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This book is structured in three parts: The first section ‘Europeanisation versus neo-nationalism in times of crises’ deals with the new political conflict line that increasingly shapes the domestic politics of the member states. The second part ‘Re-examining the crises of European integration’ explores some of the most pressing challenges to European unification from different, innovative angles. The final section ‘European Innovation and Development’ makes the case that the EU’s responses to crises, conflict and change were not only marked by policy failures but have also brought about important instances of innovation and development.

The country case studies and comparisons included in section I. ‘Europeanisation versus neo-nationalism in times of crises’ demonstrate that the emerging battle field between the forces of Europeanisation and those striving for neo-nationalism is neither limited to East-Central European member states nor to the EU-28 but reaches also into candidate and neighbouring states. Moreover, these struggles are not only fuelled by rising right-or left-wing populist political parties: they also have divisive effects within moderate, mainstream and governing political parties, and they can mobilise all sorts of civil as well as non-civil societal movements and organisations. To illustrate these points, each chapter looks more closely into the different national contexts of France, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Greece, Germany and Ireland, and Turkey and Serbia.

Here, France is certainly a prominent case in point. It became a most dramatic battle ground for pro- versus anti-European contentions, epitomised by Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen in the French 2017 Presidential elections. As in the UK in 2016 as well as in Italy in 2018, these confrontations have been driven by the EU’s ‘polycrisis’ (Schild, ch. 2). Yet, most importantly, they have fuelled not only despair and anger against the EU but also new hopes for the future of Europe. The winning presidential candidate, Emmanuel Macron, succeeded in communicating his fresh ideas for strengthening the European Union across Europe.

The Netherlands, by comparison, signals less drama and more a normalisation of anti-pluralist populism, even if it does not come out victorious. Exhibiting clear parallels with anti-pluralist movements in other European countries, the Dutch experience raises fundamental questions for the EU as a whole (Crum, ch. 3).

A more peculiar case is the Czech Republic. Despite its close ties to the German economy and while prospering throughout the times of the euro crisis, [14] the economic case for European integration has not contained nationalist populism among the elite and ordinary people, as the domestic politics of the fugee crisis has demonstrated (Havlik, ch. 4).

Greece, although situated at the lowest end of economic prosperity in the Union, and despite conditions of austerity, recession and social hardship, did not avail itself of calls for neo-nationalism (cf. Ellinas 2013). Paradoxically, successive governments have been complying with three euro-area programmes, even including anti-austerity coalitions built by the extreme left and right wing parties. In addition, Greece has witnessed the unexpected growth of civil society engagement in different fields of society severely hit by austerity policies and the influx of refugees fleeing from civil war and terrorism in neighbouring regions (Sotiropoulos, ch. 5).

Finally, two member states that were better capable of fighting off the financial crisis and the rise of Eurosceptic forces, Ireland and Germany; here the contentions about the EU’s immigration crisis have revealed deeper political conflicts surrounding the scope and meaning of ‘solidarity’ (Wallaschek, ch. 6). Within the EU, the pro-active agents working for Europeanisation include many civil society organisations. This is also the case beyond the EU, in candidate countries. Depending on whether they are supported not only by the EU but also on the home front, conditions for NGO’s will vary widely, as the comparison of the Western Balkans and Turkey demonstrates (Dereci, ch. 7).

Section II. ‘Re-examining the crises of European integration’ explores some of the most crucial challenges to European unification, including Brexit and the European ‘refugee crisis’ as well as the Nord Stream pipeline. It includes contributions that emphasise different angles that have received relatively little attention to date in the prominent crisis narratives but are pivotal to political support for the European project. For instance, the ‘remainers’ lack of attention to the EU’s achievements for minority integration in the UK’s Brexit referendum campaign provides a telling angle for understanding its negative outcome. Arguably, the EU could and should have strengthened its already highly acknowledged role in combating racial and ethnic discrimination and expanded its contribution to minority protection. This would help to avoid perceptions of it being a ‘white club’ and make European identity inclusive of all citizens on its territory (Jenichen, ch. 8). Another impediment is the weak state capacity that helps to explain non-compliance and set-backs to joint intergovernmental decision-making, for instance in the field of the European common asylum system. Here, effective implementation of the EU’s asylum policies has been blocked notably by Hungary and Poland, but also Austria and France. Although the EU has sought to draw lessons from these failures of asylum policy in favour of a more realistic concept, real advances are still required (Zaun, ch. 9). The weak administrative systems of several member states are a result of insufficient Europeanisation processes during the accession period that have been further aggravated by the financial and economic crisis. These [15] are critical impediments to the effective implementation of European policies in countries such as Greece, and more generally in the newer member states of East-Central Europe where the rule of law, state administrations and democratic institutions are not yet sufficiently consolidated (Wittmann, ch. 10). Apart from administrative weaknesses, the dynamics of domestic politics can also play out against a common European regime. As critics of the widely-used but misleading term ‘refugee crisis’ have noted, at its core this is a crisis of humanism, humanitarianism, and human rights. It consists of heated contestations within domestic contexts about whether and to what extent EU member states should commit themselves to the protection of the civil and political rights of refugees and minorities as codified in the European Charter of Human Rights, and how to follow up on them in practice. In this respect, Bulgarian domestic politics is a telling case that illustrates the difficulties of translating European Human Rights norms into effective protection for those who need it most (Guasti and Siroki, ch. 11). Moreover, some promising European projects can be buried under conflicting national interests. In the aftermath of the Crimea conflict and in the context of EU-Russia geo-political tensions, the problem of energy security has gained saliency on the EU’s political agenda. In this context, the case of the North Stream pipeline has become a particularly contested issue. Hence, a closer examination of the diverging views of Poland and Germany will shed light on the opportunities and constraints regarding the prospects for a European Energy Union (Heinrich and Pleines, ch. 12).

In sum, with regard to theorising how conflictive European integration has become across a variety of policy domains, a broader conversation between the orthodox theory schools and more heterodox approaches is needed (Abels, ch. 13): For instance, conceiving Europeanisation through a ‘gendered lens’ offers a promising way for re-interpreting contemporary right-wing populist struggles as a backlash. Arguably, neo-nationalism brings gender-biased interests and identity constructions to the fore vis-à-vis the EU’s acquis comunautaire, hence its achievements over the past fifty years in building norms, policies and institutions aimed at advancing gender justice, from the principle of non-discrimination and equal rights to the ‘mainstreaming’ of equal opportunity and equal treatment policies across a variety of policy fields (Abels and Mushaben 2012).

The final section III. ‘European Innovation and Development’ presents a selection of cases where the EU has been presented with demands for – and arguably did advance, even if not yet fully accomplish – innovative proposals in response to the crises. These European political developments range from the financial and euro crises, climate governance and trade policy to the democratisation of European governance, namely in fields where the member states are divided and the European Parliament has remained weak. These developments can be found in three fields, in particular: First, in the field of Economic and Monetary Union, the pro-active course of action adopted by the [16] European Central Bank came under critique as a backstop for stabilising EMU against present and future imbalances. Yet, President Mario Draghi’s bond-buying programme and monetary policy have proven to be pivotal for the survival of the euro area (Zagermann, ch. 14). Second, the global governance of climate change is probably the field where the EU can be lauded most for its achievements, namely regarding the Paris Agreement of 2015 on an international framework and timetable for emissions reduction. Notwithstanding, in more technical fields, ambitious climate action by the EU is more difficult. This poses the question of what the specific ‘enabling factors for ambitious EU climate action’ actually are (Morata Liebert, ch. 15). Third, the field of democratising European governance includes several issues where democratic innovations are at stake. Many critics of the EU’s crisis management have taken issue with the democratic deficits of the euro area’s emergency regime. The ECB, the Eurogroup and the ‘Troika’ have been criticised as technocratic supranational supervisory agencies with a blind eye towards social justice that reign into the democratic autonomy of national sovereigns in fiscal, economic, labour market and social matters (see Hentschel, ch. 16). By contrast, in these matters, the European Parliament can be qualified as a democratically legitimated agent for European social policy development – one that was partially successful, albeit constrained by the intergovernmental politics of the Employment and Social Affairs Council (Lange and Liebert, ch. 17). Moreover, the European parliamentary practices have developed interesting institutional innovations. In particular, the EP’s so-called ‘intergroups’ build informal, yet institutionalised cross-partisan channels for civil society participation in European parliamentary activities, from legislation to the control of European agencies and the executive (Landorff, ch. 18). Nevertheless, the innovative measures that the MEP’s have advanced for strengthening the European political party system remain shelved, and hence wait to live up to the requirements of a democratic European political Union (Ciancio, ch. 19).

Summing up the various efforts to develop the EU politically reveals a number of weaknesses: notably, deficits of harmonizing standards of social security, democratic transparency, control and legitimacy and rule of law. Arguably, the intergovernmental piece-meal approach to managing the euro-crisis has strengthened the technocratic character of EMU at the expense of democratically elected institutions. EU reforms are needed in order to re-build what has been lost due to the crisis: the popular, social and transnational trust that is the necessary foundation for a more resilient EU. At this point in time, it appears doubtful whether its shortcomings can be overcome within the present institutional arrangement of the EU multi-level polity. Therefore, during the next legislative term 2019-24, European leaders and citizens will have to address the difficult choices between alternative scenarios and options for developing the joint problem-solving capacities of the European Union. The European Union’s unfinished journey remains uncertain and open ended, depending [17] on the diverging narratives and which properties of crises will prevail: the sources of erosion and neo-nationalism – or the resources for political innovation and the development of more resilient forms of Europeanisation (Liebert, ch. 20).

The starting point of this book was this double-edged nature of crises as sources of decline as well as development. Its chapters contribute to the debate on the future of Europe by discussing lessons learnt and identifying possible innovations arising from different aspects of the crises. Its empirically based reflections address a range of key issues that need to be resolved if the unfinished project of European integration is to cope with its challenges in sustainable ways. Arguably, the key conclusion that can be drawn from these chapters and which is confirmed by the unfolding Brexit tragedy reads as follows: Instead of holding onto ‘extreme’ solutions such as fully-fledged political federalism with a European central state and a setback to nationalist protectionism, Europeans are capable of seeking for more pragmatic solutions and creative compromises. This requires the Union citizens and the European political leaders to take the lessons from the EU’s failures over the past decade to heart. They need to overcome the current tensions between Europeanisation and neonationalism for the sake of a political development of Europe that constructively learns from the past. In this case, the crises would not represent sources of decline but rather important resources for Europeans to construct their path forward in the 21^st century.