Читать книгу Fateful Triangle - Tanvi Madan - Страница 26

Most Indian policymakers disagreed that India needed such protection and objected even more vociferously to the way the Eisenhower administration envisioned protecting Asia. Indeed, in mid-1953, US intelligence analysts had noted that the American anticommunist efforts that made India the most apprehensive were those directed against China.⁸⁶

The approach Eisenhower and Dulles took focused on pressuring China. They had concluded that there were few near-term feasible options to get rid of the communist government in Beijing. Pressure, on the other hand, could facilitate internal instability. Isolating China would also strain Sino-Soviet relations since Beijing would depend more on and demand more of Moscow. Thus their strategy envisioned trade embargos, covert action, and psychological warfare, as well as refusing to recognize Mao’s regime or support its bid to take the Chinese seat at the UN.⁸⁷

Nehru told Indian heads of mission that this American approach to China was “unrealistic and fallacious.”⁸⁸ He remained frustrated about the US reluctance to recognize the regime in Beijing.⁸⁹ Washington was leaving a “major factor out of reckoning. It is bound to upset the cart.”⁹⁰ Nehru also worried about the consequences of the “obviously wrong” American effort to keep Taipei in and Beijing out of the UN Security Council, noting, “a whole castle is sought to be built on an artificial foundation; and then, if something goes wrong afterwards, complaint is made.”⁹¹ Furthermore, isolating rather than engaging Beijing only kept it more connected to Moscow.⁹²

Asked during a congressional hearing in 1953 if he and Nehru agreed at all on China, Dulles had said no.⁹³ He had told the South Korean president that their key difference was on tactics—India believed “the methods of appeasement rather than strength would weaken the communist world.”⁹⁴ There was little expectation that Delhi would change its approach. Nehru had told Dulles what he had told Truman: that India had to deal with China for reasons of geography and pragmatism—their countries shared a 2,000-mile boundary. And he did not want “trouble for the indefinite future,” especially since the Indian leadership needed peace for nation-building.⁹⁵

In the post-Stalin era, American analysts saw Beijing’s willingness to come to the table for talks on Korea as only reinforcing Indian views that China did not intend to behave aggressively.⁹⁶ US policymakers knew that India wanted to establish a modus vivendi with the regime in Beijing. For that reason, an NSC assessment had predicted in early 1954, “India will go to great lengths to win Red China’s friendship.”⁹⁷ Indeed, India was doing just that at the time, with negotiations that would culminate in the signing of a Sino-Indian agreement that included the five principles of peaceful coexistence (or Panchsheel).

Did US military aid to Pakistan cause Delhi to seek a peace agreement with Beijing? Allen believed it did.⁹⁸ And Indian foreign secretary R. K. Nehru did argue for “nonaggression pacts with the Soviet and Chinese” governments as one of the ways to maintain the balance with Pakistan.⁹⁹ However, while the announcement of American aid to Pakistan might have contributed, India’s desire to deepen its relations with China had preceded it. In March 1953, Burmese prime minister U Nu had first suggested that Burma, China, and India sign a fifty-year friendship and nonaggression agreement. Nehru had been unsure of the Chinese reaction given Beijing’s adverse response to the Indian resolution on Korea at the UN in late 1952 and the resultant “coolness” toward India. Nonetheless, Nehru had welcomed the idea, but only if it was not “anti” any country. He also thought the duration too long, recommending instead a decade-long agreement with the possibility of renewal. He had suggested that rather than a trilateral agreement, the countries aim for bilateral ones. Nehru had wanted to be careful, telling the Indian ambassador in Beijing that any such agreements would have a powerful impact, especially on the US. Moreover, Beijing should not think Delhi wanted this more—China “did not respect those who show weakness,” so India should be “both friendly and firm.”¹⁰⁰

From Nehru’s perspective, continuing global and regional tension in fall 1953, despite Stalin’s death and the end of the Korean War, had made it even more important for India to seek peace with China. But, thanks to India’s NNRC role, Sino-Indian relations were not “not quite happy,” as the Indian embassy in Beijing put it.¹⁰¹ Therefore, Nehru had sought to avoid steps that China would see as unfriendly.¹⁰² Subsequently, he had moved to settle issues that could cause tension between the two countries, announcing in September 1953 that his government had reached out to Beijing seeking talks.¹⁰³

China and India began discussing the status of Tibet at the end of December 1953. In March 1954, Pillai told Allen to expect “some kind of statement of mutual desire … to maintain peace between [the] two countries” if the negotiations were successful.¹⁰⁴ What emerged was the Sino-Indian agreement, signed in April 1954, through which India implicitly recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Explicitly, it laid out rights for trade and pilgrimages between India and Tibet, as well as Indian promises to withdraw its military missions and reduce its overall footprint in Tibet. Finally, it contained the five principles of peaceful coexistence, or Panchsheel, including clauses on mutual respect for territorial integrity and noninterference in each other’s internal affairs.

An NSC assessment saw the Indian desire for an accommodation with China through a cultural prism and thought it stemmed from “legendary bonds of friendship and culture” and “psychological ties arising from the fact that the Chinese as a colored race and as Asians have asserted themselves against the West.”¹⁰⁵ But, for Nehru, there was a more important reason. While he did not think there was any “immediate likelihood,” it was not inconceivable that India’s relations with China would deteriorate. He told senior foreign ministry officials that there could be a new phase of Chinese expansionism in the future, and the only feasible solution for India was to “fashion our policy to prevent [China] coming in the way of our interests or other interests that we consider important.” The agreement might not be “a permanent guarantee,” but it was a useful insurance policy at that stage.¹⁰⁶ Beijing could change its mind, he acknowledged to Burmese leader U Nu, but he wanted to take advantage of that moment when it sought Delhi’s friendship.¹⁰⁷ This approach was especially desirable for a leadership that did not want to enter an alliance to ensure the country’s security. Moreover, Nehru believed that India’s importance increased because of its “intimate relations” with China since Delhi could “say things [to Beijing] which many other nations could not.”¹⁰⁸

The Sino-Indian agreement did not help India’s cause in the US. The New York Times declared, “Peiping Gets Indian Gift.”¹⁰⁹ On Capitol Hill, Representative Bolton called the agreement the “first step toward the communization of India.”¹¹⁰ Allen tried to explain that the “favorable Indian attitude toward China is not because China is Communist, but in spite of the fact that it is Communist.” He acknowledged that the agreement might not be a good deal but said Indian policymakers accepted it as “the best deal they could get.”¹¹¹

Nehru traced the criticism to lack of awareness of the bigger picture—that the agreement was an effort to “encircle and contain China in a ring of pledges,” as one scholar put it.¹¹² Indians generally approved of it, but there were voices of dissent from China critics in the Praja Socialist Party on the left and the Hindu Mahasabha on the right, and even from some in the Congress Party.¹¹³ But for the prime minister, an alternate approach was neither feasible nor desirable. What India lost—rights in Tibet—it could not have held on to; moreover, what India gained outweighed any loss: “a friendly frontier and an implicit acceptance of that frontier.”¹¹⁴ India did not have the ability to act within Tibet. It could merely tolerate, without encouraging, the Tibetan movement in India—which he assumed the US was supporting—if it was “peaceful and unobtrusive.”¹¹⁵ Finally, Nehru contended that “assum[ing] an aggressive role” would only lead to trouble.¹¹⁶

After the treaty was signed, Zhou Enlai suddenly accepted a pending invitation to visit India, pleasantly surprising Nehru.¹¹⁷ In the US, a New York Times editorial reflected American disapproval, noting with chagrin that Zhou’s visit was taking place on the fourth anniversary of the Chinese-“aided and abetted” North Korean invasion of South Korea.¹¹⁸ In India, Zhou was well received. Nehru and the premier did not discuss potentially contentious issues like the Sino-Indian border—Nehru indeed thought that the very act of bringing the subject up might suggest doubt about India’s frontiers, which he asserted were settled.¹¹⁹ Sarvepalli (S.) Radhakrishnan, the Indian vice president, told Allen that Zhou was reasonable about every subject, except one—the US.¹²⁰

US policy toward China was a key subject in the Sino-Indian discussions, and their different perceptions of and policies toward the US were evident. The Chinese premier wanted China and India to use the Panchsheel principles jointly to help stop the spread of the US military bloc in Asia. But, while highly critical of US policy toward China in internal correspondence, Nehru was more circumspect in conversations with Zhou. He admitted that US-India relations were “not good,” but declined Zhou’s suggestion that China and India try to corner or isolate the US. Furthermore, Nehru tried to explain the motivation behind US policy toward China, stating that it partly stemmed from domestic politics. He noted, moreover, “the vicious circle of fear”—acting out of fear, the US was encircling and, in turn, creating fear in China and the Soviet Union.¹²¹

In order not to exacerbate American anxieties or further harm US-India relations, Nehru ensured that the Sino-Indian joint statement emerging from the visit did not condemn the US or any other country. Furthermore, as in the case of a US-sponsored Pacific Pact and SEATO, he emphasized his lack of interest in what he interpreted as Zhou’s suggestion for a grouping of Southeast Asian countries; instead, he urged the premier to pursue bilateral understandings with Southeast Asian countries to reassure them.¹²² Nehru would later also resist visiting Beijing at the same time as Burmese prime minister U Nu, in case that was misconstrued as the beginnings of an anti-SEATO alliance.¹²³

US intelligence analysts saw Zhou’s visits to India and Burma as part of a Chinese effort to split the noncommunist countries, “dull the[ir] vigilance,” and buy time. Simultaneously, they believed Beijing would continue to subvert noncommunist regimes and build up Chinese military capability.¹²⁴ After the visit, Allen and his Canadian counterpart worried that Nehru had bought China’s “peaceful intentions” line. The American ambassador lamented that as long as Nehru had “blind faith” in China’s good intentions, he would not even help guarantee Burma’s security—let alone do more.¹²⁵ There was also concern about the impact on the Indian public’s perceptions of China and the US. In India, Zhou had publicly offered reassurances about China’s intentions, while explaining Chinese concern about American encirclement and regime change efforts, “thus endeavoring to avert [a] picture of China as aggressor to [a] picture of China as [a] victim of United States aggressive designs.”¹²⁶

Pillai, in turn, assessed that Zhou’s trip had been designed to reassure India, and also to show Beijing’s independence from Moscow.¹²⁷ After the visit, Nehru admitted that Zhou’s assurances could have been part of a “clever strategy looking to the distant future.”¹²⁸ Nonetheless, at that point he was convinced that Chinese leaders did not want war because it would disrupt their efforts to improve conditions within China. The only thing, he believed, that would provoke them was fear of attack. He was impressed by Zhou’s questions about what might reassure Southeast Asian countries. He perceived the lack of an attack on Burma—even though Guomindang (GMD) operations from there gave Beijing an excuse—as evidence of China’s desire for peace.¹²⁹ Asked by an American correspondent about Zhou’s continued insistence that China had the right to use force to take Taiwan, Nehru said he disagreed with that contention, but dismissed it as directed toward a domestic audience.¹³⁰

Assured about China’s near-term intentions, Nehru seemed even more convinced that Washington’s China policy was obstructive. He pointed out to U Nu that he was not alone in thinking that US nonrecognition of the regime in Beijing was unhelpful. He pointed to statements by the Australian and New Zealand foreign ministers. Furthermore, he saw US behavior at Geneva at the time—and, later, the formation of SEATO—as only exacerbating the situation.¹³¹

Some Indian policymakers believed that the state of Sino-Indian relations proved that the Indian approach was better than that of the US. The Indian embassy in China noted that the Sino-Indian agreement showed that Beijing was willing to be a “reasonable negotiator.”¹³² Nehru told Eden that it suggested a better way than military alliances to “restrain and resolve conflicts.”¹³³ Writing to Indian chief ministers, he outlined his disagreement with the American attitude that communists would never stick to their agreements so it was better to use force rather than diplomacy, pressure rather than persuasion. Moreover, US policy had not been effective and represented a “record of repeated failure.”¹³⁴

Nehru subsequently traveled to China in October 1954. The US was again discussed in the Sino-Indian meetings, especially since the visit took place as the first Taiwan Strait crisis was unfolding. Once again, there were differences; once again, Nehru tried to inject moderation into Beijing’s attitude toward the US. He noted that the US position was not as monolithic and hostile as China believed. But Zhou questioned American intentions, asserting that Washington—unlike Delhi or Beijing—did not want to ease global tensions. The US was not just out to protect its interests, as Nehru insisted, but wanted to enlarge them through hostilities. Trying to convince Nehru, Zhou argued that the US was encouraging Pakistan to be expansionist. He drew a contrast with China’s willingness to reassure countries in the neighborhood, noting that the US was doing the opposite. The discussion left Nehru commenting that Zhou’s approach toward the US—with its insistence on preventing American expansion, isolating Washington, and not appeasing the US—mirrored what Washington said about Beijing.¹³⁵

In their first meeting, Mao reiterated to Nehru that the US was a threat. When Nehru tried to explain that fear influenced US policies, the chairman retorted that he could not understand what a country like the US had to fear.¹³⁶ Nehru disagreed with Mao that war should be welcomed if it came. Responding to the chairman, Nehru asserted that, while the Defense Department’s growing influence was problematic, most Americans, including many in government, did not want war. He included Eisenhower in the latter category, explaining that any inconsistency in the president’s position was thanks to his “third-rate advisers.”¹³⁷

Publicly, Nehru denied reports that China and India had sharp differences, noting that, while in some cases their basic approaches were different, there were no disagreements during the talks.¹³⁸ He insisted that following different paths did not inevitably lead to conflict.¹³⁹ Privately, Nehru told Zhou that he hoped that any differences would not preclude cooperation.¹⁴⁰

Washington watched this trip closely, coming as it did after the Manila Pact creating SEATO. Dulles thought that Nehru’s visit to China might be “on balance, advantageous to the West.” He believed that the prime minister’s China policy stemmed from “admiration and fear in about equal proportions.” He hoped that the visit would heighten that fear via a better understanding of the “implications for India of Chinese Communist policies and strength.”¹⁴¹ But, after his trip, Nehru publicly contradicted Dulles’s assertion that there was no proof that China had changed intentions.¹⁴² Mirror-imaging again, he asserted this view privately as well, stating that he had “no doubt at all that the Government and the people of China desire peace and want to concentrate on building up their country during the next decade or two.”¹⁴³

The US, concerned about the impact of improved Sino-Indian relations, tried to foster Sino-Indian dissension. One way was to suggest that India replace China on the UN Security Council. This could also help settle the two-Chinas problem.¹⁴⁴ The idea was not new—as an adviser to the Truman State Department, Dulles had suggested to Pandit in August 1950 that “America might be happy” with such a move (she had thought it inadvisable given Sino-Indian relations).¹⁴⁵ Nehru would later tell Soviet leaders in 1955 that he opposed this, primarily on the grounds that it was intended to disrupt the Sino-Indian relationship. It was not quite clear how Washington planned to bring Moscow on board. The latter only indicated to Delhi that it might suggest India’s inclusion as a sixth member “at a later stage.”¹⁴⁶ Nehru eventually acknowledged that the substitution plan might be a way for the US to alleviate its problem of how to include Beijing in the United Nations General Assembly without excluding Taipei, but he remained opposed. He thought the result would be a break with China, which India could not afford.¹⁴⁷

One result of India’s engagement with China was more American attention. In the aftermath of Nehru’s visit to China, on Dulles’s urging, Eisenhower wrote to Nehru stressing that “differences in approach [did not] constitute any bar to growing friendship and cooperation” between the US and India. There was a great amount of “common ground on which we can work out mutual problems and minimize differences.” Nehru agreed, saying differences in approach were “natural,” but “should not be allowed to come in the way.”¹⁴⁸ Good intentions, however, were not enough to overcome the tensions generated by differences over their methods.

A key source of that tension—Indian engagement with China—continued, with a year of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) culminating in China’s coming-out party at the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in April 1955. Publicly, Dulles said the conference was of no direct concern to the US. Privately, however, Allen, now the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs, told the Indian ambassador that the inclusion of China at the conference would not be “well received.”¹⁴⁹ But Nehru had dismissed these objections and US pressure on the other organizers, insisting that China needed to be invited.¹⁵⁰ For him, as John Garver has observed, the conference was part of “creating political constraints” on China.¹⁵¹ And at Bandung, Nehru found Zhou to be “accommodating” and countries like Pakistan and Turkey—spurred, he believed, by Washington—to be obstructive.¹⁵²