Читать книгу Security Engineering - Ross Anderson - Страница 41

The rest of the world's governments have quite a range of cyber capabilities, but common themes, including the nature and source of their tools. Middle Eastern governments were badly shaken by the Arab Spring uprisings, and some even turned off the Internet for a while, such as Libya in April–July 2010, when rebels were using Google maps to generate target files for US, UK and French warplanes. Since then, Arab states have developed strategies that combine spyware and hacking against high-profile targets, through troll farms pumping out abusive comments in public fora, with physical coercion.

The operations of the United Arab Emirates were described in 2019 by a whistleblower, Lori Stroud [248]. An NSA analyst – and Ed Snowden's former boss – she was headhunted by a Maryland contractor in 2014 to work in Dubai as a mercenary, but left after the UAE's operations started to target Americans. The UAE's main technique was spear-phishing with Windows malware, but their most effective tool, called Karma, enabled them to hack the iPhones of foreign statesmen and local dissidents. They also targeted foreigners critical of the regime. In one case they social-engineered a UK grad student into installing spyware on his PC on the pretext that it would make his communications hard to trace. The intelligence team consisted of several dozen people, both mercenaries and Emiratis, in a large villa in Dubai. The use of iPhone malware by the UAE government was documented by independent observers [1221].

In 2018, the government of Saudi Arabia murdered the Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in its consulate in Istanbul. The Post campaigned to expose Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman as the man who gave the order, and in January 2019 the National Enquirer published a special edition containing texts showing that the Post's owner Jeff Bezos was having an affair. Bezos pre-empted the Enquirer by announcing that he and his wife were divorcing, and hired an investigator to find the source of the leak. The Enquirer had attempted to blackmail Bezos over some photos it had also obtained; it wanted both him and the investigator to declare that the paper hadn't relied upon ‘any form of electronic eavesdropping or hacking in their news-gathering process’. Bezos went public instead. According to the investigator, his iPhone had been hacked by the Saudi Arabian government [200]; the malicious WhatsApp message that did the damage was sent from the phone of the Crown Prince himself [1055]. The US Justice Department later charged two former Twitter employees with spying, by disclosing to the Saudis personal account information of people who criticised their government [1502].

An even more unpleasant example is Syria, where the industrialisation of brutality is a third approach to scaling information collection. Malware attacks on dissidents were reported from 2012, and initially used a variety of spear-phishing lures. As the civil war got underway, police who were arresting suspects would threaten female family members with rape on the spot unless the suspect disclosed his passwords for mail and social media. They would then spear-phish all his contacts while he was being taken away in the van to the torture chamber. This victim-based approach to attack scaling resulted in the compromise of many machines not just in Syria but in America and Europe. The campaigns became steadily more sophisticated as the war evolved, with false-flag attacks, yet retained a brutal edge with some tools displaying beheading videos [737].

Thanks to John Scott-Railton and colleagues at Toronto, we have many further documented examples of online surveillance, computer malware and phone exploits being used to target dissidents; many in Middle Eastern and African countries but also in Mexico and indeed in Hungary [1221]. The real issue here is the ecosystem of companies, mostly in the USA, Europe and Israel, that supply hacking tools to unsavoury states. These tools range from phone malware, through mass-surveillance tools you use on your own network against your own dissidents, to tools that enable you to track and eavesdrop on phones overseas by abusing the signaling system [489]. These tools are used by dictators to track and monitor their enemies in the USA and Europe.

NGOs have made attempts to push back on this cyber arms trade. In one case NGOs argued that the Syrian government's ability to purchase mass-surveillance equipment from the German subsidiary of a UK company should be subject to export control, but the UK authorities were unwilling to block it. GCHQ was determined that if there were going to be bulk surveillance devices on President Assad's network, they should be British devices rather than Ukrainian ones. (I describe this in more detail later in section 26.2.8.) So the ethical issues around conventional arms sales persist in the age of cyber; indeed they can be worse because these tools are used against Americans, Brits and others who are sitting at home but who are unlucky enough to be on the contact list of someone an unpleasant government doesn't like. In the old days, selling weapons to a far-off dictator didn't put your own residents in harm's way; but cyber weapons can have global effects.

Having been isolated for years by sanctions, Iran has developed an indigenous cyber capability, drawing on local hacker forums. Like Syria, its main focus is on intelligence operations, particularly against dissident Iranians, both at home and overseas. It has also been the target of US and other attacks of which the best known was Stuxnet, after which it traced the CIA's covert communications network and rounded up a number of agents [578]. It has launched both espionage operations and attacks of its own overseas. An example of the former was its hack of the Diginotar CA in the Netherlands which enabled it to monitor dissidents' Gmail; while its Shamoon malware damaged thousands of PCs at Aramco, Saudi Arabia's national oil company. The history of Iranian cyber capabilities is told by Collin Anderson and Karim Sadjadpour [50]. Most recently, it attacked Israeli water treatment plants in April 2020; Israel responded the following month with an attack on the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas [230].

Finally, it's worth mentioning North Korea. In 2014, after Sony Pictures started working on a comedy about a plot to assassinate the North Korean leader, a hacker group trashed much of Sony's infrastructure, released embarrassing emails that caused its top film executive Amy Pascal to resign, and leaked some unreleased films. This was followed by threats of terrorist attacks on movie theatres if the comedy were put on general release. The company put the film on limited release, but when President Obama criticised them for giving in to North Korean blackmail, they put it on full release instead.

In 2017, North Korea again came to attention after their Wannacry worm infected over 200,000 computers worldwide, encrypting data and demanding a bitcoin ransom – though like NotPetya it didn't have a means of selective decryption, so was really just a destructive worm. It used the NSA EternalBlue vulnerability, like NotPetya, but was stopped when a malware researcher discovered a kill switch. In the meantime it had disrupted production at carmakers Nissan and Renault and at the Taiwanese chip foundry TSMC, and also caused several hospitals in Britain's National Health Service to close their accident and emergency units. In 2018, the US Department of Justice unsealed an indictment of a North Korean government hacker for both incidents, and also for a series of electronic bank robberies, including of $81m from the Bank of Bangladesh [1656]. In 2019, North Korean agents were further blamed, in a leaked United Nations report, for the theft of over $1bn from cryptocurrency exchanges [348].