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Tardy ministers and the State Security Council

‘The SSC resolved that certain ministers, after collaboration with one another and with relevant role players … would devise a strategy for releasing, from a position of power, security prisoners from both the right and the left, before Christmas …’

BOTHA’S OFFER of release and Mandela’s response seem reasonably straightforward – a simple binary of action and reaction. However, the Coetsee archive reveals that this was far from the truth. Indeed, key documents in the archive contain some startling revelations that substantially rewrite previous histories of this period.

The first is a top-secret memorandum written and signed by Kobie Coetsee, and addressed to the chairman of the State Security Council (unnamed, but known to have been P.W. Botha). Dated 13 December 1984, it was written in preparation for an SSC meeting the next day. A translation of the complete memorandum follows:

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL

MEETING OF THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL: 14 DECEMBER 1984: SECURITY PRISONERS

On 3 December, the State Security Council took the following decision (item 3 of the Minutes):

(a)‘That the relevant ministers, in collaboration with one another and with institutions such as President Matanzima and Chief Minister Buthelezi, will work out a strategy for releasing, from a position of strength, certain security prisoners from the right and left before Christmas;’ and

(b)‘That the Minister of Justice would submit the strategy to the State Security Council on 14 December 1984.’

The relevant Ministers are Ministers Botha, De Klerk, Le Grange, Viljoen and myself. I have consulted the Ministers both verbally and telephonically, and asked them via their staff to submit any inputs to me by Wednesday 12 December. No written inputs have been received. Minister Botha indicated that he wanted to hold more consultations, that he would prepare inputs, and that those inputs would be sent to me by 13 December, failing which they would be submitted to the meeting. [While this was not stated, it is reasonably clear that ‘Minister Botha’ was a reference to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, an ex officio member of the SSC, and not its chairman, P.W. Botha.]

Officials of the Departments of Justice, the Interior and Foreign Affairs as well as the Directorate Security Legislation have deliberated about the available statutory powers for removing relevant people born in the Transkei from the RSA to the Transkei. The identified possibilities are discussed in Appendix C. To summarise, the conclusion is that no legal authorisation for such a forced removal exists that does not hold serious risks of revision in the Supreme Court, and of possibly being set aside. Such litigation could also bring with its serious political disadvantages, especially as it would involve issues such as citizenship, guaranteed rights, and the removal of persons …

Appendix B contains deliberations about each of these prisoners … with relevant political and security considerations … as well as recommendations about release. Immediate release (that is to say, before Christmas) is only recommended in the case of G[ovan] Mbeki. In respect of Mandela, the recommendation is also positive, with a time scale to be determined either via negotiations with the Transkei and suitable legislation, or the model for Mbeki, based on experience with his release. As far as this person and others are concerned, the question is whether this could be done so that release could hold the maximum advantage and the minimum disadvantage in respect of political and security – so that we will not be worse off after release than we are now.

In formulating these recommendations, I have taken the following into consideration: legal authorisation for removing relevant people to the Transkei …; the contents of the ‘Green Book’ (Total Planning – Book 1 / Policy); the National Intelligence Assessment, which has just become available; the ANC Strategy as adopted by the State Security Council and the draft UDF strategy. Communication and action can only be planned after decisions have been taken.

STAMPED: H.J. COETSEE, Minister of Justice, 1984-12-13

The appendices then follow. Appendix A analyses the eligibility of prisoners in terms of the length of their sentences, their age, and the time spent in prison. Those in category I – prisoners serving life sentences who were older than 65 and had served 20 years of their sentences – include only ‘G. Mbeki, N. Mandela and W. Sisulu’. Appendix B analyses the pros and cons of their potential release in terms of seven categories, namely policy considerations; grounds for release; means of release; political aspects; security aspects; strategy (effectively, the recommendations); and time frame.

In the case of Mandela, no fewer than six ‘possibilities’ are mapped out across all seven categories. Possibility One comprises handing ‘subject’ to the Transkei for detention, either at the full discretion of the Transkei, or on conditions and guarantees approved by the RSA. After citing a host of political and security disadvantages, this option is rejected as ‘not feasible – at least not in the short term’.

Possibility Two comprises unconditional release followed by immediate deportation to the Transkei, with the legal implication that Mandela’s ‘host’ could deal with him at will. This option, the document says, would only be feasible if the legal uncertainties could be eliminated.

Possibility Three comprises unconditional release followed by immediate deportation, but preceded by negotiations with the subject aimed at (a) securing his agreement to be released in the Transkei; and (b) an undertaking that he will not make it necessary for him to be rearrested. This is recommended as the ‘second option’.

Possibility Four comprises unconditional release in the RSA after ‘successful negotiations with the subject’, aimed at securing his agreement to do nothing that would make it necessary for him to be rearrested. ‘However, it is doubtful that subject will sign such document.’ As a result, this option is ‘not regarded as feasible’.

Possibility Five comprises unconditional release on the grounds of age; the fact that ‘subject’ has served 20 years of his sentence; as well as requests by black leaders, ‘not because they regard him as their leader, but because they regard this as advisable’. This is recommended as the ‘first option, in tandem with experience in respect of Mbeki’s release. Simultaneously with Mbeki’s release, it could be announced that Mandela was also under consideration, but proof should be provided that this would not lead to unrest – or that such a step could only be taken in a climate of public order.’

Possibility Six comprises conditional release (parole), aimed at restricting ‘subject’. It could include employment, as well as reporting to the South African Police. Negative factors would include continued agitation for his unconditional release, and the deliberate flouting of parole conditions. This would create opportunities for conflict with the authorities. ‘It will not be possible to restrict the subject, and he could rather be detained in prison for this purpose.’ For these reasons, this option is also ‘not recommended’.

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The implications are inescapable. At an unknown point, but probably in the course of 1984, the SSC took a decision in principle to release political prisoners ‘from both the left and the right’ before Christmas 1984, with the unstated but reasonably obvious implication that ‘prisoners from the left’ would include long-term ‘security prisoners’ such as the Rivonia trialists, including Mandela, Mbeki and Sisulu. At this stage, the SSC still seemed intent on releasing them to the Transkei.

Pursuant to this, Coetsee then recommended that Govan Mbeki be released before Christmas 1984; that the government should announce that it was also considering Mandela’s release; and that he should then be released, at an unspecified time but presumably soon afterwards, provided Mbeki’s release did not have adverse consequences. Most importantly, Mandela would no longer be released to the Transkei, but to the Republic of South Africa. No formal undertakings or ultimatums were mentioned. Significantly, all the options for release to the Transkei (and, by extension, any other ‘independent homeland’) were rejected as ‘inadvisable’ or ‘not feasible’, and Coetsee conjured up a host of legal obstacles in this regard.

This begins to speak to Coetsee’s assertion to co-author Jan-Ad Stemmet two days before his death that his archive would ‘rewrite the story of Mandela’s release’. Specifically, it speaks to Coetsee’s assertion in the course of one of his interviews with the Irish researcher Padraig O’Malley some 25 years later that Mandela’s release flowed from a structural (and non-racially formulated) change in policy regarding the release of ‘security prisoners’, introduced by himself in a deliberately obscure speech in the Senate, which had enabled the release of Breyten Breytenbach in December 1982 – in the full knowledge or with the clear intent that this would eventually result in Mandela’s release as well.

Given the document’s elaborate officialese, and the fact that the ‘recommended’ option of unconditional release in the RSA is buried as Possibility five, it also speaks to Coetsee’s admission to O’Malley that he sometimes deliberately used obfuscation to advance his political agenda.

The second salient document in the Coetsee archive is a top-secret memorandum written on 23 January 1985 by the director-general of Justice, S.S. (Fanie) van der Merwe. This was two days after the Bethell interview, and seven days before Botha’s statement in parliament. Addressed to Coetsee, the memorandum was clearly written after Van der Merwe had studied the Bethell transcript. It casts light on the December meeting of the SSC, as well as the consequences of Bethell’s visit. The entire memorandum minus some paragraph numbering is reproduced below.

NO. 913 PRISONER NELSON MANDELA: POLLSMOOR PRISON: MANAGEMENT [HANTERING]

MINISTER

On 14 December 1984, the State Security Council, among other things, took the following decision with respect to abovementioned prisoner:

‘that he [presumably P.W. Botha] will have no objection if Mandela be informed that numerous people and institutions have asked for him to be released, and that release upon the request of the president and prime minister of Transkei will only be considered if he [Mandela] should undertake to abide by the Law’.

Subsequent to this, Lord Bethell (Britain) spoke to Mandela in the course of an orientation visit on 21 January 1985 to SA Prisons during which he also had the opportunity to conduct discussions with a number of prisoners. In the course of the discussion, which took place in the presence of the Head of Pollsmoor Prison (Major Van Sittert), Mandela expressed himself as follows about the use of violence by the ANC, with which he associated himself:

1.The policy of the RSA government had left the ANC with no other choice;

2.Attempts at ‘constructive engagement’ by the ANC since 1912 had failed;

3.Violence was primarily aimed at so-called hard targets, such as military installations, and not at persons;

4.If soft targets (individuals in charge of or in defence of such hard targets, or even civilians) were to fall victim in the process, this was regrettable;

5.That the ANC was still prepared to negotiate with the RSA government, but only unconditionally, and not under condition that violent actions should first cease.

Aforesaid attitude once again confirms what we already know and/or suspect, namely that to date there is scant indication that Mandela will renounce violence, even if this should result in his release. His attitude is that he has already spent 22 years in prison for this cause, and that he will not capitulate at this stage for personal benefit.

The question therefore arises whether, taking account of the advantages and disadvantages spelled out below, it would still be advisable to confront him with an opportunity to give a firm commitment in this regard:

(a)Advantages:

(i)Gives the Government an opportunity to motivate Mandela’s non-release on the grounds that he advocates violence. [The Government] will be able to substantiate this in writing.

(b)Disadvantages:

(i)He [Mandela] could grab the opportunity to give such an undertaking, but could qualify it in such a way that it could rob the undertaking of any value, or embarrass the government.

(ii)A declaration in favour of violence would increase his stature as a determined leader, and limit the government’s future options should it become advantageous to release him – this would also make it difficult for Mandela to change his stance at a later stage.

(iii)It would detract from the government’s strongman image to be seen at all to approach Mandela with such a proposal – it could be interpreted as a peace offering to the ANC.

PROPOSAL

That, in the light of the foregoing considerations, no effect is given to the [SSC] decision cited [above], but that, added to the results of a discussion on 23 January between Professor Samuel Dash (USA) [a law professor at Georgetown University in Washington DC] and Mandela, for purposes of the record, an arrangement should be made that the Commanding Officer of Pollsmoor Prison, Brigadier F.C. Munro, during a routine discussion which he has to conduct with Mandela in any case, should explore the same terrain. This would have the character of an incidental and informal person to person discussion, and not one of government to prisoner.

This will allow the government to state that Mandela’s prognosis is such that he cannot be released at this stage, given that he still advocates violence, and therefore remains part of the armed struggle. At the same time, this will not imply a firm commitment from his side. Therefore, his stature should not benefit from this, while it would give the government an adequate opportunity, from a position of power, and should this become necessary and strategically advisable, to release him unconditionally in terms of a prognosis that may then read differently – a management strategy [hanteringswyse] that allows for far greater freedom of movement.

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These documents allow us to unravel this hidden sequence of events for the first time. Specifically, how do Coetsee’s recommendation to the SSC, the council’s eventual decision, Van der Merwe’s recommendation to the SSC, and P.W. Botha’s later offer to Mandela and others follow on and differ from one another?

Firstly, the initial decision of the SSC seems to reflect a reasonably unequivocal determination to release ‘security prisoners from the right and left’, including Mbeki, Mandela and Sisulu. This corresponds with Coetsee’s assertion in later years that the release of Mandela emanated from a policy change relating to the release of long-term ‘security prisoners’ introduced by himself in 1982.

Next, Coetsee proposes the release first of Govan Mbeki as a litmus test and then – provided this does not result in political unrest – the effectively unconditional release of Mandela. No personal commitment or undertaking by Mandela is mentioned.

Next, at its meeting on 14 December, the SSC (in effect P.W. Botha) decides ‘he will have no objection’ if Mandela is informed that various people and institutions have asked for him to be released, but that this will only be considered if he undertakes to ‘abide by the law’. While these people are said to include Matanzima and other homeland leaders, the offer no longer seems to imply that Mandela would be released to the Transkei. However, this introduces the notion of a personal commitment by Mandela, which was not present in Coetsee’s recommendation.

Next, expectations that Mandela would tell Bethell he was prepared to renounce political violence – or that Bethell would persuade him to do so – have a predictable but disappointing outcome. Accordingly, Van der Merwe recommends to the next meeting of the SSC that the previous resolution would need to be abandoned for the time being, but proposes – remarkably – that the situation should be kept as fluid as possible and options kept open, thereby avoiding both sides painting themselves into a corner.

Indeed, Van der Merwe’s memorandum seems to be a desperate attempt to prevent Botha from presenting Mandela with any kind of ultimatum. By then, senior prison staff were on intimate and even cordial terms with Mandela, perhaps to the point of feeling protective about him, and Van der Merwe knew precisely what the outcome of the SSC decision (effectively Botha’s) would be. Whether this intervention was either initiated or encouraged by Coetsee is unknown. It is also unknown whether the SSC met between the date of the letter and Botha’s eventual statement in parliament. But the die had been cast.

Next, Botha announces in parliament that he is prepared to release Mandela and other ‘security prisoners’, provided they formally renounce violence. On the one hand, the move signifies that Botha and the government have finally abandoned their long-held objective of releasing Mandela to the Transkei. On the other, Botha’s announcement does exactly what Van der Merwe tried to avoid, namely to harden positions on both sides. Once again, it appears that, albeit seven months before his infamous speech in Durban, Botha moved to the bank of the Rubicon, and then stepped back from it.

The response from Mandela and his four ‘comrades from the roof’ is predictable. It would take two more years before Coetsee would start talking to Mandela; four more before Govan Mbeki would be released from Robben Island; and five more before Mandela walked out of Victor Verster Prison.

While it would be specious to suggest that their earlier release would have hastened the resolution of the South African political conflict, the intervening years saw two states of emergency and the deaths of many thousands of people, both in South Africa and in the broader southern African region, which bore much of the brunt of the South African conflict.

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Later in 1985, Mandela writes, he was taken to the Volks Hospital in Cape Town ‘under heavy guard’ for a prostate operation. Besides Winnie, he had a surprising and unexpected visitor in the form of Kobie Coetsee, who dropped by the hospital unannounced ‘as if he were visiting an old friend’. On the way back to Pollsmoor Prison, he was told that he would be separated from his colleagues, and was placed in a new cell unit comprising three rooms and a separate toilet. Again, no explanation was provided.1

While he was not happy about being separated from his colleagues, he realised that his solitude gave him a new opportunity, namely to begin discussions with the South African government. ‘I had concluded that the time had come when the struggle could best be pushed forward through negotiations … My solitude would give me an opportunity to take the first steps in that direction, without the kind of scrutiny that might destroy such efforts.’

This would be extremely sensitive, and a decision to talk to the government was so important that it should only have been made by ANC headquarters in Lusaka. But he felt the process needed to begin, and he had neither the time nor the means to communicate fully with Oliver Tambo. ‘Someone from outside needed to take the first step, and my new isolation gave me both the freedom to do so and the assurance, at least for a while, of the confidentiality of my efforts …’

In a candid passage, Mandela writes: ‘I chose to tell no one what I was about to do. Not my colleagues upstairs, nor those in Lusaka. The ANC is a collective, but the government had made collectivity in this case impossible. I did not have the security or the time to discuss these issues with my organisation. I knew that my colleagues upstairs would condemn my proposal, and that would kill my initiative even before it was born. There are times when a leader must move out ahead of the flock, go off in a new direction, confident that he is leading his people the right way …’

Within a few weeks, he wrote to Coetsee to propose talks about talks, but received no response. However, another opportunity to be heard came in early 1986.