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SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: [Continuing.] I was saying before the recess that there could be no doubt about the principle of criminal responsibility on the part of the state which engaged in aggressive war.

Admittedly, the conscience shrinks from the rigors of collective punishment, which may fall upon the guilty and the innocent alike, although, it may be noted, most of these innocent victims would not have hesitated to reap the fruits of the criminal act if it had been successful. Humanity and justice will find means of mitigating any injustice in collective punishment. Above all, much hardship can be obviated by making the punishment fall upon the individuals who were themselves directly responsible for the criminal conduct of their state. It is here that the powers who framed this Charter took a step which justice, sound legal sense, and an enlightened appreciation of the good of mankind must acclaim without cavil or reserve. The Charter lays down expressly that there shall be individual responsibility for the crimes, including the crimes against the peace, committed on behalf of the state. The state is not an abstract entity. Its rights and duties are the rights and duties of men. Its actions are the actions of men. It is a salutary principle, a principle of law, that politicians who embark upon a particular policy—as here—of aggressive war should not be able to seek immunity behind the intangible personality of the state. It is a salutary legal rule that persons who, in violation of the law, plunge their own and other countries into an aggressive war should do so with a halter around their necks.

To say that those who aid and abet, who counsel and procure a crime are themselves criminals, is a commonplace in our own municipal law. Nor is the principle of individual international responsibility for offenses against the law of nations altogether new. It has been applied not only to pirates. The entire law relating to war crimes, as distinct from the crime of war, is based upon the principle of individual responsibility. The future of international law, and indeed, of the world itself, depends on its application in a much wider sphere, in particular, in that of safeguarding the peace of the world. There must be acknowledged not only, as in the Charter of the United Nations, fundamental human rights, but also, as in the Charter of this Tribunal, fundamental human duties, and of these none is more vital, none is more fundamental, than the duty not to vex the peace of nations in violation of the clearest legal prohibitions and undertakings. If this be an innovation, it is an innovation which we are prepared to defend and to justify, but it is not an innovation which creates a new crime. International law had already, before the Charter was adopted, constituted aggressive war a criminal act.

There is thus no substantial retroactivity in the provisions of the Charter. It merely fixes the responsibility for a crime already clearly established as such by positive law upon its actual perpetrators. It fills a gap in international criminal procedure. There is all the difference between saying to a man, “You will now be punished for what was not a crime at all at the time you committed it,” and in saying to him, “You will now pay the penalty for conduct which was contrary to law and a crime when you executed it, although, owing to the imperfection of the international machinery, there was at that time no court competent to pronounce judgment against you.” It is that latter course which we adopt, and if that be retroactivity, we proclaim it to be most fully consistent with that higher justice which, in the practice of civilized states, has set a definite limit to the retroactive operation of laws. Let the defendants and their protagonists complain that the Charter is in this matter an ex parte fiat of the victors. These victors, composing, as they do, the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world, represent also the world’s sense of justice, which would be outraged if the crime of war, after this second world conflict, were to remain unpunished. In thus interpreting, declaring, and supplementing the existing law, these states are content to be judged by the verdict of history. Securus judicat orbis terrarum. Insofar as the Charter of this Tribunal introduces new law, its authors have established a precedent for the future—a precedent operative against all, including themselves, but in essence that law, rendering recourse to aggressive war an international crime, had been well established when the Charter was adopted. It is only by way of corruption of language that it can be described as a retroactive law.

There remains the question, with which I shall not detain the Tribunal for long, whether these wars which were launched by Germany and her leaders in violation of treaties or agreements or assurances were also wars of aggression. A war of aggression is a war which is resorted to in violation of the international obligation not to have recourse to war, or, in cases in which war is not totally renounced, which is resorted to in disregard of the duty to utilize the procedure of pacific settlement which a state has bound itself to observe. There was, as a matter of fact, in the period between the two world wars, a divergence of opinion among jurists and statesmen whether it was preferable to attempt in advance a legal definition of aggression, or to leave to the states concerned and to the collective organs of the international community freedom of appreciation of the facts in any particular situation that might arise. Those holding the latter view argued that a rigid definition might be abused by an unscrupulous state to fit in with its aggressive design; they feared, and the British Government was for a time among those who took this view, that an automatic definition of aggression might become “a trap for the innocent and a signpost for the guilty.” Others held that in the interest of certainty and security a definition of aggression, like a definition of any crime in municipal law, was proper and useful. They urged that the competent international organs, political and judicial, could be trusted to avoid in any particular case a definition of aggression which might lead to obstruction or to an absurdity. In May of 1933 the Committee on Security Questions of the Disarmament Conference proposed a definition of aggression on these lines:

“The aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be that state which is the first to commit any of the following actions:

“(1) Declaration of war upon another state;

“(2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another state;

“(3) Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of another state;

“(4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state;

“(5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another state, or refusal; notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take in its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.”

The various treaties concluded in 1933 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other states followed closely that definition. So did the draft convention submitted in 1933 by His Majesty’s Government to the Disarmament Conference.

However, it is unprofitable to elaborate here the details of the problem or of the definition of aggression. This Tribunal will not allow itself to be deflected from its purpose by attempts to ventilate in this Court what is an academic and, in the circumstances, an utterly unreal controversy as to what is the nature of a war of aggression, for there is no definition of aggression, general or particular, which does not cover and cover abundantly and irresistibly in every detail, the premeditated onslaught by Germany on the territorial integrity and political independence of so many sovereign states.

This, then, being the law as we submit it to be to this Tribunal—that the peoples of the world by the Pact of Paris had finally outlawed war and made it criminal—I turn now to the facts to see how these defendants under their leader and with their associates destroyed the high hopes of mankind and sought to revert to international anarchy. First, let this be said, for it will be established beyond doubt by the documents which you will see, from the moment Hitler became Chancellor in 1933, with the Defendant Von Papen as Reich Chancellor, and with the Defendant Von Neurath as his Foreign Minister, the whole atmosphere of the world darkened. The hopes of the people began to recede. Treaties seemed no longer matters of solemn obligation but were entered into with complete cynicism as a means for deceiving other states of Germany’s warlike intentions. International conferences were no longer to be used as a means for securing pacific settlements but as occasions for obtaining by blackmail demands which were eventually to be enlarged by war. The world came to know the “war of nerves”, the diplomacy of the fait accompli, of blackmail and bullying.

In October 1933 Hitler told his Cabinet that as the proposed Disarmament Convention did not concede full equality to Germany, “It would be necessary to torpedo the Disarmament Conference. It was out of the question to negotiate: Germany would leave the Conference and the League”. On the 21st of October 1933 Germany did so, and by so doing struck a deadly blow at the fabric of security which had been built up on the basis of the League Covenant. From that time on the record of their foreign policy became one of complete disregard of international obligations, and indeed not least of those solemnly concluded by themselves. Hitler himself expressly avowed to his confederates, “Agreements are kept only so long as they serve a certain purpose.” He might have added that again and again that purpose was only to lull an intended victim into a false sense of security. So patent, indeed, did this eventually become that to be invited by the Defendant Ribbentrop to enter a non-aggression pact with Germany was almost a sign that Germany intended to attack the state concerned. Nor was it only the formal treaty which they used and violated as circumstances seemed to make expedient. These defendants are charged, too, with breaches of the less formal assurances which, in accordance with diplomatic usage, Germany gave to neighboring states. You will hear the importance which Hitler himself publicly attached to assurances of that kind. Today, with the advance of science, the world has been afforded means of communication and intercourse hitherto unknown, and as Hitler himself expressly recognized in his public utterances, international relations no longer depend upon treaties alone. The methods of diplomacy change. The leader of one nation can speak directly to the government and peoples of another, and that course was not infrequently adopted by the Nazi conspirators. But, although the methods change, the principles of good faith and honesty, established as the fundamentals of civilized society, both in the national and international spheres, remain unaltered. It is a long time since it was said that we are part one of another, and if today the different states are more closely connected and thus form part of a world society more than ever before, so also, more than before, is there that need for good faith and honesty between them.

Let us see how these defendants, ministers and high officers of the Nazi Government, individually and collectively comported themselves in these matters.

On the 1st of September 1939 in the early hours of the morning under manufactured and, in any event, inadequate pretexts, the Armed Forces of the German Reich invaded Poland along the whole length of her frontiers and thus launched the war which was to bring down so many of the pillars of our civilization.

It was a breach of the Hague Conventions. It was a breach of the Treaty of Versailles which had established the frontiers between Germany and Poland. And however much Germany disliked that treaty—although Hitler had expressly stated that he would respect its territorial provisions—however much she disliked it, she was not free to break it by unilateral action. It was a breach of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland concluded at Locarno on the 16th of October 1925. By that treaty Germany and Poland expressly agreed to refer any matters of dispute not capable of settlement by ordinary diplomatic machinery to the decision of an arbitral tribunal or of the Permanent Court of International Justice. It was a breach of the Pact of Paris. But that is not all. It was also a breach of a more recent and, in view of the repeated emphasis laid upon it by Hitler himself, in some ways a more important engagement into which Nazi Germany had entered with Poland. After the Nazi Government came into power, on the 26th of January 1934 the German and Polish Governments had signed a 10 year pact of non-aggression. It was, as the signatories themselves stated, to introduce a new era into the political relations between Poland and Germany. It was said in the text of the pact itself that “the maintenance and guarantee of lasting peace between the two countries is an essential prerequisite for the general peace of Europe.” The two governments therefore agreed to base their mutual relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris, and they solemnly declared that:

“In no circumstances . . . will they proceed to the application of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such disputes.”

That declaration and agreement was to remain in force for at least 10 years and thereafter it was to remain valid unless it was denounced by either Government 6 months before the expiration of the 10 years, or subsequently by 6 months’ notice. Both at the time of its signature and during the following 4 years Hitler spoke of the German-Polish agreement publicly as though it were a cornerstone of his foreign policy. By entering into it, he persuaded many people that his intentions were genuinely pacific, for the re-emergence of a new Poland and an independent Poland after the war had cost Germany much territory and had separated East Prussia from the Reich. And that Hitler should, of his own accord, enter into friendly relations with Poland—that in his speeches on foreign policy he should proclaim his recognition of Poland and of her right to an exit to the sea, and the necessity for Germans and Poles to live side by side in amity—these facts seemed to the world to be convincing proof that Hitler had no “revisionist” aims which would threaten the peace of Europe; that he was even genuinely anxious to put an end to the age-old hostility between the Teuton and the Slav. If his professions were, as embodied in the treaty and as contained in these declarations, genuine, his policy excluded a renewal of the “Drang nach Osten”, as it had been called, and was thereby going to contribute to the peace and stability of Europe. That was what the people were led to think. We shall have occasion enough to see how little truth these pacific professions in fact contained.

The history of the fateful years from 1934 to 1939 shows quite clearly that the Germans used this treaty, as they used other treaties, merely as an instrument of policy for furthering their aggressive aims. It is clear from the documents which will be presented to the Tribunal that these 5 years fall into two distinct phases in the realization of the aggressive aims which always underlay the Nazi policy. There was first the period from the Nazi assumption of power in 1933 until the autumn of 1937. That was the preparatory period. During that time there occurred the breaches of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, the feverish rearmament of Germany, the reintroduction of conscription, the reoccupation and remilitarization of the Rhineland, and all those other necessary preparatory measures for future aggression which my American colleagues have already so admirably put before the Tribunal.

During that period—the preparatory period—Germany was lulling Poland into a false sense of security. Not only Hitler, but the Defendant Göring and the Defendant Ribbentrop made statements approbating the non-aggression pact. In 1935 Göring was saying that, “The pact was not planned for a period of 10 years but forever; there need not be the slightest fear that it would not be continued.” Even though Germany was steadily building up the greatest war machine that Europe had ever known, and although, by January 1937, the German military position was so strong and so secure that, in spite of the treaty breaches which it involved, Hitler could openly refer to his strong Army, he took pains, at the same time, to say—and again I quote—that:

“By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tensions and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the European atmosphere. I merely recall the agreement with Poland which has worked out to the advantage of both sides.”

And so it went on: abroad, protestations of pacific intentions; at home, “guns before butter.”

In 1937 this preparatory period drew to a close and Nazi policy moved from general preparation for future aggression to specific planning for the attainment of certain specific aggressive aims. And there are two documents in particular which mark that change.

The first of these was called “Directive for Unified Preparation for War”; issued in June 1937—June 29, 1937—by the Reich Minister for War, who was then Von Blomberg, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. That document is important, not only for its military directions, but for the appreciation it contained of the European situation and for the revelation of the Nazi attitude towards it.

“The general political position”—Von Blomberg stated, and I am quoting from the document—“justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an attack from any side. Grounds for this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the deficiencies in the preparedness for war of a number of states, and of Russia in particular.”

It is true, he added, “The intention of unleashing a European war is held just as little by Germany.” And it may be that that phrase was carefully chosen because, as the documents will show, Germany hoped to conquer Europe, perhaps to conquer the world in detail; to fight on one front at a time, against one power at a time, and not to unleash a general European conflict.

But Von Blomberg went on:

“The politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces (a) to counter attack at any time”—yet he had just said that there was no fear of any attack—and “(b)”—and I invite the Tribunal again to notice this phrase—“to enable the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities, should they occur.”

That phrase is no more than a euphemistic description of aggressive war. It reveals the continued adherence of the German military leaders to the doctrine that military might, and if necessary war, should be an instrument of policy—the doctrine which had been explicitly condemned by the Kellogg Pact, which was renounced by the pact with Poland, and by innumerable other treaties.

The document goes on to set out the general preparations necessary for a possible war in the mobilization period of 1937-1938. It is evidence at least for this, that the leaders of the German Armed Forces had it in mind to use the military strength which they were building up for aggressive purposes. No reason, they say, to anticipate attack from any side—there is a lack of desire for war. Yet they prepare to exploit militarily favorable opportunities.

Still more important as evidence of the transition to planned aggression is the record of the important conference which Hitler held at the Reich Chancellery on the 5th of November 1937, at which Von Blomberg, Reich Minister for War; Von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army; Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; Raeder, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; and Von Neurath, then the Foreign Minister, were present. The minutes of that conference have already been put in evidence. I refer to them now only to emphasize those passages which make apparent the ultimate intention to wage an aggressive war. You will remember that the burden of Hitler’s argument at that conference was that Germany required more territory in Europe. Austria and Czechoslovakia were specifically envisaged. But Hitler realized that the process of conquering those two countries might well bring into operation the treaty obligations of Great Britain and of France. He was prepared to take the risk. You remember the passage:

“The history of all times: Roman Empire, British Empire has proved that every space expansion can be effected only by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable: Neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the proprietor. The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest can be made at the lowest possible cost.”

In the course of that conference Hitler had foreseen and discussed the likelihood that Poland would be involved if the aggressive expansionist aims which he put forward brought about a general European war in the course of their realization by the Nazi State. And when, therefore, on that very day on which that conference was taking place, Hitler assured the Polish Ambassador of the great value of the 1934 Pact with Poland, it can only be concluded that its real value in Hitler’s eyes was that of keeping Poland quiet until Germany had acquired such a territorial and strategic position that Poland was no longer a danger.

That view is confirmed by the events which followed. At the beginning of February of 1938 the change from Nazi preparation for aggression to active aggression itself took place. It was marked by the substitution of Ribbentrop for Neurath as Foreign Minister, and of Keitel for Blomberg as head of the OKW. Its first fruits were the bullying of Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938 and the forcible absorption of Austria in March. Thereafter the Green Plan for the destruction of Czechoslovakia was steadily developed in the way which you heard yesterday—the plan partially foiled, or final consummation at least delayed, by the Munich Agreement.

With those aspects, those developments of Nazi aggression, my American colleagues have already dealt. But it is obvious that the acquisition of these two countries, their resources in manpower, their resources in the production of munitions of war, immensely strengthened the position of Germany as against Poland. And it is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that, just as the Defendant Göring assured the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, at the time of the Nazi invasion of Austria, that Hitler recognized the validity of the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty of 1925, and that Germany had no designs against Czechoslovakia herself—you remember, “I give you my word of honor,” the Defendant Göring said—just as that is not surprising, so also it is not perhaps surprising that continued assurances should have been given during 1938 to Poland in order to keep that country from interfering with the Nazi aggression on Poland’s neighbors.

Thus, on the 20th of February of 1938, on the eve of his invasion of Austria, Hitler, referring to the fourth anniversary of the Polish Pact, permitted himself to say this to the Reichstag—and I quote:

“. . . and so a way to a friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which, beginning with Danzig, has today in spite of the attempt of some mischief makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere friendly co-operation . . . Relying on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task ahead of us—peace.”

Still more striking, perhaps, are the cordial references to Poland in Hitler’s speech in the Sportpalast at Berlin on the 26th of September 1938. He then said:

“The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that of our relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and Germans would regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted to prevent this. I know well enough that I should not have been successful if Poland had had a democratic constitution. For these democracies which indulge in phrases about peace are the most bloodthirsty war agitators. In Poland there ruled no democracy, but a man. And with him I succeeded, in precisely 12 months, in coming to an agreement which, for 10 years in the first instance, removed in principle the danger of a conflict. We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting pacification. We realize that here are two peoples which must live together and neither of which can do away with the other. A people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the sea. A way for understanding, then, had to be found, and it will be further extended. But the main fact is that the two governments, and all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples within the two countries, possess the firm will and determination to improve their relations. It was a real work of peace, of more worth than all the chattering in the League of Nations palace at Geneva.”

And so flattery of Poland preceded the annexation of Austria and renewed flattery of Poland preceded the projected annexation of Czechoslovakia. The realities behind these outward expressions of good will are clearly revealed in the documents relating to the Fall Grün, which are already before the Tribunal. They show Hitler as fully aware that there was a risk of Poland, England, and France being involved in war to prevent the German annexation of Czechoslovakia and that this risk, although it was realized, was also accepted. On 25 August of 1938 top-secret orders to the German Air Force in regard to the operations to be conducted against England and France, if they intervened, pointed out that, as the French-Czechoslovak Treaty provided for assistance only in the event of an “unprovoked” attack, it would take a day or two for France and England, and I suppose for their legal advisors to decide whether legally the attack had been unprovoked or not, and consequently a Blitzkrieg, accomplishing its aims before there could be any effective intervention by France or England, was the object to be aimed at.

On the same day an Air Force memorandum on future organization was issued, and to it there was attached a map on which the Baltic States, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were all shown as part of Germany, and preparations for expanding the Air Force, and I quote, “as the Reich grows in area,” as well as dispositions for a two-front war against France and Russia, were discussed. And on the following day Von Ribbentrop was being minuted about the reaction of Poland towards the Czechoslovak problem. I quote: “The fact that after the liquidation of the Czechoslovakian question it will be generally assumed that Poland will be next in turn is not to be denied,” is recognized, but it is stated, “The later this assumption sinks in, the better.”

I will pause for a moment at the date of the Munich Agreement and ask the Tribunal to remind itself of what the evidence of documents and historical facts shows up to that day. It has made undeniable both the fact of Nazi aggressiveness and of active and actual aggression. Not only does that conference of 1937 show Hitler and his associates deliberately considering the acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia, if necessary by war, but the first of the operations had been carried through in March of 1938; and a large part of the second, under threat of war—a threat which as we now see was much more than a bluff—a threat of actual and real war, although without the actual need for its initiation, secured, as I said, a large part of the second objective in September of 1938. And, more ominous still, Hitler had revealed his adherence to the old doctrines of Mein Kampf—those essentially aggressive doctrines to the exposition of which in Mein Kampf, long regarded as the Bible of the Nazi Party, we shall draw attention in certain particular passages. Hitler is indicating quite clearly not only to his associates, but indeed to the world at this time, that he is in pursuit of Lebensraum and that he means to secure it by threat of force, or if threat of force fails, by actual force—by aggressive war.

So far actual warfare had been avoided because of the love of peace, the lack of preparedness, the patience, the cowardice—call it what you will—of the democratic powers; but after Munich the question which filled the minds of all thinking people with acute anxiety was “where will this thing end? Is Hitler now satisfied as he declared himself to be? Or is his pursuit of Lebensraum going to lead to future aggressions, even if he has to embark on open, aggressive war to secure it?”

It was in relation to the remainder of Czechoslovakia and to Poland that the answer to these questions was to be given. So far, up to the time of the Munich Agreement, no direct and immediate threat to Poland had been made. The two documents from which I have just quoted, show of course, that high officers of the Defendant Göring’s air staff already regarded the expansion of the Reich and, it would seem, the destruction and absorption of Poland, as a foregone conclusion. They were already anticipating, indeed, the last stage of Hitler’s policy as expounded in Mein Kampf—war to destroy France and to secure Lebensraum in Russia. And the writer of the minute to Ribbentrop already took it for granted that, after Czechoslovakia, Poland would be attacked. But more impressive than those two documents is the fact that, as I have said, at the conference of 5 November 1937, war with Poland, if she should dare to prevent German aggression against Czechoslovakia, had been quite coolly and calmly contemplated, and the Nazi leaders were ready to take the risk. So also had the risk of war with England and France under the same circumstances been considered and accepted. As I indicated, such a war would, of course, have been aggressive war on Germany’s part, and they were contemplating aggressive warfare. For to force one state to take up arms to defend another state against aggression, in other words, to fulfill its treaty obligations is undoubtedly to initiate aggressive warfare against the first state. But in spite of those plans, in spite of these intentions behind the scenes, it remains true that until Munich the decision for direct attack upon Poland and her destruction by aggressive war had apparently not as yet been taken by Hitler and his associates. It is to the transition from the intention and preparation of initiating aggressive war, evident in regard to Czechoslovakia, to the actual initiation and waging of aggressive war against Poland that I now pass. That transition occupies the 11 months from the 1st of October 1938 to the actual attack on Poland on the 1st of September 1939.

Within 6 months of the signature of the Munich Agreement the Nazi leaders had occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia, which by that Agreement they had indicated their willingness to guarantee. On the 14th of March 1939 the aged and infirm president of the “rump” of Czechoslovakia, Hacha and his Foreign Minister were summoned to Berlin. At a meeting held between 1 o’clock and 2:15 in the small hours of the 15th of March in the presence of Hitler, of the Defendants Ribbentrop, Göring, and Keitel, they were bullied and threatened and even bluntly told that Hitler “had issued the orders for the German troops to move into Czechoslovakia and for the incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the German Reich.”

It was made quite clear to them that resistance would be useless and would be crushed “by force of arms with all available means,” and it was thus that the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up and that Slovakia was turned into a German satellite, though nominally independent state. By their own unilateral action, on pretexts which had no shadow of validity, without discussion with the governments of any other country, without mediation, and in direct contradiction of the sense and spirit of the Munich Agreement, the Germans acquired for themselves that for which they had been planning in September of the previous year, and indeed much earlier, but which at that time they had felt themselves unable completely to secure without too patent an exhibition of their aggressive intentions. Aggression achieved whetted the appetite for aggression to come. There were protests. England and France sent diplomatic notes. Of course, there were protests. The Nazis had clearly shown their hand. Hitherto they had concealed from the outside world that their claims went beyond incorporating into the Reich persons of German race living in bordering territory. Now for the first time, in defiance of their solemn assurances to the contrary, non-German territory and non-German people had been seized. This acquisition of the whole of Czechoslovakia, together with the equally illegal occupation of Memel on the 22d of March 1939, resulted in an immense strengthening of the German positions, both politically and strategically, as Hitler had anticipated it would, when he discussed the matter at that conference in November of 1937.

But long before the consummation by the Nazi leaders of their aggression against Czechoslovakia, they had begun to make demands upon Poland. The Munich settlement achieved on the 25th of October 1938, that is to say within less than a month of Hitler’s reassuring speech about Poland to which I have already referred, and within, of course, a month of the Munich Agreement, M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, reported to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, that at a luncheon at Berchtesgaden the day before, namely, on the 24th of October 1938, the Defendant Ribbentrop had put forward demands for the reunion of Danzig with the Reich and for the building of an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze, the province which the Germans called “The Corridor”. From that moment onwards until the Polish Government had made it plain, as they did during a visit of the Defendant Ribbentrop to Warsaw in January 1939, that they would not consent to hand over Danzig to German sovereignty, negotiations on these German demands continued. And even after Ribbentrop’s return from the visit to Warsaw, Hitler thought it worthwhile, in his Reichstag speech on the 30th of January 1939, to say:

“We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion of our non-aggression pact with Poland. There can scarcely be any difference of opinion today among the true friends of peace as to the value of this agreement. One only needs to ask oneself what might have happened to Europe if this agreement, which brought such relief, had not been entered into 5 years ago. In signing it, the great Polish marshal and patriot rendered his people just as great a service as the leaders of the National Socialist State rendered the German people. During the troubled months of the past year, the friendship between Germany and Poland has been one of the reassuring factors in the political life of Europe.”

But that utterance was the last friendly word from Germany to Poland, and the last occasion on which the Nazi Leaders mentioned the German-Polish Agreement with approbation. During February 1939 silence fell upon German demands in relation to Poland. But as soon as the final absorption of Czechoslovakia had taken place and Germany had also occupied Memel, Nazi pressure upon Poland was at once renewed. In two conversations which he and the Defendant Ribbentrop held on the 21st of March and the 26th of March, respectively, with the Polish Ambassador, German demands upon Poland were renewed and were further pressed. And in view of the fate which had overtaken Czechoslovakia, in view of the grave deterioration in her strategical position towards Germany, it is not surprising that the Polish Government took alarm at the developments. Nor were they alone. The events of March 1939 had at last convinced both the English and the French Governments that the Nazi designs of aggression were not limited to men of German race, and that the specter of European war resulting from further aggressions by Nazi Germany had not, after all, been exorcised by the Munich Agreement.

As a result, therefore, of the concern of Poland and of England and of France at the events in Czechoslovakia, and at the newly applied pressure on Poland, conversations between the English and Polish Governments had been taking place, and, on the 31st of March 1939, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons, stated that His Majesty’s Government had given an assurance to help Poland in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist. On the 6th of April 1939 an Anglo-Polish communiqué stated that the two countries were prepared to enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance given by His Majesty’s Government.

The justification for that concern on the part of the democratic powers is not difficult to find. With the evidence which we now have of what was happening within the councils of the German Reich and its Armed Forces during these months, it is manifest that the German Government were intent on seizing Poland as a whole, that Danzig—as Hitler himself was to say in time, a month later—“was not the subject of the dispute at all.” The Nazi Government was intent upon aggression and the demands and negotiations in respect to Danzig were merely a cover and excuse for further domination.

Would that be a convenient point to stop?

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.