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The domestic opposition theory expects that when there is a threat to the patron-client networks of the ruling elite, reforms will fail to make improvements unless moderate or high levels of international resources are present. If such resources are present, the ultimate improvement in state institutions is expected to be modest at best (Hypothesis 2). As for nationalist goals, I specify process hypotheses for how the theory expects this outcome to occur (see table 2.3).

When reform threatens the patron-client networks of the ruling elite, the theory expects these elites to engage in private opposition, meaning concealed, denied, or other nonpublic efforts to undermine reform (Hypothesis 2A). Public opposition is expected to be more effective, but elites may not be able to rally public opposition because their patron-client networks tend to be unpopular, so reforms that threaten elites’ networks often have public support (Hypothesis 2B). Elites find it more difficult to sway public opinion by using patron-client networks than by using nationalist appeals because patron-client networks typically benefit a relatively small portion of the population, often at the expense of the larger society. Surveys indicate frustration with corruption in post-conflict societies or other societies where foreign actors pursue reform.⁵¹ Analysts in Bosnia and Kosovo, for example, also observe that many people in these societies support outside intervention in part because they hope foreign actors will strengthen anticorruption initiatives, prosecute senior officials for criminal activities, or strengthen the police to enable them to address high-level criminality.⁵² Even if they lack broad public support, in some cases elites may still attempt to publicly oppose reform by voicing their objections or by rallying small-scale protests. These activities are unlikely to be effective since foreign actors will not perceive broad support for elite opposition and may in some cases view such opposition as an attempt to defend networks associated with illicit or criminal activities.

TABLE 2.3. Hypotheses Given a Threat to the Ruling Elites’ Patron-Client Networks

Outcome

Process

H2: No significant improvements unless moderate or high international resources are present. If such resources are present, modest improvements are likely.

H2A: Elites may attempt public opposition, but it is unlikely to be effective. Elites will mainly use private opposition. H2B: Public opinion is expected to support or not strongly oppose reform. H2C: Private opposition involves delay, theft, and informal co-optation of state institutions. H2D: Techniques specified by international resource theory can mitigate the impact of private opposition to some degree.

Some elites may have larger networks that can reach more people within a society. However, as elite networks grow, the average benefits provided to individuals within the networks become smaller and less likely to motivate individual participation in public protests. In smaller societies where patron-client networks dominate the state and the economy, such as neopatrimonial regimes, patronage networks may be relatively more influential.⁵³ In such societies it may be easier for elites to rally broad public protests, as observed in the case of patronage-linked protests in Timor-Leste (see chapter 4). Nevertheless, the theory expects nationalist appeals to be generally more effective at swaying public opinion than elites’ use of their networks.

Elite private opposition can occur through at least three mechanisms: delay, theft, or co-optation (Hypothesis 2C). For each of these mechanisms elites make use of their networks within the target state institution. The intensity and tactics that elites use to oppose reform may vary across the different foreign demands or recommendations, depending on the threat posed to their networks and their ability to block reform. Similarly, if there is variation in the intensity of foreign efforts to undermine elite networks in different regions, issue areas, or echelons of an institution, elites are expected to engage in greater private opposition in areas where there is the greatest threat.

Delay tactics are one easy way for domestic elites to limit the impact of foreign reform. Officials may ignore foreign requests, seek more time to comply, or be purposefully absent. The presence of foreign trainers or advisers is expensive and therefore time limited, while domestic officials will remain in control for the indefinite future. For example, one foreign account explained that Iraqi officials used the expression “they have the watches, we have the time. Translation: the Americans (like the British and others) will be here for a while and then be gone; be patient, we will frustrate and exhaust them, and we will have our country to ourselves.”⁵⁴ Delay tactics are especially effective when foreign officials rapidly rotate since newly deployed foreign officials often have little information about what has been achieved or agreed on in the past. Over multiple years, delay tactics may convince foreign actors to curtail or abandon their reform goals and spend their limited resources elsewhere.

Elites may also oppose reform by extracting resources from state institutions. This may include siphoning off payrolls, engaging in contract fraud, or even stealing equipment or arms. For example, “ghost payrolls,” in which more individuals are paid than those who actually work, is a persistent problem in Afghanistan and other societies.⁵⁵ Theft degrades the capabilities of the state institution that foreign actors seek to support, and it reallocates international resources to local actors.

Elites can also co-opt or politicize a state institution. Elites may influence recruitment or promotion decisions, ensure the selection of loyal officials to senior positions, or build informal organizations under their personal control within state institutions. In Iraq, for example, as discussed in chapter 5, Badr militia groups seized control of the Ministry of Interior and developed militias outside of official control within the Iraqi police. In Kosovo, international officials observed that elites had personal relationships with judges and prosecutors and could prevent prosecution of their supporters.⁵⁶ As in the case of theft, co-optation and politicization can redirect state institutions to fulfill the private interests of elites, undermining accountability and the rule of law.

The theory expects that, where moderate or high levels of international resources are present, the impact of private opposition can be mitigated and at least some meaningful improvement can be achieved (Hypothesis 2D). Reform threatening the ruling elites’ patron-client networks creates a competition between foreign actors who use the techniques specified by the international resource theory (described below) to pursue reform and elites who use various means of private opposition. Resources to address elite obstruction may include a powerful mandate that enables the removal or sanction of elites, a high-functioning bureaucracy that can coordinate across foreign organizations and make swift decisions, and sufficient money and personnel to observe the functioning of state institutions. Gerard Toal and Carl Dahlman, for example, show how domestic officials in Bosnia were able to delay and disrupt minority return, in part by ignoring internationally backed decrees and laws. They write that the international community in Bosnia was eventually able to achieve greater minority return thanks to increased authority to remove politicians and pass laws, improved coordination between international organizations, and more personnel in areas where return was happening.⁵⁷

There are two factors that limit foreign-supported reform in the face of private opposition, even when high international resources are present. First, foreign actors ultimately rely on domestic officials to run state institutions. So long as domestic officials are involved, there is likely some means for ruling elites to use their networks to block reform. All contemporary foreign interventions involve some form of “indirect rule,” meaning that foreign reformers exercise influence through local officials and that domestic officials are ultimately responsible for providing most state services.⁵⁸ Even in well-resourced missions in Germany, Japan, and Kosovo, domestically recruited police were quickly substituted for foreign-provided officers.⁵⁹ And liberal, Western-led interventions generally assume that authority and governance will eventually be transferred to domestic actors.⁶⁰

Second, foreign actors have limited local knowledge, meaning that they lack a detailed understanding of how a state institution or society operates.⁶¹ To counter private opposition, foreign actors must be able to distinguish it from normal bureaucratic friction. This requires identifying some details of elites’ networks; recognizing when and how elites attempt to co-opt or undermine state institutions; and attributing delays, missing equipment, or ineffectiveness to intentional obstruction. Few foreign officials have such local knowledge.⁶² In Kosovo, for example, observers noted that UN Mission in Kosovo officials were “remarkably incurious about the Kosovo Albanians.”⁶³ Another common challenge is that few foreign officials speak the local language and must instead communicate through a translator or depend on local officials’ foreign-language skills. Given inevitable gaps in local knowledge, the theory expects that the effectiveness of foreign reform facing private opposition will be modest.