Читать книгу The Putin Predicament - Bo Petersson - Страница 11

As indicated by the introductory quote, the problem of succession of leaders has been a vital concern for political analysts at least since the times of Machiavelli. That famous early political theorist opined that succession by election was preferable to succession by ancestry, and that leaders had to prove themselves worthy of being chosen by election. In a healthy republic, the successor would be elected on the grounds of merit and reputation (Gagné 2011). Machiavelli was, however, not very explicit about the ways in which new leaders would have to prove themselves worthy. Assessed by today’s standards, many contemporary observers would consider his recommendations objectionable since he argued that strong leaders, or in his parlance, princes, were those who were prepared to wage war. If the princes were not ready to do this, their city would become “effeminate and the prey of its neighbors” (Machiavelli 1996: I, 19, 52).

Later analysts have continued to grapple with the question of succession and how new generations of leaders are expected to grow with their offices and assume pride of place. Once there, they are in most cases likely to be reluctant to yield the reins of power to someone else. This seems to be close to a natural law in politics, or to use the words of two prominent analysts:

Political succession, or rather its avoidance, is at the heart of the decisions leaders make. Except for the rare incumbent who voluntarily steps down, leaders overwhelmingly act as if they want to hold on to power as long as they possibly can (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2017: 708).

From this perspective, executive power is something comparable to “my precious” from Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, enviously guarded by its temporary proprietor, always coveted by scheming potential competitors.

In democratic systems, the process of political succession is generally not that much of a problem, since constitutional frameworks and regular cycles of free and fair elections set limits to the rules of political leaders, regardless of whether they are committed and popular, or corrupted and generally estranged from their electorates. In the latter case, they will be more quickly voted out of office. As the saying goes, the rascals will be thrown out. In non-democratic settings, in authoritarian or hybrid systems like in Russia, things stand differently. Most often, there are constitutional frameworks in these systems too, but as practical experience has shown in Russia, constitutions may be altered or amended on the initiatives of the leader or their devout followers (Versteeg et al 2020, Baturo 2019, McKie 2019), and elections do not have the same decisive value and effect as they have in democratic political systems. However, without recourse to the regulating force of constitutional frameworks and regular, free and fair elections, processes of succession will still need to be dealt with somehow, some time, also in authoritarian and hybrid settings.

There will always be some friction in connection with processes of succession in such environments. The core problem is how to hand over power from one individual, government, or regime to another in such a way that “the momentary crisis of legitimacy which inevitably arises is reduced to manageable proportions” (Calvert 1987: 1). There is a need for rules or agreed procedures to make such transitions as smooth as possible, otherwise uncertainty and instability will prevail. Without institutional mechanisms or at least intra-elite agreements in place for how to appoint new leaders, there is a risk of regime fragmentation, infighting, or even civil war and collapse (Kokkonen and Sundell 2020, Stacher 2011). In the worst case, there may be a “Hobbesian struggle for a Leviathan state” (Gould-Davies 2021: 205).

The existence of rules of succession, defined as “clearly specified procedures that govern the transition from one leader to another” (Frantz and Stein 2017: 937) tends to prolong the life expectancy of authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Orderly procedures for implementing succession lower the risk of having contending elites organize coups to grab power (Ambrosio 2015). Nevertheless, even if a roadmap of sorts exists, there is no guarantee for its eventual use, nor that the charted course will ultimately prevail (Meng 2021).

One way to reduce uncertainty in phases of succession is to have an heir identified and appointed by the incumbent leader. For the incumbent there are certain risks involved in identifying a successor before the termination of their tenure in office. This is the so-called “succession dilemma” (Ambrosio 2015) or “crown prince problem” (Meng 2021). The “anointed successor” (du Boulay 2021) can represent both a barrier of protection and a threat to their mentor (Meng 2021, Konrad and Mui 2016). After having emerged as the heir, the crown prince will acquire a power base of their own and may use it to dethrone the incumbent ahead of time. This is what the vice president Aleksandr Rutskoy tried to do against President Boris Yeltsin back in the formative year of 1993 in Russia, and this experience is what accounts for the absence of a vice presidency to this day in Russia’s political architecture.

However, if loyal, the named successor will provide additional protection for the sitting president against potentially contending elites. The elites who support the incumbent are likely to be calmed by the relative certainty that the existence of an heir apparent provides. They are prone to continue to support the constellation in power, which in turn reinforces the position of the sitting leader (Meng 2021, Kokkonen and Sundell 2020).

The succession dilemma notwithstanding, the problems associated with naming a crown prince do not eclipse the necessity of safeguarding an orderly transition when the time comes. This would help in avoiding an unstable and uncertain period of political vacuum. The question of orderly succession is of fundamental importance for any state. It concerns the very mechanism that ensures that a state outlives its leader and survives as a political entity (Helms 2020, Snyder 2018, Kailitz and Stockemer 2017, Ambrosio 2015). For an authoritarian or hybrid state, the problem is accentuated, as a non-democratic regime is seldom more fragile and vulnerable than at the time of a change of leadership (Helms 2020, Meng 2021). The perception of the regime as frail has important consequences, as there is a clear correlation between precarious stages of political succession in authoritarian states and the emergence of popular uprisings against their regimes (Hale 2015, Koesel and Bunce 2012). This is when the perceived invincibility of the regime has faded and the kind of legitimacy that the old leader has, after all, been able to construct does not transfer easily to the successor.