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The domestic opposition theory expects that a reform that threatens a major group’s nationalist goals will have an outcome of little or no improvement in the quality of the state institution (Hypothesis 1).²⁸ Below I specify several process hypotheses for how the theory expects that this outcome could occur (see table 2.2). The more that the process of given reform effort follows these predictions, the more that the domestic opposition theory offers insight for that particular reform. The outcome hypotheses are numbered 1–6, while the process predictions are numbered based on the associated outcome prediction (e.g., H1A, H1B, . . . , H2A, H2B).

When a reform effort threatens nationalist goals, the theory expects elites and the mass population to engage in public opposition, meaning open and unconcealed efforts to stop or undermine reform (Hypothesis 1A). Public opposition can undermine reform by convincing the foreign actor that the population opposes reform, that the demands or recommendations associated with a reform are illegitimate, and that the reform should therefore be abandoned or altered. While there is an extensive literature on the role of public demonstrations in political change, there is relatively limited focus on the role of public demonstrations against the international community.²⁹

TABLE 2.2. Hypotheses Given a Threat to Nationalist Goals

Outcome

Process

H1: Little or no improvement in the quality of state institutions.

H1A: There is widespread and recurring public opposition in the form of elite objections or mass demonstrations. H1B: Within the group whose nationalist goals are threatened, public satisfaction toward the mission or reform will decline. H1C: Widespread and recurring elite objections convince foreign actors that if they persist with their demands or recommendations, the state institution they seek to build will not be effective or legitimate. H1D: Widespread and recurring public demonstrations create cognitive dissonance with foreign reformers’ belief in popular sovereignty. H1E: The desire to avoid threatening nationalist goals can make foreign reformers preemptively adjust their demands or recommendations.

Public opposition depends on the attitudes and behavior of both the mass population and the elites but may be executed by either actor. Elites execute public opposition primarily through elite objections, in which they voice their opposition to reform in public speeches or written statements, media appearances, discussions with foreign officials, or votes against legislation. Public opinion often motivates elites to object to a reform and makes elite objections more credible. The mass population can also execute public opposition through mass demonstrations, including protests, rallies, or riots where the intent of the demonstration is to oppose the foreign actor or a specific reform effort. Elites often have a role in setting the stage for or responding to mass demonstrations, but actions by non-elites are what characterizes mass demonstrations.

The relative threat of nationalist goals influences the size and scale of public opposition, which in turn determines whether this opposition will be effective. In cases where reform threatens nationalist goals, public opposition becomes widespread and recurring, and therefore compelling to foreign reformers. Large-scale public opposition depends on the interaction between mass attitudes and elite behavior. Elites compete with one another, so they have a strong incentive to gain support by opposing unpopular reform threatening nationalist goals. Elites may engage in “outbidding,” meaning the adoption of increasingly extreme positions to compete for leadership within their group, resulting in an overall cascade of elites voicing more radical, pronationalist views. The literature on nationalist mobilization and ethnic violence explains that elite outbidding, in combination with popular sentiment opposing reform, enables and encourages large-scale mass demonstrations.³⁰ As the literature on civil resistance explains, larger public protests are usually more effective in creating political change.³¹ Elite outbidding also can create an elite consensus that makes it difficult for foreign actors to find popular elites who support the reform. For example, in the case of the Shia in Iraq (discussed in chapter 3), an elite boycott emerged in which the leading Shia officials refused to accept the CPA’s demands, and the CPA was forced to compromise. Absent a threat to nationalist goals, elites can still make statements or use their networks to organize small demonstrations, as discussed in the next section on patron-client networks. Small-scale demonstrations or elite objections that are not supported by public opinion are unlikely to be compelling to foreign reformers.

Public opinion can therefore be an important indicator of whether elite objections or mass demonstrations are indeed motivated by popular opposition to the reform effort. Hence, when reform threatens a group’s nationalist goals, public opinion within the group toward the mission or reform is expected to decline (Hypothesis 1B).

The occurrence or even potential for widespread and recurring public opposition can persuade foreign reformers to weaken or abandon reform through at least two different mechanisms. First, elite objections can convince foreign actors that if they persist with their demands or recommendations, the state institution they seek to reform will not be effective or legitimate (Hypothesis 1C). In the face of widespread elite objections, especially an elite boycott, foreign reformers may come to believe that few if any credible elites participate in the state institutions that the foreign actor seeks to create. Mass opinion plays a role in determining which elites are credible and in convincing interveners that an elite opposition is indeed representative of their views. To ensure the effectiveness and accountability of the state institutions they seek to build, foreign actors may decide to reconsider their demands or recommendations to encourage popular elites to participate in government, as occurred in Iraq following the Shia elite boycott in 2003.

Second, widespread and recurring mass demonstrations show foreign actors that continuing with the reform effort is incompatible with norms underpinning the intervention (Hypothesis 1D). As discussed earlier, Western interveners subscribe to liberal norms, including popular sovereignty, which is the idea that the citizens of a country should select and hold accountable those who rule the country.³² In the face of widespread and recurring mass demonstrations, foreign actors who believe in liberal norms therefore face facts that are incompatible with their beliefs—in other words, cognitive dissonance.³³ The theory expects that foreign officials can resolve their cognitive dissonance only by abandoning or reformulating the demands or recommendations that are provoking public opposition. In Kosovo, for example, as discussed in chapter 3, riots in 2004 convinced UN officials that their demands were not achievable, and the UN was forced to alter its demands to accommodate Kosovar Albanian concerns.

Nationalist goals can shape reform even when foreign actors do not actually make demands threatening these goals. As they develop and articulate their demands or recommendations, foreign actors may sense that their desired changes will trigger public opposition and adjust them accordingly (Hypothesis 1E). The absence of foreign demands or recommendations threatening nationalist goals therefore does not necessarily imply that nationalist goals are not important in shaping the outcome for foreign-supported reform.

The failure of reform due to public opposition is damaging in several ways. First, failed reform wastes the limited time and resources available to foreign interveners. Second, failure in the face of public opposition makes future reform more difficult. When foreign actors yield to public opposition and reduce their demands or recommendations, domestic elites may come to believe that interveners are not as committed to reform as they originally perceived. Everything else being equal, elites may therefore become more inclined to oppose foreign-supported reform. Indeed, the 2004 riots in Kosovo and public opposition to police reform in Bosnia from 2004 to 2007 reduced local perceptions of the credibility of the international community and thereby hurt the prospects for future reform, as detailed in chapters 3 and 5. Third, when public opposition makes foreign actors reformulate their desired changes, they may select new demands or recommendations that cause long-term problems for the society. For example, in Iraq, after the CPA was forced to accelerate its time line for elections in the face of public opposition, it selected a simple single-district electoral system rather than an electoral system designed to account for Iraq’s complex ethnic balance. This decision undermined Sunni support for future elections.³⁴

Nationalist goals play a powerful role in the politics of many societies where foreign actors pursue reform. This makes reforms threatening nationalist goals particularly unproductive because they provoke damaging domestic opposition. It is relatively rare for foreign actors to seek changes that threaten nationalist goals and thereby provoke public opposition, in part because foreign actors recognize the likely consequences. It may also be more common for foreign reformers with significant resources and influence to make demands that threaten nationalist goals than lower-resourced missions. Still, the potential for damaging public opposition makes it important to understand what happens when reform threatens nationalist goals.