Читать книгу Marshal William Carr Beresford - Marcus de la Poer Beresford - Страница 13
Оглавление4 THE DEFEAT OF THE FIRST FRENCH INVASION OF PORTUGAL AND THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA, 1808
The increasingly harsh rule of Junot during the winter of 1807 and spring of 1808 gave rise to an incremental unwillingness by the Portuguese to obey Prince João’s instruction to cooperate and not oppose the Franco-Spanish invader. Junot’s despotic behaviour resulted in the withdrawal of local officials’ cooperation and active popular resistance. It is sometimes not fully appreciated that such resistance emerged very quickly, notwithstanding the royal directive to cooperate with the French invader. The replacement of the Portuguese flag with that of France on the Castelo de São Jorge on 13 December 1807 led to unrest in Lisbon that was quickly put down by French arms.1 Junot’s intentions became even clearer when nine days later, on 22 December, he reduced the numbers of regiments in the Portuguese army, ultimately virtually extinguishing it with the formation of the Portuguese Legion, which was dispatched to northern Europe where they fought for Napoleon under pro-French officers with considerable distinction until the end of the war.2 In early 1808 Junot dissolved both the militia and the ordenança.3 The situation was further aggravated by acts of aggrandisement along with the plundering of Portuguese churches and households.4
On 1 February, Junot disclosed that Napoleon had declared that the house of Braganza had ceased to rule in Portugal and imposed a substantial imposition of 40 million cruzados on the country.5 Napoleon’s real intentions were now made clear with the announcement that the entire kingdom of Portugal would become a French dependency with Junot as Governor. On the same day he dissolved the Regency Council and replaced it with a council of his own appointees, made up of French and Portuguese.6 Resentment was rising. In February, nine Portuguese were brutally executed in Caldas da Rainha on the orders of General Loison, who was to make a name for himself as a merciless soldier in the Peninsula.7 In March, the French army occupied the fort of Elvas.
The spark that ignited serious opposition to Napoleonic ambitions in the Iberian peninsula proved to be the enforced abdication of Carlos IV of Spain and the waiving under duress of a claim to his throne by his son Ferdinand VII.8 The French managed to crush the resistance of the ‘Dos de Mayo’ in Madrid, but opposition to French rule in the shape of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain soon spread throughout much of the country. The divisions of the Spanish army in northern and southern Portugal managed to extricate themselves to Galicia and Badajoz, respectively, though Junot disarmed and imprisoned the division under Carafa based in Lisbon on 11 June.9
While Junot retained his grip on Lisbon and a number of important strongholds including the fortresses of Almeida, Elvas and Peniche, the vacuum left by the departing Spanish soon resulted in the emergence of increased opposition to French rule. In Alentejo that opposition was firmly put down by General Loison, but Porto witnessed an uprising on 6 June and the emergence of the self-styled Supreme Junta under the Bishop of Porto, which could dispose of a not inconsiderable armed force under Lieutenant General Bernardim Freire de Andrade (Bernardim Freire).10 On 1 May, the Prince Regent declared war on France from the safety of Rio de Janeiro, having been informed that the Regency Council he had left in Lisbon had been dismissed by Junot.
In London, the risings against French domination in Spain and Portugal were seized upon with alacrity. In early July the government was informed of the rising in Porto and on 7 July a delegation was sent to London to request help with arms and soldiers.11 The government had been assembling a force at Cork for embarkation for South America, where it was designated to assist Francisco de Miranda in his quest for Venezuelan independence from Spain. The emergence of Spain as Britain’s ally changed the political dynamic. In late June, Sir Arthur Wellesley received orders to proceed to Cork and to sail with the force for the Peninsula, without any particular destination being named. There was talk of a landing in the Asturias or Galicia, but also Cádiz as well as Portugal.12 Wellesley was directed to proceed to La Coruña to ascertain the situation there, as it was understood that while the Spanish wished for arms they were not keen on British forces landing on Spanish territory. Wellesley was told that another force of 10,000 would follow about three weeks behind his own, and that the objective was ‘the entire and absolute evacuation of the Peninsula by the troops of France’.13
Wellesley sailed from Cork (Cobh) with his force of just under 10,000 men on 12 July.14 Stopping briefly at La Coruña, he ascertained the local junta did not wish for British troops to be landed to assist in Galicia. Wellesley therefore proceeded to Porto, arriving there on 24 July, and on the following day met the Bishop who headed the Supreme Junta. Bernardim Freire informed Wellesley that he had about 5,000 men under his command available, though some of them were in Coimbra; additionally about 12,000 peasants were armed ‘in different modes’.15 A small portion of the Portuguese forces, with some Spanish assistance, was blockading French occupied Almeida while others were trying to guard Trás-os-Montes against a background of the Spanish having suffered defeat at Rio Seco on 14 July.16 The Bishop promised to supply the British commander with 150 horses for his dragoons together with 500 mules for transport purposes to be delivered at Coimbra.
Wellesley himself then sailed to the British squadron off the Tagus, where he met with Admiral Sir Charles Cotton undertaking a blockade of Lisbon, which included the confinement and isolation of a Russian fleet anchored in the Tagus.17 Cotton advised disembarkation at Mondego or Peniche, both north of Lisbon; Peniche being a somewhat curious choice as it contained a strong French garrison. From General Brent Spencer in Andalucia, Wellesley received intelligence which suggested there were perhaps 20,000 French troops in Portugal rather than the local estimate of 16,000–18,000. The latter figure is not necessarily incompatible as it may reflect the number of troops available to Junot given that there were 600–800 in each of Elvas, Almeida, São Julião and Peniche fortresses. Wellesley ordered Spencer and his force to join him in Portugal and returned to the estuary of the river Mondego, where a landing – though physically challenging through the Atlantic surf – was made eminently feasible tactically due to the seizure of Figueira da Foz, the port at the river mouth, by the students from Coimbra University on 26 June.
Arriving off Mondego, he heard of the Spanish victory at Bailén on 20 July.18 He began disembarkation of the British army at Mondego on 1 August, but not before he apparently received some important news on the previous day. On 15 July, Castlereagh had written to him telling him the troops from the Baltic under Sir John Moore would follow as soon as they were re-victualled, together with another 5,000 under Generals Anstruther and Ackland as more French than were previously thought were stationed in Portugal. A total force of 30,000 was promised for the Peninsula. These included the 3rd Regiment (‘The Buffs’) which were being dispatched from Madeira under Major General William Carr Beresford to join Wellesley. A second letter, dated 15 July, was also received on the 31 July. It may not have been so welcome for it notified him of the appointment of Lieutenant General Sir Hew Dalrymple to command with Lieutenant General Harry Burrard as second in command. Wellesley was slipping down the command chain.19
Wellesley lost little time in moving south from Mondego towards Lisbon. He met Lieutenant General Bernardim Freire de Andrade and General Manuel Pinto Bacelar with their Portuguese forces at Montemor-o-Velho on 7 August and by 12 August the combined forces were at Leiria.20 A disagreement on tactics followed, with Wellesley wishing to take a coastal route to Lisbon (with a view to staying in touch with his provisioning fleet) and Bernardim Freire anxious to secure central and eastern Portugal by following a route through Santarém.21 Wellesley also claimed that the Portuguese General had demanded the British feed the Portuguese force, which they were unable to do. As a result, only some 1,600 Portuguese troops under Colonel Nicholas Trant, out of a total of some 6,000, joined Wellesley.22 Bernardim Freire’s decision is sometimes criticised, but he marched the balance of his force to Santarém where he managed to delay Loison’s corps for three days, preventing it from uniting with that under General Henri Delaborde at Roliça at a time when the reinforcements under Ackland and Anstruther had yet to join with Wellesley. On 17 August, Wellesley fought an initial engagement against a French force under Delaborde at Roliça before meeting the main French army under Junot at Vimeiro on 21 August and inflicting a comprehensive defeat on the French General.23 However, there was to be no pursuit of the defeated French.
General Burrard had arrived in Maceira roads aboard HMS Brazen on 20 August.24 Wellesley went on board this sloop that evening to report and hand over command. The British army was then before Vimeiro and Wellington proposed to advance the next day. Burrard, perhaps feeling he needed further information, suggested delaying any advance. Matters were taken out of Wellesley’s hands on the morning of 21 August when the French chose to attack the British force. After the battle, the victorious Wellesley wished to pursue the defeated French but Burrard, who had by then joined the army, prohibited such a move even though the French were in considerable disorder.25 Burrard clearly felt the French still had their reserve intact and a substantial superiority in cavalry and accordingly caution was required in his mind. He wished to wait for Sir John Moore with reinforcements.26 As a result the French were able to retire on Torres Vedras.
Dalrymple, stationed at Gibraltar, had received his instructions from Castlereagh on 7 August.27 He was directed to seek to expel the French from Lisbon and cut off their retreat to Spain if possible. Sailing from Gibraltar on 13 August, he reached the mouth of the Tagus on 19 August and there conferred with Admiral Cotton. He left the 42nd Regiment, which had travelled with him from Gibraltar, with Cotton in case the opportunity arose to land at Lisbon; while Dalrymple proceeded to Maceira where he landed on 22 August, establishing there his initial headquarters. Assuming command, he met Wellesley who once again urged an advance. Dalrymple made it clear he was not in a position to form an opinion on the merits of such a proposal, having just landed, but he did authorise Wellesley to prepare to march the army.28
Within hours of Dalrymple landing at Maceira, General François Étienne Kellerman (who had commanded the reserve at Vimeiro) arrived under a flag of truce to propose an armistice.29 This suspension of arms was stated to be for the specific purpose of negotiating a convention for the evacuation of the French army from Portugal. Furthermore the armistice provided:
it is agreed provisionally that the French army shall not, in any case, be considered as prisoners of war; that all the individuals who compose it shall be transported to France with their arms and baggage, and the whole of their private property, from which nothing shall be exempted.30
The balance of the armistice provided for the neutrality of the port of Lisbon so that the Russian fleet trapped there could sail at will, guarantees of security for those who had supported France in Portugal, the transport of French artillery and the horses of the cavalry to France, and a forty-eight hour notice of termination of the suspension of arms.31
While the clause quoted above was to become central to the disagreements that followed, each of the provisions referred to gave rise to debate, both during the formation of the terms for the suspension of arms and the subsequent convention.32 Importantly, Kellerman assured the British that the words used regarding baggage and private property meant their strict grammatical meaning and did not cover merchandise of any sort. Wellesley for his part advocated unavailingly that the suspension of arms should be for only forty-eight hours rather than determinable on forty-eight hours notice.
The days following the signing of the suspension of arms were spent negotiating the terms of the convention, on the one hand, and the preparation for the renewal of conflict, on the other. However the ink was barely dry on the suspension of arms terms before Bernardim Freire expressed his dissatisfaction. The Portuguese commander visited Dalrymple at his new headquarters at Ramalhal on 23 August. He was given a copy of the terms of armistice and immediately objected on a number of grounds including the failure to consult the Junta of Porto, as the Portuguese leadership, and the provisions designed to protect those who had cooperated with the French during the occupation of Portugal. Dalrymple was clearly sensitive to the potential for friction with Britain’s ally for he requested the objections in writing, but apparently these were not forthcoming. Bernardim Freire agreed to establish Major Ayres Pinto de Souza as a liaison officer to attend on the British commander.33
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Murray had taken a copy of the terms to Admiral Cotton who insisted that the Russian fleet should not be allowed to sail free, and in effect should be excluded from the terms of any convention and subject to a separate agreement.34 Ultimately this was to involve the surrender of the Russian fleet to Admiral Cotton, on the basis it would be returned at the conclusion of hostilities, and the repatriation to Russia of its crews.35 However, when Murray returned to headquarters on 25 August with the news that Cotton objected to the proposed inclusion of the Russian fleet in the convention, Dalrymple, having called a conference with both Burrard and Wellesley in attendance, determined to tell the French that the cessation of hostilities would end at twelve noon on 28 August, given the terms were not acceptable. Murray was dispatched to Junot with this instruction, but with authorisation to extend the cessation for a further twenty-four hours if he was making progress with negotiations.
Murray did make progress in further discussions with Kellerman and on the morning of 29 August, Captain Adolphus John Dalrymple, a son of the British commander, arrived back at Ramalhal with an amended treaty agreed between Murray and Kellerman. Once again Dalrymple convened a meeting of his Lieutenant Generals.36 Objections were raised to the proposals, and a further draft containing alterations was sent back to Murray.37 Meanwhile, the cessation of hostilities ended and Dalrymple moved his headquarters into Torres Vedras. Junot accepted the convention as altered and signed the terms, together with some additional articles of an administrative nature, at his headquarters in Lisbon on 30 August.38 In ratifying the terms, he signed as Duke of Abrantes. No one may have noticed at the time, but the acknowledgment of this title was itself to cause resentment in Portugal when it became known.39
On 31 August at 7.30 am, Captain Dalrymple arrived back at Torres Vedras with the definitive treaty. Sir Hew Dalrymple convened a further meeting of his Lieutenant Generals in Burrard’s headquarters; a meeting which on this occasion did not include either Wellesley or Paget who were with their troops. Dalrymple ratified the ‘Convention of Cintra’ with no disapproval being made by those present. It was noted that Junot had failed to sign one part of the treaty, and Lieutenant Colonel Lord Proby was sent to Lisbon with both copies in order that this might be rectified.40 One copy was later returned to the British commander but meanwhile in its absence Murray was detailed to explain its substance to Pinto da Souza.
The Convention contained twenty-two articles and three supplementary articles.41 In essence, the French army was to evacuate Portugal and be transported to any French port between Rochefort and Lorient, the means for doing so to be supplied by the British government. The Convention provided for the hand over of the strong places in Portugal to the British army and for the gradual embarkation of the French army in three divisions. The execution of the Convention and its terms was to give rise to discussion and disagreement when it became known in the United Kingdom, but more immediately a number of articles became the subject of anger and dispute in Portugal, rendering its implementation fraught with difficulty. While several articles were to prove contentious between the British and their Portuguese allies, the interpretation of Article V by the French leadership and the manner in which the British command reacted gave rise to complaint and recrimination in Portugal and criticism at home. Article V provided:
The French army shall carry with it all its equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army; that is to say, its military chest, and carriages attached to the Field Commissariat and Field Hospitals; or shall be allowed to dispose of such part of the same, on its account, as the Commander-in-Chief may judge it unnecessary to embark. In like manner, all individuals in the army shall be at liberty to dispose of their private property of every description; with full security hereafter for the purchasers.
The possibility of disagreement as between the contracting parties relating to the Articles had been recognised in the Convention, which provided for commissioners to be named by both sides to regulate and accelerate the arrangements (Article XIII), and the Convention further provided that when doubts arose on the meaning of any article, it was to be interpreted in favour of the French army (Article XIV). The latter provision was a standard one in favour of the defeated side. Dalrymple appointed Lieutenant Colonel Lord Proby as the British commissioner to work with his opposite number, General Kellerman, on 2 September.
The French command chose to interpret ‘military chest’ as set out in Article V to include public and private property seized during its occupation of Portugal, even that taken after the execution of the Suspension of Arms of 22 August. A strong protest was not long in coming. The Bishop of Porto sent Dalrymple a letter of protest on 1 September to which Dalrymple responded the following day pointing out that he had sent Bernardim Freire a copy of the terms of agreement, the basis of the Convention, and sought his views but had heard nothing in return.42 On 2 September Bernardim Freire lodged a written protest with Dalrymple asserting that the French ‘are practicing in Lisbon a species of plunder on the Publick Treasury, Museums, Arsenals, Churches, Library, as also the houses and stores of private persons, which it is my duty to communicate to your Excellency information of, that you may take such measures as you may think proper’.43
The first division of the French army was reportedly ready to embark as early as 3 September. In a taste of things to come, General Junot had sought the use of five neutral Danish vessels then in the river to carry his own ‘personal effects’ but this was declined by Proby on Darymple’s instructions.44 The disturbing reports reaching Dalrymple regarding the behaviour of the French prompted him to appoint a second commissioner to oversee the implementation of the Convention. He chose Major General William Carr Beresford, who had arrived from Madeira with the 3rd Regiment (The Buffs) after the Battle of Vimeiro.45 Dalrymple indicated to Proby that Beresford’s appointment was ‘to ease you of at least part of your vexation and labour’.46
Dalrymple’s motives in choosing Beresford over any other staff officer for the position are not clear, though his familiarity with the Portuguese and French languages combined with recognition of his administrative abilities already demonstrated in Egypt, South America and Madeira may have played their part. On arriving at the estuary of the Tagus, Beresford’s initial assignment had been to occupy the forts on the river under the terms of the Convention. This he had undertaken with the 3rd and 42nd regiments on 2 September.47 Whatever the motives, the choice of Beresford as a commissioner proved inspired. Beresford, upon taking up the post of commissioner, made an early call on Junot at his Lisbon headquarters. While they apparently breakfasted together, the meeting was perhaps not unsurprisingly a far from happy one. Writing to Wellesley, Beresford stated: ‘Junot did not appear to have taken any great liking to me, at which you will believe I am not breaking my heart.’48 One of Junot’s officers, General Thiébault, probably identified why Junot was not taken with Beresford when he wrote: ‘Beresford était un home tres poli, mais tres ferme de caractère.’49
It is interesting and perhaps indicative of his relationship with Wellesley that Beresford was writing not only to the Commander of the British army in Portugal, Dalrymple, but also to his fellow Irishman about the implementation of the Convention. An extensive correspondence took place between Proby and Beresford, on the one part, and Dalrymple, on the other, relating to the work of the commissioners, who clearly faced a very substantial challenge in their efforts to ensure that the French left only with their ‘military chest’. Most letters were signed by Beresford and Proby but a number bear the signature of just one of the commissioners.50
In their first letter to Dalrymple on the topic of their work on 4 September, Beresford and Proby outlined the issues and expressed concern that the ‘articles of the treaty’ appeared to favour the French as allowing them to keep whatever was in their possession on 30 August (the date the French signed the Convention). The French, they wrote, seemed to be intent on taking everything other than military and naval arsenals and ships.51 The commissioners went on to list some of the categories of moveable property that the French were seeking to take. These included:
i) valuables belonging to HRH the Prince Regent;
ii) valuables taken from churches. In many cases church plate appears to have been melted down into bars of bullion;
iii) valuables taken from individuals;
iv) the contents of the royal libraries;
v) a sum of approximately £22,000 from the Depósito Público, which was made up of monies belonging to individuals.52
A day later the commissioners added a further complaint, namely that the French were still appropriating the revenues of the country.53 Wellesley was obviously consulted. He opined that the property to be carried off by the French was ‘limited to military baggage and equipments and that the French must restore what had been taken from churches and individuals’.54
An unnamed diarist visited Beresford’s house in Lisbon on 6 September and reported:
On our arrival at Lisbon, we visited General Beresford, at whose house we met Lord Paget, his aides de camp, and Colonel Graham. We here found that nothing could surpass the audacity of the attempts which had been made by the French to carry off all the articles of value which could be found in Lisbon, whether public or private property. They had actually packed up two state carriages, the property of His Royal Highness the Duke of Sussex; but at the remonstrance of General Beresford, they were compelled to relinquish their booty.55
Beresford and Proby were able to make some progress in negotiations with General Kellerman. On 6 September they reported that the French had conceded that they were not entitled to keep anything other than military baggage and private property, and that public property appropriated since the first day of the truce must be restored. The monies taken from the Depósito Público were to be replaced. The artefacts taken from the royal and public libraries and museums would be restored ‘if insisted upon’ but Kellerman suggested many of the items from the museums were in fact duplicates and were items they did not have in Paris and that it was in the interest of all that scientific examination take place. The commissioners sought instructions from Dalrymple who responded that ‘the French have no right to carry off plunder of any sort, at least not in its original form’. Dalrymple complimented Beresford and Proby on the firm manner in which they were executing their mission, at the same time confirming that the articles which were allegedly duplicates must not be removed.56
Indeed, 6 September may have been a critical day in the sequence of events. On that day Dalrymple received a deputation from the merchants of Lisbon and noted that their ire was directed almost as much against the English as against the French. They also wrote to him in strong terms expressing their outrage.57 The anger of the Portuguese was summed up by José de Abreu Campos:
Our churches plundered of their ornaments, the royal palaces damaged, the royal treasury plundered, and in general, the people reduced to such poverty and misery, as to render the streets and squares of the capital impossible; nothing of this is taken into consideration. Yet these objections are of extreme importance, as an example not to be passed with impunity … The safeties of monarchies depends on not letting their rights be invaded without punishing the offender, and the consequence of permitting such crimes with impunity will occasion incalculable misfortune.58
Bernardim Freire had lodged a protest as soon as he had heard of the terms of the Convention, even before he had received a written copy of the document. In doing so he listed particular criticisms and concerns. He made the point that the Portuguese should have been, but were not included, as a party. Furthermore, since he had not been consulted he declined to take any responsibility for its terms.59 A formal protest was not long in forthcoming. In a lengthy Memorial of 3 September, Bernardim Freire pointed out that the British army was in Portugal as an auxiliary force at the invitation of the Portuguese government and that accordingly discussions with the French should have been in conjunction with the Portuguese.60 Further, he complained that certain stipulations in the Convention, such as the surrender of forts to British rather than Portuguese troops, were such as could only have been made if Portugal was a conquered country. Dalrymple was urged to explain that this happened only to avoid friction between French and Portuguese troops. Objection was also made to the proposals to allow those who had cooperated with the French to remain in Portugal, in circumstances where they would not have to answer for their actions. To these complaints was added a general one regarding the plundering by the French continuing to take place in Lisbon.61 This Memorial was followed a day later by an article-by-article complaint.62
Further protests were received at British headquarters. Lieutenant General Dom Francisco da Cunha Menezes, Count of Castro Marim and Monteiro-mor, Governor of Algarve, who commanded the army of the south, wrote in the first instance on 9 September to Admiral Cotton seeking his intervention to prevent the French leaving the port of Lisbon.63 Cotton passed on the correspondence to Dalrymple. In an arguably cavalier approach, Dalrymple took the view that he was only required to discuss matters with the government of the country; and the Supreme Junta of Porto was not so appointed. Of course, Junot had dissolved the Council of Regency so Dalrymple had a point, but that was to ignore the fact that the Monteiro-mor had been a member of that Council, and therefore a member of the government. Nevertheless, Dalrymple was sensitive to the issue of plunder and its potential for friction. When Kellerman called to his headquarters at Oeiras on 6 September to complain of the demands made by commissioners Beresford and Proby, Dalrymple told him in their presence that if any person from the General-in-chief to the lowest person in the French army should prove guilty of plunder, that person would forfeit the benefit of the treaty and be considered a prisoner of war.64
Pressure was mounting on Kellerman, and following further representations from Beresford and Proby, Junot issued an Ordre du Jour dated 6 September. This directed every person having private property, whether in pictures or other moveables, to restore them immediately to the owners. For some time the French had maintained they were entitled to keep melted down church plate in their possession prior to the signing of the truce, but ultimately Junot conceded it should not be taken out of the country but should be used to pay the debts of the French army. Dalrymple felt that providing this offer was implemented it was fair.65 Beresford and Proby were clearly making some progress, as was testified by Charles Stewart writing to his brother, Castlereagh, then Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, on 8 September having arrived in Lisbon the previous day:
I found Proby and Beresford hard at work endeavouring to make these robbers disgorge their plunder and I hope they have in part succeeded although much remains to be done & it is impossible things can have been worse managed on our side than they have been. When Proby was first sent in to see the articles of the Treaty executed, he was not even furnished with a copy of it and owned to Sir Hew his complete incompetence to manage so intricate an affair especially as there were parts of the convention he did not understand – many points unsettled. Sir Hew however persevered in sending him in with plein pouvoirs, & no treaty. The French endeavoured to impose a spurious one and this he detected. Beresford at last came in and since his arrival things have gone on better. He has got back the museum and £25,000 taken from the Deposito Publico [sic], during the time the treaty was going on. They are now at issue on the Church Plate … The Duc D’Abrantes is the greatest robber of the whole and set the example by seizing everything in every shop and house without payment.66
Junot may well have been ‘the greatest robber of the whole’ but he was also extremely astute, reportedly using two mints to convert melted down church plate into Napoleon D’Ors, thus enabling him to claim they were part of his military baggage.67
The British, pushed by the Portuguese, set about investigating the persistent allegations of plunder and to this end established a three-man Committee for Receiving Reclamations. Its composition reflected the three nations involved: Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Trant, St António Rodrigues de Oliveira and a Monsieur Duplier, commissaire de guerres.68 On 10 September, the Committee published a proclamation under the names of the three commissioners informing the inhabitants of Lisbon of their right to claim restoration. On 11 September, Beresford and Proby reported that this committee had given general satisfaction at its initial sittings.69
However the French, including Junot, were continuing to play for time hoping that they would get away from Lisbon without having to make further concessions with which they might have to comply. The first division of the French army, it will be recalled, was reportedly ready to sail on 3 September, but ultimately did not do so until over a week later. The rows went on, delaying the departure of the French. Junot had allegedly appropriated ten chestnut horses from the royal stables, but he was able to convince the commissioners they were his own which he had stabled there.70 Fifty-three boxes of indigo reportedly worth about £5,000 were found on board a vessel destined to receive the baggage of the French Commander in Chief. He disclaimed all knowledge of the boxes, which were seized on behalf of the commissioners. Beresford and Proby felt they had done their best. Nevertheless, in their report to Dalrymple of 18 September they made their disquiet known:
We will conclude this report by stating that the conduct of the French had been marked by the most shameful disregard to honor [sic] and probity, publicly evincing their intentions of carrying off their plundered booty and leaving acknowledged debts unpaid; and finally they have only paid what they were obliged to disgorge, and were not permitted to carry off, though the British Commissioners represented to General Kellerman, that whatever their words, it could never be the spirit of any convention that an army would, as a military chest, or otherwise, carry off public money, leaving public debts unpaid; and called upon him, for the honour of the French army and nation, to act justly; and yet, unmindful of any tie of honour or of justice, the French army has taken a considerable sum in the military chest, leaving its debts unpaid to a very large amount.71
On 15 September most of the French were embarked at Cais do Sodré (Lisbon). In the first two weeks of September they had led an uncomfortable existence in Lisbon, running the gauntlet of Portuguese intent on revenge.72 On 18 September Junot went on board the vessel intended to carry him to France without repaying the monies taken from the Depósito Público, as a result of which Beresford and Proby applied successfully to Admiral Cotton to detain the second division of the French army as well as Junot. Only when £40,000 had been transferred by the French Payeur General to cover these monies and other items extracted from the public magazines (stores) were the French allowed to leave the Tagus. In addition, chests of natural history exhibits from the royal museum were restored along with a quantity of books.73
By 21 September the French force, together with a number of followers, was largely embarked and it sailed a week later.74 The exceptions were the garrisons of Almeida and Elvas, which were transported afterwards to France.75 Beresford and Proby’s job as commissioners was complete and Dalrymple praised their conduct to Castlereagh saying they had ‘performed their duty in a most firm and honourable manner’.76 Dalrymple was to state at a later stage that the French had got away with a very small amount of plunder due to the work of the commissioners. While he had a vested interest in pursuing this line, it is of note that Kellerman also gets a measure of approbation from another source for having acted in a gentlemanly manner in interpreting the convention.77
Beresford’s role in dealing with the fallout from the Convention of Cintra was not yet at an end. It will be recalled that on the occurrence of the risings in Spain, Junot had disarmed and imprisoned the Spanish division of General Carafa in Lisbon. The Convention provided for the repatriation of those troops amounting to some 5,000 men. With a view to sending them home, Beresford liaised with the Portuguese to ensure the troops were reissued with arms and their officers given back the horses taken by the French.78 Before they were sent home Beresford reviewed them at the Campo d’Ourique, presenting their general with a ceremonial sword. He took the opportunity to address the troops in an emotional address designed no doubt to fire their ardour and encourage them to maintain the struggle against the French forces of occupation:
In an animated speech [Beresford] requested that the latter [the Spanish troops] would again accept their arms from the King of England, never to lay them down till the cause of Ferdinand VII, of Europe, and of humanity had triumphed. This address which was forcibly and well delivered, had not yet come to a close, when it was drowned in the reiterated vivas of soldiers and inhabitants, whilst the roar of cannon, and the braying of trumpets, echoed from one end of Lisbon to the other.79
One wonders what the Spanish made of the representative of their historical foe urging them to accept their arms from the King of England.
Dalrymple also gave Beresford a liaison role with the reconstituted Portuguese Regency Council, with a view to restoring order in Lisbon and improving relations with the Portuguese.80 Order had partially broken down in the run up to the departure of the French and a number of Portuguese had demonstrated hostility not only towards the French but also to their liberators. Lieutenant General John Hope had been Dalrymple’s original appointee to the post of Commandant of Lisbon, but Beresford was given this command when Hope was sent into the Alentejo to enforce the terms of the Convention.81 The appointment of Beresford to this role is probably significant as it required liaison with the Portuguese authorities. It may reflect not only his grasp of and interest in Portuguese affairs, but also a recognition of his growing reputation as an able administrator. He had clearly achieved a degree of approval for his role as a commissioner under the Convention. To the post of Commandant of Alexandria, Governor of Buenos Aires, Governor of Madeira was now added, albeit for a short period, responsibility for Lisbon. By 22 September he was able to tell Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz, the Portuguese Secretary for War and Foreign Affairs of the Regency Council, that he was returning responsibility for Lisbon to the Portuguese government.82
The news of the British victory over the French at Vimeiro reached England on 1 September and resulted in much celebration, as it was presented as a complete victory.83 The content of the definitive Convention arrived in England with Dalrymple’s letter of 3 September 1808 headed ‘Cintra’ on 15 September.84 Church bells were again rung and cannon fired but jubilation soon turned to anger and recrimination. Dalrymple gave his reasons for entering into the Convention rather than continuing hostilities. These were: first, the time of year and the ability of the enemy to consume much time in the defence of strong places in the absence of a convention, and secondly, when terms had been agreed for the armistice Sir John Moore had not arrived with his army, and he had doubts about the ability to land such a large army on an open and dangerous beach. While of course Dalrymple did not at the time of negotiating the Convention possess either Lisbon or the Tagus Estuary, Wellesley had already landed an army at least as big as that of Moore on the beaches about the Mondego estuary.
A storm of protest was launched by the Whig opposition in parliament, and in the media, where Whig publications were perhaps surprisingly joined by their Tory counterparts. Within days of the news becoming widespread, condemnatory editorials were joined by satirical poems and commentary of a highly critical nature. Byron’s Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage and Wordsworth’s tract Concerning the Convention of Cintra will forever live in the minds of English-speaking peoples interested in the topic because of who they were and the quality of their writing, but the daily and weekly press contained a plethora of amusing and sometimes vicious poetry, prose and caricatures, of which it is noticeable featured Wellesley as much as Burrard and Dalrymple.85 This may well have been because Wellesley’s brother, Richard, was part of the government and thus an objective to attack by opposition supporters.86
Part of the responsibility for the build up of public anger may have been that not only of Arthur Wellesley but also politicians at home ‘over egging’ the nature of the victory at Vimeiro. Newspaper reports were full of statements to the effect that this was the end of Napoleonic tyranny in Portugal and Spain and that the battle was more significant than that of Trafalgar, in that it had shown French troops were not invincible.87 Some eleven days before the arrival of Dalrymple’s dispatch containing the definitive terms of the Convention, the cabinet was aware of the terms of the armistice because the Bishop of Porto had furnished these to the Portuguese Minister in London, who in turn had drawn them to the attention of George Canning to whom he made a formal protest.88 Canning and others found it difficult to believe the veracity of these statements and the government did not publicise the true nature of the agreement until the terms were printed in the Gazette on 16 September. As one British soldier put it, the news occasioned a ‘political electric shock’.89
The Whig opposition had been lukewarm in its support of the war with France. There was, however, a very keenly held view that the terms of the Convention were not only foolish but inimical to the interests of Portugal and Spain. Wordsworth, who had previously exhibited republican sympathies, tried along with others to hold a meeting in Cumbria with a view to submitting an address to the King on the subject, and it was probably only when this stratagem failed that he turned to writing his tract.90
For the Whigs, ‘Cintra’ was a heaven-sent opportunity to attack the Tories and the government found themselves in some difficulty. As unpalateable as it seemed, the convention could not in reality be abandoned, though Canning wrote to Bathurst, Percival and others, including the King, railing against it. In that correspondence he argued that Britain should repudiate those parts of the convention repugnant to the Portuguese and not within the competence of a military commander.91 There were comparisons drawn with the loss of Minorca in 1756, following which Admiral John Byng had been court martialled and shot, and the debacle at Buenos Aires leading to Whitelocke’s court martial in 1808.92
The government moved quickly, Castlereagh recalling Dalrymple on 17 September to England to explain his conduct. In his letter Castlereagh made the point that His Majesty was disappointed with certain Articles of the Convention which were deeply upsetting to England’s allies and stating that no ally should be exposed to an injury so offensive under the countenance of a British army.93 The uproar was such that Richard Wellesley advised his brother to return home, which Arthur did, taking leave of the army on the basis that his duties in Ireland required him there.94 Wellesley’s own trumpeting of his success at Vimeiro, which he called a ‘complete victory’ with only half his army over ‘the whole of the French force in Portugal’, was now coming home to roost.95 The government realised that it was in danger of being blamed for the terms of the Convention and that if it did not investigate the matter further, the public would hold it responsible. While recognising the fait accompli, it was decided to establish a Board of Inquiry. On 1 November, the King ordered the establishment of an Inquiry into the conditions of the Armistice and Convention, the causes and circumstances which led to them, and into ‘the conduct, behaviour, and proceedings of the said Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple, and any other officer or officers who may have held the command of our troops in Portugal’.96 General Sir David Dundas was appointed President and six other experienced soldiers and statesmen nominated to the Board.97
The Inquiry sat from 14 November to 27 December 1808 at the Royal Hospital, Chelsea. It took evidence from Dalrymple, Burrard and Wellesley, the three principal officers present in Portugal at the time the Armistice and Convention were negotiated and signed; as well as from a number of more junior staff officers. A voluminous amount of documentation was submitted to the Inquiry and this was listed in its Report placed before the House of Commons in January 1809.98
In essence, Dalrymple gave as his evidence that his instructions and objective had been to get the French out of Portugal and cut off their retreat to Spain, so as to enable the British army to assist Spain. Bearing in mind that Junot still had an intact army and held strong positions, combined with the difficulties of holding his provisioning fleet on station, he felt this was best achieved by the Convention. He not unreasonably pointed out that he had consulted his Lieutenant Generals, including Burrard and Wellesley, and that none of them had objected to the terms as eventually settled (there had been considerable negotiation).99 Where he differed from Wellesley was in his assertion that Wellesley had been involved in the negotiation of the Armistice. Dalrymple also felt that Burrard had played no great part in the negotiation of the Armistice.
Burrard gave evidence to the effect that he felt the army was exhausted after the battle of Vimeiro. It suffered from a lack of provisions and its cavalry was heavily outnumbered by the French and any advance as it approached Lisbon would be entering countryside more favourable to cavalry. He had therefore ordered a halt, anticipating in due course the arrival of Sir John Moore with a substantial force.
Wellesley had moved to distance himself from the terms of the Convention while still in Portugal. On his arrival in London he made it very clear that he had not approved the terms of the Armistice.100 He maintained that while he had favoured an advance following the victory at Vimeiro, Burrard’s decision to halt was not unreasonable. Further, while Wellesley had favoured such an advance with a view to cutting off the French from Lisbon, he pointed out that was in no way incompatible with his support for an armistice and convention when the circumstances had changed on 22 August, for by then the French were no longer in confusion. Wellesley made it clear he had not negotiated the armistice, but had merely signed it at Dalrymple’s request, given that he held a rank of equivalence with the French signatory, General Kellerman. Furthermore, Wellesley stated that he had objected to various terms of the armistice including that pertaining to the Russian fleet in the Tagus (which Cotton rejected in any event) and the agreement to give forty-eight-hours’ notice to end the suspension of hostilities. Wellesley confirmed he had in fact suggested the suspension of hostilities should be only for forty-eight-hours.
All three of these Generals expressed the opinion that if the Convention had not been entered into, the French might have passed the Tagus and gone to either Almeida or Elvas and therefore frustrated the British desire to help Spain. Furthermore, they might have held up the British by defending Lisbon and other strongholds which would have required protracted siege warfare with the same result. Indeed it was widely reported that Junot had threatened to destroy Lisbon rather than let it fall into British hands intact.101
The attention of the Board was drawn to earlier Conventions, including those whereby the French had been allowed to evacuate Genoa (1800), Malta (1800), Egypt (1801) and indeed the arrangement whereby terms for the repatriation of Dupont’s army had been agreed following the French defeat at the hands of the Spaniards at the Battle of Bailén (1808); though these were not subsequently honoured.102 Dalrymple solicited the assistance of two generals in his own defence, with Anstruther and Lord William Bentinck furnishing supportive letters.103 Though neither Beresford nor Proby were called as witnesses (they remained in the Peninsula), the correspondence with the Commissioners employed to carry the provisions of the Convention into effect was listed with a view to bolstering the cases of the generals as the subject of scrutiny, as they were able to demonstrate their determination to prevent the French taking home items of value not encompassed by the articles.104
The Board of Inquiry Report accepted that Burrard’s conduct in not advancing after the battle of Vimeiro had been justified, particularly when two commanders succeeded each other within the space of twenty-four-hours. Further, the Convention had immediately liberated Portugal and relieved a large section of the Spanish frontier from the danger of attack, enabling the Spanish to make a more effective defence of Spain without an enemy at its back. It noted much firmness had been taken in restricting the French interpretation of the Convention, with the French being forced to disgorge their plunder. The Convention was similar to those entered into in Egypt, where the garrisons of Alexandria and Cairo could not have held out for long and had no prospect of succour. The Convention had not been objected to by five experienced Lieutenant Generals and in the opinion of the Board ‘no further military proceeding is necessary’. The Report concluded with the statement that while the Board might have differences respecting the fitness of the Convention it was unanimous in recognising the unquestionable zeal and firmness of Dalrymple, Burrard and Wellesley.
The Commander in Chief, the Duke of York, was not impressed with one aspect of the Report. Three days later, on Christmas Day, he ordered the Board to express their opinion on whether the conditions of the Armistice and Convention were advisable and should have been agreed upon. As a result, the Board agreed that each member should indicate whether he approved of the Armistice, and separately whether he approved of the Convention. The results of those deliberations on 27 December showed a 6:1 majority in favour of the Armistice but only a 4:3 majority in favour of the Convention. The minority felt that the appearance of John Moore with reinforcements, together with the arrival of the 3rd and 42nd regiments following the Armistice, meant that Dalrymple could have taken a stronger position in the discussions leading to the Convention and would in all probability have obtained a more advantageous result had he done so. Only Moira felt there should have been no armistice as it effectively established the terms of the Convention.105
It is well known that Dalrymple and Burrard were never again given active commands. The King went further. While he adopted the unanimous opinion of the Board that no further military proceeding was necessary, he made a formal declaration of his disapprobation of the Armistice and Convention which was communicated to Dalrymple. It is most interesting that in doing so he highlighted his disapproval of the Articles in which stipulations were made directly affecting the interests or feelings of the Spanish and Portuguese nations. It was declared improper and dangerous to include in military conventions articles of such description. While the King’s disapprobation does not list the articles complained of, it is easy to see that these must be those that had caused so much grief in Portugal. The inclusion of Spain may relate to the promise to secure the restoration of French subjects, whether military or civilian, detained in Spain. Dalrymple was being criticised for his acceptance of political articles in a military convention.106
Napoleon initially reserved his opinion on Junot and the Convention, writing to General Clarke on 2 October saying that on landing Junot should be told Napoleon did not know if he should approve the Convention but that there had been no harm to French honour in that the troops did not lay down their arms and no standards had been lost.107 He seems to have felt that Junot should have entrenched himself and waited for reinforcements and is reported to have been considering a court martial, but the establishment of an Inquiry by the English avoided the need for him to punish an old friend.108 Indeed, on his return to France Junot was given command of the 3rd Corps to prosecute the siege of Zaragoza.109
The holding of the Inquiry bears the hallmarks of political expediency. No inquiry had been called for under circumstances where deals had been done in recent years to allow the French home on surrender, and indeed such arrangements were the norm for other countries as well.110 Indeed, Whitelocke’s army had been allowed home from Buenos Aires111 so why was the case of Portugal so different? The Report exculpated all three Generals in respect of their military conduct but clearly Portugal was felt to be a valuable ally whose feelings needed to be assuaged.112 Furthermore, the fact that some of the French returnees were back in Spain by the beginning of December and the more immediate realisation they would be available to fight again caused considerable upset. Criticism of Dalrymple and Burrard as military commanders may be justified and it may be that a better result could have been obtained by making use of Moore’s army, but is it sustainable to argue that all the parties to the conflict benefitted considerably by the Convention?113
While it was hard to get the message accepted, Britain had removed the French from Portugal without suffering serious losses and on a short time scale. The early capture of Lisbon enabled the provisioning of an army to go into Spain under Sir John Moore, and the deliverance of Portugal made the march on Spain feasible. All the other strongholds in Portugal were secured without fighting and Portugal became the British base for future operations. Furthermore, the British now had a safe harbour for their navy. On the negative side there was a perception that Britain could have struck a tougher bargain with Junot, perhaps ensuring the troops did not return to the Peninsula. There was also the more cosmetic criticism of the recognition of Napoleon’s Imperial title for the first time, as well as the recognition of Junot as the Duke of Abrantes. The British Generals in overall command had failed to take the Portuguese into account, a situation which was recognised within government. Moreover, the psychological effect of winning victories in the Peninsula at a time when British forces were faring dismally elsewhere must have been a great morale booster for the British army and the government. Condemnation of the convention was not universal, and often depended on political allegiance. On balance it is argued Britain emerged a winner.
The English government was perhaps fortunate that the hullabaloo concerning Cintra died down remarkably quickly because of a fresh scandal which erupted in late January 1809, shortly after the publication of the report of the Board of Inquiry.114 The new scandal concerned alleged corruption in the army arising from the sale of commissions under the influence of the Commander in Chief’s mistress, Mary Ann Clarke. While the Duke of York was acquitted of the charges against him, he had to stand down for a considerable time as Commander in Chief.
Portugal had rid itself of the French army of occupation. While plundered to a degree, the Convention had saved Lisbon.115 Henceforth, it obtained protection from a British army which paid its way. The fact that Moore was able to take an army into Spain and draw the French towards northern Spain and La Coruña probably prevented a fresh and more substantial invasion of Portugal by the French at this time. Of course, the involvement with Britain drew it into a lengthy war and huge suffering in terms of property and people, but in return it received a well trained army and financial assistance in its defence through British subsidies. It was not the Convention of Cintra, but the removal of the Court to Brazil in 1807 and the ensuing six years of warfare, combined with the opening up of direct trade by other nations with Brazil, that caused seismic changes to the politics and economics of Portugal. While Britain’s failure to consult with the Portuguese over the proposals leading to the Convention of Cintra proved a real irritant, it is arguable Portugal emerged a winner.
Spain is not often thought of in terms of the Convention. However, it resulted in the repatriation of the imprisoned division of its army under Carafa. The march of the British army under Sir John Moore into central Spain and its subsequent withdrawal to La Coruña may have contributed to the saving of Andalucia in that Napoleon turned troops northwards which might otherwise have been used to crush resistance in the south. Finally, Spain no longer had an enemy behind it in Portugal, which enabled Spanish forces to concentrate elsewhere. A win also for Spain.
France lost Portugal, but in doing so recovered almost intact an army which was soon redeployed.116 With some justification, the Convention was portrayed as a diplomatic triumph, as while the British feared a long engagement in Portugal the reality was that with the additional forces at the disposal of Dalrymple, a French withdrawal would have been a strategically demanding affair and might have resulted in unconditional surrender. If not a win, then a measured loss. France was still in the driving seat on mainland Europe, including the Peninsula.
The removal of the French army from Portugal enabled British propaganda to present the Convention of Cintra in a favourable light, but there were losers under its terms. A number of Portuguese lost possessions, and national treasures were looted from museums, libraries, churches and palaces. The full extent of those losses is difficult to quantify, not least because as Junot observed to Napoleon 50 million Francs worth of goods had been removed from Portugal to Great Britain when Portugal had initially come under French threat.117 In addition, the Portuguese had already suffered a brutal taxation imposed by Junot. This situation should be set against the gain of a liberated country and the recovery of a considerable amount of goods and valuables. Without defending the theft of items, it is difficult to estimate the extent of plunder when it is recalled that substantial royal and independent valuables had been shipped to Brazil in 1807.118 Further, it was a surprising oversight that Dalrymple did not seek to incorporate in the Convention provision for the return to Portugal of Portuguese prisoners detained in France.
Dalrymple and Burrard certainly emerged as losers, not being given further commands. Poor Burrard lost three sons fighting in the Peninsula and is said to have died of grief in 1813. However, fortune did not entirely desert Dalrymple. Though his son’s military career suffered in that while he purchased promotion he was not given any future command, the General, with the support of Castlereagh, was created a baronet in 1815, perhaps in recognition that judgment on him had been somewhat harsh.119
The findings of the Board of Inquiry proved to be of great consequence. In supporting the actions of the military on the ground, those findings made it possible for Wellesley to be placed in command of Britain’s next foreign expedition. In the autumn and early winter of 1808, Beresford was to participate in the attempt of Sir John Moore to assist Spain deliver itself of the French invader. Beresford’s star was in the ascendant as a result of his efforts to limit the French interpretation of the Convention, his role in policing Lisbon, and in improving relations between the British military in Portugal and the Portuguese political elite remaining in that country. One British officer arriving in Lisbon at the close of September reckoned that the vigilance of Beresford had saved the populace of in excess of £200,000 in recovered private and public wealth. He credited Beresford with proving to the inhabitants that ‘we were not the sanctioners of robbery, the protectors of plunderers, and the carriers of violated property’.120 Given the reported strength of the ill feeling towards the British following the execution of the Convention of Cintra, it is not difficult to see why Beresford’s conduct in the implementation of the Convention would ensure he would be welcomed back to Portugal in 1809.121
