Читать книгу Fateful Triangle - Tanvi Madan - Страница 27

Having had to deal with the first Taiwan Strait crisis in 1954, the Eisenhower administration would not have described the Chinese leadership as accommodating. In September, China started shelling Taiwan-held offshore islands. Eisenhower and Dulles had been concerned that Jiang would try to force their hand with an attempt to make a move onto the mainland. But for reasons of credibility, as well as domestic politics, the Eisenhower administration felt it could not jettison the GMD leader. Thus, following intensifying Chinese shelling, it expanded the presence of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. It also sped up discussions between Taiwan and the US on a mutual defense treaty (MDT), which they saw as “a way to simultaneously support and control” Jiang. It was eventually signed in December 1954 despite concerns on the part of some, including Dulles. In a related exchange of letters, the US also got Taipei to commit not to unilaterally attack China.¹⁵³

While the US had been considering the MDT, the State Department’s Near Eastern and South Asia bureau had expressed concern that it would drive India “closer” to China.¹⁵⁴ India would see the MDT as provocative and indicative of the lack of desire on the part of the US to reach a settlement with China.¹⁵⁵ An intelligence assessment had added that India would see it as “further evidence of US imperialistic interference in Asian affairs.”¹⁵⁶

But Nehru’s reaction was more nuanced.¹⁵⁷ He believed that earlier in his administration, Eisenhower had altered Truman’s stance of restraining Taiwan from attacking China. This had heightened Chinese insecurities and destabilized the situation. Nehru told the British high commissioner that, if an MDT indicated that the US would restrain Taiwan from attacking the mainland, it would be “commend[able]” and “useful” in the long term even if Beijing was not immediately convinced of US sincerity.¹⁵⁸

On his visit to Beijing, as the crisis continued, Nehru stressed the importance of diplomacy to his Chinese interlocutors. He emphasized that negotiations were the best method to solve issues related to Taiwan and Southeast Asia, “instead of using armed force as [China did] now.” Nehru emphasized that a diplomatic approach would pave the way toward easing China’s isolation. That was important because Beijing’s lack of engagement meant it did not really understand countries outside the communist bloc.¹⁵⁹

As the Taiwan Strait crisis escalated, toward the end of January 1955, Eisenhower sought and received congressional authorization to use force to protect Taiwan. The president and Dulles saw this action as brinkmanship to deter China; Nehru saw it as provocative. The prime minister thought it would prove ineffective and counterproductive to Eisenhower and Dulles’s stated goal of stabilizing the region.¹⁶⁰ Believing that China was “[l]ogically entitled” to take possession of the offshore islands,¹⁶¹ he saw Dulles’s subsequent speech on providing a shield for the offshore islands as just making things worse.¹⁶²

Nehru told his daughter the situation was “dangerous,” with “two great countries with high ideas of their own prestige and ‘face’ and with a good deal of passion [being] at logger-heads.”¹⁶³ He instructed his ambassador in the Soviet Union to urge Moscow to find a way to reduce the tension.¹⁶⁴ Nehru did not want to make any public statements that would add to the problem.¹⁶⁵ Otherwise quick to participate in multilateral efforts, he declined the Burmese premier’s suggestion of a multilateral declaration.¹⁶⁶ When U Nu then suggested that China, India, the Soviet Union, and the UK meet to discuss Taiwan, Nehru agreed with British foreign secretary Anthony Eden that such a meeting was impractical.¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, as even Krishna Menon noted, it was “unrealistic” to “ignore American sentiment.”¹⁶⁸

Nehru did not hold only the US responsible for the situation; he also disapproved of Mao’s means of tackling it. Through his ambassador in Beijing, Nehru urged China to be constructive or show some inclination to discuss the crisis. He was disappointed with the negative Chinese response. India, in theory, recognized the mainland’s claims to Taiwan, but Nehru noted that “however justified it might be, it is not practical politics at present to ask [the] US to withdraw completely.” What China could aim for, and India could help with, was direct or indirect negotiations on the offshore islands, prevention of deepening US-Taiwan relations, and recognition of the Beijing regime.¹⁶⁹

The Indian prime minister knew by this point that the US had not given Jiang assurances on the offshore islands but worried that Washington’s stance remained ambiguous.¹⁷⁰ Indeed, it was intended that way to keep China guessing.¹⁷¹ Nehru told the Commonwealth prime ministers that the situation called for an American assurance that it would not use Taiwan as a base to attack the mainland. China would then not resort to war to take over the island.¹⁷²

American policymakers did not want war, but they were not as optimistic about Chinese intentions, and they could not let Taiwan fall. In March, Eisenhower, Vice President Richard Nixon, and Dulles publicly implied that the US would not rule out the use of nuclear weapons in the event of war in the Strait—not just as a message to Beijing, but also to Moscow and perhaps to prepare the ground domestically in case of war.¹⁷³ These public statements did not help their cause with Nehru. Indian officials were aware of US concerns about credibility.¹⁷⁴ And the prime minister was not entirely unsympathetic to Eisenhower’s difficulties related to dealing with Jiang.¹⁷⁵ But he continued to believe that Washington’s China policy was “basically wrong”—and the longer it stood, the harder it would be to change.¹⁷⁶

By mid-April, Nehru felt that the American attitude on the offshore islands had “toned down a little.” He disapproved of Dulles’s indication that the issue should be brought up at the UN, seeing it—correctly—as an American attempt to tie its allies’ hands. He did believe, however, that the US was restraining Jiang from attacking the mainland and would itself not attack.¹⁷⁷ Little did he know that this was when Eisenhower and Dulles were proposing Taiwanese withdrawal from the offshore islands—in exchange for a US blockade and mining of the Strait and placement of nuclear weapons in Taiwan.¹⁷⁸ Before those US-Taiwanese discussions bore any result, however, Zhou made a surprising move.

At Bandung, the Chinese premier refused to renounce the use of force to reclaim Taiwan but indicated a willingness to talk directly to American officials.¹⁷⁹ Nehru had been frustrated with Beijing’s “good deal of stubbornness,”¹⁸⁰ but this changed to approval after Zhou’s overture. The Indian embassy in Beijing believed the offer was the effect of the Bandung conference—and validation of the Indian approach.¹⁸¹ Dulles, on the other hand, claimed that it was the result of US saber rattling, especially of the nuclear kind.¹⁸²

Dulles publicly reiterated American support for Taiwan and uncertainty about China’s intentions, but noted that the US was open to testing Chinese sincerity.¹⁸³ Nehru thought the initial US response was unhelpful but, nonetheless, a step forward.¹⁸⁴ Glad that the US had not rejected the overture outright, he expressed his belief to Soviet leaders that Eisenhower, at least, wanted to respond positively. Furthermore, he appreciated that the president and Dulles saw Krishna Menon after the latter had traveled to Beijing. Nehru had dispatched him to Washington to encourage the US leadership to respond favorably to the Chinese invitation. Nehru approvingly noted Krishna Menon’s observation that Eisenhower and Dulles were “receptive,” albeit to different degrees.¹⁸⁵ Speaking to Indian diplomats, he also highlighted the president’s lack of encouragement to Jiang.¹⁸⁶

Krishna Menon’s meetings had a more beneficial effect on Nehru than on Eisenhower and Dulles, who did not think that the Indian envoy understood the US viewpoint.¹⁸⁷ Despite the administration’s desire for clarity from China on the possibility of a ceasefire and a peaceful Taiwan solution, Dulles had never been keen on Krishna Menon’s visit. The secretary of state certainly did not want Krishna Menon to be an intermediary, even though he was interested in what the Chinese had told the Indian envoy.¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, there were key differences between the administration and Krishna Menon on potential negotiations with China. Krishna Menon recommended that China and the US discuss the big issues (Taiwan, offshore islands) and then turn to smaller ones (including American POWs being held in China). Eisenhower disagreed, noting that the question of imprisoned American POWs was not a minor issue for the US and had to be addressed first.¹⁸⁹