Читать книгу Russian Cyber Operations - Scott Jasper - Страница 26

Scholar Dmitry Adamsky claims that the current Russian art of strategy is one of “cross-domain coercion.”⁴⁴ The strategy of coercion, according to Thomas Schelling, “includes ‘deterrent’ as well as ‘compellent’ intentions.”⁴⁵ The deterrent component prevents undesirable actions by instilling a fear of consequences into a targeted actor if the act in question is taken, whereas the compellent component offers the actor positive reinforcement for taking actions he otherwise would not. Compellence usually “involves initiating an action . . . that can cease . . . only if the opponent responds.”⁴⁶ The 2014 Military Doctrine codified the ideas inherent in nonnuclear deterrence (and possibly compellence).⁴⁷ By employing asymmetric means, the weak player can impose its political will on a stronger one, without a traditional decisive battlefield victory. The asymmetric approach prevents military confrontation or mitigates its consequences. Cyber operations are an element of cross-domain coercion, but their ability to produce strategic effects was tested in the crisis in Estonia, against a member of the NATO alliance (see map 2.1). The Russians sought to achieve coercive concessions by “demonstrating their power to hurt digitally and by imposing costs.”⁴⁸ Although the cyber operation “achieved a dramatic effect,” Professors Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan Maness conclude in their seminal work on cyber strategy that there “was no concession.”⁴⁹ The Russians were able to shut down governmental and civilian websites in Estonia with DDoS attacks generated by individuals and botnets (swarms of computers hijacked by malicious code). Their use of patriotic hackers and refusal to allow investigations on their territory prevented attribution for what could have qualified as a use of force.