Читать книгу Fateful Triangle - Tanvi Madan - Страница 23

Korea was not the only Asian conflict that caused US-India strain; there was also the situation in Indochina, where Ho Chi Minh’s Vietminh was taking on US ally France. US and Indian objectives in Southeast Asia were not entirely disparate. Eisenhower and Dulles believed that after the loss of China to the communist world, a loss in Vietnam—to the China-backed Vietminh—would be crippling. Even with an upswing in Sino-Indian relations, however, India had no interest in greater Chinese influence in the region.⁴⁷ And American officials acknowledged that Delhi desired neither a return to colonialism nor a turn to communism in the region nor “a further consolidation of external communist power.”⁴⁸

But, while their goals in Southeast Asia might have been similar, once again, India and the US had different ideas about the right approach. Nehru was critical of Washington’s “purely military approach in aid of a colonial power.” Communists were no doubt taking advantage of the situation, but, he believed, at its root this was about nationalism. He understood American motivations—anti-communism and the desire not to abandon ally France—but he thought its approach was counterproductive, creating the opportunity for communists in Indochina.⁴⁹

The differences were evident in spring 1954 as a settlement conference was being discussed. Dulles gave what came to be called his massive retaliation speech, and also made clear American reluctance to participate in a conference. Furthermore, he publicly dismissed criticism of the US nonrecognition of the Chinese communist regime. Dulles insisted this policy was “soberly rational” given Beijing’s “consistently and viciously hostile” behavior toward the US. He argued that communist promises were unreliable and outlined the administration’s preferred alternative of united action against the Chinese threat.⁵⁰

Nehru found it “rather odd” and unhelpful that, ahead of the conference planned in Geneva, Dulles had given a speech emphasizing the need for collective action against the communist threat in East Asia.⁵¹ He worried that the secretary of state would play spoiler at the talks so that a collective security organization would come into being as an alternative. The US, he felt, only seemed to be able to “think in terms of war or threat of war and massive retaliation,” which rendered a solution impossible.⁵²

But Dulles’s move was deliberate—he thought it would serve as a warning to China. Given the imminent fall of Dien Bien Phu, it could also help the weak French negotiating position at the conference. Eisenhower had been skeptical of the British and French belief in the value of negotiations with the communists—and disapproved of the influence India seemed to have with British policymakers on this question. Nonetheless, the president did not want to break with allies who hoped to reach a settlement at Geneva. So he agreed to send US representatives to the conference, even as Dulles hoped that the negotiations would “acrimoniously collapse.”⁵³

India’s fallen stock as an honest broker shaped the American attitude toward its involvement in the Geneva conference that April. Dulles’s initial reluctance about such a summit was indeed partly due to any related elevation of India to a leading role in Asia.⁵⁴ The US eventually succeeded in officially excluding India from the conference. Nonetheless, as the Indian embassy in Beijing noted, India “was more than present”—the result of Nehru sending Krishna Menon to Geneva.⁵⁵

The conference did not alleviate Nehru’s doubts about the US approach. Unlike Dulles, the prime minister did not think the participating Chinese premier was “uncompromising” or merely following Moscow’s lead at the conference. He believed that any rigidity on Zhou’s part stemmed from American behavior—a sense exacerbated by Zhou’s assertion to Nehru that the US attitude basically was “to obstruct any settlement in the Conference.”⁵⁶

Nehru thought the options in Southeast Asia were clear: (1) a settlement that accepted and stabilized the status quo and essentially prevented Chinese expansion, or (2) a lack of agreement, which meant continuation of military activity that would benefit China and the Vietminh. He was concerned that US policy was leading to the latter, which, in turn, would eventually lead to war.⁵⁷ Seeking a settlement, Nehru proposed a peace plan in conjunction with other Asian leaders and sought British support for it. Furthermore, egged on by British foreign secretary Anthony Eden, Nehru urged Zhou to cease large-scale attacks in Indochina, even getting the Chinese premier’s public endorsement in principle of noninterference in Southeast Asia.⁵⁸

Nehru had not expected much to come from the Geneva conference but was relatively pleased with the result.⁵⁹ Krishna Menon’s shuttle diplomacy facilitated the achievement of a settlement. India subsequently agreed to chair the International Control Commission, created to supervise ceasefires in Indochina. The US, on the other hand, refused to sign the agreement. It had been pleased neither with the settlement nor with Krishna Menon’s shuttling.

The US-India differences on Indochina only added to negative American perceptions of India’s role in Asia. An unnamed US policymaker lamented publicly that “the Chinese Communists in a sense hold a veto over India.”⁶⁰ During congressional hearings on the foreign assistance program, members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee questioned India’s attitude. Representative John Martin Vorys (R-OH) asserted that India was a “neutral that isn’t even neutral.” Representatives Ralph E. Church (R-IL) and Walter Judd (R-MN) commented that continued assistance to an unsupportive India adversely affected the US position with supportive partners in Asia. Representative Donald Jackson (R-CA) pointed out that India had actively put up “stumbling blocks” for the US.⁶¹

One of those obstacles was Nehru’s reiteration that foreign forces en route to Indochina would not be permitted to fly over India. Representative Frances P. Bolton (R-OH) wondered if Indian policymakers realized that their attitude on Indochina was going “to bring communism right to their own doors.”⁶² Appropriations Committee chairman Senator Styles Bridges and others said the US should keep in mind Nehru’s refusal when considering aid to India. Senator Homer Ferguson (R-MI) added that India’s action “gave aid and comfort to the communist world.”⁶³

Congressional criticism had an impact in India—but not the kind intended. Nehru said that while “it would be grossly unfair … to judge the United States by the speeches of some Senators … inevitably there are reactions in India to speeches and writings in the press.”⁶⁴ Reports indicated that even Indian friends of the US and critics of Nehru were disappointed by the outburst against India in Congress.⁶⁵ The prime minister also expressed doubts to his ambassador in Washington about accepting American aid since the two countries were at such loggerheads.⁶⁶

There would be further doubts, as the US turned to a different approach to contain communism in Asia: collective security. US ambassador to India George V. Allen told Congress this was the source of the “biggest difference” between the US and India.⁶⁷ And when the administration subsequently announced the consideration of a collective security organization in Asia—the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)—this only further exacerbated US-India tensions.⁶⁸