Читать книгу Theorizing Crisis Communication - Timothy L. Sellnow - Страница 12

As with many fields of study, scholars have debated the merits of various definitions of crises. In addition, different fields of study favor different terms. Sociology generally uses the term disaster while organizational studies and communication researchers prefer the term crisis. Regardless of the terminology, these debates about definitions are important in establishing the parameters of a field and indicating the principal components of the phenomenon. Definitions are also important components of any theory. For example, within the area of crisis studies some debate exists about the level of harm necessary for an event to qualify as a crisis. A bad snowstorm may be disruptive to a community, but the storm may only be characterized as a crisis when it threatens public safety and property. High winds may be disruptive but only constitute a crisis when they create significant property damage. To construct a theory of crisis, it is first necessary to ensure the event under examination actually meets the definition of a crisis.

The FEMA uses several criteria to determine when a situation qualifies as a disaster. A disaster declaration is required for federal aid to be available to communities (see Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 FEMA Disaster Declaration Criteria.

Amount and type of damage (number of homes destroyed or with major damage);Impact on the infrastructure of affected areas or critical facilities;Imminent threats to public health and safety;Impacts to essential government services and functions;Unique capability of federal government;Dispersion or concentration of damage;Level of insurance coverage in place for homeowners and public facilities;Assistance available from other sources (federal, state, local, voluntary organizations);State and local resource commitments from previous, undeclared events; andFrequency of disaster events over recent time period (FEMA, 2011).

Source: FEMA (2011), Declaration Process Fact Sheet.

These criteria allow FEMA to assess the relative magnitude of disruption and harm an event has created and determine the amount and form of assistance a community may need. A federal disaster declaration is necessary under the provisions of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and the Stafford Act of 1988 for federal assistance and aid to be distributed. The WHO identifies elements required for an infectious disease outbreak to be declared a pandemic. An epidemic involves the emergence of a new disease or reemergence of a disease, with sustained human transmission, occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area, crossing international boundaries and usually affecting a large number of people (Kelly, 2011).

Some crises are distinct in terms of their scope and the level of harm created. These so-called mega-crises “defy boundaries, limits, neat demarcations, patterned connections and linear consequences” (Helsloot et al., 2012, p. 5). Mega-crises create especially significant threats, overwhelm capacity to respond, and have both short- and long-term consequences. These events are often inconsistent with the “traditional dichotomy between natural and man-made disasters” by creating complex interactions between human-caused and natural phenomena (Helsloot et al., 2012, p. 5). Mega-crises may profoundly and permanently undermine the viability of communities, institutions, and regions and require a fundamental rethinking of preparation, response, management. Most importantly, mega-crises require consideration of causes and consequences. Climate change, for example, involves the complex and nonlinear interaction of human and natural phenomena. As climate patterns that have been relatively stable for thousands of years shift, the consequences for local weather patterns, sea level rises, agricultural practices, and human migration will be profound. Management of this mega-crisis will require sustained, cooperative, multinational efforts and social and political change on a scale not seen before. Managing the consequences of climate change will become an imperative for communities, organizations, industries, and countries. Mega-crises such as climate change have prompted an emphasis on building and improving resilience as an important strategy of response.

From other perspectives, the question of the magnitude of a crisis is best understood as a matter of personal, community, and even cultural perception. Not surprisingly, people are more likely to understand an event as a crisis when it affects them. Coombs (2010) describes a crisis as a function of perceptions based on a violation of some strongly held expectation. Food, for example, should be safe to eat and free of harmful E. coli contamination. Tap water should be safe to drink. It is generally expected that rivers will remain within defined areas and not spread to inundate residential or downtown areas. Seasonal influenza should be a relatively minor disorder and should not create widespread illness, death, and social disruptions. The violation of these expectations and some level of community and social consensus about the relative level of risk and threat create the perception of a crisis. A crisis condition is in contrast to what would be considered a normal condition. When people believe there is a crisis, they are likely to behave differently than they would in so-called normal times.

Similar debates about definitions have also focused on the notion of the intentional creation of harm. For example, some scholars have argued that international conflicts between countries represent crises, while others have suggested that war itself should not be classified as a crisis, although the consequences, such as the dislocation of populations, disruption of food supplies, or disease outbreaks, do represent crises. War usually but not always is the outcome of some extended conflict and as such is not surprising in the same way as most crises. Terrorism attacks are intentional, unanticipated, and surprising and are generally classified as crisis events.

Table 1.2 Typologies of Crisis.

Crisis Types:
Lerbinger (1997)	Seeger et al. (2003)	Coombs (2010)
Natural disaster	Public perception	Natural disasters
Technological crises	Natural disasters	Malevolence
Confrontation	Product or service crisis	Technical breakdowns
Malevolence	Terrorist attack	Human breakdowns
Organizational misdeeds	Economic crisis	Challenges
Workplace violence	Human resource crisis	Mega-damage
Rumors	Industrial crisis	Organizational misdeeds
Terrorist attacks/man-made disasters	Spills (oil, chemical)	Workplace violence
Crises from environmental factors	Transportation disasters	Rumor

These various crises all generally evoke the notion of some dramatic, unanticipated threat with widespread and wholly negative impact. Events such as the Japanese tsunami and Fukushima nuclear accident, the Challenger Shuttle disaster, the British Petroleum (BP) Gulf oil spill, and the anthrax letter contamination episode represent crises. These events share three general attributes: they are largely unanticipated or violate expectations; they threaten high-priority goals, and they require relatively rapid response to contain or mitigate the harm (Hermann, 1963; Seeger et al., 2003). Crises are almost always unanticipated by key stakeholders, although there are usually warning signs and cues. Most often, they involve a radical departure from the status quo and a violation of general assumptions and expectations, disrupting “normal” and limiting the ability to anticipate and predict. The severe violation of expectations is usually a source of uncertainty, psychological discomfort, and stress. Sometimes, the occurrences are so confusing people simply do not know what to do and experience extreme psychological dislocation. Weick has described this response as a cosmological episode: “When people suddenly and deeply feel that the universe is no longer a rational, orderly system. What makes an episode so shattering is that both the sense of what is occurring and the means to rebuild that sense collapse together” (Weick, 1993, p. 633).

Significant threats to such high-priority goals as life, property, security, health, and psychological stability are often associated with crises. These threats also create severe anxiety and stress and the need to do something, that is, to take some action in response to the threat. This reaction is sometimes described as the fight or flight response, a natural neurological response first described by psychologist Walter Cannon in the 1920s. The primary mammalian stress hormone, adrenaline, is activated when a threatening situation is faced. This hormone produces several neurological responses, including increased heart rate, constricted blood vessels, and dilated air passages. In general, these responses enhance an organism’s physical capacity to respond to a threatening situation. Gray (1988) updated the fight or flight framework into a more comprehensive four-stage process of “freeze, flight, fight, and fright.” Initially, an organism may exhibit a freeze response, exhibiting hypervigilance or awareness to the threat. The second response, according to Gray, is to flee, and if this is not an option or if fleeing is exhausted as a strategy, a fight response is activated. Finally, a strategy of fright, freezing, or immobility may occur as the organism “plays dead” in a final effort to avoid the threat.

A third defining condition of crisis is that the event usually requires some immediate action or response by agencies and groups to limit and contain the harm. Actions such as shelter-in-place or evacuation are common for some kinds of events. During the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommended members of the public get vaccinations, wash their hands frequently, cover their cough, and stay home when sick. These actions are mitigation strategies designed to limit the spread of the disease. In cases of contaminated products, avoiding the product is necessary to reduce harm. Power outages, heavy rains, or floods often contaminate municipal water supplies. In these cases, water must be disinfected through actions such as boiling to avoid waterborne diseases. These actions usually require some communication of expert or situational advice. The need for a rapid response implies that crises emerge quickly and are of relatively short duration. This is not always the case. The consequences of a crisis can emerge slowly over time and last for very long durations. Environmental crises, for example, may be years, even decades in the making and the consequences may only become clear slowly over time. Chemical contamination is an especially challenging source of slow-moving crises. With over 50,000 known landfill sites with toxic chemicals, these legacy “time bombs” have the potential to slowly yet significantly impact human health for years and even decades (Worthley & Torkelson, 1981).

We have suggested elsewhere that a crisis may be defined as a specific, unexpected, non-routine event or series of events that creates high levels of uncertainty and a significant or perceived threat to high-priority goals (Seeger et al., 2003). This definition captures the three primary conditions of crisis and suggests a crisis may be a contained, single event such as the 27 April 2011, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, tornado in which 52 people died, or it may be a series of interacting and cascading events, such as the Fukushima earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster. This definition also includes the idea that a crisis should be contained or specific in its parameters. Larger issues, such as the ongoing healthcare crisis or the energy crisis, would not meet this definition.

Others have offered more straightforward crisis definitions. Heath (1995), for example, suggests that a crisis is a risk manifest. From this perspective, a risk occurs before a crisis and is the consequence of a risk continuing to develop without appropriate efforts to manage it. This notion of a risk incubating, developing unchecked, and perhaps interacting with other factors is one of the most common views of a crisis “cause.” Therefore, crisis is also closely related to the concept of risk. Risk communication generally concerns “risk estimates, whether they are appropriate, tolerable, and risk consequences” (Heath, 1995, p. 257). Birkland (1968) described crises as focusing events, bringing attention to issues and setting the larger public policy agenda. Thus, a crisis can be a significant force in political and social change and may determine what actions government might take.

Crisis comes from the Greek krisis and krinein. Krisis was a medical term used by the Greek writer and physician Hippocrates to describe the turning point in a disease. Krinein means to judge, separate, or decide. Crisis in its eastern etymology refers to a decision point requiring a decision of judgment. The Chinese symbol for crisis, we¯ijı¯, sheds light on the way the term is understood in some eastern cultures. Composed of two symbols, wei roughly translates to “danger, dangerous, endanger, jeopardize, perilous, precipitous, precarious, high, fear, afraid.” While there is some debate about ji, it may sometimes mean “opportunity” and may also mean “a crucial point” (Mair, 2010). According to this translation, we¯ijı¯ may refer to a dangerous situation and a crucial point.

Other fields have their own debates around definitions and terminology. Sociology, which probably has the longest tradition of research in this field, uses the term disaster to represent events that can be designated in time and space that have impacts on social units. These social units, in turn, enact responses and changes to manage the impacts (Fritz, 1961). Although many definitions have been proposed, most investigations of disaster refer to the physical impacts or problems unplanned or socially disruptive events cause for human communities (Kreps, 1984). Disasters create considerable harm to people and the physical infrastructure. They generally occur suddenly and prompt actions that can be taken to mitigate the harm. Quaretelli (2005) argued further that the term disaster is rooted in two fundamental ideas. First, disasters are social phenomena as opposed to simply natural forces. Natural forces, storm surges, earthquakes, or infectious diseases are sources of damage, while the disaster is the impact on social systems and processes. Second, a disaster involves the established social structure and associated changes, such as disruptions, to that structure. Although the term disaster is preferred by sociologists, it is conceptually very similar to the term crisis used in fields such as communication.

Closely associated with efforts to define crisis is the question: what causes a crisis? A number of perspectives have been offered to explain the cause of crisis (see Seeger et al., 2003, pp. 12–15). These include faulty decision making, oversights, accidents, natural changes, and unanticipated events. These may be summarized in three views: (1) normal failure and interactive complexity; (2) failures in warnings, faulty risk perception, and foresight, and (3) breakdowns in vigilance (Seeger et al., 2003, p. 12).

Normal accident theory (NAT) describes the ways in which normal, routine failures may lead to catastrophic crises. Developed by the sociologist Charles Perrow (1984), NAT emphasizes the interactive complexity that develops around larger scale socio-technical systems. Large systems, particularly those built on industrial or even societal scales, typically are technologically intense and create very high levels of complexity. The east coast electrical blackout of 2003 involved the interaction of environmental conditions (a very hot day and peak demand), inadequate maintenance in the form of tree trimming, a software bug, operator error, and an electrical grid that was highly integrated. The result was a loss of power to 55 million people in eight U.S. states and in Ontario, Canada. Perrow (1984) notes that failures such as these are characterized by interactivity and tight coupling. Interactivity simply means that one system, or subsystem, impacts another. In the case of the blackout, peak demand and hot weather caused transmission lines to expand and come into contact with trees that had not been trimmed. When systems become overly complex, managers cannot anticipate these interactions. Most so-called natural disasters (floods, hurricanes, tornadoes) involve the interaction of natural phenomena with human systems (dams, levees, building codes and housing developments). Tight coupling occurs when there is “no slack or buffer between two items” (Perrow, 1984, p. 90). Managers thus have little time or ability to correct failures. Quite literally, there is no room for error. Perrow’s work has been highly influential to the development of crisis theory. Among other things, his work predicts that as society becomes more complex, more crises will occur. Thus, accidents are becoming increasingly normal. FEMA reports that federal disaster declarations have been steadily increasing since 1953. In 1953, there were only 13 such declarations, yet 2011 saw 99 declarations, the highest ever recorded (FEMA, 2013).

A second but related view of crises posits that they are caused by failures in warnings, faulty risk perception, and inadequate foresight. This view follows the logic that when a risk or threat can be anticipated, it can be avoided. Turner (1976), for example, suggested a crisis is an “intelligence failure” or a “failure in foresight” (p. 381). Risks are often poorly understood or poorly communicated. Sometimes the signals of an impending crisis are not accurately interpreted or not assembled in ways that allow managers to connect the dots. Many crises, such as the Bhopal, Indiana/Union Carbide disaster, the New Orleans/Hurricane Katrina crisis, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the Flint water crisis can all be understood as failures to perceive, understand, or appropriately communicate risks.

A third view of crisis cause suggests these events occur when vigilance breaks down. This view of cause was initially popularized by the concept of groupthink developed by Janis (1972). According to this theory, decision systems, such as small groups, sometimes develop pressures to conform and reach consensus and a sense of invulnerability that reduces their ability to critically evaluate information and assess risk. Faulty decision making characterizes many crises, including the collapse of Enron and the 1986 Challenger Shuttle disaster. These faculty decisions systems and breakdowns in vigilance are often reflected in what Clarke (1999) described as fantasy planning. Disaster plans are often based on wildly optimistic assumptions and have little hope of actually working. Clarke characterizes such plans as rhetorical documents designed primarily to convince publics that technologies are safe and that appropriate precautions have been taken.

Although there is general consensus about what constitutes a crisis, there is almost always debate about what and who caused a crisis. Issues of causality are related to responsibility, accountability, and often liability. Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 10, strategic portrayals of blame, cause, and responsibility tend to dominate the discourse following a crisis. It is also important to recognize that the term carries considerable semantic weight and thus is used strategically to call attention to issues. Defining an issue as a crisis means that action must be taken in response and resources should be made available. Sometimes there is public disagreement regarding whether a situation constitutes a crisis, with advocates hoping to make the issue part of the public agenda precisely because it is a crisis.