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Europe – staying safe together: The need for a common security framework beyond terrorism

Désirée Biehl*

Abstract

There are many forms of threats to a personal or national security. Besides the obvious threat of war, the European Union has been facing countless security threats over the past 15 years. Alongside terrorism, financial crises and natural disasters a new form of threat has emerged: a pandemic. This paper seeks to explain and argue why successful cooperation in the field of counterterrorism and civil protection demonstrates the imminent need for European cooperation during the global health crisis. This will be laid out by addressing the question of whether or not the threat of pandemics should be considered within the frame of securitisation in order to become part of the EU’s agenda for combating this universal – albeit invisible – threat.

Introduction

What are the future security threats and challenges in the upcoming years? Next to the more “classic” challenges like terrorism and radical violence, one can certainly add recent threats like climate change induced incidents as well as global pandemics. Threats such as economic lows, poverty, and loss of work will not be included in this paper’s analysis. The other more obvious category that will be excluded from this article is the factor of external conflicts. Asking EU citizens, conflicts at the borders of the EU are not perceived as dangerous to one’s personal well-being compared to other threats. Furthermore, it is not possible to tackle international conflicts with mere European cooperation; often a wider, more international response is needed.

This article offers an overview of the past and current measures and instruments regarding anti-terrorism and civil protection, and, based on the current COVID-19 crisis, gives arguments on what could and should be done at a European level. This argument will mainly be embedded in the securitisation theory. There have been three important Eurobarometer surveys conducted so far in 2011, 2015 and 2017 concerning the perceptions and fears of European citizens. As most people still continue to feel strongly about the safety in the EU, the latest named challenges of EU citizens have mainly been terrorism, organised crime, natural and human-made disasters, and cybercrime. However, security is an everchanging phenomenon – either in perception but also regarding topicality. In 2020 and especially in the near future, a new survey could show new threats in hindsight.

Terrorism and anti-terrorism mechanisms

Terrorism is almost impossible to define as a concept of structural violence. In security studies themselves, the number of definitions given is vast. The turning point of categorising terrorism was certainly 9/11, but beforehand it was already defined as “violence—or equally important, the threat of violence—used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim.” (Hoffman, 2006). Even categorisation of terrorism drivers (jihadist, anarchist, right- or left-wing motivated) seems impossible. In the following parts, the Europol categories will be used for any further EU related explanations.

Since 2007, Europol publishes an annual report about terrorism drivers as well as the current situation in the EU. The report distinguishes between Jihadist, Separatist, left-wing, right-wing and single-issue terrorism. That said, carried out attacks are declining overall since their new peak around 2015/16. Depending on the targeted country, jihadist terrorism remains the biggest type of attempted and carried out terrorism in the EU. However, looking at single countries: the UK suffered more attacks from separatist groups, with Italy mostly combatting left-wing terrorism. The UK’s fight against separatist terrorism might seem to undermine the argument of the need of a European common work frame against terrorism. Since the vast majority of attacks however seem to impact more than one country, at least in the field of persecution but also prevention schemes, there is definitely a need for coordination at a European level. Looking at the example of the Paris or Berlin attacks: in the case of Paris the surviving perpetrators tried to flee via Germany, and the terrorist Anis Amri in Berlin was previously being known in Italy, Switzerland and different German communal entities. He managed, however, to trick the Schengen Information System (SIS) in order to travel irregularly across borders and assume multiple identities. This fact alone calls for more radical measures to establish a reliable database, allowing police authorities to track potential offenders. A more coordinated, even institutional mechanism could work towards a more secure environment within the European Union.

Before going into presenting already existing mechanisms, another important argument in combatting terrorism is not only the legal or cooperative policing system in the European Union, but rather a key point in combatting terrorism are the everchanging drivers that lead to these attacks. Hence, there is not only a need for European cooperation but also enhanced studies and implemented mechanism to keep potential future offenders from turning to terrorism as a solution for their agenda setting. How can that be incorporated? The problem ahead lies within the different types of possible terrorism motivation drivers. There will be no “one-size-fits-all” solution. For the near future there is a need to prevent potential terrorists from entering the EU via common migration routes. Saying this, the argument made is clearly not pointing out that asylum seekers are terrorists, but rather that irregular migration perpetuates the possibility for a hidden entry into the EU by people whose intent is clearly harmful.

What has (successfully) been done so far? The easiest measure to name is certainly the Schengen Information System (SIS). It is used for information sharing in order to secure and mange border crossings. The system enables police authorities to not only check on possible alerts when people enter a country but also contact other member states if necessary. Following the terrorist attacks in 2015/16, the European legislation initiated new functionalities comprising new alert categories, biometric data, more information exchange on possible connections to terrorist activities, child protection in regards to human trafficking, more transparent data on irregular migration such as travel bans, and an enhanced access for EU Agencies such as Europol. This enhancement might not tackle the roots of terrorism, but will certainly be a step towards prevention on a legal level.

After the first peak in terrorist attacks within the new era of terrorism (hence after 9/11), the Council of the European Union adapted an EU counter terrorism strategy paper. At its centre the core strategy calls upon: “prevent, protect, pursue, respond”. Part of this agenda was the creation of the position of EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator. Since 2007, this seat has been filled by Gilles de Kerchove. Why is this role so important? With all the newly implemented measures and mechanisms, there is a need for one person that coordinates, mitigates and prioritises activities. Furthermore, the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris led to several more measures within the European Union. Firstly, the European Agenda on Security was established.

This plan seeks

to define and criminalise terrorist offences, prevent radicalisation and the spreading of terrorist propaganda, and to cut terrorists’ access to the means to perpetrate attacks such as finance, firearms, explosives, etc. (European Commission, 2020, b)

Whereas this instrument is hence implemented to cut potential terrorists off their means to attempt an attack, the relatively newly founded Radicalisation Awareness Network on the other hand seeks out the possibilities to reach out to people before they radicalise themselves or are radicalised by others. Furthermore, Europol received more competencies with the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC). The ECTC provides five key fields of competencies: information hub, coordination and operational support, strategic support building, fighting terrorist online content, and direct and immediate support in case of an emergency. The Centre is exemplary in its fields and combines most relevant tasks a counter terrorism centre can have – and this on a common European level. The work in the field of counter terrorism has certainly not yet come to its full potential, but numbers so far do not lie: the European coordination of counter-terrorism works – to an extent. The agenda setting of the need for counter terrorism was quickly built up. There was no doubt in whether the European population needed safety from terrorism. In the framework of securitisation theory, this development was easy to comprehend. The European Union serves as the securitising actor and introduces with its agenda a possibility to combat the existential threat (terrorism) to a referent object (the citizens of the EU). The audience in this case is rather ambiguous, because it was not only the EU’s citizens that needed to be persuaded to give in to the idea of sharing their private data for the greater good but also the member states themselves that had to be convinced that only on a supranational level it is possible to protect their own citizens.

In summary, the counter terrorism framework so far is a good example for introducing measures on a supranational European level in order to ensure safety from terrorism. In the next step, the Civil Protection scheme will be introduced as a means to coordinate immediate response in the case of natural disasters, which have occurred more often in the past 10 years.

Natural disaster and man-made disasters

According to a 2017 report by the European Commission, the most common risks ahead – some of them climate change induced – are flooding, extreme weather, fires, and pandemics as well as earthquakes or energy / infrastructure disruptions (EC Report 2017: 5). Most of these risks tend to tackle regions and not only certain countries. Therefore, the report emphasises the importance of cross border cooperation. Along with this information comes another success story: the 2001 established EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Again, looking at natural or man-made disasters from a securitisation perspective, the need for supranational cooperation seems rather clear. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, forest fires or extreme weather are a threat to a person’s life. Similarly to the framing of terrorism as a threat to people living in the EU, one can observe the same pattern of securitisation: the EU again takes upon the role of the securitising actor by implementing a mechanism to coordinate information, data, knowledge on prevention as well as pooling resources to react as first responders. And again, the EU citizen is the referent object in this case being threatened by multiple possibilities that are difficult to control or even prevent from happening. However, the possible victims that could follow a disaster can definitely be minimised by said mechanisms. The audience again are the EU member states that had to be persuaded to set up the mechanism and give up parts of the responsibilities to Brussels. The path to this was not easy, as civil protection is not to be rooted on the same administrative level in every member state. Civil protection in Germany, for example, is a competency of the Länder, in France instead it is located with the national level. In order to set up the Civil Protection Mechanism, the responsible Commissioner had to get more than 28 ministers to the table.

Leaving aside that both the Civil Protection Mechanism and the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) are able to act worldwide, the implementation of both show another success story of why the European level is crucial for a safer EU. The ERCC manages an assistance reserve from EU Member states in order to deploy them to countries in need, faster and more efficiently than a single country could maybe offer. The reason behind this is that disaster equipment can be very expensive. Should there be a large forest fire and that specific country has no specific equipment to extinguish the fire, then the ERCC would coordinate a fast response to ensure assistance from perhaps neighbouring countries. A recent example for a successful mission were the forest fires in Sweden in 2018 where over 360 fire-fighting personnel, 7 planes, 6 helicopters and 67 vehicles were quickly mobilised. Another advantage of the Mechanism is the training provided. In the past years more personnel than ever were trained for first responder assistance in case of an earthquake. Latest example of this work was the 2019 earthquake in Albania. As such, the EU was able to activate assistance within 8 hours, precious time when it comes to earthquake rescue missions.

After the growing success, the Civil Protection Mechanism was strengthened in 2019 with the so-called rescEU programme. The programme:

includes a fleet of firefighting planes and helicopters, medical evacuation planes, as well as a stockpile of medical equipment and field hospitals that can respond to health emergencies, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. (Factsheet rescEU)

It is certainly a step in the right direction, yet when it comes to the next crucial threat to the EU, a “stockpile of medical equipment” is not enough. After pointing out a very successful and a rather successful mechanism for countering terrorism and natural disasters, the last part of this article will pick the success sides of these two mechanisms and demonstrate why a European health policy is immensely needed.

Pandemics

In the past 20 years, the EU has faced several epidemic threats such as SARS, bird flu, swine flu and several different forms of influenza. However, only the current pandemic poses a threat that Europe has not seen since the Spanish flu in 1918/19. The COVID-19 pandemic has challenged the EU to new ends. Countries started to close borders, leaving Schengen ignored and started frantically to look for hospital supplies such as Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Masks and disinfectant for the population were quickly scarce. It seemed that every country was panicking on its own. In the end, different member states were hit differently in regards to collapsing health systems, swamped hospitals and death tolls. An example: different countries sent supplies to Italy or took in a small number of patients. However, the response to the Corona crisis was neither coordinated nor efficient. Every country had different measures against the virus, different types of lockdowns. But the virus knew no borders – the EU response was belated. The answer to the pandemic was an EU recovery plan: 2,4 trillion Euros to soften the impact of this crisis on the citizens. This article is not a plea for a common European health system. However, the current crisis shows clearly that there is the need for a coordinated response in combatting the impact on each sanitary system. As with the Civil Protection Mechanism, there should be a Health Emergency Mechanism. There is the need to coordinate supplies, medication, PPE and even medical personnel. The EU cannot stand aside when some of their member states are struggling whilst others are clearly thriving by their knowledge or advantages in medical supplies. The EU is a community of states and is built on solidarity. Besides the argument based on the EU’s values, there is the hard fact that the other two mechanisms show so clearly: coordination on European level is the only solution and answer to current and future security threats.

Conclusion

Whether one supports the utopia of the United States of Europe or not, and whether there will soon be further political integration or not, the imminent need for further implementation in security mechanisms and framework is calling us to action. Being it the Counter Terrorism Agenda or the Civil Protection Mechanism, both instruments show success and a promising future in order to secure EU citizens. To this day, pandemics have always been a threat to other parts of the world. Now that it is at the EU’s doorstep, there a strong need for a coordination and prevention mechanism to prevent the current devastation from happening again. Only this can mean that the EU is #StrongerTogether.

Works Cited

Buzan, Barry, et al. Security a New Framework for Analysis. Lynne Rienner Pub., 1998.

Council of the European Union. The European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy. 2005, register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204

European Commission. EU Civil Protection Mechanism. 4 May 2020, (a) ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism_en

---. Counter Terrorism and radicalisation, 30 June 2020, (b), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/counter-terrorism_en

---. Overview of Natural and Man-Made Disaster Risks the European Union May Face. 2017, www.sos112.si/slo/tdocs/eu_risks_overview_2017.pdf

European Council on Foreign Relations, European Responses to Terrorism. 30 June 2020, www.ecfr.eu/debate/european_responses_to_terrorism6082

Europol. European Counter Terrorism Centre - ECTC. 12 Mar. 2019, www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc

---. European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2020. 6 July 2020, www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2020

Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press, 2006.

Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission. Schengen Information System. 6 Dec. 2016, ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-information-system_en

Ouferroukh, Hayet. “About RAN.” Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, 17 June 2020, ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran_en

“RescEU.” European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations - European Commission, 17 July 2020, ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/resceu_en

* Désirée Biehl is Research Fellow at Villa Vigoni. She studied Security Studies at University of Sheffield as well as European Studies at CIFE in Nice, Berlin and Rome. Her scientific background is political science and her research interests lie in the fields of terrorism studies and memory studies. Additionally, she works as a lecturer in political education for young adults.