten guns, 10 Bren guns, more than 75,000 rounds of ammunition, selected weapons and magazines, and one pistol. To provide more time for the vans, two IRA men in British Army uniform were left behind. When the patrol and new sentry arrived at 4 AM they were captured at gunpoint, bound, and gagged. This done, the two volunteers sped off for London in the rented car. Six hundred soldiers slept through the raid. The alarm was finally raised by the sergeant, who wiggled himself loose, hopped across the road, and banged his head on the door of the regimental sergeant-major.

Probably at about the time the sergeant-major sounded the alarm, the first van was being pulled over. They were traveling too fast, and they caught the attention of police officers who took up pursuit. When the police caught up with the van, they found its cargo and arrested two IRA men. This van was pulled off to the side of the road as Ó Brádaigh and the others drove by in the second van. They stopped, considered going back, but decided against it. Magan had told them to get home safely, even if it meant leaving their goods behind. Also, their own haul was significant and there was not a lot they could do to help the others. Ó Brádaigh drove on to London, dropping Skuse off on the way so he could return to Blandford. In London, they unloaded the van at the rented shop. The plan was to wait out what was likely to be a storm of publicity and high security and then quietly ship the guns and ammunition to Ireland.

According to newspaper accounts, Scotland Yard and MI5 organized a manhunt involving 50,000 people. Sea and air routes were watched and Irish neighborhoods in larger cities were combed. Building sites, where many Irish immigrants were employed, were watched. Two days later, soldiers at a base in Wales claimed they had foiled a raid there. It was a hoax, but it added to the tension as Ó Brádaigh and his colleagues made their way back to Ireland. The team split up to make themselves less conspicuous. Ó Brádaigh took with him another volunteer, who seemed more nervous than the others. On Sunday, while riding on a train, an elderly lady across from them was reading a paper, The News of the World, with the headline, “All Britain Man Hunt; Armed and Dangerous.” She set it down and began checking out the two young Irishmen. As she became more and more curious, his compatriot became more and more nervous. Ó Brádaigh, a polite and well-spoken young man, struck up a conversation with her about the weather, thunder, lighting, and anything else available. He presented himself as a “nice boy,” and it worked. They were in Dublin by the following Saturday. Ó Brádaigh tracked down the newspapers for Monday through Sunday and read the accounts. His own account of the event appeared in the November 1955 United Irishman as “The Arborfield Raid by One of the Volunteers Who Took Part in It.”

Bad luck led to the capture of the first van and the arrest of Dánal Murphy (Charlie’s brother) and Joe Doyle. Police searching the van found maps and receipts which led to the discovery of the arms in the rented shop and the arrest of James Murphy (no relation). Although the raid was not a success, it was not a complete failure either. The IRA had demonstrated daring and courage and had embarrassed the British Army in England. And Ruairí Ó Brádaigh had demonstrated his ability to organize the raid, carry it off, and return safely to base. He also became very aware of the risks he was taking. When the arrested volunteers went on trial in September, a soldier testified that “one man sounded very well spoken, like a university student.” The IRA then, as it is now, was primarily comprised of people with working-class and small-farmer backgrounds. Relatively few of them are university educated. This reference to Ó Brádaigh caught his attention. Fortunately for him, there were no repercussions.

That fall, Sein Cronin arrived back in Ireland. Originally from the Gaeltacht in County Kerry, Cronin was a veteran of the 1940s Irish Free State Army, not the IRA. He was married, in his early 30s, and he had been working in the United States as a journalist. He settled in Dublin, took a job with the Evening Press, and sought out the IRA. Cronin was special, a guerrilla leader in waiting. His recruiting officers found that he knew more about military affairs than they did. He was quickly moved on to the IRKS general headquarters staff and charged with developing a new training program. He also began working on what became Operation Harvest, a plan of attack on the Six Counties. Cronin was not interested in more arms raids; he wanted a campaign. Before long, he was IRA director of operations.

The IRA was becoming more professional and the Irish government was getting more nervous. John A. Costello, the Fine Gael Taoiseach, was caught in a dilemma. Like most people living in the south, he wanted a united Ireland. Yet as Taoiseach, he could not stand by and watch his authority be undermined by a guerrilla army that was launching arms raids on the territory of another government, even if the Irish Constitution claimed that territory. In November 1955, he addressed the Dhil, trying to forestall what seemed inevitable. He threatened the IRA: “We are bound to ensure that unlawful activities of a military character shall cease, and we are resolved to use, if necessary, all the powers and forces at our disposal to bring such activities effectively to an end.” Yet he was not willing to cooperate with the northern authorities or the British and stated there would be “no question of our handing over, either to the British or Six-County authorities, persons whom they may accuse of armed political activities in Britain or the Six Counties.” Costello, like most people in the south, believed that the only reason there was a Northern Ireland was because Britain was more powerful than Ireland, “This ancient nation, whose geographical extent is defined by nature as clearly and as unquestionably as that of any nation in the world, has, for many years, been divided in two by the act of a more powerful State, against the will, repeatedly expressed, of the overwhelming majority of the Irish people.” He also argued that times had changed, that “now we have an Irish Government and Parliament, free and democratic, to speak and to act in the name of Ireland.”

The Catholic Church supported Costello. In January, 1956, the Irish hierarchy issued a statement condemning the use of force that was read at all Masses in Ireland. The IRA leadership, through the pages of the United Irishman, replied that the people in Ireland who bore arms illegally were the British Army. Ó Brádaigh agreed with the leadership, but he was troubled enough that he discussed the condemnation with his mother. She placed the hierarchy’s condemnation in perspective, commenting, “De Valera and the whole Republican movement in 1922 were excommunicated with bell, book, and candle. And they are now at high masses and all this kind of thing.” She did not recall the excommunication being lifted. Her opinion was that the Irish people had clung to their religion “in spite of the bishops.” The conversation cemented a personal view he still holds, that “you cling to your religion in spite of the politics, the passing politics.” Most volunteers took the same perspective, and only one left the movement because of the statement; he was back within a year.

The Stormont government was not caught in a dilemma. Faced with opposition, they repressed it. In November 1955, the Northern Ireland minister for home affairs, G. B. Hanna, passed regulations allowing the arrest and detention, without warrant, of any person for up to twentyfour hours. In July 1956, his successor, Captain Terence O’Neill, banned processions associated with another County Fermanagh Feis in Newtownbutler. One hundred police officers, many in riot gear and steel helmets, invaded the village of perhaps 400 residents and enforced the ban. There were no processions, no baton charges, and no water hoses and the event passed peacefully. The only altercation of any kind was when the RUC ordered a band to stop playing. They were crossing a street and therefore engaging in a procession on a public road. The Stormont government forced the peace in Newtownbutler, but it was a short-lived peace.

The appeals of Costello and the Catholic Church and the repression from Stormont did not deter the IRA. The Westminster elections showed that it had support. Many in the leadership were influenced by Sein Cronin’s enthusiasm and his abilities. Cronin had produced a manual called Notes on Guerrilla Warfdre and a series of battle lectures, and was pushing for a campaign. The Army Council, a mix of senior and junior people, considered the possibility. Tony Magan, the chief of staff, was complemented by two veterans from the 1940s, Tomis Mac Curtiin and Paddy Doyle, and by Larry Grogan, a veteran from the 1920s. The younger people were Charlie Murphy, Robert Russell (a nephew of Sein Russell, chief of staff in the 1930s), and Ó Brádaigh, who was co-opted onto the council in July 1956. While the younger people tended to be enthusiastic, as was Ó Brádaigh, Mac Curtiin was not convinced that the IRA was ready. He believed that the political situation in the north was not quite ripe and argued that a passive resistance campaign by northern Nationalists should precede an IRA military campaign. He suggested that Stormont elections, which were scheduled for 1958, offered an opportunity to organize civil disobedience and noncooperation. The council voted in favor of a campaign but did not set a specific start date. They did set up a summer “battle school" under Cronin’s direction. Ó Brádaigh attended it.

The Army Council’s plans were interrupted by a split in the IRA. Joe Christle, who had been shot during the Omagh raid, was a maverick with an ego who thought the leadership was too conservative. He grated on Tony Magan, who insisted on complete loyalty and dismissed him. Christle took with him several members of the IRA’S Dublin unit. They organized themselves, linked up with other dissidents, and in November 1956 they began their own campaign by blowing up five unmanned customs huts along the Northern IrelandIRepublic of Ireland border. They burned a sixth hut to the ground.

This adventure had no attraction for Ó Brádaigh. Many of Christle’s followers were recent recruits who had been attracted by the arms raids. Ó Brádaigh, in contrast, had been in the IRA for five years; had been a delegate at conventions in 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1956; and was in the leadership. Christle was impatient. Ó Brádaigh is careful and meticulous. Some of those who went with Christle were “young turks,” full of energy and, to a degree, themselves. Ó Brádaigh was the opposite. On the Army Council he was surrounded by men who had been in the leadership for decades. He was so full of trepidation that he did not even speak at his first two council meetings. Magan, Mac Curtiin, and Grogan, and McLogan in Sinn FCin were building for a military campaign. As veterans of previous campaigns, he knew, they wanted a successfil military campaign. It was a question of when, not if. The Christle crowd, less cautious, seemed most interested in simply having a go at the British.

But Christle’s activities put pressure on Magan and the Army Council. More defections were likely, and when the Dublin authorities went after Christle they would also go after Sinn FCin and the IRA. They decided to skip the passive resistance phase and begin a campaign in December 1956. It has been asserted that Belfast was excluded from the campaign because the leadership feared that including it would lead to sectarian conflict. In truth, Belfast was excluded because Paddy Doyle, an Army Council member and the Belfast commanding officer, had been arrested, which created disorganization there. Four flying columns, mobile groups of IRA volunteers modeled on the guerrilla columns of the 1920s IRA that operated in the countryside for extended periods, would be sent north. The columns, operating along Northern Ireland’s 240-mile border with the Irish Republic, were named for Irish patriots: Patrick Pearse, Liam Lynch, Bartholomew Teeling, and Tom Clarke. Under Cronin’s original Operation Harvest plan, each column would have twenty-five members. The columns were cut to fifteen members, armed with Bren light machine guns, rifles, Thompson machine guns, and pistols but no heavy gear such as bazookas or mortars. Gelignite was the primary source of explosives. The columns were supposed to link with local IRA units and attack high-priority targets, including police stations and British Army barracks. Local units were also to pursue their own-mainly sabotageoperations. It was hoped that a quick start would bring new recruits and the campaign would expand in quality and quantity. To fill the columns, the leadership drew on the best members of the various units available. Following the rules of the Geneva Convention, members of the flying columns dressed in uniform-a mix of British, U.S., and Irish fatigues- and wore black berets. On their shoulders they sewed tricolor patches (flashes) indicating they were soldiers in the Irish Republican Army.

On the night of December 11–12, 1956, the campaign began with a bang. Bridges were blown up and shots were exchanged with RUC patrols. In Magherafelt, a courthouse was bombed. In Derry, a BBC transmitter was blown up. In Armagh, Gough Military Barracks was attacked and there was a gun battle. On the 14th, police stations in Lisnaskea and Derrylin were attacked. A Sinn Féin manifesto was released: “Irishmen have again risen in revolt against British aggression in Ireland.” Early estimates were that 150 IRA volunteers were involved in the various assaults.

The Stormont government immediately authorized internment, the arrest and detention without trial of persons suspected of involvement in the campaign. British Army troops were rushed to Enniskillen from Ballykinlar Camp in County Down and ordered to stand ready for action against the IRA. British Army engineers destroyed bridges crossing the border and rendered side roads impassable with spikes, barriers, and obstructions. The next day, police rounded up thirty Republicans from across the north, including Sinn Féin activists. In the last week of December 1956, the northern government banned Sinn Ftin, making the party an illegal organization. Belfast Sinn Féin headquarters were raided, equipment was confiscated, and Sinn Ftiners were interned. In the south, Costello’s cabinet met and released a statement that the guerrilla activity might lead to civil war. Irish police and army personnel arrested and questioned suspected IRA activists along the border but released them for lack of evidence. Toward the end of the month, Costello urged Anthony Eden, the British prime minister, to allow Northern Ireland to unite with the Republic, which would end the guerrilla attacks.

Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, an Army Council member and a general headquarters staff officer charged with raising and training the Teeling Column in the West of Ireland, missed the opening of the campaign because he was teaching in Roscommon. Tony Magan instructed him to help organize supplies for the columns but to remain at his job until the Christmas holiday, which began on December 20th. After that, he was available full-time. As his students left for vacation, Ó Brádaigh “gathered up selected people from the West, and moved up" to South Fermanagh, just below the lakes. He joined the Teeling Column as second-in-command to Noel Kavanagh, the commanding officer.