Читать книгу The Putin Predicament - Bo Petersson - Страница 15

Political myth is a central field of political analysis (Bottici and Challand 2013), even if it has not always been recognized as such by social science researchers. It is my contention that charismatic authority is largely constructed through skillful communication and the effective use of political myths. These constructs are “identity-constitutive historical narratives” (Toth 2021), whose contents are largely taken for granted by the public in any given society. The myths express naturalized, taken-for-granted cultural knowledge (Barthes 1993), but they do not arise from thin air. They may be top-down constructs, corroborated and reinforced by “deliberate manipulation and intentional action” (Bell 2003: 75, cf. Toth 2021, Charteris-Black 2011), but they also reflect beliefs that have existed and been widespread in society for generations. Through successful epitomizing of the myths and effectiveness in getting across to the public, legitimacy is bestowed on those leaders who master the game.

Key political actors successfully enact and communicate political myths, which, nota bene, are not about falsities in philosophical terms (Bottici 2010). What matters is that a significant number of people believe in them and relate to them as if they were true. Clunan (2014) refers to “fitness tests” that are continually played out in a society. Here, the politicians prove themselves worthy and show that they can deliver on the implementation of cherished political myths. When passed, the fitness tests serve to legitimize the political leaders. When failed, the leaders will find their positions eroding. If they do not live up to the myths and do not deliver on them, the contents of the myths can contribute to bringing the incumbents down. This is “the myth’s cunning” (Boer 2009: 26); it can in other words be a treacherous companion (Eatwell 2006).

Like political rhetoric itself, political myth is characterized by the close intertwining of emotive and cognitive elements (Malinova 2015). Unless appealing to people’s emotions in a positive sense, no political entity is likely to hold together in the end. At the same time, the construct will not be viable unless it is firmly anchored in widely accepted knowledge. After all, despite its claim of superiority to Western states, the Soviet socialist bloc evaporated as the populace could see with their own eyes that the mythical contention was unfounded and false.

There are strong links between charismatic legitimacy, political myth, and the leaders’ capacity to act and live the myth. Political myths concern core values which people feel strongly about. Charismatic leaders convey and recount the important stories that the myths retell. In the process the leaders will see to it that they play a crucial role in the plots of the stories (Isaacs 2015). The term “discourse legitimacy” (Schlumberger and Bank 2001: 65) describes this phenomenon well.

Some political myths reappear in slightly shifting guises, in many settings and across many different countries. They constitute a universal political phenomenon. Radically summarized, such myths are on a very general level about three vital processes in the history or contemporaneity of a nation: glory, heroism, and victimhood (Assmann 2010, in Toth 2021). Similarly, Edelman (1977, in Charteris-Black 2011) enumerated three universally recognized master myths: the omnipresent enemy who conspires against the nation; the valiant and wise leader who salvages the people from that terrible enemy; and the people who in times of great need unite behind their leader to deliver the country from the gravest danger. All three master myths are familiar from the Russian setting and Vladimir Putin has been markedly successful in exploiting them all. These myths constitute the fabric from which much contemporary Russian nationalism is woven. Their narrative contents are in conformity with the discourse of traditionalism, which over the centuries has been in a constant, antagonistic clash with discourses of liberalism in Russia. The course of Russian political development has been largely chartered out depending on the struggle between these two discourses, famously known as the perennial conflict between Slavophiles and Westernizers (Chebankova 2015, Hosking 2001).

The use of political myth is thus universal political practice. Prominent populist actors have demonstrated its effectiveness in established democracies as well. Together with several other states Russia claims to be “uniquely gifted, accomplished and superior, morally and spiritually, to the West” (Mishra 2017: 164). This corresponds to a powerful and basic political myth about great power supremacy and prowess. Here, non-democratic Russia is certainly not the only setting for such political myths. Corresponding narratives come to mind also regarding democratic great powers such as the United States and France.

Again, charismatic authority is the product of a continuous process of persuasive communication and emotional allegiance which aligns political leaders with the people. It comes into being through interaction with the audience (Hoffmann 2009). Here Vladimir Putin often excels, and his skills at adapting his style of communication to fit the audience, especially when he is addressing the public are well known (Petersson and Sommers 2015, Gorham 2013). His ways of communicating have many faces. In the context of primary audiences of politicians and officials, his presentations are at times bureaucratic and wooden. On other occasions, his way of expressing himself is drastic and vulgar, which in certain contexts seems to be an effective way of making people listen. Having the talent of getting narratives across to the audience, he is in such instances the kind of gifted storyteller that the charismatic political leader is expected to be. Let us ponder one example of this.

The occasion was the Annual News Conference in 2014, the year of the Russian annexation of Crimea. Putin was asked a question about Russia’s international role and to what extent current economic difficulties had been brought about by the sanctions introduced by the Western community after Crimea. Putin framed his answer in terms of Russia’s national survival and its right to exist as a great power. He conjured up a vivid image of the stereotypical Russian bear losing sovereignty over its habitat:

At the Valdai Club I gave an example of our most recognizable symbol. It is a bear protecting his taiga. You see, if we continue the analogy, sometimes I think that maybe it would be best if our bear just sat still. Maybe he should stop chasing pigs and boars around the taiga but start picking berries and eating honey. Maybe then he will be left alone. But no, he won’t be! Because someone will always try to chain him up. As soon as he’s chained they will tear out his teeth and claws… As soon as—God forbid—it happens and they no longer need the bear, the taiga will be taken over. (- - - )

And then, when all the teeth and claws are torn out, the bear will be of no use at all. Perhaps they’ll stuff it and that’s all. So, it is not about Crimea but about us protecting our independence, our sovereignty and our right to exist. That is what we should all realize… [W]e must decide whether we want to keep going and fight, change our economy—for the better, by the way, because we can use the current situation to our own advantage—and be more independent, go through all this or we want our skin to hang on the wall. This is the choice we need to make… (President of Russia, 18 December 2014, cited in Petersson and Sommers 2015).

This is an illuminating example of a charismatic leader talking to his devotees and colorfully invoking political myth: about Russia’s nature-bound greatness, its subjection to threats from powerful enemies abroad, and the need always to be vigilant. It is an effective message, and it bears witness to Putin’s skills as an effective political communicator and performer.