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1.1 Case Diary: A Collision of Facts and Perceptions

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A few years ago, an established nuclear research facility hired me as a consultant. The facility housed a nuclear reactor used for high‐level research. It was also near a densely populated community that sat above a protected aquifer. This aquifer was the community’s sole source of local drinking water.

The site managers contacted me with concerns about a local newspaper article on this nuclear reactor. The article reported the facility’s nuclear reactor had leaked radioactive water for over a decade. Site managers and engineers had reportedly known about the leak for years. The leak resulted from a hairline crack, but the amount of the leaking radioactive water was well below levels that could cause human health consequences.

Leadership did not report the leak because they feared community outrage. They believed the public could misunderstand the science and react irrationally, even though the technical facts proved there was no significant environmental impact. Revealing the leak to the surrounding community might lead to unwarranted fear and panic and give ammunition to activists who were lobbying to shut down the reactor.

Unfortunately, the article also reported an internal poll of managers and engineers at the facility, asking how they would like to spend the facility’s end‐of‐year funding surplus. Respondents had two primary choices:

1 repair the hairline crack and stop the leak of radioactive water, or

2 support work enhancements, including refreshments for the facility’s visiting speaker program.

The facility’s employees – applying their scientific knowledge and logic that the hairline crack was inconsequential – chose the refreshments.

I was hired to consult after the publication of this newspaper article. The engineers and managers explained to me, in meticulous technical detail, the nature of the crack and why the amount of radioactive water leaking into the community’s aquifer was miniscule and posed no threat to human health.

After I sat and listened to a variety of technical presentations, I conducted a training on basic principles of risk, high concern, and crisis communication. I agreed that accurate technical facts were essential for decision‐making, but facts by themselves were not always sufficient. Technical facts are only one factor that influences public fears and risk perceptions. Emotional factors also drive decision‐making. Trust is based on attributes, including caring and concern. People in high‐stress situations need to know you care before they will listen to you. I pointed out that nuclear power and radiation is a highly emotionally charged issue and raises high levels of anxiety for the public.

I predicted the public would perceive the facility’s actions as a major breach of trust, notwithstanding the actual lack of potential harm. I recommended actions the managers and engineers could still take to regain trust and counter community anger and outrage. These recommendations included a sincere apology for not communicating early and a commitment to restore trust and ensure the mistakes would not be repeated. Such actions included environmental restoration and creation of a community advisory committee with significant oversight powers.

Unfortunately, I was brought into this situation too late. An avalanche of negative stories followed the first newspaper article, triggering community outrage before leadership could implement any of the recommended actions. Outrage was further fueled by the publication of a previously unrevealed government report that cataloged a long history of environmental shortcomings at this facility. That report cited the facility for failing to respond to the discovery of a leak of radioactive water over 10 years earlier and described delays on promises to make environmental improvements.

Government agencies withdrew their support for continued operation of the reactor, citing environmental and economic concerns. Community and environmental groups pressured government representatives to deny the reactor a permit to continue to operate. The nuclear reactor was indefinitely closed, and all the scientific research it supported ended.

I began Chapter 1 with this story because it encapsulates several vital lessons:

First, effective communication is critical to the effective prevention of and response to risks, high concern issues, and crises.

Second, trust is a prerequisite for communicating successfully about controversial and emotionally charged issues.

Third, organizations and institutions interact with their environments, eco‐systems, and communities. Those responsible for leading those organizations and managing them at every level must understand how stakeholders view what they do; they must seek and be prepared for stakeholder engagement, and they must build – and earn – and nurture trust from those interested or affected.

Fourth, leaders, managers, supervisors, and technical professionals require training in the principles of trust, stakeholder perceptions, and communication about risks, high concerns, and crises prior to encountering situations that require effective communication.

If the facility managers and engineers in this story had learned and applied the principles and values discussed in the chapters to follow, the research reactor would likely be in operation today.

Communicating in Risk, Crisis, and High Stress Situations: Evidence-Based Strategies and Practice

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