Читать книгу Fateful Triangle - Tanvi Madan - Страница 28

The prisoner question was another source of US-India debate. India was no stranger to the issue of American civilian and military prisoners detained in China after 1949—it had acted as an intermediary, including as late as 1954. Like its predecessor, the Eisenhower administration had not welcomed the Indian role. It tried to sidestep India, working instead through the UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjold to secure the release of the prisoners.¹⁹⁰ The Indian refusal to send an official to accompany the secretary-general to Beijing on the grounds that China would think India was taking the US/UN side did nothing to alleviate the impression that Delhi’s sympathies lay with Beijing. Nor did the Indian ambassador in Beijing’s assertion that the US needed to cease its “bluster” because China would make no concessions under pressure to change that impression.¹⁹¹ Zhou’s indication that India was one of the two countries that China would accept as an intermediary—the other being the Soviet Union—only cemented the view.¹⁹²

India was not, however, backing Beijing on this question. Officials did find steps like US-led condemnation of China at the UN to be unhelpful to resolving the situation.¹⁹³ But Nehru understood from his own officials, as well as other world leaders, that the US was serious about the prisoner issue.¹⁹⁴ So the prime minister had urged Zhou to meet with Hammarskjold.¹⁹⁵ After meeting Eisenhower and Dulles, even Krishna Menon came to understand the resonance of the issue in Washington and recommended that Delhi suggest to Beijing that it release at least some prisoners as a goodwill gesture.¹⁹⁶ And Nehru subsequently raised the issue with Zhou in Bandung.¹⁹⁷

US officials remained unconvinced about India as intermediary, but Delhi nonetheless played a role. After Bandung, India announced that Krishna Menon would visit Beijing to discuss the prisoner issue. US officials were keen to ensure he knew that he did not have a “mandate” to speak for the US.¹⁹⁸ China did agree to release four detained airmen after Krishna Menon’s visit, which Nehru took credit for.¹⁹⁹ The Indian envoy told John Sherman Cooper, former senator and new ambassador to India, that Beijing did not release all the airmen because of public opinion and the desire to assess the response to that first step.²⁰⁰ Thus, when Krishna Menon subsequently met Dulles and Eisenhower, he urged them to take steps to reassure China.

Dulles, however, pointed out that the US had already taken such steps. Even during the Korean War the US had ceased fire first, despite some domestic opposition. Furthermore, since then, the US had facilitated the Taiwanese withdrawal from one of the offshore islands, ensured that the MDT did not cover the offshore islands, and restrained Taiwan from attacking airbases on the mainland. Washington was also considering changing operating instructions for US aircraft so that their flights were less provocative, and trying to make repatriation for Chinese students easier. Dulles stressed that a war with China was not desirable. He recognized that it would not remain limited, with the possibility of Soviet involvement and the use of nuclear weapons—and even if the US emerged victorious, it would be left holding the bag in China.

Krishna Menon thought, however, that the US could do more, by allowing US citizens to visit China, urging Taiwan not to follow a “scorched-earth” policy on the offshore islands, and not setting preconditions for negotiations. Dulles, on his part, did not want to negotiate prematurely even though he had detected a change in Chinese attitude. China was using American prisoners as bargaining tools and expected to be rewarded for bad behavior—if Washington acceded, China’s image in the US would only deteriorate.²⁰¹

These US-India discussions on China followed a familiar path. Krishna Menon insisted that China wanted to improve relations with the US. Dulles retorted that there was scant evidence of this desire. He reminded the Indian envoy that after Bandung he had made an unconditional offer to negotiate with the Chinese.²⁰²

Indeed, the Indian intermediary efforts had an unintended impact—they partly resulted in Eisenhower and Dulles coming to see a Sino-US exchange of “commissioners” as a preferable option. They wanted to establish communications between China and the US without using third-party representatives. Dulles felt Krishna Menon had only “mix[ed] up the channels of communication” and “crossed wires,” causing the situation to “slip … backwards.”²⁰³ US concern only intensified when different messages seemed to emanate from Beijing from the various channels being used; Washington was left not knowing whom to believe.²⁰⁴ But the need to communicate persisted, given the “uneasy calm” in the Taiwan Strait and the possibility of Moscow otherwise insisting on China’s inclusion in the four-power summit due to be held in July in Geneva. China’s release of some American airmen created better conditions for a direct dialogue.²⁰⁵ Besides, by July 1955, Dulles was “fed up with all the intermediaries.”²⁰⁶

Dulles mentioned to Krishna Menon the possibility of direct Sino-US contact at a higher level in Geneva. The Indian envoy, who suggested Delhi and Moscow as alternate venues, responded that the outcome of such talks would depend on the subjects up for discussion.²⁰⁷ Concerned that Krishna Menon would “warp” what the US was proposing in Geneva in his interactions with Chinese officials, Dulles asked Eisenhower to send a clarifying message to Nehru.²⁰⁸

Nehru was pessimistic about the Chinese reaction if the US kept the scope of the talks limited. He believed that Washington had not gone far enough and in fact wanted the Taiwan “question to remain unsettled and the tension to continue.”²⁰⁹ Acting on Nehru’s concerns and British foreign secretary Harold Macmillan’s advice, Dulles agreed to use less restrictive phrasing in the US proposal for talks.²¹⁰ Nehru wrote to Zhou recommending that China accept the US proposal to hold ambassadorial talks, noting his belief that American opinion had changed and “a realistic approach” to the Strait crisis was possible. Nonetheless, he was somewhat taken aback when he heard that Zhou’s response was “quite friendly.”²¹¹

Dulles believed that Nehru’s pessimism had stemmed from his desire to keep Krishna Menon involved as an intermediary.²¹² But, by June 1955, Nehru believed that direct, preferably informal, Sino-US negotiations were the only effective option. He disagreed with the Sino-Soviet call for a six-power conference to discuss Far Eastern issues because he had come to believe that large conferences involved too much back and forth on issues like participants. Furthermore, issues like Taiwan were best dealt with bilaterally.²¹³ He did not expect a Taiwan solution, but told the Indonesian prime minister that direct talks could alleviate tensions related to the offshore islands, which could create a better atmosphere more broadly.²¹⁴ Finally, Nehru believed there was a limit to how much India could achieve as an intermediary; he was frustrated with the Chinese attitude on American prisoners, believing that their continued detention gave the Eisenhower administration an excuse to rile up anti-China opinion.²¹⁵

There was another reason for Indian reticence to becoming involved again between China and the US: the impact on US-India relations. Nehru worried about the effect of the US seeing Indian policymakers as “stronger advocates of [the] Chinese position than [the] Chinese themselves.²¹⁶ In his talks with Dulles, Krishna Menon repeatedly asserted that Indian policy toward China was not anti-American; instead, India actually wanted to “help increase and promote the prestige of the United States throughout Asia.” He stressed that he did not want India’s mediation and differences over China to affect the US-India relationship negatively or result in the US questioning India’s motives.²¹⁷

Some members of Congress were, at the very least, questioning India’s wisdom. In hearings, they expressed frustration about India’s naïveté about China. They invoked the Munich analogy, as well as the metaphor of lambs lying down with lions. Others asked if Delhi did not realize that growing Chinese strength would decrease India’s prestige in Asia.²¹⁸ Moreover, there was frustration that India had helped increase China’s global respectability.²¹⁹

India’s improving relations with China and then, in 1955, the Soviet Union, also gave Delhi’s critics on Capitol Hill more ammunition. That summer, while advocating for aid to India, Allen acknowledged, “There are important differences in views between ourselves and India on the best means of preserving the peace of Asia and the free world.” He admitted that these differences resulted in India being “considered one of the most controversial countries insofar as [the administration’s FY1956] aid program is concerned.” Representative Vorys (R-OH) bluntly asked, “What do we get out of” aiding India? Representative E. Ross Adair (R-IN) asserted that the US should not be as generous with India as with those who were “avowedly our friends.” Mutual Security Agency director Harold E. Stassen had to point out that the administration was asking for only a “modest amount.” But congressional leaders like Senators Knowland (majority leader) and Bridges (ranking Republican on the Appropriations Committee) argued that even a modest amount was too much, asserting that aid should be reserved for those who substantially cooperated with the US.²²⁰ Eventually, Congress approved only $50 million of the $70 million requested for India.

Concern about such consequences gave India another reason to limit its mediation. Once Eisenhower told Nehru of US agreement to ambassadorial talks in Geneva, the prime minister instructed Krishna Menon to keep his distance from the discussions—something the Indian ambassador in China recommended as well. Nehru did not want either Chinese or US officials to think that India was interfering. Furthermore, he told Krishna Menon that Delhi would handle things from that point.²²¹ Nehru believed the talks, even if their scope was limited, and the four-power conference in Geneva could lessen tension even if nothing substantive was achieved.²²² He was pleased that the US publicly gave India and Burma credit for the developments, which was in contrast with Washington’s having played down India’s role a month earlier when Delhi had helped secure the release of the American airmen.²²³

That fall, India did get involved again, but only when Beijing and Washington requested its help with Chinese citizens in the US who wanted to return to China.²²⁴ When the Sino-American talks seemed to stall in October, the Indian ambassador in Washington suggested to Dulles that China and the US consider higher-level talks to discuss larger issues. But Dulles stated that raising the level was not feasible, and Beijing had not taken up the US offer of discussing additional issues. He also questioned the reliability of Chinese promises since nineteen American prisoners remained in China. Saying that India had and could play a “very useful” role, Dulles urged Krishna Menon to help with their return.²²⁵ Nehru tried once again to clear roadblocks, suggesting to Chinese officials via his ambassador that the release of more American prisoners would result in progress with the US on various matters.²²⁶ He believed that neither side wanted to terminate the talks, but, as 1955 turned to 1956, he was concerned that they were in danger of failing.²²⁷