Читать книгу Russian Cyber Operations - Scott Jasper - Страница 30

The need to modernize the Russian military became obvious after its dismal tactical performance in Georgia in 2008. In direct-fire engagements, Georgian forces inflicted more damage on Russian units due to superior Georgian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles equipped with reactive armor and advanced radios and fire-control systems.¹¹³ In 2010, Russia embarked on an ambitious State Armament Program (SAP), setting a goal of 30 percent share of modern equipment (i.e., with advanced technology) by 2015 and 70 percent by 2020. Russia reached an actual share of 60 percent before President Putin approved the SAP 2018–27 in December 2017.¹¹⁴ The SAP emphasizes programs for the development of a viable twenty-first-century military, including the improvement of antiaccess capabilities.¹¹⁵ The SAP also funds six new nuclear or hypersonic weapon systems designed to penetrate and evade US antimissile defenses.¹¹⁶ However, the SAP is not just about new and more capable weapons but also “well trained, manned and equipped land, sea and air forces” for “rapid, high intensity conventional operations within a geographically limited zone.”¹¹⁷

Russia has showcased the newest weapon platforms in displays and parades. For instance, a military show in August 2018 just outside Moscow featured the latest fighter jet, the Su-27, and the Armata battle tank.¹¹⁸ A naval parade the previous month sent forty ships through waters near Saint Petersburg and anchored eleven more, including the guided-missile frigate Admiral Gorshkov, at parade formation.¹¹⁹ Shows of military force are impressive but can be questionable on substance, while actual operations prove the existence of true capability. The commander of US European Command told lawmakers in March 2018 that “at sea, on land, in the air—frankly, every domain—Russia’s increasingly modernized military is operating at levels not seen since the Cold War.”¹²⁰ US Navy leaders concur by contending that “in terms of great power competition,” Russia operates its newest attack submarines in the North Atlantic “at a pace not seen since the Cold War.”¹²¹

Over a period of two years, Russia demonstrated the ability to strike into Syria from virtually all directions.¹²² In the Caspian Sea, the frigate Dagestan and three Buyan-M-class corvettes launched twenty-six Kaliber subsonic cruise missiles more than nine hundred miles into Syria.¹²³ In the Mediterranean, Kaliber cruise missiles were launched by the frigate Admiral Grigorovich and the Kilo-class attack submarine Rostov-on-Don.¹²⁴ In addition, Russian strategic bombers flying from northern Russia released Kaliber cruise missiles at targets in Syria.¹²⁵ The Russian defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, said new Russian weapons have “proven their worth in the conflict.”¹²⁶ Their impressive performance lends credence to a 2018 RAND Corporation report that “improvements in Russia’s military forces over the last decade have reduced the once-gaping qualitative and technological gaps between Russia and NATO.”¹²⁷ However, the display of military power in Syria was by a finite number of units.

New air and surface platforms with similar advanced capabilities have suffered technical issues and funding shortages that have delayed or limited production. For instance, the stealth frigate Admiral Gorshkov was commissioned in July 2018, two years later than expected due to periodic funding shortages for the entire program.¹²⁸ Also, it is uncertain whether compatibility problems with its Poliment-Redut air-defense missile system have been solved. The second ship in the Admiral Gorshkov class is delayed, and two more are uncertain to enter service since they depend on Ukrainian-made gas-turbine engines.¹²⁹ In the aviation sector, President Putin has announced intentions for a modest buy of seventy-six Su-57 fifth-generation fighters by 2028.¹³⁰ The aircraft is supposed to replace the MiG-29 and Su-27, with original plans to purchase 150 aircraft over a decade. The most likely reasons for the reduced acquisition are shifting defense priorities and budgetary deficits.

The hard reality is that while military modernization remains a priority, the Russian defense budget is severely constrained. While Russia seeks respect on the world stage with military forces that are comparable to those of the United States and NATO, President Putin reassures domestic audiences that defense spending will not rise at the expense of domestic priorities.¹³¹ From 2012 to 2015, increases in defense expenditures averaged 12 percent a year, but defense spending fell by 15 percent from 2015 to 2018, reducing allocations for modernization of the armed forces.¹³² Projections within the 2018–20 budget show defense expenditures falling from 3.8 percent of GDP in 2016 to 2.6 percent in 2020, their lowest level since 2008. While the SAP was ostensibly delayed for the last two years, the Kremlin shows no sign of abandoning modernization in approving $270 billion for the SAP 2018–27.¹³³ However, for an energy-dependent economy, fluctuating oil prices could hinder aspirations for armament modernization, as oil plunged to a fifteen-month low in December 2018.¹³⁴ While Russia will attempt to modernize its entire military, progress in 2019 will have been mostly “in its air defense, submarine and electronic warfare capabilities.”¹³⁵ Consequently, the need for low-cost cyber operations will not necessarily fade away.