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Political mobilization in defense of nationalist goals is an underappreciated factor influencing the outcome of foreign-supported institution building. Public opposition based on the threat of reform to nationalist goals is a bottom-up process that may involve both elites and the mass population but that is fundamentally driven by the popularity of nationalism among the population of a society. Because of the power of popular mobilization, my theory sees nationalist goals as an upper limit for what reform efforts can achieve.

Nationalism refers to the idea that a specific group should govern a territory.¹³ In societies where nationalism is politically important, individuals within the society tend to associate themselves with one or more identifiable “groups” distinguished by a “salient political cleavage” within their society.¹⁴ Elites and political parties in these societies often compete for support within their particular group.¹⁵ For example, postwar Bosnia was, and perhaps remains, an “ethnocracy”: there were three main groups—Bosnian Muslim, Croat, and Serb—each with their associated political parties, and political competition focused on the identity and relative political position of these three groups.¹⁶ In some cases, such as the Shia or Sunnis of Iraq, groups may not seek independence within a territory but may have beliefs for how a shared state is governed, such as seeking a dominant position or minimum representation for their group.¹⁷ I include these sentiments as part of nationalism since they amount to a group-based vision for the governance of a society. Nationalism can also be politically important in societies without strongly defined ethnic groups. In Timor-Leste, there was only one main group after 1999, as supporters of Indonesia had largely fled. Nevertheless, the nationalist discourse of the achievement of independence remained politically important.¹⁸

The importance of nationalist goals in explaining institution building depends on a scope condition: whether or not nationalism is politically important in the relevant society. This condition is met in some but by no means all societies where foreign actors pursue institution building. In societies where there is little history or likelihood of popular mobilization around group identities, this element of the theory is unlikely to explain the process or outcome of reform. In neopatrimonial societies where patronage relationships dominate politics, for example, group identity may be more important for structuring patron-client networks than as a means of mass mobilization, and mass mobilization in response to a threat to nationalist goals may be unlikely.¹⁹

Scholars have noted several reasons for the political importance of nationalism, including the specific history of political and economic modernization, the mobilizing role of elites, and a history of violent conflict. While nationalist leaders may claim that ethnic identities go far back in history, scholars have traced the origins of nationalism in many countries to processes associated with economic and political modernization that occurred in the eighteenth to early twentieth centuries, including mass literacy, industrialization, and the rise of widely distributed media.²⁰ Many works also highlight how elite rhetoric and competition reinforce nationalist ideas and show that elite participation is an essential part of nationalist mobilization.²¹

A recent experience of war often leads to an increase in the political importance of nationalism. Carrie Manning, for example, observes that many political parties emerging from wartime into the postwar period continue to use “war-time packages of collective incentives,” meaning appeals that include reference to general wartime objectives, depending on whether the “major war-time cleavage remains relevant in the post-war political arena.”²² Elizabeth Wood explains how individuals’ experience of war or violence can influence the lasting development of particular political beliefs through mechanisms such as the military recruitment of individuals into rebel groups.²³ Laia Balcells documents in the case of Spain that experiences of victimization are often socialized into subsequent generations, which can lead wartime identities to have a long-standing political impact.²⁴ Roger Petersen argues that the experience of violence may create emotional residues that create a resource for subsequent political mobilization.²⁵ When many individuals identify with nationalist beliefs and elites begin to depend on nationalist identities for political power, it becomes very difficult for foreign actors to diminish the importance of nationalism.

To understand whether a reform threatens nationalist goals, it is first necessary to identify the dominant nationalist goals for the relevant groups. Nationalist goals refer to the minimum political objectives associated with a group’s nationalist aspirations. Identifying these goals is not always straightforward since individuals within groups have varying political objectives. Some individuals may espouse more radical preferences for secession or takeover of the central government, while more moderate individuals may seek improved political representation or greater autonomy. The balance of radical and moderate preferences may shift over time. Each of the case studies in chapters 3 through 6 analyzes the history of the society, elite discourse, and surveys (where possible) to map the nationalist beliefs of the key groups within the society. From this analysis, the case studies identify the dominant nationalist goals, meaning the minimum goals that were most consistently articulated by the group’s leaders and backed by the members of the group (summarized in table 2.1). These assessments are meant to distinguish widely shared nationalist goals that, if challenged, would generate widespread popular unrest from the more fringe goals, which are likely to inspire a smaller reaction.

The case studies then evaluate the threat to nationalist goals by considering whether foreign demands or recommendations, if implemented, would undermine the relevant groups’ nationalist goals or make them unachievable. For example, a reform effort may threaten nationalist goals by eliminating local control over a police force, which would undermine an institution critical to regional autonomy. Demands may also threaten nationalist goals by requiring changes to the constitution that would reduce ethnic dominance or autonomy. Finally, as in Kosovo, foreign actors who exercise temporary sovereignty over a territory may threaten nationalist goals by indefinitely delaying the territory’s self-governance. Some members of a group may claim for political reasons that foreign demands or recommendations threaten nationalist goals even if there is little threat. Determining which foreign demands or recommendations actually threaten a group’s dominant nationalist goals inevitably involves some subjective judgment, so the case studies seek to be as transparent as possible in their assessments. Where there is uncertainty, the analysis errs on the side of not identifying a threat.

TABLE 2.1. Dominant Nationalist Goals of the Major Groups in the Case Studies

a Because East Timor was a case of successful secession, there were no group divides in the post-conflict political arrangement.

b As discussed in chapter 6, while there were linguistic and social divisions in Ukraine, including around the usage of the Russian language, there were not clearly delineated or stable groups, and pro-Ukrainian nationalism strengthened throughout the country after 2014. See Fedorenko, Rybiy, and Umland, “The Ukrainian Party System before and after the 2013–2014 Euromaidan,” 624.

Many works observe that nationalist goals are an obstacle to peace because they offer a motivation or means for elites to obstruct international efforts. For example, Stephen Stedman describes how elites may “spoil” peace processes depending on their interests and capabilities.²⁶ Similarly, Zürcher and his coauthors observe that elites may have the primary objective of ethnic dominance or independence, objectives that I refer to as nationalist goals, and they claim these may be threatened by the development of democracy.²⁷ As mentioned in chapter 1, few works recognize that elite pursuit of nationalist goals reflects the widespread popularity of nationalist goals and that popular support for nationalist goals plays a bottom-up role in blocking reform, as I discuss next.