Читать книгу Fateful Triangle - Tanvi Madan - Страница 34

Nehru’s visit helped highlight an aspect of the relationship that had been improving over the previous few months: the increased understanding of, if not convergence with, the other government’s foreign policy approach. This improvement, which would continue for the rest of the Eisenhower administration, had a salutary effect on the relationship.

For one, there was greater tolerance on the part of Eisenhower for what he called neutralism and Nehru called nonalignment. This meant less criticism and more acceptance of Delhi’s diversified portfolio of partners as it pursued relationships with both Moscow and Washington. There was a more sophisticated understanding of nonalignment, with American assessments seeing it as a strategy that countries perceived as best serving their interests rather than as a rigid ideology.²⁶ In language that Nehru could have used, Eisenhower publicly noted that neutrality did not necessarily mean neutral between right or wrong, and was largely a desire not to get entangled in a military alliance. He added that the US had been neutral for 150 years.²⁷ Later in his second term, he would indeed go as far as saying that India was wise to be nonaligned.²⁸

Dulles also redefined his view on neutralism. Both Nixon and he initially publicly contradicted Eisenhower. The secretary of state had said that neutralism was immoral, and, in Asia, Nixon criticized the concept in general and India in particular. But Dulles subsequently declined to cite India as an example and noted that holding UN membership removed a country from the immoral list since it showed an acceptance of the idea of collective security.²⁹

The new tolerance was aided by the fact that the administration no longer believed that it could or should bring India into an alliance.³⁰ Budget-conscious Eisenhower repeatedly emphasized that it was better for the US that India remain nonaligned. If India sought an alliance with the US, it would require the American taxpayer to take on a greater burden and the US military to help defend “2,000 miles more of active frontier” (alluding to India’s China boundary).³¹ This attitude was indeed echoed by some on the Hill, such as Representative Albert P. Morano (R-CT), who stated that too much cooperation with India might not be advisable because it could prove costly.³² Thus the goal was not necessarily to win India over—or require it to come over—to the US side any more, but to ensure that it was not lost to the other side.³³

Moreover, the age and attraction of alliances in the US had faded somewhat. For the White House, dealing with allies sometimes seemed as, if not more, difficult than dealing with adversaries. Interactions with South Korean leader Syngman Rhee during the Korean War, Jiang during the Taiwan Strait crisis, and Britain, France, and Israel during the Suez crisis had contributed to Eisenhower’s exacerbation with allies. By fall 1956, Eisenhower had directed committees to assess US alliances and propose ways of reducing military aid packages to certain allies. More specifically, in India’s neighborhood, the president and a number of American officials had come to see the alliance with Pakistan as a “burden and a blunder.” Eisenhower would note frankly in early 1957, “Our tendency to rush out and seek allies was not very sensible.” Finally, there was recognition that some allies were not as important as some neutrals—as Dulles made evident when he contended that he “would rather see us lose Thailand, an ally, than to lose India, a neutral.”³⁴

Indian policymakers were neither unaware nor unappreciative of the changes in Washington. Nehru detected a “variety of opinion” on nonalignment, approvingly noting that Eisenhower had “put in a good word” for it.³⁵ He felt that there was less rigidity in the US and “more understanding” that India’s nonalignment was not just a matter of principle, but, more important, of practicality.³⁶ For India, the benefits of staying outside an alliance outweighed the risks. Advantages went beyond “enhanced” stature and a role in maintaining peace. Nehru stated that he did not want to “get into a position of bargaining for temporary benefits with one camp or the other.”³⁷ What he left unsaid was that diversifying its partnerships put India in a position to gain benefits from both camps.

Nehru, on his part, showed more tolerance of other countries’ freedom to choose a side. He acknowledged that, in some cases, it might be less risky to be in an alliance.³⁸ He even acknowledged that some countries that did not have the capacity to defend themselves might want foreign troops in their country.³⁹ And Nehru engaged with two Asian countries that had chosen to align closely with the US—Japan, whose prime minister he exchanged visits with, and South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem, who visited India.

The Indian prime minister also showed less passion for the third way. He rejected calls for a commonwealth of Afro-Asian states, calling it impracticable. He did not think there were enough common interests or unity to make even another Bandung-style conference desirable or feasible.⁴⁰ As for a “third force,” it had “no relation to reality.”⁴¹

Furthermore, Nehru appreciated Eisenhower’s attitude toward partners, including his statement during their conversation that “you cannot make friends by dominating them.”⁴² The prime minister disliked larger powers not treating smaller nations as equals or with respect—as he noted, “We are friends with every country but when somebody tells us, join up, line up, I am not a soldier to be recruited in a regiment.”⁴³ For this reason Nehru believed that Soviet intervention in Hungary to crush a nationalist uprising had “undermined” both national and international communism. In contrast, when he returned from the US he especially remarked that the Eisenhower administration “went out of their way in showing me honour.”⁴⁴

Indian officials also realized that there was a growing awareness in Washington of the risks of alliances. After a visit from Dulles, Nehru noted that the US came across as “a weary titan trying to do good to the world but being let down by [its] allies and having to go to their rescue repeatedly.”⁴⁵ The American refusal to support the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt after the latter had nationalized the Suez Canal also made Indian policymakers aware that Washington could act on the merits of a case rather than just on the basis of alliance solidarity. Nehru appreciated the US attitude, convinced that Eisenhower did not approve of the invasion.⁴⁶

Eisenhower’s portrayal of the US as a reluctant warrior serving on invitation—when it would rather focus internally⁴⁷—also struck a nerve with Nehru. While lamenting the American emphasis on a military approach, he publicly praised Eisenhower as a “great man” of peace and stressed that the US “could do a great deal of good in the world.”⁴⁸ The US president, on his part, continued to convey to Indian officials like the visiting Indian vice president his reluctance to resort to arms. He also expressed awareness of the damage done to America’s image by certain US military actions.⁴⁹

From the US perspective, Nehru also displayed more circumspect behavior on the international stage. Indeed, he was more restrained in offering to mediate or in seeking participation in major conferences. Given India’s own “burdens,” the prime minister concluded it best to avoid most such entanglements and a crusading or condemnatory attitude. The latter was ineffective and only reduced India’s influence.⁵⁰

The greater tolerance toward the other country’s approach—and the acknowledgment that the other side meant well—was accompanied by a reduced emphasis on differences. The change was evident in the tone of the Dulles-Nehru discussions in March 1956 and the Eisenhower-Nehru talks later that year. Nehru noted that neither American policymaker had rejected his contentions, but merely pointed out where they differed and explained their reasons.⁵¹ He publicly noted that no two countries had “complete agreement.”⁵² Privately, Nehru observed that, in many cases, US-India disagreement was exaggerated, and often the difference was one of emphasis.⁵³ In parliament, Nehru stated that indeed “there are many basic similarities in approach,” which were being emphasized more.⁵⁴

The two countries also handled differences in a better way. Disagreements over existing alliances, for example, remained. Nehru believed that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization had exacerbated the problems they had been designed to solve. However, he was careful to add that he was not “trying to run them down” or be “presumptuous enough to criticize,” but merely wanted to note that they were counterproductive. Nehru also made sure to include the Warsaw Pact when he discussed the downside of alliances.⁵⁵ When the Eisenhower doctrine was announced in 1957, promising American assistance to Middle Eastern countries against communist aggression, Nehru internally expressed regret about the US emphasis on a military approach.⁵⁶ But he dismissed the idea of making a special statement, heeding the foreign secretary’s advice that it would serve no purpose.⁵⁷ He declined to offer a critical assessment of US policies when prompted by CBS.⁵⁸ And when there were press reports about problematic American statements, Indian Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt sought clarification directly from the administration instead of first reacting.⁵⁹

The Eisenhower administration, in turn, understood that it was not realistic to expect full support from India. Some in Congress questioned whether the US should strengthen a country that disagreed with it. There was a strong sense in the administration, however, that it was in American interests to do so. From Delhi, the American embassy, now led by Ellsworth Bunker, suggested that the need to help India develop into “a democratic counterpoise to China” was a “compelling reason for our accommodating certain of our objections to Nehru’s policies and views.”⁶⁰ An interagency assessment instead emphasized important common interests, including limiting communist expansion—especially Chinese expansion in South and Southeast Asia—and encouraging cooperation between Asian and African noncommunist states.⁶¹ And the administration’s policy statement was clear that, despite some differences, the benefits of a “stable and influential” India outweighed the costs of a “weak and vulnerable” one. It could serve as an alternative to China and eventually have the ability to protect itself and South and Southeast Asia against China.⁶²