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1This is according to a subsequent Ukrainian MoD report. See Anton Lavrov and Alexey Nikoslky, “Neglect and Rot: Degradation of Ukraine’s Military in the Interim Period,” in Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine, edited by Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov, 65–72 (Minneapolis, MN: East View Press, 2015).

2For details, see our final report: Olga Oliker, Lynn E. Davis, Keith Crane, Andrew Radin, Celeste Ward Gventer, Susanne Sondergaard, James T. Quinlivan, Stephan B. Seabrook, Jacopo Bellasio, Bryan Frederick, Andriy Bega, and Jakub P. Hlavka, Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1475-1.html.

3See Andrew Radin, “The Limits of State Building: The Politics of War and the Ideology of Peace” (PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012); and Andrew Radin, “Domestic Opposition and the Timing of Democratic Transitions after War,” Security Studies 26, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 93–123.

4See Adriana Lins de Albuquerque and Jakob Hedenskog, “Ukraine: A Defence Sector Reform Assessment,” Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), 2015, https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4157--SE; and Oksana Bedratenko, “More Proof Ukraine Is Changing: Opaque Defense Sector Embraces Reform,” October 26, 2016, https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/oksana-bedratenko-proof-ukraine-changing-opaque-defense-sector-embraces-reform.html?cn-reloaded=1.

5“Ukraine to Take into Account RAND Corporation’s Recommendations during Defense Ministry Reform,” Interfax-Ukraine October 24, 2015, http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/298483.html.

6Isabelle Facon, “Reforming Ukrainian Defense: No Shortage of Challenges,” Institut Français des Relations Internationales, May 2017, https://www.frstrategie.org/web/ documents/publications/autres/2017/2017-facon-ifri-reforming- ukrainian-defense.pdf, 23–24.

7See Bedratenko, “More Proof Ukraine Is Changing.”

8On the role of institutions in the maintenance of peace, see Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth, Building States to Build Peace (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008). On the role of governing institutions, democracy, and peace, see Benjamin Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies,” Democratization 13, no. 5 (2006): 811–27; Philip G. Roeder and Donald S. Rothchild, Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); and Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007). Call and Stanley emphasize the importance of the police as the largest security force and the one with the greatest interaction with citizens. Charles T. Call and William Stanley, “Protecting the People: Public Security Choices after Civil Wars,” Global Governance 7, no. 2 (April 1, 2001): 151–72. Skendaj makes a similar assessment of which state institutions are most valuable for study. He identifies four “core state functions” and corresponding state bureaucracies: extraction and boundary maintenance (associated with the customs service), coercion (associated with the police), executive (associated with the central administration and corresponding to my analysis of central government institutions), and legal order (associated with the judicial system). Elton Skendaj, Creating Kosovo: International Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 14.

9See Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown, 2012), chap. 3. In other work, they define political institutions as “the social and political arrangements that allocate de jure political power” and offer the example of a political institution as “an electoral rule that gives the right to decide fiscal policies to the party that obtains 51 percent of the vote.” Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 21–22.

10Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 450.

11“Institutional Capacity Building,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency website (n.d.), https://www.dsca.mil/programs/institutional-programs.

12The 2017 National Security Strategy states, “We will help our partners develop and responsibly employ the capacity to degrade and maintain persistent pressure against terrorists and will encourage partners to work independently of U.S. assistance.” Similarly, the 2018 National Defense Strategy proposes building “a capable alliance and partnership network.” White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, 11; see also Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf, 4.

13Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget,” February 2018, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/ defbudget/fy2019/ Security_Cooperation_Budget_Display_OUSDC.pdf, 3. US doctrine and policy analysis describe efforts to help partners using various overlapping terms, such as security assistance, security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and building partner capacity. Security cooperation is usually the most inclusive. See, inter alia, Derek S. Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016); and Taylor P. White, “Security Cooperation: How It All Fits,” Joint Forces Quarterly 72, no. 1 (2014): 106–8.

14The World Bank’s International Development Association, for example, “works with ministries, agencies, and departments of the executive branch on managing public institutions and finances. On broader governance issues, IDA works with the legislative and judicial branches and other institutions that promote public accountability and greater engagement with society.” See World Bank, “The ABCs of IDA—Governance and Institution Building,” http://ida.worldbank.org/results/abcs/abcs-ida-governance-and-institution-building.

15On peace building, see Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). Nation building in this context refers not to efforts to create a national identity but to efforts to “use military force to underpin a process of democratization.” James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, and Anga R. Timilsina, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 1; and Jeremi Suri, Liberty’s Surest Guardian: Rebuilding Nations after War from the Founders to Obama (New York: Free Press, 2012). On state building, see Paul D. Miller, Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898–2012 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

16See Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, 46; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90; Paul Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003); Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Marina Ottaway, “Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States,” Development and Change 33, no. 5 (November 1, 2002): 1001–23; and Call and Wyeth, Building States to Build Peace.

17UN Security Council, “No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” S/2001/394, New York, April 20, 2001, para 10.

18Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

19James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” International Security 28, no. 4 (2004): 5–43; Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Stephen D. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” International Security 29, no. 2 (October 1, 2004): 85–120; and Chester A. Crocker, “Engaging Failing States,” Foreign Affairs 82 (2003): 32.

20See, for example, Kenneth Pollack, “We Need to Begin Nation-Building in Syria Right Now,” New Republic, September 24, 2014, https://newrepublic.com/article/119556/obamas-syria-strategy-must-include-nation-building. Jeremy Suri writes that Americans are “a nation-building people” and observes that American’s commitment to building a democratic nation-state at home has ineluctably led them toward nation-building abroad. Suri, Liberty’s Surest Guardian, 1–9.

21By examining reforms within Kosovo, Elton Skendaj also examines institution-level reforms rather than intervention-level outcomes. Skendaj, Creating Kosovo, 3.

22See, inter alia, Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); Fukuyama, Origins of Political Order; Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.

23Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 320. See also Jason Brownlee, “Can America Nation-Build?,” World Politics 59, no. 2 (2007): 314–40; and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective,” Center for Global Development, April 2005, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.997377.

24Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

25Another group of works offers normative suggestions for what types of institutions foreign actors should build to achieve positive outcomes, including recommending specific electoral systems or suggestions of best practices for what form institution should take. Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics”; Roeder and Rothchild, Sustainable Peace; David A. Lake, The Statebuilder’s Dilemma: On the Limits of Foreign Intervention (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 15–16; and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD, 2007).

26For example, Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace; and Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building.

27Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, chaps. 3, 4, and 7; Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay, chaps. 4 and 11; and Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Ruesche-meyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169–91.

28Brownlee, “Can America Nation-Build?”; Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 38–39.

29William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin, 2007); and Fukuyama, State-Building, 139.

30Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 5–53.

31Michael Barnett, Songying Fang, and Christoph Zürcher, “Compromised Peacebuilding,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September 1, 2014): 609.

32Christoph Zürcher, Carrie Manning, Kristie Evenson, Rachel Hayman, Sarah Riese, and Nora Roehner, Costly Democracy: Peacebuilding and Democratization after War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 29. Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker also describe how the divergent interests between the United States and elites in partner countries can undermine security force assistance, but they do not explore in detail how particular local interests lead to different forms of opposition. “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1–2 (February 23, 2018): 89–142.

33Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

34Astri Suhrke writes, “[The concept of local ownership] in itself accentuates the external origin of the programmes; local ownership clearly means ‘their’ ownership of ‘our’ ideas, rather than the other way around.” Astri Suhrke, “Reconstruction as Modernisation: The ‘Post-Conflict’ Project in Afghanistan,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 7 (2007): 1292; see also Timothy Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes,” Peace & Change 34, no. 1 (January 2009): 3–26.

35For example, Philippe Leroux-Martin, Diplomatic Counterinsurgency: Lesson from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Louis-Alexandre Berg, “From Weakness to Strength: The Political Roots of Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” International Peacekeeping 21, no. 2 (2014): 149–64; Stefanie Wodrig and Julia Grauvogel, “Talking Past Each Other: Regional and Domestic Resistance in the Burundian Intervention Scene,” Cooperation and Conflict 51, no. 3 (September 2016): 272–90; and James D. Savage, Reconstructing Iraq’s Budgetary Institutions: Coalition Statebuilding after Saddam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

36See, for example, Berg, “From Weakness to Strength”; and Skendaj, Creating Kosovo. While Skendaj studies specific institution-building efforts, he predicts that building effective state institutions is more successful when international missions “insulate public administration from political and societal influences” and that “democracy is enhanced through international support of public participation and contestation.” His argument about state institutions is contrary to my domestic opposition theory—by insulating state institutions from societal influences, institution builders ignore domestic political concerns and risk domestic opposition. I contrast our arguments in chapter 3 in analyzing the development of central government institutions in Kosovo.

37See also Pellumb Kelmendi and Andrew Radin, “UNsatisfied? Public Support for Post-Conflict International Missions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 5 (May 2018): 983–1011.

38See Lisa Gross, Peacebuilding and Post-War Transitions: Assessing the Impact of External-Domestic Interactions (New York: Routledge, 2017); and Skendaj, Creating Kosovo.

39For example, Christopher Paul and colleagues emphasize the importance of the alignment of aims of the US and partner nations for security cooperation but does not examine how shifting US objectives influence this alignment of interests. Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, and Christine Leah, What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and under What Circumstances? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 38–39.

40Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy, 148–50.

41Barnett, Fang, and Zürcher, “Compromised Peacebuilding,” 616–17.

42Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace; Paris, At War’s End, 55; Lake, Statebuilder’s Dilemma; and Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building.

43For example, Fukuyama, drawing on the work of Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock, finds the goal of foreign state builders is “getting to Denmark,” “a mythical place that is known to have good political and economic institutions.” Fukuyama, Origins of Political Order, 14–16; and Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock, “Solutions When the Solution Is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development,” World Development 32, no. 2 (2004): 192–93. See also Colin Jackson, “Government in a Box: Counter-Insurgency, State Building, and the Technocratic Conceit” in The New Counterinsurgency Era in Critical Perspective, ed. Celeste Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones, and Michael Lawrence Rowan Smith (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 82–110.

44This definition of effectiveness draws on Fukuyama’s definition of “governance as a government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not.” Francis Fukuyama, “What Is Governance?,” Governance 26, no. 3 (July 1, 2013): 350.

45Accountability is closely associated with the concept of “democratic” institutions but is intended to include a broader sense of whether institutions reflect the interest of the entirety of society rather than just the majority.

46There is also debate about how the sequencing of these objectives—for example, some claim that effective institutions should be built before elections are held. See, e.g., Paris, At War’s End; Miller, Armed State Building; and Thomas Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 (2007): 12–27.

47For example, Marina Ottaway writes, “For the international community, rebuilding institutions in collapsed states means organizing government departments and public agencies to discharge their functions both efficiently and democratically, following models found in Weberian states.” Ottaway, “Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States,” 1003–4. See also Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958).

48Roland Paris, “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice,’” Review of International Studies 28, no. 4 (2002): 638.

49Pritchett and Woolcock observe that there is “a broad consensus on objectives” and on the “adjectives” associated with good institutions: “‘accountable,’ ‘sustainable,’ ‘responsive,’ and ‘transparent.’” Pritchett and Woolcock, “Solutions When the Solution Is the Problem,” 203–4. Institution-building efforts by non-Western organizations may have fundamentally different goals and methods, such as Russia’s institution-building efforts in the Donbass in Ukraine or Syria, or China’s engagement in Africa. See, e.g., David Dollar, China’s Engagement with Africa: From National Resources to Human Resources, Brookings Institution, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-engagement-with-africa-from-natural-resources-to-human-resources/; and Lance Davies, “Russia’s ‘Governance’ Approach: Intervention and the Conflict in the Donbas,” Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 4 (April 20, 2016): 726–49.

50Reveron, Exporting Security, 131–32.

51See also Paddy Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007), 27.

52Variation in the World Governance Indicators in other study countries was similarly small. World Bank, “World Governance Indicators” (2018), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home. Other measures tend to be highly correlated, such as in the case of the rule of law. Mila Versteeg and Tom Ginsburg, “Measuring the Rule of Law: A Comparison of Indicators,” Law & Social Inquiry 42, no. 1 (December 1, 2017): 100–137.

53Polity IV, for example, lists interruptions in BiH for the period of study and in Iraq from 2003 to 2009, and only codes Kosovo after 2008. Center for Systemic Peace, “INSCR Data Page” (2018), http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2017.xls. Freedom House’s “Freedom of the World” (2017) index does not specifically study effectiveness, accountability, and the rule of law; see https://freedomhouse.org/report/fiw-2017-table-country-scores.

54Cullen Hendrix notes a range of different metrics of state capacity, some with significant flaws, and observes that the validity of these metrics may vary across countries with different export profiles and levels of development. Similarly, there is extensive criticism of the various available cross-national indicators of democracy. Cullen Hendrix, “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 3 (2010): 273–85. See also Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Steven Fish, Allen Hicken, Matthew Kroenig, Staffan I. Lindberg, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Holli A. Semetko, Svend-Erik Skanning, Jeffrey Staton, and Jan Teorell, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach,” Perspectives on Politics 9, no. 2 (2011): 247–67; and “Indicators of Governance and Institutional Quality” (n.d.), http://siteresources.worldbank.org /INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/ IndicatorsGovernanceandInstitutionalQuality.pdf.

55This selection is similar to the “folk Bayesian” approach identified by Timothy McKeown. See Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), chap. 9.

56In the course of recounting the events of the reform effort, the case studies describe details or data points or “causal process observations” that offer evidence in support or opposition to the proposed process hypotheses of the different theories. See James Mahoney, “After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research,” World Politics 62, no. 1 (2010): 125–29; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), chap. 10; and Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry. For an application of process tracing in studying state building, see Oisín Tansey, “Evaluating the Legacies of State-Building: Success, Failure, and the Role of Responsibility,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 1 (March 2014): 175–77.

57See George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, chap. 8.

58All interviews cited below were conducted by the author. Where I cite interviews conducted by others, I cite the work in which they are quoted or described.

59See James Dobbins, Seth Jones, Benjamin Runkle, and Siddharth Mohandas, Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009).