Читать книгу Witness to War and Peace - Ahmed Aboul Gheit - Страница 18

7 Accepting the Ceasefire

The few days that followed Israel’s success in repelling Egypt’s efforts to develop its attack on October 14 were accompanied by important developments that had a great effect on the form our military action took, and on diplomatic efforts. On October 16, President Sadat presented an integrated vision for Egypt’s proposed settlement to the Egyptian People’s Assembly. He presented a consolidated account of what he had discussed with the ambassadors of the main countries involved during the previous few days, including the content of Hafiz Ismail’s messages to Kissinger in the first week of the war. Sadat affirmed that Egypt’s ultimate goal was to reclaim our territory in Sinai, liberating it from Israeli occupation. He reiterated that Egypt was prepared to accept a ceasefire on condition that Israel withdrew from all our occupied territory, under international supervision. Egypt, he said, was prepared, as soon as the withdrawal was complete, to attend an international peace conference at the United Nations to set out protections and safeguards for peace in the region, on the basis of the legitimate rights of all of its peoples.

The president stated that Egypt was prepared to start clearing the Suez Canal immediately and opening it to international navigation. This proposal, naturally, reiterated the legitimate rights of all the peoples of the region, as well as protections and safeguards for peace in the region—all of which Egypt took steps to achieve from that moment on, through to the Camp David peace talks and the signing of the Egypt–Israel peace treaty, including at the Geneva Conference in December 1973.

At the same time that President Sadat was making his speech at the People’s Assembly, Golda Meir, then prime minister of Israel, was making a short statement on Israeli radio, the gist of which was that Israeli military units and special forces had crossed the Suez Canal and begun armed operations between the cities of Ismailiya and Suez. Hafiz Ismail, as part of his communications with Kissinger, conveyed to him an Egyptian vision close to what the president presented in his speech, although it went a bit further than the introductory vision that Sadat gave to the people. On October 10, Ismail demanded that Israel withdraw within a specific time frame to the lines of June 5, 1967, under the supervision of the United Nations, noting that war would be over as soon as the withdrawal was complete. He also demanded that after this withdrawal the Gaza Strip be placed under UN supervision until such time as the Palestinians had the right to self-determination.

Kissinger’s response to Sadat’s speech at the People’s Assembly came quickly. So did Hafiz Ismail’s message of October 9 mentioned above. It became clear that the US “wishes to end the current clashes and fighting, in circumstances that will facilitate moving forward toward a final settlement.” This was a telling paragraph in Kissinger’s message, as it revealed what the U.S. side was working toward during the second week of fighting: namely, assisting Israel with every possible military support so as to restore its military and strategic balance with Egypt, allowing Kissinger to play the role of mediator and move toward a resolution to the conflict.

Kissinger reiterated to Hafiz Ismail that the Egyptian vision put forth in Sadat’s speech, and the messages from the Egyptian national security advisor, could only be achieved through a protracted war. Egypt, he said, should look into limiting its goals; this insistence on achieving the full extent of its desired goals would mean a continuation of armed conflict, which threatened to erode all the Egyptian successes to date. Kissinger focused on his demand for a ceasefire along the current lines of battle, securing an agreement from the warring parties that they would start negotiations under the supervision of the United Nations, and the establishment of a full and equitable peace based on Resolution 242, taking into account the importance of the balance between sovereignty and security. Kissinger wrote to Hafiz Ismail on October 14 that America would work to supply Israel with equipment and consumables, seeming to be speaking of ammunition, which is of course consumable by its very nature. However, the truth of the matter was that the Americans went ahead and supplied the Israeli side with a great deal of heavy equipment, firepower, tanks, antitank missiles, and other weaponry of that kind. My diary from 0700 hours on October 15 reads:

This last message makes it clear that the American decision to start the supplies flowing is using that the Soviets are supplying Egypt and Syria with what they need as an excuse to keep fighting. Kissinger said in his message that the US would cease this flow of supplies as soon as the fighting stops; he added that he would like to continue “this useful consultation,” and that he had asked Israel not to attack civilians. He said he had also obtained Israel’s agreement to cease firing on the current positions, but it was Egypt that refused.

Naturally, anyone reading these messages today, and linking them to the developments on the ground starting on the evening of October 15, would conclude that the US had decided, in the wake of Egypt’s rejection of a ceasefire, to create a fundamental shift on the ground. It aimed to restore the balance (as the Americans saw it) and help Israel to countervail the Egyptian gains of destroying the Bar-Lev line and reestablishing military control of a ten- to fifteen-kilometer strip extending the length of the east bank of the Suez Canal.

This exchange of messages and positions between Egypt and the US, and President Sadat’s frank presentation of his vision to Egypt and the international community, coincided with an important visit to Cairo by Alexei Kosygin, premier of the Soviet Union, on the evening of October 16. It was clear that President Sadat had chosen the timing of his speech to the People’s Assembly to coincide with Kosygin’s arrival. He aimed to present the consolidated Egyptian position in a way that would not allow Kosygin to affect our decision to keep working toward the goals of the conflict, and to reject Soviet calls for a ceasefire along the current lines of battle in the absence of a clear political view of the required settlement. My diary for 0100 hours on Tuesday, October 16, reads:

Kosygin arrives in Egypt today. He will try to pressure us into a ceasefire. The president will make his speech to preempt Kosygin and take the initiative on the five points. This will force the Soviets into a confrontation with the US, who have already taken the decision to provide military support to Israel; this may lead to a political crisis.

My diary also mentions President Sadat’s efforts to make use of his strong ties to the shah of Iran to soften the American stance. He kept up the highest degree of communication with the shah all the time, from the start of military operations, via the energetic and efficient Iranian ambassador stationed in Cairo at the time. The shah, for his part, was responsive to Sadat’s efforts, replying to his messages and doing his best to influence the Americans in favor of Egypt. I doubt that this was very far from the president’s thoughts, as evidenced by his reaction to what the shah went through later and his granting the shah political asylum in Egypt.

At this point in my narrative, it is important to return to what Hafiz Ismail mentioned to me in the early days of the conflict. The gist of what he said was that he had no objection to a meeting with Yigal Allon, the Israeli deputy prime minister, who had proposed a draft Arab–Israeli settlement a few years before—especially now that Egypt had moved beyond the humiliation of 1967. My diary for 0100 hours on October 16 speaks of this, as I had discussed it again with the national security advisor, indicating the importance of what he said on October 9, of being flexible in our thinking, and of not refusing direct meetings with the Israelis, especially now that we had trounced them. Hafiz Ismail responded that it was Syria he worried about, as they had lost actual land. He wondered how that country could be satisfactorily compensated. The other Arab countries that had rushed to take part in the war with small units would also constitute a problem.

My narrative now takes me to Kosygin’s visit and his extended one-on-one sessions with President Sadat, in which the aim was agreement not only on the form of Egyptian–Soviet coordination in communications with the Americans and with the UN Security Council, but also on the type and amount of equipment and armaments the Soviets would supply to us. I remember reading the minutes of one of the president’s meetings with the Soviet ambassador to Cairo the day before Kosygin’s arrival, in which Sadat said, “Please tell my friend Alexei Kosygin to prepare himself and prepare deep pockets. I will put my hand in them and scoop out as much equipment and weaponry as I can, as well as anything else our fighting forces need.”

There was a clear understanding between the Egyptians and the Soviets at the end of Sadat’s meeting with Kosygin, who left Cairo on October 19, just as the Egyptian military position came under threat. The Soviets would try to get the US to agree to a U.S.–Soviet attempt to secure a ceasefire, with Israel’s withdrawal to start immediately after the ceasefire, in compliance with Resolution 242, as well as joint U.S.–Soviet guarantees of the implementation of each aspect of the agreement. It was at this exact moment, as a result of conversations between some members of Egyptian Intelligence, that I learned that Egyptian military intelligence had concluded that Israeli forces were extremely numerous, as a result of surveillance of Israeli forces’ communications and observations of the number of logistics units and accompanying medical units west of the Suez Canal. This did not bode well.

As soon as Kosygin arrived in Moscow, he asked the Americans to send Kissinger to the Soviet capital immediately for consultations on what they could do together to contain the fighting and possibly end it, and to move toward a satisfying settlement and an international conference.

Although I am speaking primarily of diplomatic efforts, I find it necessary to mention the military situation, which indicated that we were surrounded by threats to the successes we had achieved thus far in the conflict. My diary for Tuesday, October 16, at 1720 hours, reads:

The enemy has penetrated the gap between the Second and Third Armies, and is sending in amphibious forces via the Great Bitter Lakes opposite the Deversoir region. The enemy is attacking the west bank of the Suez Canal in an attempt to destroy our forces’ bridges and our anti-aircraft missile batteries, which are impeding their fighter bombers’ ability to fight our forces.

Our armored forces, especially the Twenty-First Armored Division, fought back valiantly until 1400 hours today.

We will lose the initiative with our current inaction. If we do not move fast, we will lose heavily.

What is the enemy’s objective with these attacks? Is it to develop the attack toward the west? Perhaps.

I feel extremely resentful at this flurry of enemy activity, activity that our own inaction served to bring about.

The entry for Wednesday, October 17, at 1500 hours, reads:

Suspicious silence. Extremely violent fighting in the axis of the Sixteenth Infantry Division of the Second Army. No communiqué, no news, no reports.

Do the enemy operations seek to break through the gap [between the Second and Third Armies] on the eastern and western banks of the Suez Canal?

Its forces in the west must be neutralized, at once, so that such an attempt is not repeated.

It is clear that the enemy has started to fight its Egyptian battle, although its Syrian battle is not—and cannot be, as yet—concluded. The enemy cannot seriously envisage being able to successfully conclude a battle for Egypt.

Long years after I wrote this evaluation of the situation, I was granted access to a British official document that dealt with this period of the conflict. According to the report, prepared for the eyes of the British prime minister at 1130 hours on Tuesday, October 16, 1973, “The Israeli forces in Syria will most probably attempt to establish positions that threaten Damascus, but that also require fewer forces to secure them, allowing the Israelis to move their forces to the Sinai front.” Naturally at the time I had no way of knowing that Israel would, in the coming days, transfer their forces to the Suez Canal front to attack the Egyptian forces stationed there.

The fighting continued over the next few critical days. My diary for 0800 hours on the morning of Thursday, October 18, reads:

Yesterday’s battle was critical in the extreme. The enemy seeks to establish a bridgehead on the western side of the Great Bitter Lakes from which to strike at our army.

Our armored forces are striking at them from both sides.

The diary resumes at 0100 hours on Friday, October 19:

We have lost the initiative, and shall pay the price.

It is clear that the enemy has massive forces capable of dealing with us on the western side of the Suez Canal. However, the national security advisor is confident that we will succeed in this military clash.

We must strike at the Israeli bridgehead, then strike at the penetration in the east.

We must seize the initiative by means of effective action, or the situation will deteriorate, compelling us to withdraw the army from Sinai to confront the penetration in the west, or else lose it.

At 1700 hours on Friday, October 19, I wrote:

Israel is attempting either to secure a bridgehead and await a ceasefire—meaning that Israel has not been defeated—or else to encircle the Second Army. The latter is an extremely difficult operation, requiring a great deal of effort; I doubt that Israel possesses the forces to achieve such an objective.

The national security advisor says in his conversations with us that the US and Israel are working to get everyone out of this on even footing, making it easier to reach a subsequent settlement.

Hafiz Ismail remains optimistic, thinking of how we will conduct the ceasefire as agreed with Kosygin, and how to work toward a disengagement of forces and the means of implementation, and how we will deal with the Israeli bridgehead on the west bank of the canal when the ceasefire comes.

The moment of crisis came on Saturday, October 20:

Our forces are trying to close the breach in both east and west and sustaining insupportable losses; but they are fighting with desperate ferocity.

In the next two short days, we approached a ceasefire. At 0815 on Sunday, October 21, I noted in my diary that Presidential Secretary for Information Ashraf Marwan had arrived at 0200 hours to meet Hafiz Ismail, who took him to see President Sadat. They returned after a short time, when the national security advisor asked the deputy chief of Intelligence, Rif‘at Hassanein, to summon the representative of the Central Intelligence Agency in Cairo and have him send a message to Secretary Kissinger, in Moscow at the time, informing him that Egypt agreed to a ceasefire on the present lines, and to holding an immediate peace conference, on condition that the US and the Soviet Union guarantee the cessation of hostilities and Israel’s withdrawal.

It is clear that the decision was imposed on us by the harsh military situation. Hafiz Ismail notified us that after President Sadat visited the command center and was reassured about the confrontation plans vis-à-vis the Israeli penetration, the commander in chief took the president aside and told him that he needed to build reserves—which required time to prepare—to resume armed conflict with the Israelis on the east and west banks of the Suez Canal. Ismail Ali had no objections to a ceasefire at this point, to allow time to rebuild our logistical side.

I added in my diary at the time that the ceasefire might be achieved in about three days, and that it was imagined that Israel would also agree to a ceasefire. The Americans would no doubt leap at a ceasefire on the present lines, that is, with Egypt in Sinai and Israel west of the Suez Canal, achieving the balance Kissinger was seeking to simplify diplomatic efforts to reach a settlement. The summary of all this—the truth that was visible to me in 1973, and of which I became more convinced while rereading my writings at the time and the writings of others, foremost among which were those of Hafiz Ismail—is that our abortive attack on the entrances to the mountain passes in Sinai on October 14 and our heavy losses that day gave Israel the opportunity to counterattack and breach our defenses in the east. The Israelis leapt into the space left unguarded by Egypt and thereby affected the balance of power and the military equilibrium between the two parties. There can be no doubt that the Americans throwing their full weight into the conflict, providing Israel with virtually unlimited supplies, was the primary factor, not only in allowing them to penetrate the lines but also essentially to stand against the development of the Egyptian attack. It is not going too far to state that fighting on the Syrian front from October 13 to the ceasefire announcement on October 22 had its own effect, allowing the Israelis to advance their forces southward, to Sinai. This was revealed by the developments in the battle, and affirmed by international reports.

The fact is that the lack of effective precautions on the Egyptian side allowed the Israelis to move westward and broaden the threat they posed to the Egyptian forces. What is incontrovertible, however, is that the strength of the Egyptians’ military performance, their solidity, and their insistence on continuing to apply pressure on the Israelis on the west and east banks of the Suez Canal—as well as Egyptian ambushes in that region, which cost the Israelis dearly and caused heavy losses on their side—played a role in bringing the Israeli leadership to the conclusion that the most they could achieve was a measure of equilibrium with Egypt, which could pave the way for active negotiations.

Kissinger and the US maneuvered to achieve this result, liberating each side from the consequences of feeling vanquished by the other. It did, in fact, have the effect of opening up the diplomatic and political path after the fighting stopped. But it is also quite futile to deny that Egypt’s strategic success was the basis for moving the situation forward and reestablishing the strategic balance in the Middle East, which largely limited the effects of the 1967 defeat on the relationship between the two parties.