Читать книгу The Nuremberg Trials (Vol.3) - International Military Tribunal - Страница 19
Оглавление“It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is a claim from which I will not swerve and which I will satisfy, God willing.” (Document Number 2358-PS.)
And further:
“I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot go back beyond the limits of our patience.”
This is Page 2, Column 1.
“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the moment, when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems—that is to say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other minorities peacefully and without oppression—I will no longer be interested in the Czech State. And that, as far as I am concerned, I will guarantee it. We don’t want any Czechs!”
The major portion of the passage I have quoted will be contained in Document TC-28, which I think, will be offered by the British prosecutor.
Yet two weeks later Hitler and Defendant Keitel were preparing estimates of the military forces required to break Czechoslovak resistance in Bohemia and Moravia.
I now read from Item 48, at Page 82, of the Schmundt file. This is a top-secret telegram sent by Keitel to Hitler’s headquarters on 11 October 1938 in answer to four questions which Hitler had propounded to the OKW. I think it is sufficient merely to read the questions which Hitler had propounded:
“Question 1. What reinforcements are necessary in the situation to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia?
“Question 2. How much time is requested for the regrouping or moving up of new forces?
“Question 3. How much time will be required for the same purpose if it is executed after the intended demobilization and return measures?
“Question 4. How much time would be required to achieve the state of readiness of 1 October?”
On 21 October, the same day on which the administration of the Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian authorities, a directive outlining plans for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia was signed by Hitler and initialed by the Defendant Keitel.
I now offer in evidence Document C-136 as Exhibit USA-104, a top-secret order of which 10 copies were made, this being the first copy, signed in ink by Keitel.
In this order, issued only 3 weeks after the winning of the Sudetenland, the Nazi conspirators are already looking forward to new conquests. I quote the first part of the body of the document:
“The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down by me in a later directive. Until this directive comes into force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times for the following eventualities:
“1) The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection against surprise air attacks.
“2) The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.
“3) The occupation of the Memel.”
And then proceeding, the statement following Number 2:
“Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia: It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany.
“The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those for Grün; they must, however, guarantee a continuous and considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The organization, order of battle, and state of readiness of the units earmarked for that purpose are in peacetime to be so arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such that at the same time ‘Grenzsicherung West’ ”—the measures of frontier defense in the West—“can be carried out.
“The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows:
“a. Army: The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a surprise type of attack. Their number will be determined by the forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success must be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack must be worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness in such a manner that they may be either committed in securing the frontiers or sent after the attack army.
“b. Air Force: The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured by early elimination of the Czech Air Force. For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peacetime bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still stronger forces may be required can be determined from the development of the military-political situation in Czechoslovakia only. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the offensive forces against the West must be prepared.”
And then Part 3 goes on under the heading, “Annexation of the Memel District.”
It is signed by Adolf Hitler and authenticated by Defendant Keitel. It was distributed to the OKH, to Defendant Göring’s Luftwaffe, and to Defendant Raeder at Navy headquarters.
Two months later, on 17 December 1938, Defendant Keitel issued an appendix to the original order, stating that by command of the Führer preparations for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia are to continue.
I offer in evidence Document C-138 as Exhibit USA-105, and other captured OKW documents classified top secret.
Distribution of this order was the same as for the 21 October order. I shall read the body of this order.
“Corollary to Directive of 21. 10. 38.
“Reference: ‘Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia.’ The Führer has given the following additional order:
“The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be expected.
“To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is merely an action of pacification, and not a warlike undertaking.
“The action must therefore be carried out by the peacetime Armed Forces only, without reinforcements from mobilization. The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by adjustment within the units.
“Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march in must, as a general rule, leave their stations only during the night prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously form up systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary for previous organization should be limited to the minimum and will be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements, if any, of single units and particularly of motorized forces, to the troop training areas situated near the frontier, must have the approval of the Führer.
“The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar general directives.
“For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly occupied territory and only for a short period.”—Signed—“Keitel.”
I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that this particular copy of this order, an original carbon signed in ink by Keitel, was the one sent to the OKM, the German Naval headquarters. It bears the initials of Fricke, head of the Operation Division of the naval war staff; Schniewind, Chief of Staff; and of Defendant Raeder.
As the Wehrmacht moved forward, with plans for what it clearly considered would be an easy victory, the Foreign Office played its part. In a discussion of means of improving German-Czech relations with the Czech Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky in Berlin on 31 January 1939, Defendant Ribbentrop urged upon the Czech Government a quick reduction in the size of the Czech Army. I offer in evidence Document 2795-PS as Exhibit USA-106, captured German Foreign Office notes of this discussion. I will read only the footnote, which is in Ribbentrop’s handwriting:
“I mentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick reduction in the Czech Army would be decisive in our judgment.”
Does the Court propose sitting beyond 4:30?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I think not. The Tribunal will adjourn.