Читать книгу Marshal William Carr Beresford - Marcus de la Poer Beresford - Страница 16

7 CONTINUING REFORM OF THE PORTUGUESE ARMY: THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN OF 1809 AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE DEFENCE OF PORTUGAL

When I arrived here the army was in a terrible state…One found it without discipline and without subordination. The soldiers were lacking in confidence in their officers who were negligent in their duties and had an attitude and behaviour which encouraged insubordination among the soldiers. There was completely lacking in the officers any strength or application of military laws, and the army I saw was an ungovernable machine.1

Following the successful campaign on the Douro, Beresford continued the serious business of reforming and rebuilding the Portuguese army. In this he was helped by both Forjaz and Wellesley in enforcing structural and command change; and over the years by several hundred British officers in drilling and training the infantry, cavalry and artillery. Portuguese officers, trained in accordance with the British regulations, increasingly played a part in training their own men.

Castlereagh’s letter to Beresford of 15 February confirming his appointment to command and organise the Portuguese army had merely specified ‘a due proportion of British Officers will be appointed to assist you, and a supply of arms to the extent of 10,000 stand has been for some time embarked …’2 The number of officers allocated at the outset was twenty-four, but Beresford soon realised this number would not be nearly enough. The original twenty-four officers came both from Britain and from the British army in Portugal.3 Those already with the British army in Portugal who chose to join Beresford included Lieutenant Colonels Blunt and Campbell.4 Many of those who applied from the British army in Portugal were relatively junior and Beresford needed more senior officers, not just for training and disciplinary purposes but to lead the regiments and brigades in battle.5 The strongest attraction for those in the British army to join the Portuguese army may well have been double or later single step promotion, but an additional incentive was that serving officers in the British army also received pay both for their rank at home and in respect of their Portuguese appointment. Many of them elected to have their British salary paid at home while living in Portugal on their Portuguese salary.6

By early April 1809, if not earlier, Beresford had realised he would need many more than twenty-four British officers if he was to train the Portuguese army to a sufficient level of competence. His request for a total of 150 such officers caused some concern at government level, even though it had been suggested originally by Castlereagh.7 On Wellesley’s advice, Beresford was offered a further twelve to fourteen officers, though Wellesley was quick to realise once he arrived in Portugal that this number would be insufficient.8 Furthermore, those now accepted to join the Portuguese army were only given a step up in rank in that army, a far less attractive proposition than hitherto. As late as 23 April Beresford was telling his sister, Lady Anne Beresford, that ‘officers in abundance are volunteering to serve under me in the Portuguese service, nay even from the Guards, two colonels of which have offered their services’.9 However, he realised that notwithstanding the British commitment to Portugal and to rebuilding the Portuguese army, it was not going to be easy to obtain a sufficient number of officers with the requisite experience to train the Portuguese army, irrespective of whether they were to come from the British Isles or from the British forces in Portugal, for he went on:

As usual however at home after agreeing to everything before I left them, and directing Cradock to give me in officers every assistance he could, they now throw some doubt on the propriety of my having officers from regiments on service, and propose to send them to me from England, alas they propose making it a business of patronage and they have thereby put a very great delay in my advancing the discipline of the Portuguese troops.

He had received notice of this objection from Brigadier General Stewart some days previously and had immediately remonstrated to Castlereagh.10 Apart from the question of delay, it is clear from his letter to his sister that Beresford was concerned that appointments would not be made on merit, a principle of which he was a steady advocate.

Towards the end of 1809, Beresford was to revise the figure of British officers he required slightly, seeking a total of 179 officers, being five for each infantry regiment, three for each regiment of caçadores and three for each of the twelve regiments of cavalry.11 Now, however, he had a far more pressing problem, for although the government had approved the appointment of thirty more British officers to the Portuguese army in May, it was on the basis of only one step up in the Portuguese service, but even that move was threatened by a suggestion by Wellesley that all promotion should be done away with as it was liable to cause command difficulties when the armies were operating together.12 Beresford was seriously concerned that this suggestion would mean that not only would he not be able to persuade a sufficient number of British army officers to join the Portuguese service but that those, other than the original twenty-four appointees who had joined in expectation of promotion in the British army, would now resign.

Beresford raised this concern with Wellesley in mid May and his apprehension was soon proved to have a valid foundation. While the British government refused to modify its new stance on the matter, a compromise of sorts was eventually achieved, though not before the number of resignations had threatened to destroy the work Beresford and his fellow officers were seeking to undertake. The compromise involved an assurance that the quality of service in the Portuguese army would be taken into account when promotions were being considered in the British army.13 In coming to its decision the government appears to have had regard for a change of heart by Wellesley, who realised following further representations from Beresford how important the presence of sufficient British officers in the Portuguese army would be for the common cause, and the one step up provision was continued.14 Later in the year Beresford and Wellington (for he had by then been created Viscount Wellington in August 1809), in a determined effort to prevent a drain of British officers from the Portuguese army, mounted a strong campaign which clearly persuaded the the government that British officers should not be allowed to leave the Portuguese service for the purpose of rejoining British regiments without the express permission of the commander on the spot, and any such decision was at his discretion.15 As will be seen in ensuing chapters, British officers continued to apply to serve in the Portuguese army on the basis of a one step increase in rank there.

Promoted rank was only one of the problems facing Beresford in his effort to establish a committed officer corps in the Portuguese army. At the other end of the scale he had to deal with those whose primary interest was promotion rather than being part of the great drive to reform the Portuguese army, and he did not hesitate to refuse commissions.16 The process whereby an officer might transfer from one service to another was straightforward, save that it depended on the preparedness of the commanding officer of the British regiment in question to agree that he could spare the man seeking to make the move. The correspondence is littered with requests where consent by Wellesley is followed by correspondence with regimental commanding officers resulting in agreement or refusal to let a man transfer.17 This would seem to be indicative that the one step promotion in the Portuguese service only was sufficiently attractive to lure a considerable number of officers to transfer, for by the end of the war upwards of 300 had done so.18

The appointment of British officers to train and discipline the troops was only one facet of the challenge facing Beresford. He also had to remove Portuguese officers lacking in ability from causes such as incompetence and physical infirmity. At the outset there is little doubt that the British view of the calibre of many of the Portuguese officers was not complimentary. Warre expressed it thus: ‘The officers for the most part, are detestable, mean, ignorant and self sufficient. It is incredible the little mean intrigues, the apathy, and want of military sentiment, the Marshal has had to work against. Nothing but a very severe discipline can overcome these, and which I hope he will follow.’19 He did, however, acknowledge the promise of the young Portuguese officers.20

The testimony of Warre, while it may well reflect national prejudice, is important because he and his family spent much time in Portugal. He understood the language and was sympathetic to the cause. He was certainly not biased against the Portuguese nation, as is revealed by his complimentary remarks regarding their troops in general from an early date, recognising their potential:

The Portuguese troops immediately under the instruction of British Officers are coming on very well. I could have wished we had been allowed more time, but even now have great hopes of some corps. The men may be made anything we please of, with proper management, and, wherever I have had authority, I have soon settled the little mean jealousies and tricks of the officers, and without, I hope, gaining much ill will. I will endeavour to combine inflexible firmness with politeness of manner. I know it is the only way to make these fellows respect you, and the mass of officers is miserable indeed. This, however, will in time be altered. Merit is the great recommendation with the General, not grey hairs and numbers of years service, however much to be respected, for these subalterns, some of whom should be anything but soldiers.21

The reformado (retired) Portuguese officers were replaced not just by British officers but by mostly young Portuguese now being trained by the British. Between the time of his appointment as Commander in Chief in March and the end of July 1809, at least 215 Portuguese officers were retired and replaced by a combination of British and Portuguese officers. While this caused disquiet in Portugal, critically Forjaz stood by Beresford. Though many of the newly appointed Portuguese were at the levels of lieutenant and captain, from the outset Beresford seems to have attempted to strike a balance in the upper echelons of each Portuguese infantry regiment; so that where the Lieutenant Colonel was British the Major would be Portuguese, or vice versa. Thus infantry brigades were commanded by those such as Ashworth, Bradford, Campbell and Pack, as well as Lecor, Fonseca, Palmeirim and Bernardim Ribeiros. The cavalry commanders were Hawker, Madden, Póvoa and Barbacena. The artillery was under the command of Colonel Alexander Dickson, who was later to play a pivotal role for Wellington in the liberation of Spain and the invasion of France. Major General John Hamilton was appointed Inspector-General of the army, and from early 1810 was to command the ‘Portuguese’ Division formed in late 1809. That division was made up of two or sometimes three Portuguese brigades and usually served with the 2nd Division. The Conde de Sampãio was appointed Inspector-General of the cavalry in April 1809.

The process of making appointments to the Portuguese army was a little cumbersome, for while in theory all promotions were in the hands of Beresford, as Commander in Chief, they were subject to the approval of the Regent, Prince João. This meant that recommendations had to be sent to Brazil and then confirmed, a process which of necessity took a number of months. Until a confirmation was received the promotion remained conditional. The process also gave rise to another serious issue, for in August 1810 Beresford discovered that members of the Regency were making their own recommendations to Prince João without reference to Beresford. The Prince Regent having made appointments not sought by Beresford, the Marshal protested in the strongest terms against those advancements, requiring Forjaz to withdraw the recommendations in question and to undertake not to interfere in this aspect in future.22 Further issues arose concerning appointments which Prince João was persuaded to make by those at Court, but Beresford brooked no opposition to his control of promotions; no more than he had on the question of discipline and the court martial process.23

Likewise, Beresford insisted that he, and he alone, should determine whether any Portuguese or British officer be allowed to resign from the Portuguese service. It was not merely a matter for the officer in question. When a specific issue arose in the shape of the attempt by Francisco de Mello to resign his commission, Wellesley supported Beresford’s authority to determine the application. Forjaz also agreed that this was a matter within the Marshal’s remit, but even then Beresford insisted on getting a ruling from the Prince Regent in Brazil. and his authority was confirmed on 17 May 1810, some five months after de Mello had sought to resign. This interval shows just how long it took to obtain a decision when a matter was referred to Rio de Janeiro, and of course consideration of an issue might mean it could be many months before a decision was made. However, on this occasion another issue fundamental to Beresford’s authority over the army had been resolved in his favour.24

Relations between British and Portuguese officers varied, depending on the individuals involved. Although there were some serious incidents of both disobedience and personal antagonism, the records suggest that these were not widespread. Some of these stories involve merely personal disagreements; others breaches of discipline. Disobedience was not a one-way street and there are recorded instances of British officers being unwilling to submit to orders from Portuguese senior officers while training and in camp. One example of personal antagonisms (there is insufficient evidence to class it as a nationally motivated attack) and three examples of conflict in the course of training and on the battlefield will give a flavour of the sort of breakdown that might occur.

Edward Costello tells a most amusing story in his memoirs. He had gone to purchase rum at the headquarters of the 52nd Regiment when he fell in with a rather quarrelsome soldier from the 3rd Caçadores on his return. The Portuguese soldier threatened Costello with his bayonet whereupon Costello struck him hard. Other caçadores then approached Costello, allegedly yelling ‘kill the English dog’. Just in time a party of men from the 52nd appeared and rescued Costello.25

The first example of a breakdown in discipline concerns the unfortunate Major James Warde Oliver, a Lieutenant Colonel attached to the 10th Portuguese Regiment of line, and who was to die later at the second siege of Badajoz. In October 1809 he was accused of abusing officers, tearing the epaulettes off the shoulders of one of them and striking soldiers in the Regiment. He denied abusive conduct, though agreeing that he might have spoken harshly in the field where necessary in order to gain the confidence and goodwill of the officers. Explaining the incident with the epaulettes, he indicated that he had spoken with an officer who was four paces out of line about ten or a dozen times as loud as he could, he then rode up to him, took him by the arm and put him in line during which time the epaulette came off and fell to the ground.

By May 1811 Oliver was with the 14th Regiment of line, then before Badajoz in the first Anglo-Portuguese siege of that city, when a controversy arose concerning the alleged mistreatment of Spanish lemonade sellers in the lines by a Major Lacerda (who apparently was already under arrest but clearly at liberty, presumably on parole). Lacerda refused to be questioned by Oliver on the incident whereupon Oliver struck him. For his own conduct Oliver was placed under arrest by General Fonseca, on the orders of Major General John Hamilton, the matter being referred to the Marshal. In the interim Oliver sought permission to return to the trenches with his regiment. His commitment to the cause was admirable but ended most unfortunately when poor Oliver died a month later of wounds received during the second siege of Badajoz and he is buried in the British Cemetery at Elvas.26

On another occasion, Lieutenant Colonel John Grant was deprived of command of a battalion of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion for striking a fellow officer. In imposing the sentence Beresford made it clear that he did not wish to lose Grant’s services and he was requested to report to HQ. Baron Eben, in transferring the battalion to Lieutenant Colonel Hawkshaw, noted it had been much improved under Grant.27

A third incident involved George McGregor of the 8th Portuguese Regiment along with a Captain Marlay and Captain Charles Western and two Portuguese officers, the brothers João and José María Alferezes.28 It resulted in a Court of Enquiry in Almeida with Lieutenant Colonel António de Lacerda Pinto da Silveira of the 11th Portuguese as President. As reported by McGregor to Beresford’s military secretary, Robert Arbuthnot, it involved name-calling by the Portuguese resulting in João Alferezes being slapped by Captain Western. A campaign of harassment was then mounted by fellow officers of the Alferezes’ over the next few days. McGregor confronted them on leaving Captain Marlay’s house one evening and being certain they could not mistake him for Western, as McGregor was in English uniform, he threw down his sword and approached them with open arms. However, the Portuguese brothers drew their swords, one in front of him and the other behind. Western then arrived, picked up McGregor’s sword and put them to flight. McGregor went to the Colonel (Vasconcellos) and asked him to put the two Portuguese under arrest which he agreed to do.

The British officers went in search of their Portuguese counterparts and broke down the door to a house, whereupon the Officer of the Guard arrived with soldiers and demanded McGregor give up his sword and go with him and a sentinel, claiming these were the orders of Colonel Vasconcellos. McGregor refused on the basis these could not be the orders. The Officer of the Guard told his troops to prepare to fire and a Mexican standoff ensued, with Western challenging them to shoot. The Officer of the Guard returned with another Major and the Guard was sent away. McGregor went before the Colonel, claiming he had been grossly insulted. In reply the Colonel claimed he should not be wearing a British uniform and that he should obey his orders. McGregor told him he considered himself a British officer and did not consider himself under arrest.29

Following a report from the President of the Court of Enquiry, Beresford determined to dismiss McGregor from the Portuguese service.30 McGregor was a colourful character and by 1812 he was involved in the independence movements in South America, serving under Simon Bolivar and others. Later he was involved in a number of fraudulent schemes to entice settlers to Central America. This case exemplifies Beresford’s preparedness to rely on the integrity of a Portuguese officer in a difficult case involving a British officer.

Whereas some of the British officers, and presumably likewise some of their Portuguese counterparts, found it hard to deal with these antagonisms, others merely regarded it as something which must be coped with and sought instead to emphasise their own sense of duty. Alexander Dickson in 1809 found his Portuguese commanding artillery officer extremely difficult but, rather than succumb, he determined to do all he could to help the common cause stating, ‘I am determined to make no difficulties and to do all I can’; qualities that no doubt endeared himself to Wellington a few years later when he placed the young Lieutenant Colonel in charge of all the Allied artillery prior to the campaign in the Pyrenees.31

Beresford’s emphasis on discipline extended not just to Portuguese officers and men but to the British officers in the Portuguese service. Not only did he seek to make promotions on merit, but he brooked no opposition to his authority as Commander in Chief, even when its source was a senior officer such as Lieutenant Colonel Robert Wilson, commander of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion. Beresford and Wilson had served together before. While they would have both briefly been in Egypt at the same time, in the summer of 1801, they do not appear to have met there. In 1805, however, they formed part of the army under General Sir David Baird which captured the Cape of Good Hope, and indeed Wilson and his dragoons landed with Beresford at Saldanha, thus missing the battle at Blaauwberg.32 In 1808 it was Beresford who had inspected the newly formed Loyal Lusitanian Legion following their arrival in Portugal, and Beresford’s correspondence leading up to and including the Porto campaign in the spring of 1809 contains a considerable number of letters to Wilson.

When Beresford arrived in Portugal, Wilson was harassing the French on the Spanish border with one of the battalions of the Legion. Cradock informed him of Beresford’s arrival and appointment and that the British officers with him were getting one step up in rank, telling Wilson that he too should do so and that Cradock would support him. Wilson, with part of the garrison of Almeida, joined Beresford at Viseu on his march north in the campaign against Soult, which resulted in the scrambled French withdrawal from northern Portugal, but it was shortly afterwards when Beresford began in earnest the reform of the Portuguese army that matters reached an impasse which was to lead to Wilson leaving the Peninsula.

Beresford proposed to appoint Wilson a Brigadier, but made it clear that on promotion Wilson would not be in command of the Legion, but as a general officer and could not be restricted to any particular corps or place. Wilson, for his part, said that he had been appointed to raise, command and discipline the Legion and on 23 May first tendered his resignation. Beresford said while Wilson’s departure would be a loss, he could not concede the principle, as it would be incompatible with all military systems. Wilson countered by saying that rather than retire he would prefer to join his regiment and hope to be relieved in due course. Beresford said that if he wanted to remain a Colonel then he would always serve with his corps, but he hoped Wilson would serve on the same principles as other officers of his rank served.

Wilson rejoined his regiment at Castelo Branco in early June but then unsuccessfully sought to enlist Castlereagh’s assistance so that he could retain the Legion under his own direction. Wellesley backed Beresford’s decision and in the autumn of 1809 Wilson left the Peninsula not to return; he was succeeded as Colonel of the Legion by Baron Eben.33 Where British officers, such as Wilson and Colonel William Mayne, felt aggrieved that officers now joining Beresford in Portugal were receiving expedited promotion whereas those who had come to Portugal earlier were not able to avail of the same advantage, Beresford clearly sought to address that issue.

In reality, Wilson and Mayne wanted to remain independent of Beresford and the Portuguese command structure and instead sought integration in the British army. When that objective was frustrated, they left the Peninsula. Wellesley, noting that they were absent from the Portuguese service without leave, observed they could not be punished for their misconduct back in Britain because they were not in His Majesty’s service. He was extremely critical of their conduct, suggesting they not be employed in future in England as Inspecting Field Officers or otherwise.34 However, he warned Beresford to tread carefully, on the basis that Robert Wilson had friends at home spreading rumours that Wellington (as Arthur Wellesley had now become) had mistreated Wilson because of jealousy, observing ‘he has many faults, but one above all others is that he cannot speak the truth’.35

Wellesley and Beresford were amongst the few field officers who did not go home at any stage prior to the conclusion of the war in 1814. They both became increasingly irritated by requests from officers to go home on leave, sometimes under the disguise of pressing business. There was no issue if the applicant was obviously ill, and a number of officers who went home because of illness returned later to the Peninsula.36 In October 1809, Wellington told Beresford that the solution he had adopted with regard to officers in the British army going home was to oblige them to declare the nature of their business, fix the date of return and if they did not return by the due date court martial them for being absent without leave.37

Beresford was to prove equally intransigent, and when Brigadier General Miller sought leave to return to Ireland two weeks after his appointment as Governor of Minho in mid November 1809, Beresford responded that public service demanded sacrifice; stating that had he made the application prior to his appointment it might have been possible but that the Portuguese government needed the British officers. Beresford concluded, ‘I don’t doubt you will cheerfully occupy your post until a more favourable occasion.’ All this despite the fact that Miller had said he understood that if he went he could not expect to retain the position of the Governor of Minho, and furthermore that if he was not in Ireland to sign some deeds for the sale of a property by 1 January, he feared foreclosure on a mortgage.38 Miller chose to stay in Portugal, rendering valuable service there in the years ahead.

British officers who entered the Portuguese service but proved unsatisfactory were sent home, if this could be done without causing a political storm. One such was Brigadier General Robert MacLeroth, who only served in Portugal for a few months in 1809. Wellington was clearly of the view that MacLeroth should be sent home, but advised Beresford in October 1809 to proceed with caution by preparing the ground at Horse Guards before taking action to remove him. MacLeroth disappeared from Portugal shortly thereafter.39 Of course, there were other officers that Wellington and Beresford would like to have sent away from Portugal, and later Spain, but it proved impolitic to attempt their removal.

It was Forjaz who implemented a recruitment policy which in turn enabled Beresford to put a well trained and disciplined army into the field. The efforts made by Forjaz to recruit in late 1808 and early 1809 have already been referred to, and Forjaz’s own background and experience showed that he understood what was required. The arrival of Beresford and the allocation of British officers to train troops effectively gave Forjaz the impetus to introduce a more intensive and persistent system of recruitment. In doing so he broke with tradition and came into conflict with both the Regency and the magistrates at local level, but pushed by the determination and demands of Beresford, Forjaz proved a reliable colleague in this respect.40

The recruiting system in place at the beginning of 1809 involved the Superintendent of Police sending notices relating to recruitment to those responsible for recruiting in the individual provinces; the capitães-mores. There was a real problem in that initially so many privileges or exemptions from the obligation to serve were made, that it led to confrontation and delay in implementing decrees. The capitães-mores complained of the difficulties they encountered in recruiting, including emigration, concealment and the reception they received when recruiting. In response, the Superintendent directed the proper enforcement of the laws which included seizure of property and the sale of the goods of those avoiding recruitment and very severe penalties for those hiding a fugitive from recruitment.41

Insufficient numbers of recruits led to Forjaz taking further action. At his instigation the Regency issued decrees on 14 and 15 December 1809 providing the structure for increased recruitment. Recruiting was to be on a provincial basis with the responsibility for a determined number of recruits to be raised placed on the capitão-mor of the province in question. Within the provinces there were recruiting districts. Each district was required to raise one regiment of infantry and two regiments of militia. Two districts combined were required to produce a regiment of cavalry, while artillery recruits were drawn from all the districts. The number of recruiting districts in a province depended on population density.42

Single men between eighteen and thirty-five, with certain exemptions, were initially liable. The classes exempted were quite wide. Some of them are easily understandable, for they included certain agricultural workers and those involved in maritime commerce. Other groups exempted, such as students and those involved in the arts, are less comprehensible. In physical terms, men over 4-foot 10½-inches (1.49 m) were drafted, though this height requirement had to be reduced by an inch later.43 Penalties were introduced for draft evaders, including loss of citizenship and possessions for those who left the country. When the age bracket for those liable for military service failed to produce sufficient recruits it was extended to the age of sixty. A system of provincial training depots was introduced with specific regiments allocated to particular depots. Peniche, Tomar and Viseu emerged as three of the most important training depots in the course of the war.

The effectiveness of this recruiting system depended on the commitment of the capitães-mores and the willingness of judges to enforce the rules in the case of evasion. The degree of commitment varied from province to province, but the end result was that in the spring of 1810 there were still insufficient recruits coming into the army. Beresford and Forjaz tackled the problem aggressively, devising a system which punished those harbouring fugitives and removing those capitães-mores who failed to recruit adequate numbers.

At Beresford’s insistence, the filling up and training of the army rather than the militia was prioritised, and within the army the priority was the infantry, not least because of a shortage of horses to mount the cavalry regiments. Raising the cavalry component of the army to a state of full efficiency remained problematic throughout the war, despite some fine performances by individual units under leaders such as D’Urban and Madden. In March 1809, Beresford could at best field five of the notional twelve cavalry regiments. As one Portuguese author has pointed out, the number of horses reportedly existing in the different districts of the realm in 1808 was virtually the same number required to equip all the cavalry regiments, so inevitably mounting the cavalry was going to be a hard task.44

After the summer campaign Forjaz, at Beresford’s request, ordered the military governors of the various provinces to provide 100 mares each for the 2nd Cavalry regiment but success was limited and on 12 December 1809 a decree was issued which restricted the ownership and use of horses for non-military purposes with a provision for swingeing fines to be imposed on transgressors.45 Seizures were made, with hundreds of horses thus being acquired, though unsuitability as cavalry mounts, together with sickness and deaths of animals, meant the supply of horses remained a continuing struggle. Alongside appropriation Forjaz sought to obtain horses from the Barbary coast and suggested Beresford might do so from England. Wellington also issued an order to prevent British army officers buying Portuguese horses of the size required for the cavalry. When an allegation was made in 1810 that such a horse had been purchased, Wellington wrote to tell Beresford that while he thought this might be a false report, if proven the horse would be given up.46 Despite all these difficulties, Beresford did manage to increase the numbers of cavalry in 1810, though the figure was to slip backwards a year later.47

The four regiments of artillery under the command of Dickson appear to have been well organised from an early date. Their problem, which they shared with the cavalry, frequently centred on a lack of feed for their animals.48 Beresford did bring in a number of reforms in respect of the artillery, including the creation of a dedicated battalion of artificers in 1812. In the same year he created a battalion of dedicated artillery drivers. While Beresford appreciated the importance of the militia, their training was for him secondary to that of the army, though he did allocate regular army officers to assist with the training of officers of the militia.

So how successful was the enforcement of the Portuguese recruitment regulations? Certainly considerable numbers were recruited to the ranks and many of the regiments filled up from time to time, but losses, whether caused by injury, sickness or desertion, meant that regiments were rarely able to put their full complement in the field. When Forjaz reported to Beresford that between May 1809 and October 1810 29,796 men had been raised giving a total count of 56,217 men in the army, he also noted that losses over the same period amounted to 16,571 including 10,224 deserters. Beresford was not hugely impressed with the net increase of 13,221 men, clearly feeling that a nation of over three million people should have produced more than 29,000 recruits in eighteen months.49

On his arrival in Portugal, Beresford had written to Charles Stewart telling him the Portuguese army was no better than a mob with a dangerous proclivity towards mutiny.50 He had immediately set to work with his original allocation of British officers training a number of Portuguese regiments, and he was encouraged enough after the Porto campaign to believe that the Portuguese could be welded into an effective and disciplined force given time and training. It did not look as if there was to be sufficient respite to undertake the necessary training, for shortly after the return from the Douro information was received in Portugal to the effect that Soult and Ney had met at Lugo and suggested, erroneously as it turned out, that the combined 2nd and 6th corps were about to reinvade northern Portugal. In fact, Soult’s force was temporarily exhausted and a combination of confrontation in Galicia and poor relations between the French generals prevented their combining to present a coherent threat for the time being.

An initial decision in mid-June that Beresford should march for Porto with a force was subsequently abandoned when the position became clear.51 Instead Wellesley divided the Allied resources in two, with the main British army marching to Spain via Abrantes in a campaign that was to culminate in victory at the battle of Talavera and the subsequent tactical retreat back to Portugal. He took with him only two Portuguese regiments, the Loyal Lusitanian Legion and the 5th Caçadores. Beresford suggested that the Portuguese would occupy Puerto de Baños and the area around Plasencia (mid way between Ciudad Rodrigo and Wellesley’s army on the Tagus) because of the fertility of the location, but Wellesley declined the suggestion and instructed him to guard the northern and north eastern frontier with a view to defending Portugal from any French incursion.52 Beresford’s Quartermaster General, D’Urban, was quite critical of this decision, claiming that it later allowed Soult to come down into this area, depriving the British army of supplies.53

Wellesley’s instructions meant effectively that for many of the regiments involved training was ‘on the hoof’ as Beresford moved to assemble the army at Almeida. The Return of the Army for the end of July suggests he had about 18,000 men available, made up principally of fourteen regiments of regular infantry together with five battalions of caçadores, the university regiment of volunteers from Coimbra, together with the Portuguese artillery and a scratch collection of cavalry.54 Drilling took place daily on the basis that replication of manoeuvres based on British drill regulations would produce the required discipline and steadiness to face the enemy.55

The results of the training during the summer were mixed. There was no instant achievement of an objective standard and much seems to have depended on the officers of each regiment. While there was progress, what Beresford referred to as ‘a little light begins to show on the chaos I found here’, it is probable that much more was achieved in the autumn and winter of 1809 when the army was back in encampments.56 Beresford had by then appointed Major General John Hamilton to the post of Inspector of Infantry of the Portuguese army.57 His reports to Beresford show their determination to produce an effective fighting force. The introduction of firing live ammunition on a daily basis unsurprisingly improved accuracy and engendered a real feeling of esprit de corps.58

One of those to comment broadly on the training of certain Portuguese regiments was Lieutenant Colonel William Cox. In April 1809, Beresford had appointed Cox Commander of the fortress of Almeida. His correspondence with Beresford and Wellington both in that year and 1810 reveals a man who was not happy at Almeida and who worried about almost every aspect of his command, and it was to drive both the Marshal and the Allied commander to distraction.59 His comments on the training of the regiments at Almeida may not be representative of the position elsewhere because of Cox’s personal insecurity, but they are some of the most extensively recorded. The 12th and 24th regiments were stationed in Almeida in the second half of 1809, but by the end of October a despondent Cox reported:

I am sorry to say that the two regiments of this garrison have made very little progress in discipline since you saw them, and particularly my own: the causes of this are various, but it is principally owing to the want of active and intelligent officers. Had the 12th regiment remained under the command of MacDonnell, I am convinced that in a short time it would have made a rapid advance from the state it is now in to very much better, but unfortunately just as he was beginning to establish a good system, of which he is very capable, and had made some progress in the first principles of Drill, with which he began de novo, he is superseded in the command by a man who, let his talents be what they may, cannot possibly have the necessary experience; having served but a few months as an officer of the line, and having passed at once from a cadet of cavalry to be Lieutenant Colonel of Militia: to do him justice I must say he is extremely active and intelligent and in time may make a very good officer; but it might perhaps have been better if he had not jumpt all at once into command.60

James MacDonnell, referred to here by Cox, had joined the Portuguese service only on 26 August 1809 from the 78th Foot. He was to go on to become one of the heroes of Waterloo, famously with his sergeant closing the gates at Hougoument after the French forced them open.