Читать книгу Marshal William Carr Beresford - Marcus de la Poer Beresford - Страница 11
Оглавление2 THE CAPTURE OF THE CAPE COLONY AND THE RIO DE LA PLATA EXPEDITION OF 1806–1807
‘It grieved me to see my country subjugated in this manner, but I shall always admire the gallantry of the brave and honourable Beresford in so daring an enterprise.’1
Until the armistice of October 1801, which led to the Peace of Amiens in March 1802, Britain had been at war with not just France, but also with Spain and other French allies. War with France broke out again in 1803, and in 1804 Spain entered the war on the side of France following an attack on its treasure fleet by a squadron of the Royal Navy off Cape Santa Maria on 5 October without any declaration of war.2 Britain’s links with its colonies and trading partners were once again threatened, and the government developed a number of strategies to safeguard its position.
Possession of the Cape Colony, or at least the presence there of a friendly power, was a substantial asset to those interested in securing the sea route to India and the East Indies in the days of sail at a time prior to the construction of the Suez Canal. Lord Castlereagh, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, expressed it thus:
‘ the true value of the Cape to Great Britain is its being considered and treated at all times as an outpost subservient to the protection and security of our Indian possessions.’3 The British had conquered the Cape in 1795 but returned it to the Dutch (then the Batavian Republic) in 1803 pursuant to the Treaty of Amiens.4
French sea power, particularly when combined with that of Spain, remained a real threat to Britain in 1805 prior to the battle of Trafalgar in October of that year. Only two years previously, Napoleon had threatened an invasion of England by a massive force based around Boulogne and Calais.5 Against this background the British government determined to seek to recapture the Cape Colony. An expedition under the command of Sir David Baird was dispatched, comprising some 6,000 soldiers divided into two brigades. The first brigade, led by Beresford, was made up of the 24th, 38th and 83rd regiments. The second brigade, the Highland Brigade, was made up of the 71st, 72nd and 93rd regiments and was commanded by Ronald Craufurd Ferguson, like Beresford a Brigadier General. The land forces were escorted by a fleet commanded by Sir Home Popham on HMS Diadem. This fleet fitted out and sailed from Falmouth on 5 August, and having assembled and taken on troops and further provisions departed on 31 August from Cork.6
The fleet called first at Madeira in the last week of September 1805. There the destination of the expedition was confirmed, ending weeks of speculation, as instructions had been declared secret to all but the commanders. The ships prepared to sail from Madeira on 1 October. A few days later, those ships destined for the West Indies separated from the remainder of Popham’s fleet. After leaving Madeira, Popham raised his pennant as Commodore and appointed Captain Hugh Downman of the Diomede to command the Diadem, in a move that was to cause many disputes later when it came to claiming prize money. The fleet traversed the Atlantic, crossing the Equator on 3 November and arriving at São Salvador (now Bahia) on the Brazilian coast on 9 November after suffering some damage in a heavy storm. Two large vessels, the King George and the Britannia, were lost on Las Rochas with fatalities including Brigadier General Yorke, who had command of the artillery. Repairs and the sourcing of provisions and horses for the cavalry meant that the fleet did not depart São Salvador until late December.7 It was not until 4 January 1806 that the fleet reached Table Bay, where it was sighted by the Dutch colonists.
Notwithstanding the rough seas, Beresford and a small landing party were sent ashore that day to ascertain a suitable disembarkation venue.8 The next day, 5 January, there was an unsuccessful attempt to land Beresford’s brigade at Leopard’s Bay in high surf. Baird then detached Beresford with the 38th Regiment and some cavalry with orders to land at Saldanha Bay. This wonderful harbour is some 60 miles north of Capetown.9 Orders were to secure the area (including seizing the postmaster) with a view to obtaining provisions for the army, and to prepare the site for a landing by the entire force if that should prove necessary. Beresford’s force was carried by the Diomede (50-guns) and some smaller vessels, and disembarked without opposition on 6 January. As it turned out, landing at Saldanha Bay meant that Beresford missed the ensuing battle that determined the fate of southern Africa.
A change of wind direction abated the surf enough to allow Baird to land his main force at Leopard’s Bay (now Melkbosstrand), some 16 miles north of Capetown, with only minor opposition on 6 January.10 Two days later Baird comprehensively defeated the Dutch under Lieutenant General Jan Willem Janssens at the battle of Blaauwberg, and on 9 January the commander of Capetown surrendered on terms which were ratified later that month.11 In Capetown, the British learnt the welcome news of the victory of Nelson at Trafalgar over the combined Franco-Spanish fleets on 21 October of the previous year.
Beresford caught up with Baird in Capetown. Baird then sent him after Janssens, who had withdrawn into the interior in the Hottentots Holland Kloof area with his defeated force. He caught up and made contact with the Dutchman, having assumed a position in Stellenbosch on 14 January, and secured the environs. When Baird arrived the following day, Janssens surrendered after further discussions. In his dispatch home, Baird praised Beresford’s ‘spirit of conciliation and perseverance’.12
Up to this point the British expedition had followed its instructions and achieved its objectives with little loss. Baird’s and Popham’s orders provided (in the absence of a negotiated surrender) for the capture of the Cape with the granting to the inhabitants the continued enjoyment of their private property, usages and religion as nearly as might be possible consistent with the terms granted in the previous war when it had been occupied by Britain. Baird was then to send on to India the troops designated for that service. In the event of it being decided that an attempt to capture the Cape was not viable (there was concern the French might have fortified it by means of troops and provisions on vessels that had escaped from Rochfort), the instructions were for that part of the force not designated for India to return to St Helena to await further instructions, and in the event these were not forthcoming within fifteen days, to return to Cork, calling at Faial in the Azores in case instructions had reached that island.13 There was no element of discretion that would allow for the expedition that Baird and Popham subsequently determined upon.
The renewal of the conflict with Spain offered the opportunity to weaken Spain as a military power and to open up trading opportunities, particularly in South America. The latter objective was particularly important in mercantile circles threatened by the loss of British and Irish trade with continental Europe.
One of the most vociferous advocates of British intervention in South America was Sir Home Popham. He had been trying to interest the British government in South America for some years. However, the attack on the Rio de la Plata in 1806 which now took place was pure opportunism and had not been sanctioned in advance by the British cabinet.14 While in Capetown, Popham apparently heard from a number of sources that the Peruvian treasure (in fact primarily silver from the mines around Potosi in modern-day Bolivia, then part of the Viceroyalty of Peru) was on its way to Buenos Aires for transhipment to Spain.15 With communications to London taking perhaps three months in each direction, there was no time to seek instructions. Popham approached Baird, and after some initial resistance persuaded the military commander to authorise Popham to take part of his fleet and some 1,400 troops from Capetown to support the enterprise. The voyage provided for a stopover at St Helena, where it was hoped that the expedition might pick up additional troops and artillery.16
Baird determined to appoint Beresford to command the expeditionary force, stating to Lord Castlereagh that he had: ‘confided the command to an officer of rank and recognized ability, wise and zealous.’ He further authorised the appointment of Beresford as Lieutenant-Governor if he should get possession of ‘the Spanish establishment on the River Plate’.17
The core of Beresford’s force (some 864 men) was made up of the 1st Battalion of the 71st Regiment of Foot, commanded by another Irishman, Lieutenant Colonel Denis Pack. Beresford and Pack were firm friends, though it is not known whether this factor played any part in the selection of the 71st Regiment to accompany Beresford.18 Popham had wanted to take a different regiment, whose commanding officer was a close friend of his own.19 Additional firepower was to be supplied by Royal Marines, Royal Artillery members and a picket of the 20th Light Dragoons, as well as sailors from the fleet accompanying Beresford’s force.
Following the capture of Capetown, the 71st had been quartered at Wynnberg, about 7 miles outside the town. Once again secrecy was the order of the day and the speculation in Capetown concerned Macao or Manila as the destination of the expedition, given that the Ile de France was considered too strong a target. Popham’s predeliction for South America was such that it was not long before opinion fixed on a marauding expedition along the coast of Peru. When later they heard of Beresford’s success in capturing Buenos Aires, the reaction was one of incredulity that a city of this size could be taken by one regiment.20 On 12 April 1806, the 71st Regiment and the other members of the expedition embarked, and Popham’s fleet, which sailed on 20 April, arrived in Saint Helena nine days later. On the way there contact had been lost with The Ocean, one of the transports carrying some 200 men, but fortuitously this was waiting for the fleet when it arrived at the entrance to the Rio de la Plata. In Saint Helena, Beresford acquired some 250 additional soldiers including artillerymen and two 5½-inch howitzers. In all this little army numbered little more than 1,600 men.21
Arriving in the Rio de la Plata in early June, Popham and Beresford disagreed on their first objective. Beresford sought to strike against Montevideo rather than Buenos Aires, on the basis that Montevideo was reportedly well fortified and that it would be preferable to strike the stronger position first while the British force had the element of surprise and the men were fresh. He was overruled by Popham, allegedly on the basis that provisions, which were apparently in short supply, would be easier to obtain in Buenos Aires.22 However, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that the suspected presence of ‘Peruvian’ silver in Buenos Aires in transit to Spain may have contributed to Popham’s preference for an attack on Buenos Aires rather than Montevideo.23 The troops then transferred from the men-of-war to frigates and transports as the former were too big to proceed up-river. The scene was set for a landing, though Beresford’s disclosure that Baird had commissioned him as Major General on the eve of his departure from the Cape (12 April) upset Popham, who later lodged a complaint with the government in this respect.24
On 24 June, the force was off Buenos Aires and the Spanish Viceroy, Rafael Marquis de Sobremonte, was advised of its arrival while attending the theatre that evening. He had been warned in general terms of the presence of the British squadron in the Rio de la Plata some weeks earlier, in response to which Sobremonte had taken certain defensive measures. Buenos Aires at that time was a town of between 40,000 and 50,000 inhabitants.25 There was a fort near the river with thirty-five 24lb guns and assorted other ordnance. However, the city was short of regular troops, for some of those designated to go there were still in northern Spain. A number of local regiments were augmented by a militia. When he was first warned of the British presence, Sobremonte called out the militia and stationed troops in Quilmes, Olivos and along the line of the Rio Riachuelo; the former to cover anticipated landing points, and the latter to create a defensive screen outside the city. However, the Viceroy’s reaction to the landing of the British was to abandon Buenos Aires and to proceed inland towards Córdoba with some 600 troops and sixteen wagons loaded with the state treasure and the valuables of wealthy citizens. He left his aide-de-camp (ADC), Hilarión de la Quintana, to resist the British, and if necessary to negotiate terms.26
The following day (25 June) Beresford disembarked his forces, amounting to probably less than 1,450 men, at Quilmes, approximately 12 miles from Buenos Aires.27 Having seized the beachhead, the small force spent the night near Reducción de Quilmes before proceeding towards Buenos Aires. The next day the British encountered a Spanish force estimated variously to be 2,000–3,000 strong with cavalry and cannon drawn up in a line. Beresford sent the 71st Regiment under Pack forward with bagpipes playing, while keeping the Saint Helena infantry in reserve. The British troops brushed aside resistance following a short but sharp fight. The Spanish retreated to a small village called Barracas, burning the bridge over the river Riachuello, but early on the morning of 27 June, following a brisk exchange of fire, Beresford’s troops crossed the Riachuello on a pontoon bridge made up of small boats and planks, and quickly gained possession of Barracas.
Beresford sent one of his ADCs, Alexander Gordon, to summons the city of Buenos Aires. Quintana sought terms for surrender, but Beresford refused conditions save such as he was pleased to offer. On the afternoon of 27 June the British entered Buenos Aires and took possession of the fortress. From disembarkation to the surrender of the fortress the British force lost only one man killed and a further twelve wounded. In victory Beresford allowed generous conditions, which may have stood him in good stead later; he allowed the garrison to surrender with the honours of war. Captain A. Gillespie of the marines was appointed Commissary for Prisoners and the Spanish officers signed their parole papers at his lodgings, in the ‘Inn of the Three Kings’. Beresford guaranteed security of property and freedom of commerce, together with the full exercise of religion. While this was entirely in line with British thinking on freedom of trade, it is likely that Beresford was motivated by a desire to cement the acquisition of Buenos Aires in a situation where he had landed with some 1,400 troops and needed to control a population of over 40,000 with many other potential enemies within striking distance in Montevideo and other towns.
Beresford’s correspondence with both London and the Cape reveals his anxiety regarding his position. Indeed, even while in Saint Helena he had written home to the government stating that in the event of success he would require reinforcements and additional instructions.28 He clearly felt that the best he could try and do was to hold Buenos Aires, and he indicated that he would not be undertaking further operations until reinforcements were received. In early July he requested an additional 2,000 infantry and 600 cavalry. Beresford must have received some degree of intelligence from the local community because he knew that Viceroy Sobremonte was trying to collect a large force from the towns of Córdoba in order to attempt the recovery of Buenos Aires.29
It was immediately evident that to have any prospect of retaining the city and its surrounding area would require additional troops. Popham’s first letters after the capture of Buenos Aires were to Baird in Capetown advising him of the success and seeking reinforcements. Similar reports and requests were sent to London.30 By way of response, Baird advised on 13 August that he was sending 2,000 men as soon as possible, a force that would include 350 cavalry. Understandably, given the length of time it took to communicate with England, a response from the government was somewhat slower.31
Beresford set up his headquarters in the fortress of Buenos Aires. He moved quickly in an effort to consolidate the tenuous hold he had on the city and with a view to garner support for British rule. While he secured the city, he sought to conciliate those accustomed to exercise power, the merchants and indeed other groups. In essence, he left in place the existing legal, administrative and ecclesiastical structures making just one major change in that he proclaimed the sovereignty of George III and assumed the position of Lieutenant-Governor in place of Viceroy Sobremonte.32 He made a series of proclamations designed to reassure the population, which reduced many commercial tariffs. As late as 4 August 1806 he issued a proclamation containing sixteen commercial regulations designed to break the system of ‘monopolies, restriction and oppression’.33 Free trade was established subject to the payment of certain taxes to the British Crown and to the Consulate. The amount of these taxes depended on the origin of the goods, with lesser rates appertaining to trade with Great Britain, Ireland and the colonies of the British crown. There were specific taxes in respect of tobacco, Chilean wine, whiskey, Paraguayan herbs, horse hides and other skins as well as for gold and silver.
Beresford moved also to establish his supply lines, appointing an Irish merchant resident in Buenos Aires, Thomas O’Gorman, as purveyor of provisions to the army. Some funds were available for this purpose, as over 600,000 pesos was sequestered from government coffers in the fort and on the quayside.34 In parallel with securing the city and encouraging commerce, he sought to recover the ‘treasure’ which it will be recalled had been sent inland with the Viceroy and an escort. To this end Beresford sent a party under Captain Robert Arbuthnot to attempt to retrieve the treasure, which had been sent to Luján, some fifty kilometres in the interior.35
Arbuthnot took with him seven dragoons, twenty infantry and two other officers from the 71st Regiment. They set out by horse on 3 July and remarkably returned with an immense sum one week later.36 The total sum recovered from Luján was $1,291,323. Of this $1,086,208 (perhaps $70–77,000,000 in current value) was sent back to England on 17 July on a frigate, HMS Narcissus, while Beresford kept back $205,115 for the Buenos Aires treasury and the needs of the expeditionary force.37 At the same time, over $100,000 worth of valuables was reportedly returned to Portenos (as the inhabitants of Buenos Aires were and are still known) in keeping with Beresford’s promise of security of property.
The Narcissus, commanded by Captain Ross Donnelly, arrived at Portsmouth, England, on 12 September after a 57-day voyage, and the news was forwarded to London. Letters had been despatched by Popham to the City of London, the chambers of commerce of other towns and even Lloyds Coffee House extolling the potential of trade with South America. In what appears to have been a well-engineered propaganda occasion, the treasure was transported on wagons from Portsmouth to London escorted by a picket of cavalry. The convoy arrived in London on 21 September to a rapturous reception, as reported in The Times and other publications. Each wagon bore a large sign stating ‘Treasure’ and when the convoy reached St James’s Square silk banners stating ‘Buenos Aires, Popham, Beresford, Victory’ were presented to the convoy as it made its way to the Bank of England.38
The lion’s share of the proceeds seized in what is now Argentina went to the state, but each officer, soldier and sailor received a share. Baird, who had authorised but not participated in the expedition, was awarded £23,990-5-8d, the largest sum; but even the lowly soldier or sailor received £18-6-0d. Beresford’s share at £11,995-2-10½d was deemed to be double that of Popham (£5,997-11-5d), notwithstanding the latter’s angry representations.39
A grateful City of London, with an eye on future trade at least as much as the benefit accruing from the capture of the treasure, voted Beresford and Popham the Freedom of the City; the Court of Common Council resolving unanimously:
that the thanks of this Court be given to Major-General Beresford and Commodore Sir Home Popham, and the officers and men under their respective commands, for their very gallant conduct and the very important services rendered by them to their country in the capture of Buenos Ayres, at once opening a new source of commerce to the manufacturers of Great Britain, and depriving her enemy of one of the richest and most extensive colonies in her possession.40
In addition to the Freedom of the City, Beresford and Popham were awarded jewelled freedom boxes and beautiful dress swords to the value of 200 guineas each, though they were not to collect these until after the abdication of Napoleon in 1814.41
Back in Buenos Aires, the situation – unbeknownst to the government in London – had changed dramatically. While Lord Grenville’s administration prepared to send out a relieving force under Brigadier General Samuel Auchmuty, and indeed even before the Narcissus had arrived at Portsmouth with its cargo of precious metal, the British forces in Buenos Aires had suffered defeat and capture.42 Though some Portenos took the oath of allegiance, by mid July 1806 Beresford was conscious of growing opposition to British rule. He observed that while people were desirous of change they were (quite wisely as it turned out) concerned that Spain would recover the conquered land and that factor inhibited people from coming forward to declare their support. Notwithstanding this difficulty, he seems personally to have developed a good relationship with some of the important families and individuals in Buenos Aires.43 Later, after his return to England, Beresford was to send presents to a number of these. Furthermore, in light of later events, it is possible that Beresford sympathised with the ambitions of some Portenos to achieve independence, though he trod a very careful line in the absence of instructions from London. There were also rumours of masonic connections between erstwhile opponents, and the ‘Southern Cross’ masonic lodge may have been established at this time.
The population of the Spanish colony (the Virreinato) was made up of four components; the Spanish, the creoles, the native Indians and slaves. Those of political consequence were the Spanish and the creoles. While Beresford reportedly met a number of proponents of independence, including Juan Martin de Pueyrredón and J.J. Castelli, both of whom later pursued independence from Spain, neither the Spanish settlers nor the creoles were interested (with possibly a few exceptions) in exchanging one colonial power for another. The resistance and number of deaths arising from subsequent assaults by other British forces on Montevideo and Buenos Aires make this clear. Whether they were long-term residents, recent arrivals, Spanish or Creole, they realised quickly that the British force under Beresford was too weak to guarantee their independence.44
With the growth of opposition to the British presence, Beresford now faced two further problems. The first of these concerned Spanish officers released on parole who disappeared, thus breaking that parole. There was little that could be done once they had absconded.45 The second problem, the desertion of some of his own troops, was met head on by Beresford. The force brought from the Cape and St Helena included a number of German and Spanish mercenaries, some of whom deserted. Beresford had already demonstrated his capacity to ensure discipline in Egypt and he was later to be recognised for his great organisational and administrative abilities. Here in Buenos Aires he showed those same qualities. Four Spanish deserters from the St Helena regiment were ordered to be given 500 lashes and one of those died in the process. However, when a Spanish cadet was sentenced to death on 17 July, Beresford reprieved him at the request of the Bishop of Buenos Aires, even though the latter was not well disposed towards the British. Two days later Beresford decreed that those assisting men to desert would be liable to the death penalty, a move that may have been inspired by the efforts of some of the clergy to persuade soldiers who were their fellow Roman Catholics to desert. Many of those targeted were Irish, and some reportedly deserted in late July and early August having been offered land and in some cases employment. Following the battle of Perdriel, a German deserter who was recaptured was given the death penalty, a not infrequent punishment at the time.46
At the end of July, Beresford was faced with an insurrection led by Juan Martin de Pueyrredón at the head of a force of perhaps 1,000–2,000 mostly mounted horsemen.47 Pueyrredon had initially appeared well disposed to the British on their arrival, but he subsequently left the city to gather troops to resist the invaders. This force was put to flight in twenty minutes by Beresford at Perdriel on 1 August, with Colonel Pack and a force of 500 men from the 71st regiment assisted by six pieces of artillery.48 A lack of cavalry prevented any pursuit and Pueyrredón escaped, fleeing to Colonia de Sacramento in modern-day Uruguay, where he joined another force being raised by Santiago de Liniers, a Frenchman who served for most of his life as a military officer in the service of Spain. In 1788 he had been promoted to Captain and put in command of the flotilla guarding the Rio de la Plata, and at the time of the British invasion he obtained sanctuary in the convent of San Domingo in Buenos Aires before escaping to Montevideo, where the governor authorised him to raise an army to resist the invasion.49
Popham had naval patrols in the Rio de la Plata to both report on and attempt to prevent the transfer of any force from the north to the south bank of the river. Some of the marines used in the initial capture of Buenos Aires were taken from the garrison to give teeth to these patrols. However, on the night of 4/5 August under cover of a storm, de Liniers managed to cross the river with a force of in excess of 2,000, augmented by further adherents as he advanced on the city. Arriving before Buenos Aires on 10 August, which itself was now in a state of unrest, he called on Beresford to surrender, reminding him that he was vastly outnumbered. Rather than surrender, Beresford determined to try and extract his forces, now reduced to about 1,300 men, but only succeeded in getting the sick and the wounded onto Popham’s fleet before hostilities began in earnest on 11 August.50 A running battle ensued over two days during which the British force suffered 45 deaths with 100 injured and a further 9 missing; while the enemy reportedly sustained some 700 losses.51
Beresford had insufficient forces to hold the city and initially sought to maintain himself in the fort, the Retiro barracks and a few other outposts including the Recova.52 Indeed he could spare just fifteen men for the defence of the Retiro which only fell to the Spanish force when all but two of the fifteen defenders had been killed. The British drew back to the Plaza Mayor on 12 August, having been forced to abandon the Recova, where Beresford’s secretary, Captain Kennett, was killed at his side. Beresford had placed riflemen in the steeple of the cathedral, but this position was also abandoned when the decision was made to retreat to the Plaza Mayor.
Beresford at one stage may have planned to retire to the docks at Ensenada and embark there but ultimately he fell back on the fortress, reportedly himself being the last man across the drawbridge.53 Later that day (12 August), under a flag of truce, terms for surrender were negotiated. These included the security of person and property of all British subjects; the troops to march out with the honours of war, and a provision for their speedy embarkation for the Cape or England at the expense of Spain. Further, the British troops were not to serve against Spain directly or indirectly until exchanged for Spanish prisoners. Some of the troops at least appear to have been exchanged for Spanish prisoners previously taken by Beresford in June 1806, and on 17 August a number of Popham’s transports arrived off Buenos Aires for the purpose of taking men on board.54
There seems to have been no doubt at this stage that the terms of the agreement between Beresford and de Liniers provided for the repatriation of the British force, for the appearance of Popham’s transports followed de Liniers ADC visiting Popham on board the Diadem on 16 August under a flag of truce for the specific purpose of embarking the troops and effecting an exchange of prisoners.55 De Liniers however, under pressure from his political masters, ultimately signed the terms on 20 August with the caveat ‘so far as I am able’ (‘en cuánto puedo’). Terms clearly agreed were now rendered uncertain and Beresford immediately protested when there was a failure to release the prisoners with a view to repatriation. To this end he sent back the amended terms to de Liniers via his ADC, Robert Arbuthnot, on 21 August, reminding him that the Spanish version of the treaty had been written by Don Felix Casamayor, the Superintendant of Finances in Buenos Aires. Initially, de Liniers acknowledged the unfairness of this unilateral variation of the terms, which he condemned, and stated he would adhere to the original agreement. Subsequently, he indicated to Beresford that the people of the town were in a state of insurrection as a result of which he wished the British to embark at night from a place out of sight of the crowds. Even that plan was abandoned and clearly under pressure de Liniers denied any knowledge of an agreement in the terms originally reduced to writing.56
Popham supported Beresford’s protests. He engaged in a vigorous correspondence with the Governor of Montevideo, Ruiz Huidobro, and subsequently Viceroy Sobremente, protesting strenuously at the non-fulfilment of the terms of the capitulation agreed between Beresford and de Liniers. These protests were to no avail as the Spanish authorities determined that de Liniers had no authority to agree the terms, and that in reality the terms had not been signed until after the surrender of the British forces in Buenos Aires.57 Popham castigated the Governor of Montevideo for arguing that the agreement had been intended merely as a private document and not a public treaty, pointing out that it had been agreed in the presence of Casamayor antecedent to the surrender, and if this had not been the case Beresford would not have surrendered the castle. In a burst of righteous indignation, Popham claimed the Spanish conduct was disgraceful and contrary to the law of nations and he contrasted this behaviour with that of Beresford on the capture of Buenos Aires earlier.58
The treatment of the defeated force was a mixed one. A number of men were abused and even murdered, but alongside such incidents acts of considerable kindness took place.59 In particular, the Bethlemite fathers administered medical treatment to the injured, and this was recognised by the 71st Regiment when it was later repatriated.60 Colonel Pack kept up a correspondence with Don Luis, one of the Bethlemite Friars, for some years afterwards. He expressed his gratitude for the attention paid to the wounded and sent him the gift of a coffee service in English china in 1809.61 Initial developments were far from satisfactory, for instead of release and repatriation the British soldiers were committed to various jails and other strongholds in and around Buenos Aires. Beresford (and other officers) were released on parole and he lodged with the family of Felix Casamayor in the city.62 Casamayor was the official who had transcribed and witnessed the original terms of the treaty whereby Beresford surrendered.
Following the arrival of further British forces in the estuary of the Rio de la Plata from the Cape at the end of September, as part of the response designed to reinforce Beresford, there was a change of policy and the senior officers were rounded up in mid October and sent under guard to the Cabildo of Luján, the very town from which Beresford’s force had seized the ‘treasure’. Other officers were sent to San Antonio de Areco, Capilla del Señor and various estancias. Parallel with the decision to send the officers to Luján and other locations, the Cabildo dispersed the British troops to a number of inland towns, including Santiago del Estero, Tucumán, San Luis and Córdoba.63 The decision to place them at a distance from Buenos Aires was taken in anticipation that Britain would either attempt their rescue, or, as in fact happened, seek to use reinforcements to restore and extend British rule. Moving officers to the interior and the failure to repatriate the force was seen by the British officers as a breach of the terms of surrender by the colonial government and this was made clear. Later the British officers were able to use this breach as a justification for their own conduct.
In Luján, Beresford and the officers with him were initially at liberty to exercise. They hunted, fished and played cricket; and at first were allowed to correspond.64 Beresford was attended from time to time by Captain Saturnino Rodriguez de Peña, military secretary to de Liniers. De Peña was an opponent of Spanish dominion and he seems to have formed the opinion that Beresford supported the objectives of those who sought independence.65
The promised relief force of some 2,000 under Colonel Backhouse arrived in the Rio de la Plata from the Cape of Good Hope towards the end of September. Meeting up with Popham’s fleet, Backhouse learnt of Beresford’s defeat and capture. After an abortive attempt to capture Montevideo, a small force was landed and captured Maldonado, a then modest town on the left bank of the Rio de la Plata, together with a number of surrounding gun batteries. Maldonado then became the British shore base. Meanwhile British strategy, unaware until 25 January 1807 of Beresford’s surrender, was being directed not just to the maintenance of the conquest of Buenos Aires, but with a view to taking control of Chile. Further reinforcements arrived from England in December with Rear Admiral Sir Charles Stirling, who relieved Popham of his command. Popham returned to England to face trial for his unauthorised campaign.
The main British relief force under Brigadier General Sir Samuel Auchmuty arrived off Montevideo in early January 1807. On 3 February, Auchmuty captured Montevideo. The reaction of the chief magistrate of Buenos Aires was to order the seizure of Beresford’s papers. Judge Juan Bazo y Berry and another procurator fiscal, Dr Pedro Andrés García, with a military escort were sent to Luján for this purpose and despite Beresford’s protests his papers were taken from his ADC, Robert Arbuthnot.66 It was also decided to move Beresford and the other officers further away from the coast to Catamarca in the interior.67 Colonel Pack was clear in his report that García was reminded that the British officers did not regard themselves as on parole due to the Spanish breach of the terms of surrender.68
These developments galvanised de Peña, who was in charge of bringing supplies and money to the detained officers. In possession of a free pass from de Liniers for that purpose, he and a colleague rode to Luján, arriving on 16 February to find that Beresford and the other officers had left under armed escort that very day for Catamarca.69 De Peña and his colleague, in an act of daring, pursued and caught up with the escort party near the Estancia Grande of the Bethlemite Fathers at Arrecifes claiming to have orders to bring Beresford to Buenos Aires. De Peña apparently informed Beresford that he would be taken to Montevideo and that de Peña and his colleagues were undertaking this rescue for the good of the country. However, a difficulty arose in that Beresford refused to leave without Pack, so both were taken back to Buenos Aires by de Peña. There they were hidden by de Peña and his two colleagues, messrs Padilla and Francisco Gonzalez, for three days in the home of Gonzalez before being smuggled offshore in a small boat on 21 February.70 On 22 February 1807 they were transferred to HMS Charwell in the estuary of the Rio de la Plata and they made good their escape to Montevideo.71
Auchmuty’s forces had captured Montevideo three weeks prior to Beresford’s arrival there. When Beresford arrived, Auchmuty was preparing to attempt the recapture of Buenos Aires. He proposed that Beresford should take command of the forces designated for the attempt, in accordance with his own orders to place his force under Beresford’s command. Beresford refused this offer on the grounds that he wished to go to England to acquaint the government fully concerning the situation in the country (i.e. the Rio de la Plata). In this respect he may have wished to express views regarding the potential for Argentinian independence and possible British support for such a move, given the suggestion he had expressed sympathy for such a move to de Peña.72 He also suggested that given the disgrace which had occurred he doubted whether he could really assume command; though it is not clear whether this remark was a reference to military defeat or the rows about the terms of surrender.
A Court of Inquiry held in Montevideo determined that neither Beresford nor Pack had broken their parole, but perhaps Beresford still felt honour-bound not to resume the fight personally.73 Pack corroborated Beresford’s evidence regarding the conditions under which they had surrendered and stated that he was present on 13 August when de Liniers dispatched a Spanish officer to Popham to request transports be furnished to execute the terms of the treaty. Insofar as they were able to controvert the evidence of the surrender document, the Spanish advanced an argument that Beresford had raised the Spanish flag over the fort at Buenos Aires prior to the signing the document and had thrown down his sword, both considered as evidence of unconditional surrender. However, it was pointed out that the Spanish flag had been raised at the specific request of de Liniers’ ADC in order to stop the exchanges of fire which were continuing, and in fact Captain Patrick rather than Beresford had thrown down his sword in disgust.74 Beresford conceded he had given his parole not to escape but maintained he was not bound by his word given the failure of the Spanish to return him and his troops to England and the subsequent placing of an armed guard on him and his fellow officers. Having been cleared of any improper conduct, Beresford sailed from the Rio de la Plata on the Diomede on 26 March, reaching Ireland on 22 May 1807. Pack remained with the army in Montevideo and only returned home following its defeat in the summer of 1807.75
Interestingly, Beresford wrote from Montevideo to Martín de Álzaga (then Mayor of Buenos Aires) to try and secure the release of the British prisoners in compliance with the terms of the capitulation in August 1806, declaring in that correspondence that he intended to take no further part in the campaign: ‘but in spite of all that has happened to me I feel interested for the people of Buenos Aires’ and if they heard from him again he wrote ‘it will be from my striving to do what I consider will make them prosperous and happy’.76
Beresford’s departure meant General Whitelocke ultimately came to be placed in charge of the army that attempted but failed to recapture Buenos Aires in the summer of 1807. His abject capitulation at the head of a force of over 9,000 – including 350 horse – led to a complete surrender of the British forces in the region, including the abandonment of Montevideo. This was one of Britian’s most humiliating defeats in the Napoleonic wars and on returning home Whitelocke was court martialled and subsequently cashiered. Lieutenant Colonel Pack was amongst the British troops who were repatriated to Britain under the terms of the 1807 surrender. Those who came back included the remaining officers and many of the men who had served as part of Beresford’s force.
Not all chose to return, however, and in particular a number of soldiers who appear to have been of predominantly Irish and Scots origin decided to stay on in South America. It is noticeable that many of those who determined to remain were members of Pack’s 71st Highland Regiment which had a large Irish cohort, probably recruited when that regiment was based in Ireland. They forfeited their share of the prize money, not just from the ‘treasure’ of Buenos Aires but from vessels taken off the coast during the time of the British occupation.77
The officers and men who sailed back with the British regiments, or in the case of those who had died in service their dependents, were paid dividends from this prize money, in some cases many years later; allocation of funds depending on rank. Popham became involved in litigation with some of his own captains over his share of prize money and the court (Mansfield J) found he was not entitled to a commanding officer’s share as he was not a commodore with a captain serving under him.78 Similarly, he engaged with Baird and Beresford in litigation in which he was ultimately unsuccessful.
Rather touchingly, on his return to England Beresford obtained from the British government pensions for de Peña, Padilla and Gonzalez, as well as for the boatman who had helped him escape, Antonio Luiz de Lima. De Peña and Padilla resided in Rio de Janeiro following their having rendered assistance to the British officers, de Lima eventually settled in London on his pension of £300 per annum.
Baird and Popham seem to have envisaged military conquest of the Rio de la Plata Viceroyalty, or a portion of it, rather than just a type of privateering venture. On that basis the size of the force sent there showed a distinct lack of realism. The knowledge of the crushing naval defeat suffered by the French and Spanish at Trafalgar would presumably have encouraged both Popham and Beresford to believe they had a secure exit strategy if events went against them in the Rio de la Plata; in that they were unlikely to be challenged at sea. On his own return to England, Popham had suggested his expedition had been supported in concept by a now-deceased Pitt. The Times rejected this argument and summed up the position adroitly:
Who will believe that Mr Pitt, or any other person who might be the Prime Minister of England, would, if he had actually determined to occupy La Plata, consider 1046 soldiers and 480 seamen and marines, to be a force adequate to such an object? The first temporary success of this small expedition ’twas all that was contrary to probability; the ultimate failure, and the capture of all the troops that comprised it, was what might have been expected.79
In truth the British government had merely tried to capitalise on the initial success of the expedition under Popham and Beresford. Ultimately, the venture ended in the collapse of the military objective after Beresford had left South America. There had for some time been a faction within government advocating the development of commercial ties rather than physical conquest with South America, and this group now gained the upper hand.
In Great Britain, the legacy of this foreign expedition is perhaps best remembered in terms of the ‘treasure’ sent to England. As such the events of 1806 have been seen as a ‘derring-do’ voyage of virtual piracy along the lines of Drake, Raleigh and others. In the words of one soldier present, ‘the object of our enterprise is to cripple the pecuniary resources of Spain’.80 However, it seems highly likely that its consequences were far greater. The ease with which Beresford’s small force had dismissed the Spanish colonial forces demonstrated to others that this was an empire in serious decline; and so it proved when the colonials moved against the Spanish monarchy less than four years later. Beresford clearly understood that it was going to be very difficult for Spain to recover control of the Rio de la Plata for he expressed that view in correspondence with the British government.
While the war of independence in what is now Argentina did not conclude until 1818, full independence was declared in 1816. One commentator has summed up Beresford’s campaign by stating it ‘cracked the monumental edifice of the Spanish Empire and began the process by which it collapsed into rubble’.81 As such, while modern-day Argentines celebrate the Reconquista, Beresford is remembered today in Buenos Aires more with admiration than hatred.
While there are suggestions that Beresford was not inimical to the desire of a number of the inhabitants of the Rio de la Plata for greater freedom, and even independence, he prudently followed a cautious line. Supporting independence in a rival empire’s colonies created potential danger in Britain’s own dependencies. Napoleon’s forcing of the Portuguese royal family into exile in 1807 and his seizure of the Spanish throne in 1808 made it important for Britain that the colonies of those nations did not succumb to French influence, an objective that was achieved by British naval power. The quid pro quo for British support for Portugal and Spain was the loosening of trade restrictions enabling British commerce with South America to grow considerably. Those in Britain who sympathised with aspirations for independence in the various colonies of South America appreciated that so long as Spain was fighting the Napoleonic threat, it was against the British interest to weaken Spain by encouraging insurrection by the colonials of South America. Whereas in early 1808, Britain was still planning a substantial expedition to South and even Central America in response to Napoleon’s takeover of Spain, the subsequent Spanish revolt and the request for British assistance transformed policy, providing Britain with the opportunity to open up a new European front.82
What of the fate of the three principals in the expedition to the Rio de la Plata? The expedition had been unauthorised and both Baird and Popham faced criticism and risked serious censure. Baird was roundly criticised by the Secretary of State for War for authorising the expedition to South America without sanction or authority, and it was made clear to him that if the government had wished to attack the Spanish settlements at the Rio de la Plata, a more appropriate sized force would have been employed than that which Baird had dispatched under Beresford.83 He was recalled from his position as Lieutenant-Governor of the Cape and he left there on 19 January 1807, arriving in England in March. He was soon employed again, taking part in the Copenhagen expedition of 1807 before going on to serve in the Peninsula under Sir John Moore. Later in life he was to be appointed Commander in Chief of the forces in Ireland between March 1820 and June 1822.
Popham was not so fortunate. On his return to England he was arrested and tried by Court Martial for both leaving the Cape in a defenceless state and for undertaking an expedition for which he had ‘no direction or authority whatsoever’. Following a robust defence, in which Popham pleaded his various papers presented to and conversations with Pitt, Melville and Miranda, he was found guilty of both charges, but was only severely reprimanded ‘in consideration of the circumstances’.84 The finding does not seem to have inhibited his career even in the short term, for not only did he take part in the Copenhagen expedition of 1807, but he did so as First Captain in the fleet commanded by Lord Gambier.
For his part, Beresford was clearly not felt to be culpable. He had neither devised nor authorised the expedition, and the letter of recall to Baird makes it clear that a larger force would have been utilised had the British wished to attack the Spanish in the Rio de la Plata; the implication being that he had done well with the force at his disposal. His conduct of his small force was admired by those present and recognised by the government.85 Beresford’s own feelings that he had perhaps let the side down by surrendering rather than fighting to the end were not shared by others. Pack neither blamed him for the subsequent disputes surrounding the terms of surrender, nor for the act of surrender observing:
A more gallant and honourable officer than General Beresford there cannot be, and I am fully persuaded he has acted from the purest motives of humanity, and I cannot help thinking it was to us a dreadful sacrifice. If the place ought to have been defended, I am afraid it will be thought we lost too few in the attempt; if not, too many.86
Beresford’s experience in the Rio de la Plata colony was to stand him in good stead in the years to come in the Iberian Peninsula. He had demonstrated administrative abilities, an adherence to discipline and personal courage in leading his troops. Within six months of his return to England he was appointed to command an expedition to take control of the Portuguese island of Madeira. It was only following the abdication of Napoleon in 1814 that he was able to attend the Guildhall in the City of London on 11 June in that year and receive in person the Freedom of the City together with the freedom box and sword voted to him in 1806. In accepting this honour, Beresford described it as the proudest moment of his life.
While it was undoubtedly a high point of an already distinguished career, it was to prove one step in a life which subsequently saw him rise to become Marshal-General of Portugal and a cabinet minister in Wellington’s government of 1828. His reputation was enhanced rather than tarnished by his South American experiences, though arguably had he thought through Popham’s proposal he would not have agreed with it, as conquest of the Rio de la Plata had little chance of success with such a small force. Did he let an opportunity for glory cloud proper judgment? If he had not wished to support the decision of Baird to endorse Popham’s proposal for the invasion of the Rio de la Plata, he would have had to resign from the expeditionary force at the Cape and return to England and might have been criticised in some quarters for such conduct; though this is what Sir Robert Wilson did when chastised by Home Popham for expressing doubts regarding the project.87
Even in Argentina Beresford was not without his admirers. The capture and 47-day occupation of Buenos Aires is frequently acknowledged by Argentine historians as part of the process which enabled Argentina to secure its own independence, beginning four years later.
