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Оглавление6 FIRST STEPS IN THE REBUILDING AND REFORM OF AN ARMY: THE CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN PORTUGAL, 1809
Sometimes military reform becomes an engine for change for an entire society, intended or otherwise. Given the global reach of British and French military practices and the compulsive energy and hypermilitarization of Imperial Germany, it is not surprising that the great reformers are Europeans: William Carr Beresford in Portugal, Charles George Gordon in China, Ivor Herbert in Canada, H.H. Kitchener in Egypt, Orde Wingate in Jewish Palestine, John Bagot Glubb in Jordan, Joseph-Simon Gallieni in Indochina, Hubert Louis Lyautey in Morocco, Colmar von der Goltz and Liman von Sanders in Turkey, Emil Korner in Chile, Hans Kundt in Bolivia and Max Bauer and Hans von Seeckt in China.1
After the evacuation of the British army at La Coruña, Beresford’s stay in England on his return from Spain was to prove a short one. He did not even have the opportunity to return to Ireland to visit his relatives, and indeed it was to be a further five years before he was reunited with his family. Soon after returning from Spain he was offered the command of the British forces in Jamaica, with the expectation of Governorship of that island. He declined on the basis that he wished to see active service.2 Within days of turning down this opportunity, on 9 February 1809 he was ordered to Portugal in response to a request from the Regency Council for a British officer to reform and rebuild that country’s army. While he noted that he would not have refused this opportunity to be involved in active service, he also made clear that he had been told that his appointment to command the Portuguese army was not open to refusal.3
Notwithstanding the victories at Roliça and Vimeiro, the position of Portugal was fraught with danger by the close of 1808. The optimism which surrounded the British advance into Spain that autumn had perished in the retreat to La Coruña and Vigo. Once again, in early 1809 Portugal was faced with a French invasion.
In the aftermath of the Convention of Cintra and the deportation of the French army, on 18 September 1808 General Dalrymple had re-established the Regency Council subject to the removal of its French supporters. It faced huge difficulties, not least because of the need to obtain instructions from the Prince Regent in Rio de Janeiro before making major decisions. This restriction was born of a determination by the royal family and its advisers in Brazil not to allow the growth of an alternative power base, a policy which was to make difficult Portuguese participation in the war, and which on occasion was to provide a convenient stratagem for those opposed to British suggestions. It is important to realise that on arrival in Brazil in January1808, Prince João effectively set up a full royal government and state apparatus there.4 It included a Council of State, four ministries, a Supreme Court of Justice, Royal Treasury, Royal Mint, Royal libraries, a military academy, a law school and more. This government-in-exile not only established the conditions for the development of Brazilian independence, but for thirteen years led to a role reversal whereby Portugal was in many respects ruled from Brazil.
This situation created difficulties which were manifested in different ways, such as when Prince João, in confirming the reinstatement of the Regency by order of 2 January 1809, made it clear that all matters other than those requiring immediate decision should be referred to the appropriate ministry in Rio de Janeiro. This requirement included all reforms as well as promotions in the army and even the universities. In effect, the Regency Council were governors rather than a body standing in lieu of the Queen (or in reality the Prince Regent) with all the difficulties in making decisions required to govern on behalf of a ruler some 5,000 kilometres away in an age when communication was by sail and subject to the vagaries of the prevailing weather system.5
Furthermore, the Regency experienced considerable difficulty in establishing its own authority in Portugal. It was split by rival factions and undermined by, amongst others, the Bishop of Porto whose reluctance to recognise its authority reflected a desire to promote himself and the Junta of Porto as a leadership uncontaminated by collaboration with the French. The serious riots which had occurred in Porto in early October, riots in which many of the soldiers stationed there were involved, were brought under control but there remained an inflamed mood with the threat of further outbreaks. Anarchy was matched by apathy, with many thinking the war with France was now at an end and that the French would soon be driven from the Iberian Peninsula. French success in the winter of 1808–9 meant that apathy amongst some was quickly replaced by terror, and the febrile atmosphere in Lisbon was not helped by persistent rumours of an intention by Britain to withdraw its remaining troops from Portugal, rumours which were not without foundation for that possibility was recognised by Sir John Cradock, the new commander of the British forces in Portugal, on his arrival in Lisbon in mid December. British government policy was itself uncertain.
Remarkably, at the end of January – the very moment the government was considering further involvement in Portugal – it simultaneously recognised the possibility of withdrawal. Following La Coruña and the bringing home of Moore’s army in what must have been a particular low point for British ministers, Castlereagh wrote to Cradock on 28 January 1809 urging him to maintain himself as long as possible in Portugal in order to give the Spanish an opportunity to regroup and to force the enemy to engage in long marches. If Cradock had to withdraw he was to go to Cádiz, if the Spanish wanted the British army there, but if the response was negative he should proceed to Gibraltar.6 Cradock for his part was clearly worried about his ability to maintain a presence in Portugal, and following receipt of the news of the departure of the British army from La Coruña he closed a number of provisioning depots in northern Portugal – at Almeida and Lamego – and sought to concentrate his army of about 10,000 men in and around Lisbon; though the 40th Regiment was garrisoned strategically at Elvas and Brigadier General Charles Stewart, with a force of 2,700, occupied Santarém. British popularity in Portugal was less than universal, with its troops in Lisbon not immune from attack by Portuguese.7
In addition, the departure of a number of the pro-French party in Portugal, whether through going to France with the Portuguese Legion under d’Alorna or from taking sail with Junot, did not mean there was not a pro-French faction still in Portugal. A British observer, the Reverend James Wilmot Ormsby, detected in October 1808 that there was still a strong French party in Lisbon, though in most of the country people detested the French. He noted the joy of the Portuguese at the extermination of the French but added, ‘it does not follow that because they hate them they should love us. Had they behaved with moderation the French might have been hailed as deliverers.’8 The result of this state of affairs was that little rebuilding of either administrative or military structures was achieved in Portugal in the autumn of 1808 and early spring of 1809. Ultimately the Regency would be reformed in the summer of 1809, but before the end of the previous year it had at least recognised that it was incapable of reforming the Portuguese army and sought the assistance of Great Britain to do so.
If Portugal was in a state of chaos in 1808, it is equally clear that its army was not fit for purpose. No discussion of the rebuilding and reform of the Portuguese army would be complete without looking at its historical evolution prior to the Peninsular War and the career of the man who more than any other provided the Portuguese impetus for change, Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz.9 Beresford was to prove to be the instrument of reform and the creation of an efficient fighting force was made possible by the provision of financial and material support from Great Britain; but the undertaking and progression of this task owed much to the foresight and determination of Forjaz, one of the Secretaries to the Regency Council. The much maligned General Burrard had identified that nothing would be done in Portugal without a minister ‘equal to the task of instructing, urging and conciliating the government and people’ and Forjaz proved to be that man of vision and determination.10
Forjaz joined the re-established Regency Council as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, War and Marine and remained one of those most influential and supportive of the Anglo-Portuguese war effort throughout the Peninsular War.11 A lack of military organisation and modernisation in the Portuguese army had been identified as far back as the 1790s, and the need for reform had been advocated by Forjaz and some of his compatriots since that time. Following the conclusion of the ‘War of the Oranges’ in June 1801, the appointment of Karl Alexander von der Goltz as Commander in Chief of the Portuguese army led to recommendations for reform aimed at producing a trained and disciplined force, but internal resistance led to Goltz’s departure a year later.12 His short period in Portugal was not without result, for it led to the appointment of a military Commission to examine how the army could be improved, and Forjaz served as Secretary to the Commission. The Commission did not agree a final report and its resolutions were not acted on by the government. Forjaz, however, worked closely with successive Ministers for War and made suggestions for appointments to be made on merit and the reform of logistical support, which had they been acted upon might have reduced the serious problems encountered by the Portuguese army in the Peninsular War. It is likely that the policy of appeasement adopted towards Napoleon by António de Araújo, the Francophile Minister for War from 1804, was an important factor in the failure to address the issues required for the proper defence of the realm.13
Forjaz had been dismissed from the army by Junot, and having withdrawn from public life rather than support the French regime he had been one of the first to become involved in the re-establishment of a Portuguese army under the Supreme Junta of Porto in the summer of 1808. Serving under General Bernardim Freire de Andrade (his cousin), Forjaz sought to introduce many of the reforms he had long advocated for the Portuguese army.14 Relatively little had been achieved in the run up to the defeat of the French in August 1808, and indeed thereafter progress was very slow prior to Beresford’s arrival and appointment as Commander in Chief in the spring of 1809. The combination of Forjaz’s vision and application and Beresford’s commitment to the creation of a well disciplined fighting force, where promotion was based on merit rather than merely birth, meant that over the next few years these two men effectively combined to produce one of the finest armies in Europe.
In the autumn of 1808, the prospect of Portugal possessing an army to be reckoned with in the Napoleonic wars must have seemed remote. In despair the Regency Council reported to Rio in mid October that the country was effectively a demilitarised zone; a rather startling and pessimistic assertion given there were then over 30,000 British soldiers in the country in addition to the Portuguese forces.15 Junot had denuded Portugal of some of its best soldiers by creating the Portuguese Legion under the Marquis d’Alorna.16 The regiments raised by the Supreme Junta of Porto and others in 1808–9 were for the most part badly armed, poorly trained and in some cases lacking in leadership. There was a shortage of money to pay the troops, discipline was weak and there was a chronic lack of supplies. In addition to the troops raised in Portugal in 1808, the Loyal Lusitanian Legion had been formed in England, and this force commanded by Sir Robert Wilson had landed in Porto in the autumn of that year. Made up principally of Portuguese who had escaped from Portugal it consisted of two battalions of infantry and an artillery unit, and the Loyal Lusitanian Legion was to perform useful service until ultimately subsumed into the Portuguese army in 1811.17
The steps taken by the Regency involved a declaration of 30 September recalling all officers retired by Junot to the colours. This step could only have been moderately successful given that many officers had either gone to Brazil with the Court, joined the Loyal Lusitanian Legion or the Portuguese Legion. At the same time a radical move was made in creating six battalions of caçadores (light troops). This decision was not entirely innovative; one such regiment had been created previously under the Marquis d’Alorna as part of the reforms suggested by the members of the military commission, but this had been part of the force dispatched to France designated to become the Portuguese Legion in the service of Napoleon. In October and November, further decrees were issued designed to reorganise the army on previously existing lines, recalling men to their regiments and including a pardon for deserters.18 Forjaz instigated the formation of volunteer regiments in Lisbon in late 1808.
The restored format for the army thus envisaged twenty-four infantry regiments of the line (37,200), six battalions of caçadores (3,768) twelve cavalry regiments (7,128) and four artillery regiments (4,800), giving a regular army of some 52,000 men. In addition, there was theoretically a militia force of comparable size and a levée en masse, known as the ordenança, which could be called out in time of crisis. However, the reality was very different. Early in September a report prepared by Baron Frederick von Decken for the British Government suggested there were in fact 13,272 infantry, 3,384 caçadores, 1,812 cavalry and 19,000 militia.19 Portuguese returns for 26 November 1808 suggested that this figure had risen to 22,361 infantry, 3,422 cavalry, 4,031 artillery and 20,800 militia by that date, but Portuguese historians query the veracity of these and later figures when set against the much more strictly tabulated figures for 1810 and 1811.20
Portuguese forces raised in 1808 were lacking in equipment, provisions and discipline.21 A return for 5 January 1809 lists 21,094 infantry but some without arms or uniforms. A theoretical cavalry force of 3,691 could not be put in the field due to a lack of horses, while there was an artillery force of 2,419. The remaining British force under Sir John Cradock amounted to just over 10,000 men, with a rather alarming number of a mere 5,221 effectives. These were centred on Lisbon from whence it was anticipated initially they would sail for England in the event of a major French advance, though later a retreat to Cádiz or Gibraltar was contemplated.22
Furthermore, it is clear from the correspondence of Sir John Cradock with the British Envoy to Lisbon, Sir John Villiers, that the former had been told by Forjaz that the quality of those recalled to the Portuguese army did not greatly impress him and further there were less than 10,000 serviceable arms for the Portuguese forces in mid December.23 At the beginning of the month, Major General MacKenzie, who had just arrived in Lisbon, observed to Castlereagh: ‘I am sorry to say that very little assistance can be relied on from the government of this country. The reestablishment of their military force goes on, but very slowly and without energy.’ Forjaz had told him that there was an extreme lack of arms for both the regular forces and the militia.24 A month later, in early January 1809, Villiers wrote to Canning stating, ‘this part of the Peninsula will fall whenever it is attacked, unless measures for its defence are immediately taken’, going on to add that at present it may be considered as defenceless.25
By February 1809 there were two Portuguese armed forces of any size operational in Portugal together with garrisons in fortresses such as Almeida and Elvas. The larger of the two forces, under the command of Lieutenant General António José de Miranda Henriques, was headquartered at Tomar with the objective of protecting Lisbon. This corps nominally amounted to just under 15,000 regulars and 2,000 cavalry with artillery support. The second force was operative north of the Douro in the provinces of Minho and Trás-os-Montes. This corps was split into two forces, with that under Lieutenant General Bernardim Freire de Andrade covering Porto and another group under Brigadier General Francisco da Silveira operating in Trás-os-Montes with headquarters in Chaves. The combined total of these two forces was calculated at only 6,444 with some cavalry. It was supplemented by a large force of militia.26
In London, notwithstanding the successful expulsion of the French from Portugal following the battle of Vimeiro, there was recognition by government ministers that the rebuilding of the Portuguese army would require financial assistance. Indeed, even prior to Vimeiro Arthur Wellesley had suggested it would require substantial British help to rebuild the Portuguese army.27 The Government proceeded with caution, given its own requirement for troops to meet disorder at home and the possibility of French invasion. However, Portugal clearly fell into the category of an ally who could and would fight if given the materials to do so. Additionally, both Portugal and Brazil offered important military, naval and economic advantages to Great Britain, just as they would have done to France. The initial decision to give financial aid was communicated to Villiers in November 1808, when it was agreed that cloth for uniforms, leather and materials for 10,000 men would be sent to Portugal. It was to be March 1809 before arms and clothing for this number was in fact delivered to the country.28
Credit should be given to the Regency for recognising the need to bring in outside help in order to reorganise and rebuild the army. By letter of 26 December 1808, Cipriano Ribeiro Freire on behalf of the Portuguese government requested a British officer to reform and rebuild the Portuguese army, and in what proved to be an inspired choice, Beresford was nominated for that position in February 1809.29 The request baldly stated: ‘Present circumstances rendering it extremely desirable that there should be at the head of the Portuguese army a general officer, whose experience and other qualifications may fit him to command the Military Force of this kingdom, whether for its own immediate defense [sic], or for the general cause and liberty of the Peninsula …’30 That the decision to send a British general to help build the Portuguese army was taken at all, let alone within weeks following the retreat to and evacuation from La Coruña, is perhaps remarkable but shows a determination not to allow the hard-earned fruits of the victory at Vimeiro to slip away. Indeed, the decision when first announced was ridiculed by some who expressed the view that Lisbon would be in French hands before the appointee could reach the Tagus.31
How and why was Beresford chosen by the Duke of Portland’s administration to reform and rebuild the Portuguese army? The decision was made within a month of the request being received by the government in London, surely indicating an understanding at cabinet level of the imminent dangers facing Portugal and a wish to capitalise on the military success of the 1808 campaign in that country. Beresford’s appointment was no racing certainty. While no specific general was requested by the Portuguese, Villiers was told privately that Wellesley would be most welcome.32 It is unclear whether Wellesley indicated that he was not interested, but in any event Castlereagh felt he was too valuable to be put forward for the job and opposed his appointment.33 Lieutenant General Sir John Doyle’s name was mentioned, probably at the behest of the Duke of York. He was senior to Wellesley, so it was perhaps as well that this suggestion was not implemented, as it would have made it difficult, if not impossible, to appoint Wellesley commander of all Allied forces a month later. There were certainly more senior candidates than Beresford, a relatively junior Major General. Canning favoured Sir John Moore, but by the last week of January news of his demise had reached London. Canning then appears to have decisively supported Beresford’s nomination, explaining that his appointment was due not only on account of his military ability but because of his knowledge of Portugal and the Portuguese people and language.34 Further factors leading to his selection may have included the interest Beresford had shown in training Portuguese infantry while in Madeira, and his own recommendations for the creation of a modern Portuguese army shortly after arriving in Portugal in 1808, before leaving for Spain with Sir John Moore’s army.35
The decision to appoint Beresford seems to have been the result of strong support from Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, at this time Minister for War and the Colonies and an ally of the Wellesleys. Castlereagh had also been born in Ireland in the same year as Arthur Wellesley (1769), just one year after Beresford. In his seminal work on the Peninsular War, Sir Charles Oman hypothesised as to whether Wellesley had had any influence on the appointment.36 Certainly Wellesley and Beresford were on good terms and remained so throughout the war, as is ascertainable not just by their mode of familiar address but by Wellington’s frequent exchanges with Beresford, whether in person or through correspondence.37 Furthermore, the rebuilding of the Portuguese army with British assistance was the subject of a proposal which Wellesley had put forward in the summer of 1808, as part of a plan to secure Portugal from the French and give support to the various Spanish armies. Wellesley foresaw that the combined numbers of a rebuilt Portuguese army with a British army in Portugal would give this alliance a very strong say in the conduct of the war.38 While there seems to be no irrefutable evidence that Wellesley played a hand in Beresford’s nomination, Sir Charles Oman’s speculation that the appointment was part of a plan by Castlereagh and Wellesley to involve another of the Anglo-Irish Tory coterie is an attractive theory.39 A further factor which may have assisted Beresford’s appointment was the relationship by marriage of his father with the Prime Minister, the Duke of Portland.40
Beresford was nominated less than two weeks after his return from La Coruña.41 Napier suggested that parliamentary interest was the deciding factor in Beresford’s appointment and that this caused great discontent amongst those officers of superior rank.42 If there is justification in Napier’s assertion that the appointment arose through parliamentary influence, then it would not be the first or last occasion such appointments were due to political influence. Beresford’s Strictures, written in the 1830s in response to Napier’s suggestion, make some relevant points regarding the appointment. Those fall into two categories: The first concern his previous experience in Portugal and Spain, which involved his tenure as Governor of Madeira, his nomination as a commissioner to implement the Convention of Cintra by Dalrymple, whom Beresford did not know, and his selection by Sir John Moore to cover the retreat and embarkation at La Coruña.43 The second point Beresford makes is that in 1809, after his return from La Coruña, he had hoped to visit his family in Ireland, a family which he had not seen much of since 1793; but that when summoned by Castlereagh he was told he could not decline the appointment to command the Portuguese army.44 That is born out by the contemporary correspondence. It is clear that even if parliamentary influence was at work in securing the appointment, it was not solicited by Beresford.
Beresford’s reputation as an able administrator and a strict disciplinarian appear likely to have been factors in his appointment, combined with qualities already referred to here. While Canning was now committed to the defence of Portugal, he was under no illusions as to the challenge faced by Beresford, referring to it as an ‘arduous and difficult undertaking’. It involved placing a British army officer in a position of power in a country with different laws, a fractured government, a divided society, a different religion, and different customs and climate. The appointment was to give him command of the Portuguese army, but on the basis that Beresford was to be subject to the overall command of the commander in chief of the British forces in Portugal. As such he was thrown into a complex series of relationships where political, economic and military factors fell to be decided by a number of parties who were sometimes geographically distant, personally jealous and whose policies were not perfectly aligned. The lack of any meaningful central authority with the ability to make things happen in Portugal had to be altered, and it is a tribute to Forjaz, Wellington and Beresford that an efficient war machine was created over relatively few years. That this could be achieved in the face of French military might was doubted by many at the outset and Beresford himself expressed the view that it was not impossible, indeed not improbable that he would go to and return from Portugal given the state of affairs there.45
The Portuguese had requested an officer of the rank of Lieutenant General to command their army. Beresford, whom we have seen had only been promoted to Major General in 1808, was made up to Lieutenant General ‘during the time in which he shall be employed the [sic] command of the Portuguese forces’.46
Beresford arrived in Lisbon on 2 March 1809 after an eight-day voyage, during which his vessel ‘missed the French fleet by little’.47 While it was rumoured that the French were on their way back to Portugal he found the Portuguese in high spirits and full of enthusiasm.48 Five days later he was appointed Marshal and Commander in Chief of the Portuguese army. He wrote to Charles Stewart, brother of Castlereagh and soon to be Wellington’s adjutant general in the Peninsula, explaining that he had not wished to be made a Marshal, but that the Portuguese had insisted that this was necessary for the command of the army. Beresford’s suggestion that he be appointed a Lieutenant General in the Portuguese army would not give him command of that army because it contained a considerable number of Lieutenant Generals already, all of whom would have been senior to Beresford and thus would have had command over him.49 Probably wisely, Beresford determined that the terms of his appointment and the extent of his authority required clarification before he took up his duties. In particular, he was understandably anxious to establish that he would have authority over all military appointments and promotions and it was only when agreement on this point and his ability to discipline those who would not obey commands was secured that he moved to finalise his appointment.50 Indeed, he had stressed the necessity of such powers in a paper sent to Castlereagh in early February prior to taking up his appointment.51 As a result it was a further week before he formally took command of the Portuguese forces on 15 March.52
The Portuguese may have been full of enthusiasm but Beresford found the army, both officers and men, in a state of insubordination, to such an extent that officers no longer gave orders and if they did so, there was no certainty they would be obeyed.53 Hence his initial task was to get control of the army. It is not therefore surprising that in his first Order of the Day (Ordem do Dia) Beresford made it clear that discipline and subordination would be key elements of his command and in a carrot and stick approach he stated that he had confidence in the Portuguese people and their ability to build an army as good as any in Europe. Sensing perhaps potential distrust of a foreigner he specifically asserted that he was a ‘Portuguese Officer, and to the Portuguese he confers his honour and his reputation.’ 54 Serving the Portuguese crown while bearing in mind Britain’s interests was to be a challenging task for Beresford over the next eleven years.55
The means of instilling discipline and authority, combined with ensuring the ability to fight as a unit through understanding and training in military regulations, was the introduction of British officers into the Portuguese regiments. This had been agreed with Castlereagh before Beresford’s departure from England, though at the time neither had perhaps envisaged the number of officers which would be required or the consequences of the inducement to be offered to those officers. Beresford had travelled with a small personal staff to Portugal. These included William Warre of the Anglo-Portuguese wine family, and Robert Arbuthnot, who had served with him previously in South America, Madeira and in the campaign of 1808–9 ending at La Coruña. Arbuthnot was now to serve Beresford as ADC and military secretary until the close of the war. Soon after taking up his appointment in Lisbon, Beresford was to make a number of appointments which not only established the way he intended to work, through a combination of British and Portuguese working together, but which were to endure throughout the war and beyond in many cases.56 His four adjutants were the aforementioned Major William Warre, who had been born in Porto and was able to speak and write Portuguese fluently, Captain William H. Sewell, Captain Conde de Lumiares and Captain Dom José Luiz de Sousa.57 In addition he appointed Manuel de Brito Mosinho as Adjutant General of the army and António de Lemos Pereira de Lacerda his Portuguese military secretary. Both of these men were to play a vital part in keeping the show on the road over the ensuing years.58
On arrival in Portugal in March 1809, Beresford was faced with a theoretically unified command but in practice a series of small forces operating of necessity independently. In addition to being poorly armed, clothed and fed, many regiments fell far short of a full complement. A report of 10 March 1809 sent to the Prince Regent contained an appendix purporting to set out the real state of the Portuguese army. In effect it identified an army based north of Lisbon to guard the city of some 16,000 with 7,500 militia under Lieutenant General António José de Miranda Henriques, and a second army of some 6,000 with 12,000 militia designed to protect Porto and the north under Bernardim Freire.59 There were in addition garrisons in various forts and forces of a lesser size in the southern provinces. That report made no reference to the Loyal Lusitanian Legion but in any event in view of the steps subsequently taken to raise regiments and fill existing regiments, the figures are suspect.60 Later, following the efforts of Forjaz and Beresford combined, with the financial assistance of the British government, the annual size of the army including artillery and policemen has been calculated at between 48,000 and 53,500 during the period 1809–11.61
The moulding of a well-disciplined fighting force required experienced officers with the ability to drill and train recruits. Beresford secured these by obtaining their secondment from the British army, while simultaneously enforcing the retirement of those Portuguese officers not up to the task and promoting promising younger officers within the Portuguese service.62 Obtaining men of fighting age necessitated an efficient recruiting system combined with a commissary to feed, clothe, arm and pay the soldiers. These requirements meant Beresford had to persuade the Portuguese political (both in Portugal and Brazil) and military establishment of the potential benefits if he was to make substantial progress. Self-evidently, the task could not be achieved in the short term, not least because the country was in the course of being invaded for the second time in three years, and steps needed to be taken to meet that threat. Nevertheless, immediate actions were taken which ensured the incremental improvement of the army over a surprisingly short period of time.
History did give Beresford one advantage. There had been a practice of foreigners being brought in to advise and indeed to command the Portuguese army in times of crisis. The British had sent the Marquis de Ruvigny, Earl of Galway, to assist the Portuguese during the war of the Spanish Succession. In the mid-eighteenth century, during the Seven Years War (1756–63), the Portuguese had engaged the Prussian General the Count of Schaumburg-Lippe to command their army. He effected considerable reforms with the help of British and Prussian officers, but on his dismissal many of these changes were reversed, as inimical to the ruling elite. A further attempt to reform the Portuguese army took place after reverses in the war of 1801, ‘The War of the Oranges’, led to Portugal giving up possession of Olivença and its surrounding territory to Spain.63 Reference has already been made to a military commission established in the autumn of 1801 to advise on reforms with Dom Miguel Forjaz as its Secretary. Because of disagreements it did not present a formal report. Nevertheless, Forjaz produced a summary of its deliberations for the Minister for War, Dom João de Almeida. Political infighting, partly the product of the existence of both pro-British and pro-French factions at court, severely limited the reforms introduced by Almeida and his successors. A particular success was the introduction of light troops of the line, the caçadores, who were to earn their laurels in the Peninsular War.64
The Regent João and his ministers had sought to walk a tightrope with a view to alienating neither Britain nor France after war between those two countries resumed in 1803. Pressure from French emissaries combined with that of the Francophile party in Portugal led to the reduction in size of the Portuguese army following Dom António de Araújo’s appointment as Minister for War in 1804. By 1806 there was widespread recognition of the need for further reform and an internal reorganisation was commenced in order to streamline the command and logistical supply of an army that contained perhaps 10,000–15,000 effectives; though in theory it was made up of 24 regiments of infantry, 12 regiments of cavalry, 4 regiments of artillery and 43 regiments of militia.65 However, little had been achieved when Junot led his forces into Lisbon in November 1807; and the small gains were swept away in his subsequent dismemberment of the Portuguese army. Nevertheless, the seeds had been sown and when the time came for Beresford to institute reform and rebuild the army he was to find in Forjaz an enthusiastic and able architect for change.
The nature and size of the challenge facing Beresford as well as the Portuguese and British armies in Portugal in early March was immense. Soult was on Portugal’s northern border, while Victor was on the Guadiana with the French 1st Corps and Sebastiani with the 4th Corps in the region of Salamanca, with the Spanish armies in disarray. Immediately Beresford had been appointed to command the army he had to face the invasion of Soult. Intelligence of Soult’s movements was obviously fairly good, for he was able to tell Brigadier General Charles Stewart on 17 March that the French had tried unsuccessfully to cross the Minho near its embouchure but had now crossed the river higher up and were attacking through Trás-os-Montes, where Silveira was retreating in what Beresford felt was a bad start. However, he sent two officers north to see what might be done, rather plaintively hoping the French might be pressed for provisions.66 He was obviously very concerned about the extent to which he might be able to organise the Portuguese regiments at short notice.67
Soult’s troops arrived at Porto and captured the city on 29 March, following a difficult march through northern Portugal during which they had been continuously harassed by Portuguese regular and irregular forces.68 Beresford declined a request to send Portuguese troops to defend that city on the basis that in their present state it would merely result in the loss of men and arms. He was aware that the city was in a state of ‘the greatest anarchy and insubordination and by the latest accounts the population entirely govern the civil and military’.69 His decision was almost certainly justified by the chaotic and vicious defence of Porto which followed the massacre of a number of Portuguese leaders, including their commander Lieutenant General Bernardim Freire and Brigadier Luis de Oliveira by fellow Portuguese.70 Beresford discussed the question of aid to Porto with General Cradock, passing on a request for help from the Regency. While recognising it was a decision for Cradock, he urged the latter to advance a British force as far north as Leiria in an effort to dissuade Soult from attempting to march on Lisbon. In response, Cradock did advance troops from his growing army to Óbidos and Rio Maior, moving his headquarters to Leiria.71
Both Beresford and Cradock realised that Lisbon was the key to Portugal and that it would be important not to allow Soult join with Marshal Victor’s corps, which was in Spain threatening the Portuguese frontier to the east of Lisbon. To that end Beresford directed the dispatch of 2,500 troops with Sir Robert Wilson to support the Spanish under General Cuesta on the Guadiana.72 Victor, however, advanced towards Badajoz and Cuesta suffered a bad defeat at Medellín on 28 March and was attempting to regroup. At the end of the month of March 1809 the Allied position appeared perilous. Cuesta’s defeat had opened up Andalucía to the French and the capture of Porto by Soult threatened to suffocate the rebirth of the Portuguese army, with the possibility that Soult would move on Lisbon in accordance with Napoleon’s orders. While some Portuguese regular troops and a considerable force of largely untrained militia had escaped across the Douro at the time of the fall of Porto, there was disagreement as to whether the Allies should try and hold the country between the Douro and the Mondego or merely concentrate on the defence of Lisbon.
With its wonderful natural harbour, Lisbon was recognised as the key to the country, but there was considerable unease amongst the Portuguese at the prospect of the abandonment of rich and fertile countryside and its population, and concern as to the intentions of the Portuguese Regency, as well as the British political and military establishment. General Silveira expressed his reluctance to leave the people and country north of the Douro, notwithstanding Beresford’s instructions that it was more important to maintain his force in retreat.73 The issue of whether to attempt to defend Portugal on its frontiers or to withdraw to a defensible position with the objective of making the defence of Lisbon the priority was one which was to raise its head repeatedly during the next few years.
The difficulties faced by Beresford at this time are exemplified by the experiences of the Irishman, Colonel Nicholas Trant, a British officer in the Portuguese service since 1808. Trant was at Coimbra when the news of the fall of Porto came through. He advised Beresford he had barely 1,100 militia and 200 students from Coimbra at his disposal, the first in the worst possible state, never having fired a blank cartridge, the latter in no way as enthusiastic as he had anticipated. His first action on arriving in Coimbra on 28 March had been to imprison the police guard corporal who had accompanied him from Lisbon, because he had shot a courier from General Miranda on the road from Pombal. Trant had hoped to march north but this would not be possible due to a lack of preparations and he opined the levée en masse would be of no assistance, and there was much despondency amongst all classes of the population.74 Trant determined to try to hold the line of the river Vouga and his little force was augmented by those who had escaped from Porto. He ordered the destruction of the bridge over the Vouga but was doubtful of his ability to check the French at the river if the enemy moved forward other than with reconnoitring parties. There were almost daily skirmishes along the rivers Vouga and the Ovar. Trant put the situation succinctly to Beresford. He explained that even after retreating southwards from Porto a forward movement with a force inferior to the enemy was required to assuage the fears of the people of the country and to inspire confidence in his own troops, who were by no means at his disposal following recent events, and a move forward was needed to calm their suspicion of ‘every movement of mine’. Clearly Trant was concerned that his own troops could turn on him and his officers if he retreated further, a not unsurprising fear given recent events prior to and during the siege of Porto.75 A mutiny by artillery sergeants required them to be treated as prisoners. Trant was clearly in a difficult position.
The position regarding the assembling of the ordenança was even more dire than the problems Beresford and his commanders faced with the army and the militia. Once again we have Trant’s opinion, this time that the levée en masse was of no assistance. The ordenança would assemble to defend their own village but were not inclined to form a disposable force. The Inspector General of Ordenança north of the Mondego had fled at the first approach of the French, and when Lieuteneant General de Mello ordered Major Albuquerque to join Trant with 8,000 ordenança, only 2,000 arrived. Desertion meant that only 200 remained a day after their arrival and this number had been reduced to 50 on the following day. Trant, however, found Albuquerque a most zealous fellow and made him an Inspector General. He also found time to praise other Portuguese officers.76
Trant may have been proposing to take on the French under a disadvantage, but he clearly did not lack initiative and even confidence in these early days for he sought Portuguese cavalry from Beresford in the beginning of May with a view to delivering a left hook around the back of the French as Soult advanced south from Porto.77 He even envisaged trying to take Porto by a coup de main.78 A year later, when Trant was threatened with removal from the Royal Staff Corps unless he returned to Britain, Wellington intervened telling Liverpool that ‘there is no officer the loss of whose services in this country would be more sensibly felt by the government and the people, and Marshal Beresford and myself, than those of Col. Trant’.79 Wellington won the argument for the time being, though in 1813 Trant did have to return to England.
By early April Beresford was proceeding with his staff to army headquarters at Tomar (some 140 kilometres north of Lisbon) with a view to ascertaining the strength and quality of the troops there and organising new levies in that city. The reorganisation of the Portuguese army was about to begin with the assistance of British officers. In this task he was greatly aided by the arrival of Benjamin D’Urban, whom he made his Quartermaster General and who was to remain an integral part of Beresford’s command structure throughout the war and for some years thereafter.80
Beresford’s approach to the rebuilding of the army was multi-faceted and indeed comprehensive. He directed that each regiment should prepare accurate records of men and equipment.81 He engaged William Warre to translate the British army regulations into Portuguese and these were subsequently published. Immediate implementation of those regulations was begun and Warre reported on 27 April that under the instruction of the British officers the Portuguese troops were ‘coming on very well’.82 The importance of this move was clearly shown when the time came for the British and Portuguese forces to work together. As early as 24 March Beresford had begun to introduce an informal brigading of regiments under British as well as Portuguese officers.83
The use of and performance of the British officers will be dealt with in a later chapter, but Beresford had been authorised initially to engage up to twenty-four such officers (perhaps one for each infantry regiment). That number was to prove woefully inadequate and was considerably augmented in due course, though when Beresford first sought additional officers from the British army the then Commander in Chief, Sir David Dundas, told Wellesley that the King’s instructions were not to exceed the twenty-four initially approved.84 These original appointees were given one step up in the British service and a further step in the Portuguese service; thus a captain became a major in the British service and a Lieutenant Colonel in that of Portugal; at the same time retaining their seniority in the British army. Later appointees only received a step in the Portuguese army. Not all twenty-four original officers came out from England and Cradock was asked to facilitate the move to the Portuguese army of those he could spare who were requested by Beresford. From 9 March onwards these British officers were being appointed in the Portuguese army.85 While Cradock clearly facilitated Beresford in respect of the request for officers, eighteen of the twenty-one who availed of the opportunity to transfer at this time were Lieutenants or Ensigns, whereas what Beresford desperately needed was officers with substantial experience.86 Beresford and Cradock would seem to have got on reasonably well, even if Cradock proved reluctant to move the troops under his command too far from Lisbon, for later Cradock’s only son, John Hobart Cradock, was to serve in Lisbon as Beresford’s aide-de-camp.87
While witness accounts suggest considerable progress with training was made in the first five or six weeks following Beresford’s appointment as Marshal, work was cut short by the need to move the forces north as part of the Anglo-Portuguese campaign against General Soult, which began in May.88
Allied to the introduction of a strenuous training regime, Beresford moved quickly to impose his authority on the army. Nowhere was the lack of discipline and the disregard for authority more forcefully demonstrated within weeks of Beresford’s arrival than in the defence of northern Portugal. Silveira had abandoned Chaves following a disagreement on whether to stand or withdraw from that town in early March, which split his force in two; and he himself proved reluctant to implement Beresford’s order to withdraw south of the Douro with a view to protecting Lisbon, on the basis that his force would be of greater use maintaining itself in and protecting the northern provinces. Further, he argued a number of his officers would desert if he retired south, for nine-tenths of his officer corps were from the two northern provinces (Minho and Trás-os-Montes) and would be unwilling to leave their houses and families to the mercy of the enemy.89
General discipline was imposed forcefully, with even small infractions leading to serious consequences. Court martials became a regular feature, not just for desertion, which was a serious problem, but for other substantial misdemeanours. The Portuguese court martial process was extremely cumbersome and Beresford moved to replace it with a more streamlined version. Once again Beresford approached this subject with a carrot and stick. Exhortation was matched with consequences for failure to obey. This was vital because the lack of discipline was not just a problem in the ranks but had to be tackled at officer level as well; for Beresford was faced with a situation where officers frequently took leave without the permission of their superiors. In the case of desertion the consequences were usually, but not always, dire. He made it clear that a soldier’s duty was to fight for the nation, and a failure would be punished.90 Beresford left no doubt that the practice of soldiers selling equipment was prohibited, and would be punished severely. Likewise, he made it clear to officers that the practice of brutality towards the ranks would not be tolerated and he outlawed it and provided that infractions would be severely punished.
In order to impose a system of immediate justice Beresford demanded the replacement of the Portuguese court martial processes, telling Forjaz that if they were not changed it would be impossible to introduce discipline to the army, declaring that the trial of a deserter which ‘should have taken five minutes took five days’.91 The core of the problem for Beresford was extensive pre-trial and trial processes reduced to writing and the fact that a decision then had to be referred to the Council of War before any sentence was carried out. On his own authority Beresford short-circuited the trial and post-sentence procedures, and it was only some time later that authorisation for his own procedures was received from Prince João, and even then it was limited to when the army was on campaign, though Beresford seems to have continued to apply it in other circumstances.92 In order to get the process under way, Beresford appointed a well established lawyer Judge Advocate for the army, José António de Oliveira Leite de Barros.93
Initial sentences were severe. An early case, which was determined on 20 April 1809, resulted in ten years’ hard labour being imposed on a soldier who refused to march on the basis that it was illegal to move a soldier more than three leagues from his encampment.94 Insubordination could involve a prison sentence, such as the one-year imprisonment in the Torre de Belém imposed on Major Manoel Xavier Botelho in January 1810.95 Desertion usually, but not always, resulted in execution by shooting, as Beresford insisted that the alternative of garrotting be terminated.
Beresford needed to tackle other aspects of army organisation involving both personnel and logistics. Recruitment went on remorselessly under the hand of Forjaz, but with Beresford very often hounding him.96 Where Beresford played a major role involved the removal of non-performing officers and their replacement by either experienced officers from the British service or young, active and interested Portuguese. Many of the latter filled the junior officer ranks initially, but appointments made in the first few years of the war were later to rise to high positions. Beresford showed a determination to promote on merit, which was both feared and admired. On initial enquiry Beresford found that many of the junior officers (captains and lieutenants) had been in situ for upwards of thirty years, or in some cases much longer. Others had risen to command regiments, but they were now too old and in some cases too infirm to face the rigours of a campaign. Some of their appointments had been purely political, with no real intention of pursuing a military career, but in any event many were too old to march with their regiments and deemed incapable of performing the training or leading in battle. The process of weeding out those deemed incapable or unwilling to perform their functions was commenced immediately.
To counter a practice of leave taken on the grounds of illness, Beresford persuaded Forjaz to support the introduction of a system whereby those officers who reported sick had to go before a special board of physicians who in turn reported to a panel of officers empowered to make the decision on whether or not to grant leave.97 Officers who went absent without leave were liable to be demoted to the ranks.98 In March and April 1809, Beresford began the process of remodelling the officer corps of the Portuguese army ultimately reaching a situation where each infantry regiment had a balance of British and Portuguese officers. Nowhere was this more noticeable than at the top of the regimental command structure, where frequently first and second in command would come from different nationalities. The Ordens do Dia (Orders of the Day) reveal the promotions made. Not unnaturally, the promotion of British officers caused some resentment, which Beresford met by assuring the Portuguese that the appointments were only temporary as the officers involved would retain their British rank.99
While Beresford did not hesitate to remove or suspend officers he also moved quickly to praise those who had performed valiantly, even in defeat. Brigadier António Teixeira Rebelo, the Inspector of Artillery, was suspended on 8 April in order to establish better discipline. A few days later Ordens do Dia were published commending Brigadier António Marcelino da Vitória for his part in the defence of Porto and a pension directed for the only daughter of Captain António Pereira Vahia who had died for his country at Chaves.100
The struggle to equip the army was compounded by the difficulties faced in transporting supplies, whether of provisions or equipment. Captain Alexander Dickson, who was to play a significant role in the utilisation and direction of artillery in the war, arrived in Portugal on 2 April 1809, joining the Portuguese service as a lieutenant colonel. It became immediately apparent that the Portuguese army needed to tackle the problem of transporting guns and ammunition. His diary contains many entries reflecting these requirements from the moment of his arrival. Musket ammunition could only be carried in quantity on the backs of mules or in ox wains, both of which were hard to procure. Parties were sent out to secure these but there were still shortages and the decision was taken to transport as much as possible by water. The guns required horses, or in some cases mules, to draw them. Once again there was a shortage. Captain Cleves of the King’s German Legion artillery was sent to Tangiers to acquire horses, but the mission was not a success as the animals there were found not to be suitable. A better source for horses was Ireland and on 7 April 300 ‘excellent horses’ were landed and distributed to the brigades of guns, having been shod and fitted for harness on arrival. Provisions had to be brought to the army then and later in the war from Lisbon, a continual logistics challenge. Likewise, the army was frequently dependent on forage being brought to the front.101 This problem was by no means unique to the Portuguese army, with Cradock advising Beresford in mid April that the forward movement of his force had been held back by a lack of supplies, forage and straw.102
Within days of Beresford landing at Lisbon to take up his post as Commander in Chief of the Portuguese army, the British government had determined to send a further British army to Portugal. Towards the end of March, Wellesley was told privately that he was to command this army and it was announced officially on 2 April.103 A further 20,000 troops were to be sent to augment the force already there under Cradock, making a total of about 30,000 British soldiers. Wellesley had left the army in Portugal in late August 1808, citing an obligation to take up again his position as Chief Secretary for Ireland, his substitute having passed away while Wellesley was on active service. While factually this was the situation, there is little doubt that he wished to remove himself from an environment where he had been superseded in command and where he was concerned at the strategy being followed by Dalrymple.
However, absence from the Peninsula did not mean that Wellesley’s views were not sought and given on what should be undertaken there in the period between September 1808 and the spring of the following year. Prior to Vimeiro he had advocated that the British raise, organise and pay an army in Portugal to be made up of 30,000 Portuguese and 20,000 British troops, including 4,000–5,000 cavalry.104 A month later, in the wake of the Convention of Cintra, Wellesley, in the knowledge that the government intended to send a force of at least 10,000 to help the Spanish under Castaños, was suggesting a British force of 5,000 be kept in Lisbon and Elvas, while the remainder of the army then in Portugal (about 10,000) would be reinforced with a further 10,000 men from England. He was not sanguine about Spanish success and he envisaged that it might well be necessary for the British to evacuate the Peninsula ‘and that retreat must be the sea’. While the use of the Asturias was seen as a possibility which would secure any line of retreat, clearly Lisbon offered this option too.105
In a memorandum of 7 March 1809, Wellesley returned to the theme of British military involvement in Portugal, arguing now for a British force of 30,000 rather than the 20,000 advocated previously. At the same time he suggested the development of the Portuguese militia.106 Strategically, Wellesley saw the army in Portugal as linking with the Spanish armies in Galicia and Andalucía to create a barrier to French domination of the Peninsula and to provide a springboard for future advance. The decision to send Wellesley back to Portugal was taken at cabinet on 26 March and on the same day a decision was made to offer Cradock the command at Gibraltar.107 As soon as the formal announcement of his appointment to head the expedition to Portugal was made, Wellesley resigned as Chief Secretary for Ireland on 4 April and having embarked for Portugal on 16 April arrived in Lisbon on 22 April. Part of his army had arrived before him but regiments designated for his army at this time were continuing to disembark at Lisbon over the next few weeks.
Wellesley did not let the grass grow under his feet on arrival in Portugal. He assumed command of the British forces from Cradock (who soon sailed for Gibraltar), and made two significant staff appointments; placing Charles Stewart as Adjutant General and Colonel George Murray as Quartermaster General. He requested Beresford to come to Lisbon for what was in effect a council of war, in order to determine how best to move against Soult while simultaneously safeguarding Lisbon should Victor move against it with the 1st Corps then on the Spanish border.108
On 27 April they met in Lisbon (with Cradock still in attendance) and decided the strategy which was subsequently followed almost without deviation, namely to strike at Soult before he and Victor could effect any merger of their respective forces. This was a strategy which Beresford had suggested to Cradock on 28 March but which Cradock had rejected on the basis that it would put Lisbon at risk.109 Beresford was requested to move the Portuguese army from Tomar to Coimbra and simultaneously Wellesley ordered the English force to march there from Leiria where it was in the course of assembling.110 A containing force was left at Lisbon and an outer screen under Major General John Randoll MacKenzie pushed towards Abrantes to watch for any sign of Victor moving forward from the Spanish frontier, and if necessary to defend the line of the Zêzere. On 27 April, Wellesley was presented to the regency at the Palace of Inquisition in the Rossio and two days later, on 29 April, he was appointed Marshal-General of Portugal, assuming overall command of both armies. He made it clear to Beresford that he wished the latter to take the lead in all matters dealing with the Portuguese government. Their relationship over the remainder of the war was one of mutual support and was evidenced by a lack of friction.111
On 2 May, Wellesley and Beresford were at Coimbra and a review of the two armies was held there a few days later. Beresford felt he had made progress with the Portuguese regiments and Warre, while wishing they had had more time, felt they were coming along well under the instruction of the British officers.112 Wellesley and other British officers were not as impressed, the British commander observing to Beresford that his troops made a bad ‘ligne’ this morning at Review, the battalions very weak, none of them with more than 300 men, the body of them, particularly the 10th, very bad ‘and the officers worse than anything I have seen’.113 Beresford noted with regret that some battalions had paraded so weakly, observing that the English officers should have ‘brought them into some method’. He felt the march from Tomar might have been partly responsible but still felt they were a stout body of men capable of being made into soldiers. He used the occasion to plead for Wellesley to lend him more British officers as ‘in their own I have not the slightest dependence’.114
In a slightly more nuanced vein, Major the Hon. Charles Edward Cocks, later to become one of Wellesley’s favourite and most effective intelligence officers, observed: ‘The bridge over the Vouga in our front is occupied by the Portuguese. Their troops are superior to what I expected, at least in appearance, but I fear their officers are bad.’115 Nonetheless, Wellesley must have been sufficiently confident to brigade two Portuguese regiments (10th and 16th together with a detachment of 1st Portuguese Grenadiers) with English regiments, and the 16th was to show considerable promise at a brisk encounter with the French at Grijó during the advance on Porto.116 Wellesley was sufficiently impressed to tell Villiers, ‘they tell me that the Portuguese riflemen, the students I believe behaved remarkably well’ and referring separately to the 16th Portuguese regiment under Colonel Doyle ‘this last regiment behaved remarkably well’.117
Leaving a mixed Anglo-Portuguese force under Major General J.R. Mackenzie to cover Lisbon against any sudden move from Spain by Marshal Victor, Wellesley determined on a three-pronged attack on Marshal Soult’s force, centred in Porto.118 While the main army (of some 20,000 infantry and 1,400 horse) would take the central or main road northwards, a force under General Hill was dispatched along the coastal route. Beresford’s force was designated to head north east via Viseu and Lamego with a view to crossing the Douro if possible, joining up with Silveira’s Portuguese and cutting off Soult from a retreat east into the province of León in north west Spain. Before leaving Coimbra, news had reached Wellesley and Beresford of the capture of Amarante by a French force under General Loison with Silveira being driven back to Lamego.119
It is not clear whether the commanders of the Anglo-Portuguese army thought Loison’s brigade was the advance guard and was an indication that Soult was planning to head east to Spain, but rumours abounded, and Soult later claimed in his Mémoires that he had formed the intention to retreat from Porto into Spain rather than to try to defend the city.120 Wellesley was very conscious that the strategy devised might expose Beresford’s relatively small contingent of between 6,000 and 7,000 (the latter figure probably included his small cavalry detachment) to the full force of Soult’s army, and if a crossing of the Douro did not prove practical, then at least he was to prevent the French coming south over the Douro.121
Beresford was aware that if Soult’s entire force moved east against him, he would not be able to prevent him passing, but with considerable foresight suggested that if Wellesley attacked Porto, and then detached to his right such force as he could spare, the French could be stopped in their retreat and forced to abandon their guns and baggage; in the process probably losing a great number of men.122 Wellesley was adamant that if Soult moved east from Porto with his entire army, Beresford should not attempt to obstruct him for he did not wish ‘to see a single British brigade supported by 6,000–8,000 Portuguese exposed to be attacked by the French army in any but a very good post’.123 Accordingly, Wellesley’s instructions to Beresford were specific. He was not to endanger his force unless he felt strongly he would defeat the enemy:
If the French should weaken their corps about Amaranthe [sic] and Villa Real so as to give you any reason to hope that you can do anything against them, then I wish you to attack them and take any opportunity of getting possession of either of these points. But remember that you are a Commander in Chief of an army & must not be beat & therefore do not undertake anything with your troops if you have not some strong hopes of success.124
Beresford’s force was designated to include the 3rd Brigade under Major General Tilson, but this force of some 1,500 men of the 60th, 87th, 88th and Portuguese grenadiers was delayed amid suggestions that Tilson did not take gladly to being under Beresford’s command.125 Beresford expressed his disappointment to Wellesley at Tilson’s failure to respond to the order to join him with alacrity, more particularly as he failed also to communicate with Beresford on receiving the order.126 Tilson had made it clear he did not wish to serve under Beresford, and in making his report to Wellesley, Beresford castigated Tilson’s performance and made repeated pleas to Wellesley to accede to Tilson’s request.127 Tilson’s wish not to serve under Beresford was clearly not personal but based on the principle of not having to serve under an officer who had been promoted Major General at the same time as himself.128
Following the expedition to clear northern Portugal of the French, Tilson asked to be allowed to resign the command of his brigade and go to England, making the further request that in future he would be employed in the Portuguese army, and therefore under Beresford, but presumably with the step up in rank to Lieutenant General. Wellesley was not prepared to agree to this proposition and Tilson was urged to reconsider his position, being reminded that he must obey the orders of his superior and commanding officer. He gave Tilson leave to resign his command, which Tilson opted to do, though he subsequently sought and obtained leave to withdraw his resignation acknowledging that he had been mistaken regarding his responsibilities.129 Tilson served under Hill at the battle of Talavera later in 1809, but he was to leave the Peninsula the following year, though returning again later in the war.
Wellesley’s successful march on Porto and the surprise crossing of the Douro, causing Soult to flee eastwards on 12 May, is well known. Before setting off from Coimbra with the main army on 7 May, Wellesley started Beresford on his flanking march a day earlier, given the greater distance he had to cover. Beresford reached Viseu on 7 May where he was joined by Wilson and two battalions drawn from Almeida. Beresford proceeded to Lamego on 8 May and the Portuguese regiments of infantry and part of the artillery designated to join the Marshal’s column assembled at Lamego by 9 May, while Tilson’s brigade had reached Viseu.130 Urgent instructions were despatched to Tilson to join Beresford at Lamego by 11 May.131 On 8 May Loison had reached Vila Real and on 10 May he closed up on Mesão Frio. On 10 May, Beresford sent Silveira and a force including the 6th Caçadores over the Douro at Peso da Régua. Loison was engaged and thrown back on Amarante. Beresford followed with his main force, crossing the Douro on 11 May and on approaching Amarante the next day Loison retreated to the far side of the River Tamega to a position of considerable strength.
On 12 May, Wellesley not only captured Porto but put a considerable force under Major General Sir John Murray across the Douro upstream to get behind Soult, who now marched east to join with Loison in the hope of marching to Spain to link up with the French forces there.132 Murray did not seek to stop Soult, perhaps fearing his own force was too small. Soult had expected Loison to stand his ground at Amarante, but instead he retired north west to Guimarães on 13 May, thus leaving Soult’s army in a potential trap between Wellesley and Beresford.133 In difficult conditions Beresford’s army, including Tilson’s brigade which had joined it early that day, crossed the Tamega with the river rising fast because of the rain.134 The crossing took four hours and was led by the 60th, 87th and 88th regiments from Tilson’s brigade, but two companies were unable to cross and a number of men were lost.135
Much of Amarante had been burnt by the retreating French. Soult, realising his danger, destroyed his artillery and abandoning heavy baggage marched to join Loison in Guimarães. Meanwhile, Wellesley was still bringing equipment, including guns and supplies, across the Douro and combined with the exertions of the army this meant he needed a day in Porto before setting off in pursuit of Soult. The latter, with his full force, headed for Braga and Beresford, whose advance guard had come across Soult’s abandoned baggage and destroyed guns on 14 May, when he learnt of the recapture of Porto anticipated that Wellesley would head to Braga. Beresford left a screening force in Amarante and proceeded himself to Chaves by forced march, reaching it late on the evening of 16 May with only part of an exhausted force after three days marching in the rain.136
On the same day, 14 May, he ordered Silveira to Montalegre. The objective was to deny Soult the Montalegre and Chaves exit routes to Spain. While the latter was achieved, the delay in Silveira’s troops reaching Montalegre left open a door for Soult to escape. The French Marshal, now aware that Wellesley was coming up behind him to Braga, ordered Loison in turn to destroy his artillery and the men to abandon anything other than essential food and a reserve of ammunition. With the help of local guides the French army led a desperate but ultimately successful escape to Orense in Spain over the mountains, via Montalegre; Silveira’s force only arriving as the French were leaving on the afternoon of 17 May.137 Though the Portuguese were themselves much wearied, they picked up some French stragglers.
Those of Beresford’s troops who had reached Chaves were exhausted and needed to rest on 17 April while he waited for Tilson’s brigade and that of Bacelar to catch up.138 On 18 May, Beresford did march from Chaves to Monterey, catching up with some of the French near Ginzo, but Soult’s main force by now was far to the east and pursuit was abandoned the following day on Wellesley’s orders, perhaps because of a lack of supplies but also alarming news had reached the latter from MacKenzie that Victor’s corps was on the move into the Tagus valley, having expelled the Loyal Lusitanian Legion from the bridge at Alcantara.139 While Victor had indeed captured the bridgehead at Alcantara, the news that he was advancing into Portugal turned out to be false. Beresford’s exhausted force then returned south to Castelo Branco via Lamego picking up those abandoned on the route north. Beresford himself then proceeded to meet Wellesley at Lamego on 27 May to take stock of the position and coordinate plans for the future.
There was a suggestion in some quarters that Beresford might have driven his forces with greater intensity so as to shut the door on Soult’s escape, but such comment fails to recognise the nature of the extended marches undertaken in appalling weather conditions. Beresford had ordered Silveira with a body of troops to Montalegre to try to deny Soult’s force that road into Spain, but Silveira had reached the town only as the French departed. Ironically it was Silveira, who was jealous of Beresford’s command, that later sought to blame Beresford for the escape of part of the French army.140 Wellesley was not critical of Beresford, indeed he had had to stop to rest his own troops and obtain supplies after the capture of Porto, but Beresford seems to have been sensitive to the criticism, for writing to his half-sister Anne on 26 May he referred to the escape of some of the French ‘for which I need not be much criticised, as it is really wonderful how they escaped, tho in so miserable a condition having abandoned everything and trusting simply to their getting off by their lightness’.141 If anything, Beresford perhaps drove his men too hard, as is witnessed by the large number of losses suffered through exhaustion on the march from Amarante to Chaves adverted by then Major (later Field Marshal) Hugh Gough.142 Wellesley realised the reality of the situation echoing Beresford’s remarks to Anne, when he wrote to Castlereagh:
It is obvious, however, that if an army throws away all its cannon, equipments and baggage, and everything which can strengthen it, and can enable it to act together as a body; and abandons all those who are entitled to its protection, but add to its weight and impede its progress; it must be able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed, with any prospect of being overtaken, by an army which has not made the same sacrifices.143
The campaign had been a huge success. Wellesley had achieved his objective, even if the elusive Soult had escaped with part of his corps. Within two weeks of leaving Coimbra the Anglo-Portuguese army had driven a French army out of Portugal in a precipitous flight causing it to abandon artillery, carriages, horses and large numbers of men, not to mention seized property. A number of regiments of the Portuguese army had performed well in the first campaign of 1809. Further, while Wellesley and Beresford had been chasing Soult out of northern Portugal, the Loyal Lusitanian Legion and the militia of Idanha-a-Nova had proved brave and tenacious when holding off Marshal Victor’s much larger French corps at Alcantara for nine hours, before retiring in good order on 14 May. Beresford, in his order of the day, praised the conduct of Colonel Mayne and the Legion observing that: ‘The army will see, that although troops are sometimes obliged to retreat, at the same time they may cover themselves with glory, and merit the greatest praise.’144
Soult’s force was degraded and no longer an immediate threat. Wellesley and Beresford were now able to turn their attentions elsewhere. Wellesley needed to meet the threat posed by Victor and King Joseph, whereas Beresford badly needed time to train an army that had begun to show its metal, so much so that when Mackenzie had expressed the view the Portuguese would not fight Wellesley retorted: ‘You are in error in supposing the Portuguese troops will not fight. One battalion has behaved remarkably well with me, and I know of no troops that could behave better than the Lusitanian legion.’145
