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Оглавление4 American Assessments of the Situation
The previous chapter gave a brief overview of Egyptian diplomatic efforts to get things moving on the political front in the early months of 1973. Egypt sought to convince the United States to accept its view, namely that it would be dangerous to continue the deadlock in the Egyptian–Israeli situation, and of the consequent importance of the US putting pressure on Israel to relinquish its stubbornness and make sincere and real efforts—led by the US and with support from the Soviet Union—to achieve peace with Egypt and withdraw from Sinai to the 1906 Egypt–Palestine borders, conceding complete Egyptian sovereignty over that territory.
Egypt, as I mentioned, reached out to the US. The Egyptian national security advisor agreed to an initial meeting with his counterpart, Henry Kissinger, to look into possible ways and means of reaching an Egypt–US agreement that might open a serious path to—and perhaps the start of moving toward—a peaceful settlement. Long before the October crossing of the canal, on February 25–26, 1973, a meeting had been arranged for the two parties on Long Island, not far from New York City, for consultations. Although I was not party to these consultations, which were only attended on the Egyptian side by Hafiz Ismail, Abdel Hadi Makhlouf, Ahmed Maher al-Sayed, and First Secretary Ehab Wahba, all from Hafiz Ismail’s office, I was able to read the transcript of those meetings upon their return. I was also briefed by Ahmed Maher on many of the details. US official sources published, years later, a number of details of this meeting.
Today, we may assess this initial Egyptian–American meeting as an attempt by each party to find out where the other stood. The Egyptian side reaffirmed Egypt’s commitment, to date, to finding a peaceful solution to the dispute via faithful implementation—and clear interpretation—of Security Council Resolution 242, as well as Egypt’s readiness to negotiate the required settlement as envisaged by the resolution. On the American side, Kissinger said at the Paris meeting on May 20, that the US was prepared to take responsibility for getting the situation moving. However, the US was very clear about Kissinger’s take on how to deal with the situation: he proposed slow step-by-step activity over a long period, possibly two years or more, which might be built on a temporary settlement as a first stage, followed by a final and durable settlement after a certain period of time. The American side also made it clear that they found the possibility of success remote if a final settlement was sought via a single step. The reason for this is that the US was convinced that the matter was complex and convoluted, with many other considerations beyond the Egypt–Israel situation and affecting other Arab countries involved in the conflict.
The general impression on both the Egyptian and the American side after this first meeting was positive, despite a certain degree of natural suspicion of the other’s motives, thought processes, and intentions. They showed readiness to move forward and hold more of these talks, to look into what kind of agreement might be reached regarding ideas to open the way for a legitimate move.
In the wake of this initial meeting, there was a great deal of talk about the importance of Egyptian military action, and the necessity of not relying completely on American statements of goodwill. Israel would not comply with anything that ran counter to its hopes of imposing its will on the Arab states, by dint of its military superiority and the impact of the invasion. The Egyptians, as everyone recalls, threatened international actors that they would not wait too long; after all, it had already been nearly six years since their land was invaded. It was not too farfetched, they intimated, to imagine Egypt breaking the ceasefire or conducting a military operation. In fact, an American document declassified in 2000 (in accordance with American law) states that the US, like the other superpower at the time, was closely following Egypt’s preparations. This document, dated April 1973, indicates that the US was aware of Egypt’s war efforts, having made “an observation of hostile intent.” The author outlines these observations as follows:
• In the first quarter of 1973, Sam-6 anti-aircraft batteries were moved from Aswan and surrounding areas to within thirty kilometers west of the Suez Canal. The Americans also noted much development in the batteries of Sam-2 anti-aircraft missiles, with a clear uptick in their operating efficiency.
• About thirty French Mirage 5s were brought in from Libya, which had signed a contract to buy them in 1969 with the intent of allowing Egypt to use them in any confrontation with Israel. Egyptian pilots were also being trained on this aircraft. The aircraft, the report said, had already arrived in Egypt.
• Sixteen Hawker Hunter older-model fighter aircraft were brought in from Iraq, with Iraqi pilots, and Egyptian pilots were being trained to use them. Egyptian air bases started using these in April 1973.
• Egyptian heavy bombers were moved from Aswan to areas surrounding Cairo, especially the Cairo West Air Base, which had always been a base for these bombers. The U.S. report adds that there were no indications of these bombers being moved or equipped with air-to-ground missiles. The latter were used in the October War to great effect, destroying Israeli radar stations and command communications and controlling Mount Umm Margam in Sinai.
• In April 1973, the alert status of the Egyptian air force was raised, and Egyptian air squadrons were redistributed and their combat efficiency increased in preparation for being commissioned for new combat missions in light of the arrival of the fighter bombers from Libya.
• A great many army units, including Special Forces units, were moved from all over Egypt to areas close to the Suez Canal. The US received information about major plans for an Egyptian crossing of the canal, choosing a time when the moon would be full. The American report even mentions May 19 and June 16, 1973, as possible dates for a large-scale Egyptian military operation.
• Jordanian sources—with British support, the U.S. report says—expressed their concerns as to the repercussions of the situation, due to Egypt’s insistence on conducting a large-scale military operation regardless of the outcome. Moreover, the U.S. assessment says that available information indicated that King Hussein of Jordan had told Israel he feared that the situation would deteriorate militarily if things remained as they were, with Israel refusing any move to initiate a real peace process.
• There were indications of Egyptian attempts to arrange an Arab oil embargo against western nations that stood with Israel in case of military action.
• The U.S. document illustrates this by saying, “Such action on the part of Egypt will be consolidated and increased in the coming period, in order to achieve one or both of the following objectives: either an actual Egyptian military operation across the Suez Canal, or convincing international actors to intervene between the two parties to the dispute, achieving a political breakthrough in the situation.” The American document goes on to say, “Egypt may attempt to invade areas east of the Suez Canal for a few days only, so as to force an international intervention; Egyptian troops are established in strength in areas east of Cairo all the way to the Suez Canal.”
• The U.S. assessment report states that while it was difficult to be sure of Egypt’s intentions, it was imagined that President Sadat had not yet made a final decision with regard to the form, scale, or timing of any military action. The Egyptian economic situation, it adds, was in decline; however, the assessment was that these conditions would not impose their weight on President Sadat or drive him to large-scale military action, since the Egyptian president was well aware that a failed military operation might have the effect of removing him from power.
• The U.S. assessment document, declassified in 2000, concludes that, after close monitoring by American sources, “it is most probable that President Sadat will await the proceedings of UN debates in May before making a decision on this matter.” This was the effort undertaken by Egypt at that time to convince the Security Council, ending with the U.S. veto in 1973.
• The report goes on to mention more U.S. surveillance of movements surrounding the preparations for an armed battle between the Arabs and Israel, however concluding that in order to promote the building up of Arab diplomatic pressure on international powers, a number of Moroccan military armored units have been observed moving to Syria. Soviet transport ships were used to transfer the Moroccan equipment from Algerian ports. Twenty Algerian MiG-21s were moved to air bases in Libya, with the objective of raising the efficiency of Libyan air defenses, while remaining close to Egypt’s borders should they be needed for any battle with Israel. There was also news that Algerian MiG-17 and MiG-15 fighter aircraft were being moved to Syria.
• The report also mentions Jordan: “The greatest weakness on the Arab front is Jordan’s refusal to place its forces under the command of the joint Egyptian–Syrian leadership. However, it can be noted that there is currently [April 1973] tension on the Lebanese–Israeli borders. The Palestinian resistance may take advance action, leading to the eruption of the situation on all fronts, especially the Egyptian–Israeli front. This may drag Jordan into any major warlike confrontation.”
• As far as Soviet movements go, the U.S. document reveals close monitoring of Soviet positions. This indicated that the Soviets desired a degree of continued pressure on both the US and Israel. Still, they—the Soviets, that is—definitely did not desire any military action using advanced Soviet weaponry that might result in a new Arab defeat, thus negatively impacting on the policies of the Soviet leadership, in particular Brezhnev, who was eager to maintain the U.S.–Soviet pacification that had been in effect since mid-1972.
• The U.S. document mentions confirmed intelligence that the Soviets requested that Syria not enter into any armed confrontation with Israel, and to inform the Egyptians of that intention. To reconfirm this, Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal Grechko brought it up during his meeting with the French chief of staff. He asked his French counterpart to try and influence Egypt to move away from armed conflict.
• The American assessment came to an additional conclusion, namely that the US ruled out any flare-up of hostilities prior to the end of the UN session scheduled for May 1973. Egypt, the report concludes, would not undertake any large-scale military action in the coming few weeks—around six weeks.
This U.S. assessment—conveyed no doubt to Israel, which country’s information and intelligence services were certainly instrumental in the compilation of the report—reveals that both the US and Israel were closely and carefully monitoring the framework in which Egypt was operating. The fact is that reading this document shows the seriousness and dedication of Arab efforts conducted via their armies. Morocco sent troops to Syria and Egypt (although U.S. intelligence did not specifically mention that development); Algeria sent aerial forces to both Libya and Syria; and, last but not least, Morocco sent ground units, whose equipment was transported by Soviet supply ships to protect it while being transported across the Mediterranean, and used Algerian ports for that purpose. Doubtless, Algeria’s permission for this equipment to pass through its ports and across its soil, accompanied by Moroccans, represented a significant step that reflected Algeria’s commitment to supporting Syria and the Arab East in their confrontation with Israel. When I say the ‘Arab East’—Egypt and Syria—this of course meant that the Arab nation was united, and that its western side supported its eastern side in carrying out a consolidated military action.
Some Arabs who read about these events may be provoked by the U.S. document’s statement that the Jordanian leadership informed Israel of the possibility of an upcoming military action by Egypt and Syria. My own assessment today—and at the time—is that Jordan, like Egypt and Syria, was using the possibility of military action against Israel to induce flexibility in that state’s position or to motivate western powers to pressure Israel to reach a settlement with the Arabs. As for the US, note that Jordan refused to place its army under joint Egyptian–Syrian command. This may well be explained by the bitter defeat experienced by Jordan in 1967, which seemed to dictate caution and a reluctance to embark on a new venture. This is especially valid in light of what was being bandied about at the time by both Israel and the west, that Jordan could serve as an ‘Arab Palestinian state’—a catastrophic suggestion, especially given the demographic imbalance between the two countries, namely that Palestinians far outnumbered Jordanians.
The American document also offers an assessment of the Egyptian economic situation, saying that President Sadat was capable of withstanding economic pressures and managing their threat to internal stability in Egypt. In truth—again—a reader of the minutes today, or indeed back then, of Sadat’s meeting with the Egyptian National Security Council on September 30, that is, six days before the battle with Israel, would be convinced that these economic pressures had a decisive role in driving the Egyptian president to the necessity of taking action and attempting to find solutions to the Egyptian predicament. Without this, Egypt would have eventually fallen prey to economic and military failure.
The official U.S. assessment of the Egyptian and Arab situation at the time made it clear that the Americans—naturally—ascribed great importance to U.S.–Soviet relations. They appreciated that the Soviets would not accept Egypt embarking on a war, thus revealing the inadequacy of Soviet weaponry in a repeat of 1967’s humiliation. The Americans shared this view, which shaped a great deal of Kissinger’s actions vis-à-vis the 1973 battle and his insistence on not allowing U.S. weapons to be defeated by its Soviet counterpart.
It can be gleaned from the report that there were additional factors driving the U.S. assessment of the situation: not only the international détente achieved by the Moscow meeting between Brezhnev and Nixon in late 1972, but also the agreement between the leaders of the two superpowers on the importance of relaxing the military tensions in the relationship, and in every international issue of mutual interest, foremost among which, of course, was the tense situation in the Middle East.
Egypt had in fact been preparing for a large-scale military operation across the Suez Canal in March–April 1973. The Egyptian timeline originally set April as the month for that cross-channel leap. Israeli documents and writings post-October 1973 show that Israel was monitoring these preparations and getting ready for them. A review of Israeli military and media activity at that time shows that Israel was conducting small operations against Syria with the aim of convincing everyone of its ability to crush the Arabs. The media preparations conducted by Israeli military personnel and politicians were of course known to the Arab side; the Arabs were busily making preparations to stand up to these, while Egyptian diplomatic efforts continued unabated in hopes of achieving their ends. Egypt ultimately decided to give diplomatic efforts one final chance to achieve the desired goal, which is why President Sadat chose to defer military action instead of launching it in April as planned.
The postponement worked in favor of Egypt’s strategic deception plan when the time came for Egypt to strike across the Suez Canal. Israel had observed Egyptian preparations in April, as had the US (as evidenced by the declassified document); Israel already had been making preparations and mobilizing. The joint Egyptian–Syrian strike never came. When the military action came on October 6, it took Israel by surprise, as it decided not to mobilize anew in response to the Egyptian preparations it observed. The mobilization had cost Israel a great deal in April 1973, after all. The Israelis saw the October mobilization as a toothless repetition of what had gone on earlier in the year. Israel thus ignored the writing on the wall, paying a hefty price for its clash with the Arabs.
In February 2013, I read a number of U.S. analyses of the possibility of Egyptian military action against Israel—documents written either in the days leading up to the fighting or during the clashes of October 1973. These were published by an American intelligence research center in January 2013, and dealt with the CIA’s success or failure in its surveillance of the war operation. The documents revealed recognition on the part of the US that the Egyptian strategic and tactical deception, on the military and political fronts, had fully achieved its objectives as far as the US and Israel were concerned. In fact, the CIA went so far as to present a report on possible developments in the situation to Henry Kissinger on the evening of October 5, in which it ruled out any direct Egyptian military action against Israel. When the fighting broke out, the documents took to saying that the war would be short-lived and end with a crushing defeat for the Arabs. The US, they said, would have to pressure Israel to accept a ceasefire within a few days. However, Egyptian military obduracy managed to give the lie to all these assessments and expectations.
It may be relevant here to go back to the communications between the US and Egypt in early 1973 in preparation for another meeting between the national security advisors of the two countries, in a suburb of Paris, for further talks on how to start the ball rolling on serious peace efforts. This was in accordance with Egypt’s decision to allow more time for American–Egyptian efforts to produce a peaceful settlement and explore the possibility of the Security Council and the UN intervening, in the hope that the latter could have some influence on Israel.
The meeting was held on May 20, 1973. Hafiz Ismail, accompanied by the Egyptian working group, met with Kissinger, who had also come to France as part of a schedule of meetings and efforts to settle the Vietnamese crisis, whose negotiations were moving forward at that time.
The Americans had raised two points with Egypt at their previous meeting in the US in February. The first was that the US was offering a move toward a settlement in gradual increments or steps. It is noteworthy here that Kissinger stuck faithfully to this during all of his negotiations with Egypt, even after the October War. It led to an extended peace process, which started on November 7, 1973, with Kissinger’s arrival in Egypt, and ended with the second disengagement between Egypt and Israel in May 1975, as well as the implementation of a series of additional Israeli withdrawals deep into Sinai, allowing for the reopening of the Suez Canal to international shipping and the repopulation and rehabilitation of the Suez Canal cities.
The second point Kissinger discussed with Hafiz Ismail was his request that Egypt come up with a new vision or put forth an initiative that would leave the way open for the US to put pressure on Israel to take steps to reach a settlement and final peace. However, the US made clear that it could not guarantee Israeli compliance, nor its own ability to apply pressure on the Israelis successfully, due to the internal situation in America.
The Paris meeting, held at a villa owned by a CIA official, began with Kissinger reaffirming that he had no intention of making promises he could not keep; that the US wanted to tell Egypt that its role in the Middle East was independent of Israel; and that the US, as a result of Israel’s internal situation and the hard line taken by Israel’s leaders in preparation for the upcoming elections, could not guarantee that its views and voice would be heard in that country.
Hafiz Ismail responded by saying that recalcitrance was one of the inherent qualities of the Israeli stance, election or no election. The US, he added, could not claim with any truth that it was powerless to pressure Israel—the shipments of U.S. armaments were still flowing, after all, and there were contracts in place to supply more U.S. fighter jets to Israel over 1974–75, a fact that raised profound concerns in Egypt. What made matters worse, Ismail noted, was that the US was pushing the Soviet Union to agree to more Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel, to say nothing of the financial incentives the US offered the Soviets to agree to this.
Hafiz Ismail moved on to the substance of the meeting. He made it clear that Egypt was quite prepared to sign a peace treaty with Israel. This was the Egyptian response to the U.S. request to offer a new initiative. The Egyptian national security advisor then discussed the American idea of a gradual Egyptian–Israeli settlement, saying that Egypt feared, with good reason, the US’ talk of an interim or temporary settlement. The reason, naturally, was that an interim settlement has a way of taking on permanence, accompanied by a cessation of efforts to achieve peace or the US losing interest. It was therefore essential, according to Ismail, to look into how the proposed interim settlement could be linked to the final settlement, within a strict time frame. What was required if Israel agreed to the American plan, he said, was that both sides, American and Israeli, announce that this interim step in withdrawing from Sinai—in exchange for security guarantees for Israel—would be a part of a comprehensive peace process with an acceptable time frame.
It was now Kissinger’s turn to speak. He asked Hafiz Ismail about the Egyptian areas for negotiation, with a view to creating an agenda for them. He said that it was difficult for the US to accept any Egyptian attempt to agree (with the US) on a precise interpretation of the disputed articles of UN General Assembly Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, generally considered the basis for any settlement, while compiling the general areas. Ismail retorted that the general areas constituted the agenda for negotiations and that it was necessary to elaborate them in some detail so that Israel would not equivocate. The Egyptian national security advisor went on to criticize the U.S. position in assisting Israel’s nuclear program. Kissinger cut him off, insisting that the US would never assist any party in acquiring nuclear weapons or the knowledge to develop them; indeed, he said, the US was constantly badgering Israel to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. He asked the Egyptians to give him details of any specific occurrences where the US had assisted Israel in building military nuclear capacity.
Hafiz Ismail went on to explain the course of Egyptian diplomatic efforts, affirming that Egypt had resorted to the United Nations and reopened the Middle East issue before the Security Council to obtain adequate interpretations not provided by the Security Council resolution of 1967. He then alluded to the fact that Egypt had no desire to push forward with military operations, and that this was only on the table because of Israeli intransigence. Egypt, Ismail said, was following the Vietnamese people’s fight; he emphasized that his country was keeping a careful eye on how this extended conflict was unfolding. Kissinger heard the innuendo and responded with some disgruntlement that it was dangerous to compare the situation in Vietnam, which was a fight that had been going on for years because of completely different geographical and topographical circumstances than the deserts of the Middle East. In Egypt, he said, we must recognize that desert battles and military clashes are always time-limited and conclusive in their results. They are different from jungle fighting. Kissinger stated quite clearly that, in his view, any military undertaking by Egypt would have negative consequences for Egypt, and damage its standing in the region.
It was now Hafiz Ismail’s turn to speak. He said that the initiative President Sadat had charged him to convey to the Americans aimed at transitioning from a state of war to a state of peace. Egypt, he said, was asking the US to offer a clear American interpretation of UN Resolution 242, directly from the White House. He said that Egypt expected the US to officially announce its acceptance of Egypt’s borders with Palestine/Israel—a view that it expected would include complete Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai.
Kissinger responded with what may be called a great deal of evasiveness. There might not be an issue with accepting Egyptian sovereignty; however, there were security arrangements for Israel that must be guaranteed. Kissinger hinted that he could see the US accepting nominal Egyptian sovereignty, although he was aware that Israel would be inflexible about its security concerns.
The second Egyptian–American meeting was drawing to a close. What with consultations and lunch, it had lasted about four hours. The Egyptians promised to let the Americans know President Sadat’s decision, and his view on the American proposal of a gradual, step-by-step settlement. Kissinger asked in return that the Egyptians postpone raising the issue at the Security Council until after the Soviet–American summit in Washington on June 18, 1973. Something might come out of it that would be relevant to the Middle East. Hafiz Ismail said that Egypt might look into postponing the United Nations, but added that the US needed to commit to affording that effort a real chance with the Security Council.
Both sides agreed on the possibility of arranging a third meeting, to look further into the chances of achieving a peaceful settlement. The reader must take note of the extra attention given by the Egyptian national security advisor to these meetings, which revealed a great deal—for the first time—about America’s ideas for reaching a settlement. Hafiz Ismail, it must be noted, tried to convince President Sadat, during the Egyptian National Security Meeting on September 30, to postpone this major step and leave room for a third meeting with Kissinger, which might bear the fruit that Egypt sought via armed action. President Sadat’s mind, however, was made up. His position was only reinforced by the U.S. stance at the Security Council in June–July 1973, which can only be described as absolutely negative.
Finally, I would like to convey some of the conclusions reached in this meeting via an official U.S. document prepared by Alfred Leroy (“Roy”) Atherton, then deputy assistant secretary of state and later ambassador to Egypt, and presented to Kissinger to be sent on to the White House. It was released in 2001 as part of the thirty-year declassification program. This document included a statement that Hafiz Ismail made it clear to Kissinger during a private conversation between them, just before that day’s working lunch, that Egypt was completely prepared to sign any peace treaty in accordance with the American concept offered to Syria and Jordan in Paris. Hearing this, Kissinger asked about Egypt’s vision of the nature of the peace with Israel, how any Egypt–Israel accord would affect the Palestinian question, and the situation between Syria/Jordan and Israel. The Egyptians did not explain their vision in detail, but they did insist on the US’ announcement of Egypt’s full sovereignty over Sinai.
Both sides left the CIA representative’s villa in the suburbs of Paris with an understanding that there might be yet another meeting, and that Hafiz Ismail would respond to the Americans with regard to the relevant questions and ideas. Each went home. They would only meet again after the end of the armed conflict, in October 1973. What is certain today is that anyone who reads the results of these meetings and the elements that made them up cannot miss the fact that many American ideas were advanced and implemented in the years to follow.
