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The previous sections specify the predictions of my domestic opposition theory, but domestic opposition is not the only factor that determines the process and outcome of reform. Specifying hypotheses for the two alternative theories is essential to understand how international resources and preexisting conditions shape and set the context for reform.

The international resources theory reflects the common belief that the stronger that foreign actors are, the more they are likely to achieve success. International resources may include anything that is provided by foreign actors, including troops, equipment, or money; more abstract resources such as the authority provided by the mission’s mandate; or bureaucratic resources such as planning, organizational learning, and interorganizational coordination. This section adapts arguments from the literature on intervention to the specific problem of institution building and identifies testable hypotheses for the case studies.

A core line of reasoning in the literature is that foreign missions can succeed when they have sufficient resources to overcome the problems present in a given society. The RAND series on nation building, for example, emphasizes that “among the controllable factors the most important determinant [of success] seems to be the level of effort—measured in time, manpower, and money.”⁶⁴ The authors of the series recognize the constraints posed by domestic conditions, such as the destructiveness of the war and the preexisting level of development, but believe that “resistance can be overcome, but only through a well-considered application of personnel and money over extended periods of time.”⁶⁵ Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis use a statistical model to demonstrate that the greater international authority (measured as strength of mandate) and the more money transferred to the target society, the better the expected outcome of peace-building missions.⁶⁶ Paul Miller similarly claims that sufficient and appropriate application of resources can correct problems with state institutions: “State builders should apply attention, resources, and effort to the parts of the state that are broken, and should apply more efforts the more broken the state is.”⁶⁷ The clear implication is that greater resources are expected to overcome preexisting problems and local resistance and thereby increase the effectiveness of intervention.⁶⁸

These and related works highlight how four key international resources can enable intervention success. I also draw from existing measures to categorize low, medium, and high levels of resources in each category.

The first and perhaps most important resource is the mandate of a foreign mission. The mandate not only specifies the goals and authority of a mission but, as Doyle and Sambanis write, is also a “proxy for the mission’s strength, its technical and military capabilities, and the level of international commitment.”⁶⁹ Drawing from Miller, I identify three categories of mandates as low, medium, and high, respectively: monitor, which includes observing and reporting on events; train and equip, which includes a range of activities to strengthen state institutions; and administer, which involves a foreign actor directly exercising executive authority over the target society.⁷⁰ The mandate for an intervention or institution-building effort is typically decided prior to its deployment and may be formalized in a UN Security Council resolution, legislation, or an executive decision. One reason that mandates are significant is because Western institution builders are typically constrained by law. Although Western institution builders or military forces may at times exceed their legal authority, such violations are the exception rather than the rule.⁷¹

A second critical resource is personnel. Missions need skilled leadership and qualified staff. Civilian personnel with experience working in a foreign cultural environment may have greater success as advisers, trainers, or mentors. The literature emphasizes the need for troops and police proportionate to the size of the relevant society. Drawing from the average number of personnel deployed during the first year of eight past peace missions, Dobbins and his coauthors estimate future requirements based on a ratio of thirteen foreign soldiers per one thousand inhabitants.⁷² I use this ratio as a proxy for overall personnel resources and use Dobbins and colleagues’ proposed requirements as an indicator of medium personnel resources. I assess personnel resources as high when the ratio of troops to inhabitants is greater and low when the ratio is smaller. Ultimately, the absence of international troops can weaken the international community’s hand in enforcing its will on domestic officials. Philippe Leroux-Martin notes, for example, how a small international troop presence limited the international community’s options in imposing laws against the opposition of BiH Serb leader Milorad Dodik (see chapter 5).⁷³

The third resource is money. Interventions are expensive. Dobbins and colleagues estimate that in a hypothetical country of 5 million people, total costs for a “heavy” peace enforcement mission will be approximately $15.6 billion per year, compared with only $1.5 billion for a “light” peace enforcement mission.⁷⁴ More money permits paying additional foreign personnel, reconstructing basic infrastructure, encouraging economic development, and funding nascent state institutions. Annual per capita development assistance averaged $231 in the first two years in ten major post-conflict missions (in 2000 dollars).⁷⁵ Although the needs of societies vary, this figure is useful as a rough proxy of a medium level of financial resources, with low and high financial resources assessed accordingly. This estimate does not, however, include spending for foreign troops and police—each American or other Western soldier costs approximately $200,000 per year, and each police officer $155,000 per year.⁷⁶

The fourth resource is bureaucratic capacity, which includes the interactions within and between the foreign organizations that collaborate in reform efforts. The literature considers at least three elements of bureaucratic capacity—planning, coordination, and organizational learning. The case studies assess bureaucratic resources as high if there were no significant reports of problems with bureaucratic capacity in these areas, medium if some problems were visible, and low if participants highlighted bureaucratic problems as a perceived cause of failure.

Planning failures are often identified as a cause of failed intervention. In preparing for its mission in Timor-Leste, for example, UN planners were reportedly told to “take the Kosovo plan and reconfigure it for East Timor,” despite the clear differences between these countries.⁷⁷ The problems in the planning for the Timor-Leste mission led to the slow deployment of UN officials and hurt the mission’s ability to incorporate Timorese views into the mission’s activities. In Iraq, flaws in the planning process for the postwar stabilization phase are also believed to have undermined the development of governance.⁷⁸ Planning failures appear to stem most often from flawed assumptions, dysfunctional organizations, or political circumstances, although a shortage of available personnel may also play a role.

Unity of effort is another component of bureaucratic capacity. There are either multiple organizations with different mandates that comprise an intervention or there may be a single organization composed of suborganizations.⁷⁹ When these organizations do not coordinate—or, worse, actively disagree—intervention outcomes are expected to suffer. Domestic actors may be able to play different organizations against one another, and disagreeing organizations may inefficiently allocate resources to tasks or adopt tasks that are poorly suited to their own capabilities.⁸⁰ Deployed international organizations must also coordinate with states and international organizations outside of the mission. One way to address coordination problems is to alter the formal structure of the organizations deployed on the ground, such as by centralizing control over different international organizations, as was attempted in the case of Kosovo.⁸¹ Even when there is a single hierarchy of civilian organizations, in many interventions, including Kosovo, there is also a separate military command structure, which tends to produce coordination problems between the civilian and military efforts. Changes in leadership may also improve coordination. Arguably, Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia from 2002 to 2006, was more able to coordinate international organizations than his predecessors and successors (see chapters 4 and 5).

A final component of bureaucratic capacity is organizational learning. Lise Morjé Howard writes that peacekeeping success depends on organization learning, as indicated by an organization’s ability to gather information, coordinate internally, engage with the environment, and exercise leadership.⁸² Similarly, Thorsten Benner and his coauthors observe that, to succeed, “the UN Peace operations apparatus had to transform itself into a ‘learning organization,’ ”—in other words, adapt its structure to respond to changing circumstances.⁸³