Читать книгу The Putin Predicament - Bo Petersson - Страница 12

The concept of legitimacy has a long pedigree in political science and social theory (Weber 1978). It refers to a widespread belief that arrangements of power are appropriate, just, and in keeping with agreed-upon rules. On the individual level, legitimacy can be defined as a psychological property expressing such a belief (Tyler 2006).

Because of legitimacy, a popular majority feels that they ought to defer to the authorities’ decisions and rules. They follow them voluntarily out of obligation and responsibility, rather than out of fear of punishment or anticipation of immediate pecuniary or other reward. Simply put, legitimacy is “support-worthiness”. Rulers who have attained that quality maintain their position without having to use force or bribery (Macdonald and Macdonald 2020).

Social stability rests on legitimacy. Most often, the concept of legitimacy has been applied to the state level of analysis. The logic is that the ideational basis of the state must appeal to the bulk of its population to be sustained in the longer run (Kelman 1969). Political leaders also need the consent of contending elites to stay in power, regardless of whether these represent political, economic, military, or other circles. Unless they are supported, accepted, or at least tolerated by such elites they will not stay on for long, regardless of how popular they may be among the public (Chen 2016). However, the understanding of this phenomenon is better covered by other terms, such as co-optation or clientelism, and should not be conflated with the concept of legitimacy that refers to a social relation between the leaders and the public.

Being able to gain voluntary acquiescence from most people, most of the time, due to their sense of obligation and commitment, allows the state to function even during periods of scarcity, crisis, and conflict. This creates a reservoir of support, which can be drawn upon under difficult circumstances, and is not contingent upon self-interest or coercion. That is why David Easton once defined legitimacy as diffuse regime support (Easton 1975, Nathan 2020). It is diffuse because it does not presuppose quid pro quo deals between the political elites and the populace. The people are content to know that the political system works satisfactorily, and that the government is proper, just, and legal. This foundation may however erode and change. Losses of legitimacy may result in popular discontent and societal opposition. Leaders who have no or dwindling legitimacy will soon find themselves on a slippery slope as the very basis of their government is becoming undermined (Schlumberger and Bank 2001).

Max Weber’s classical distinction between three types of legitimate authority—rational-legal, traditional, and charismatic—still has a formative influence on today’s literature (Weber 1983: 144–175, Netelenbos 2016). True to his methodology of ideal types, Weber postulated that these manifestations would never appear in pure form or in real life. Instead, all ideal types were likely to blend with the others, albeit often with one sub-type dominating (Eisenstadt 1968, Apressyan 2013). The legitimacy of an individual leader or a group of leaders most often builds on a combination of all three (Weber 1983: 147).

Weber’s take on legitimacy has had many critics over the years, most notably perhaps David Beetham (1991). Among other things, he argued that despite Weber’s statement that the three forms were ideal types prone to appear in blended form only, followers of his work have come to treat them as real-life descriptions, forcing their empirical observations into narrow theoretical constructs. Bearing this warning in mind, I still believe it to be fruitful to use the classical triad. The lasting value of the ideal-type approach is heuristic. Through its usage, the analyst can discern which approximate type of legitimate authority dominates in a political system during a given period and so assess the degree of vulnerability of the political regime.

Rational-legal authority is the type of Weberian legitimacy that is most intimately associated with established Western liberal democracies. This is the kind of legitimacy deemed most mature and durable by contemporary Western political theorists (Holmes 2016). It builds on the leaders’ meticulous adherence to the precepts of the constitution and other national legal frameworks. The loyalty to the legal institutions forms a reliable basis of trust between the leaders and the electorate and makes up the foundations of a social contract between the two parties.

Weber’s second type of legitimate authority is the traditional one. Its foundational principle is that a leader or their family has been in power for as long as anybody can remember. In the years of yore power was considered to be vested in those families by the grace of God. In settings where this ideal type still seems to be the most relevant, alternatives are beyond imagination. In this sense, there is legitimacy by default. This is the situation masterfully depicted in Gabriel García Márquez’ novel The Autumn of the Patriarch. The dictator has been there for so long that no one is able to imagine anything else. His presence is taken for granted and regarded as a fact of life. The people fear him but do not call his rule into question. However, in the novel the unthinkable finally happens. The dictator dies, and the people must face the previously inconceivable period of transition. Regimes with lengthy incumbencies approach this ideal type, even if their reigns have not lasted since times immemorial.

Weber’s third type of legitimate authority is the charismatic one, which builds on the leader’s personal characteristics and exceptional qualities. Weber had primarily religious leadership in mind here, but secular leaders can also draw legitimacy from these grounds. This is maybe the type of legitimate authority that has been most discussed in the literature inspired by Weber (Helms 2020). It is also the ideal type of greatest interest to this book since I argue that it corresponds to the predominant legitimation strategy in Putinist Russia. I will therefore discuss it in some more detail.

According to Weber (1978: 241-242), charisma denotes a “certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities”. Charismatic authority is irrational and alien to rules. It does not build on any easily defined, specific characteristics. This makes it difficult to analyze and hard to measure (Andrews-Lee 2019). Charisma does not denote a binary variable which is either there or not there, but a matter of degree determined on a discrete and sliding scale (cf. Gippert 2016). If it is lost, it evaporates slowly. It is not drained overnight.

The literature has long struggled to come up with answers concerning the components of charismatic authority (Mio et al 2005, Chung Yoon-Gun 1993). First, the charismatic leader is an “extraordinary individual with extraordinary qualities and a magnetic personality” (Chung Yoon-Gun 1993: 87). Charismatic leaders inspire their followers, make them believe in their collective abilities and lay out visions of the future. They have unique personal characteristics, are perceived as national saviors or heroes who step in at the very last moment to salvage the nation from crisis and dissolution and are therefore indiscriminately admired by their adherents. The leaders have shown leadership in the initial stage of nation-building and are recognized as capable of accomplishing the great and ambitious goals that they have set out to reach (Chung Yoon-Gun 1993: 85).

Moreover, charismatic leadership relies strongly on oratory and communication skills (Andrews-Lee 2019, Petersson 2017). Charismatic leaders have well developed abilities to get across to the people with stories that matter to them. They own the capacity to sway an audience and tell stories that make a difference. When such political leaders communicate, the audience experiences the illusion of being invited to co-create and co-construct the vision and the world together with them (Kjellgren 2019, Andrews-Lee 2019). The charismatic leaders often enliven their stories by using analogies, metaphor, or political myth (Charteris-Black 2011, 2019; Petersson 2017, Mio et al 2005).

The construction of charismatic authority is, then, more about an “emotional form of irrational relationship” than the work of rational principles and processes (Chung Yoon-Gun 1993: 85). All this suggests a dark side of legitimacy, as charismatic leaders may attract a multitude of supporters and have their commands heeded with consequences that would be deplorable to most other people. This offers an answer to Benedict Anderson’s (1983) familiar query about what it is in nationalism that makes otherwise rational-minded people willing to lay down their lives in defense of the national. Historically, sacrifices on behalf of the national have been urged and prompted by charismatic leaders who have managed to gather a large following by manipulation and use of their persuasive skills.

The popularity and support-worthiness of a certain political ruler will only last while the general magic works and widespread perceptions of the leader as charismatic hold sway (Weber 1983: 146). In this sense the concept of charisma resembles the concept of invincibility that some authors prefer to use. The standing of the charismatic leader is so strong that their political misfortune seems inconceivable (Koesel and Bunce 2012). When the ability of the leader to tell a convincing story recedes, so does their authority and the aura of invincibility diminishes with it. When the trustworthy stories end, charismatic leadership also risks vaporizing. The fundamental dilemma for authoritarian regimes is how to follow up a convincing story with credible action to keep it convincing and sustain the orator’s legitimacy (Samoilenko 2017).