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Already before the start of the financial market crisis, support levels for the European Union among French citizens have dropped compared to earlier decades. Graph 1 displays the long-term evolution of net support³ measured by the Eurobarometer trend question: “Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is a) a good thing, b) a bad thing, c) neither good nor bad”. Three observations stand out. Firstly, France follows more or less the European long-term downward trend (see trend line for France). Secondly, the early 1990s marked a turning [23] point, heralding the end of the ‘permissive consensus’. Thereafter, support for European integration never again reached the same level as in the 1970s and 1980s. Thirdly, French support levels were above the European average in the 1970s and 1980s but fell persistently below the European average since the early 1990s (see Graph 1).

Graph 1: Net support for European integration 1973-2011 (in per cent)

Question: Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is ...? A good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad.

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 1-75

Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer surveys do not ask this trend question any longer in EU member states. Hence, we have to make use of other trend questions in order to assess recent trends. We chose two questions repeatedly asked during the last years, one on the image of the EU and the other one on citizens’ trust in the EU.

The EU’s image clearly deteriorated in France during the last years since the start of the global financial crisis in 2007 (see Graph 2). This trend is by no means specific to France. Positive images nevertheless still prevailed in public opinion until very recently. In the fall 2016 Eurobarometer, negative images turned out to be slightly more widespread than positive ones (31 negative, 29 [24] positive images and 39 per cent of respondents picking the neutral answer category). Immediately before the start of the financial market crisis in 2007, fully 52 per cent still had a positive image of the European Union (see Graph 2).

Graph 2: Positive or negative image of EU (in per cent)

Question: In general, does the EU conjure up for you a positive or a negative image? (in %)

Source: Eurobarometer EB59-EB86

The picture is still darker when we look at trust levels (see Graph 2). Fully two thirds (65 per cent) of the French population did not tend to trust the European Union in fall 2016, up from 34 per cent back in 2007 (Eurobarometer 68).

Graph 2: Trust in the European Union (in per cent)

Question: Please tell me if you tend to trust or if you tend not to trust the European Union (in %)

Source: Eurobarometer EB59-EB86.

[25] It seems plausible to assume that the more negative images and lower trust levels derive from more negative evaluations of the EU’s performance in times of crises. One of the European Commissions’ biannual Eurobarometer survey questions asked respondents to evaluate in a very general way the overall performance of the EU. Do they think “the EU makes the quality of life better in Europe”? According to a recent Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer 83, spring 2015), only 40 per cent of the French population (as opposed to 51 per cent in the EU-28) share the idea that the EU makes their lives better whereas as many as 49 per cent explicitly reject this view (versus 39 per cent in the EU-28).

Political actors tend to politicize European issues along the lines of domestic political conflict, shaped in France by the socio-economic and the sociocultural cleavages. So, we might ask in how far we find negative evaluations of the European Union’s performance that might be linked to these two cleavage dimensions.

One of the potential reasons for the relatively negative evaluation of the EU’s overall performance reported above can be found in the EU’s perceived impact on the employment situation in France. Asked whether or not the “EU creates the conditions for more jobs”, as many as 58 per cent of the French respondents answered in the negative (EU-28 average: 40 per cent). Only 30 per cent subscribed to this statement (EU-28 average: 49 per cent, data from Eurobarometer 83, spring 2015).

However, these increasingly negative attitudes did not translate into a dwindling support for European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 68 per cent of respondents still support the Euro and the EMU, according to the Eurobarometer survey of autumn 2016 (Eurobarometer 86, fall 2016). The right-wing populist National Front (Front national, FN) party, which makes the case for leaving the Eurozone, does not find substantial support in French public opinion on this key issue.

The overall picture we find in France is one of a declining number of citizens seeing the EU as a helpful framework for dealing with their most pressing problems. The IPSOS public opinion research institute asked repeatedly whether the French think that the decision-making power of France or that of the EU should be strengthened in order to “address effectively the major problems of the coming years”. In 2015, only 14 per cent of a representative sample of respondents came out in favour of a strengthening the EU’s decision-making power (down from 38 per cent back in 2012) whereas no less than 72 per cent considered it more appropriate to strengthen national decision-making power in order to effectively address major problems in the coming years (up from 56 per cent back in 2012, see Graph 4). This is a clear trend towards a ‘renationalisation’ of public opinion.

[26] Graph 4: To address effectively the major problems of the coming years… (in %)

Source: Ipsos/STERIA und Ipsos/Logica Business Consulting.

These critical attitudes regarding the problem-solving capacity and the socioeconomic consequences of European integration provide a fertile ground for political strategies of Eurosceptic parties. The same holds true for the sociocultural dimension regarding attitudes towards immigration. According to the Eurobarometer 83 survey from spring 2015, French citizens score slightly above EU average (58 per cent for France, 56 per cent for the EU-28) in expressing negative feelings towards immigrants from outside the EU. In an IPSOS survey, dating from May 2015, no less than 67 per cent of the respondents subscribed to the view that there are “too many immigrants in France”. And a majority of 54 per cent think that the “Islamic religion is not compatible with the values of the French society”. Surfing on widespread anti-immigration attitudes, the right-wing populist FN could fully exploit the European refugee crisis of 2015 to broaden its support base. This major European crisis in conjunction with the terrorist attacks in Paris in January and November 2015 provided the FN with a formidable window of opportunity which it was able to translate into a strong showing at the polls in 2015. In the regional elections held in December 2015, the FN came out as the most important French political party attracting no less than 28 per cent of the vote in the first round of this election.

Critical attitudes of mass publics towards European integration and EU policy outcomes influence both inter- and intra-party conflict in France, as they [27] can be easily linked to the sociocultural as well as socio-economic issue-dimensions of domestic political debates.