Читать книгу Marshal William Carr Beresford - Marcus de la Poer Beresford - Страница 12

3 MADEIRA, 1807–1808

Portugal had long held a strategic importance for Great Britain and others. To this had been added a commercial relationship of considerable importance. The Portuguese had developed an empire based on maritime trade and Portugal proved to be invaluable to Britain in the latter’s politico-economic struggle with first Spain and later France. In 1807, Portugal was governed by a Regent, Prince João, due to the fact that his mother Queen Maria had been deemed of unsound mind.1 Britain and France, as well as other participants, had been at war again since 1803 with Portugal desperately seeking to maintain its neutrality.

The importance of Portugal to France lay in its continued resistance to the implementation of the imposed continental system, whereby Napoleon sought to block Great Britain from access to continental markets.2 Furthermore, France had not given up its ambition to invade Great Britain. After Trafalgar, the French engaged in a naval rebuilding programme but at the same time perceived the potential benefit of securing the only two remaining navies other than the Royal Navy in western Europe, both representing neutral powers.3 The French failed to secure the Danish fleet when the British pre-empted Marshal Bernadotte’s invasion by itself acquiring twenty-nine ships of the line and frigates following the bombardment of Copenhagen in late August and early September 1807. Napoleon was also prepared to invade Portugal, should that country fail to comply with French demands.

In the summer of 1807, France gave Portugal an ultimatum to seize British property, to close its ports to British shipping and to declare war on Great Britain. Portugal tried to appease Napoleon while keeping Great Britain onside but ultimately this proved impossible.4 Deeming the Portuguese response inadequate, Napoleon determined to send a French army under Marshal Junot to invade the country. Prior to this invasion, the British envoy to Lisbon, Lord Strangford, had negotiated in August an arrangement whereby the Governor of Madeira would surrender when British forces appeared off the island; subject to the Portuguese government being informed first of the intention to send an expedition to Madeira. Separately, in October 1807 the British Foreign Secretary George Canning, and the Portuguese envoy to London, Domingos António de Sousa Coutinho, drew up a secret agreement providing for the occupation of Portuguese possessions only on notice and for a British fleet to escort the Portuguese court to Brazil should that prove necessary.5 In Britain, however, there remained both unease and uncertainty as to Portuguese intentions both prior to and subsequent to these agreements. This was not just because of the apparent desire of the Portuguese to appease Napoleon, but also because of the existence of a pro-French faction in the Portuguese government.

When Portugal succumbed entirely to France’s demands on 20 November, expelling Britons, seizing property and closing Portuguese ports to British vessels, it seemed as if the British fleet off the Tagus under Rear Admiral Sidney Smith might be called upon to undertake offensive operations against Portugal rather than come to the defence of that kingdom.6 His orders provided for the destruction of the Portuguese fleet and the bombardment of Lisbon if necessary, and on 16 November Smith called on Prince João to remind him of what had happened to the Danes at Copenhagen. On 24 November, following receipt the previous day of the news that Junot and the French army had crossed the Portuguese frontier and was at Abrantes, the decision was taken by João and his advisers to move to Brazil; an outcome that determined the Portuguese Empire would remain an ally of Great Britain.

The Portuguese royal family, the court and much of the administrative apparatus left Lisbon for Rio de Janeiro in a massive fleet of some fifty ships carrying reputedly 15,000 people a couple of days prior to Junot’s arrival in the Portuguese capital.7 In addition to ships of the Portuguese navy, it was protected by a Royal Navy convoy under Admiral Sidney Smith with nine ships of the line.8 In concept this was no last-minute flight but the adoption of a well-thought-out strategy followed by the Portuguese court when all attempts to remain neutral failed to secure that status.9 Repair work on the Portuguese fleet had commenced in August. When the moment came for embarkation on 27 November, notwithstanding a system of permits and allowances, many could not obtain passage and on Junot’s arrival on 29 November much of value was simply sitting abandoned on the Lisbon docks.10 The French General watched helplessly as the fleet sailed down the Tagus estuary and out of sight on its long seven-week voyage to São Salvador (Bahia) and Rio de Janeiro.

By virtue of the secret Treaty of Fontainebleau, Napoleon initially agreed to carve up Portugal with Spanish assistance. The treaty envisioned three separate states: In the north a new kingdom centred on Porto and to be known as the Kingdom of Northern Lusitania was proposed to compensate the Spanish Bourbon King of Etruria for the loss of his kingdom to France. In the centre, a French dependency to include Trás-os-Montes, Beira and Portuguese Estremadura would be centred on Lisbon, and in the South a promised principality for the Prime Minister of Spain, Manuel Godoy, the ‘Prince of the Peace’, was to be made up of the Alentejo and the Algarve.

The treaty enabled Junot’s army to march through Spain with Spanish approval. Even so, because of the duress placed on Junot to move with speed to capture both the Portuguese royal family and its navy, the French force straggled piecemeal into Lisbon on 29 November with three Spanish armies under Taranco (Porto), Carafa (Lisbon) and Solano (Algarve), respectively, following it into Portugal some days later.11 The presence of these Spanish forces in Portugal helped maintain Junot’s rule there until the late spring of 1808.

Prior to the departure of the Portuguese court to Brazil, the Regent had provided for Portugal to be ruled by a Regency Council. Initially this was made up of the Marquês de Abrantes (Pedro de Lancastre da Silveira Castelo Branco Sá Meneses); the Marquês de Olhão (Francisco de Melo da Cunha de Mendonça e Meneses); ‘The Principal’ Sousa Coutinho; Pedro de Mello Breyner; Tenente-General Francisco Xavier de Noronha; and the Conde de Sampãio, but its composition changed from time to time and in particular Dom Miguel Forjaz, who had started as Secretary to the Council, came to wield considerable influence. The Regent’s instructions to the Council and the army were not to resist the French forces, but within a short time Junot was to replace the Regency Council with one of his own on which served a number of members of the previous council.

The archipelago of Madeira is located approximately 32° North and 16° West. Discovered and colonised by the Portuguese in the fifteenth century, it lies just over 500-kilometres from the African coast and in the early nineteenth century remained an important point of replenishment for those sailing to India, the East Indies, Southern Africa, South America and the West Indies. It was strategically important in time of war. The capital and main port, then, as now, was Funchal. In 1801 British troops under Lieutenant General Clinton had occupied the two forts guarding the harbour of Funchal. The garrisoning of these forts had been undertaken jointly with the local Portuguese forces. No attempt was made on that occasion to interfere with the civil administration of the island and it was made clear to the Portuguese government that the occupation would end once peace was achieved with France. Nevertheless the Portuguese were still intensely irritated by this episode. The occupation lasted only six months and the troops were withdrawn on 19 January 1802 during the negotiations leading to the Peace of Amiens, effective on 27 March 1802.

Months before Junot’s invading army had crossed into Portugal, orders had been given for 3,000 men to be detached from Sir John Moore’s army returning from Sicily for the purpose of securing Madeira, but lack of knowledge of the whereabouts of this army led to William Carr Beresford being appointed in mid November to command a force of approximately 3,600 men for that purpose, though instructions were given to keep the destination of this small army secret. He was given a briefing document outlining the characteristics of the Governor of the island and other influential persons in Madeira, together with an assessment as to whether they were likely to serve a British administration. Beresford sought clarification as to the civil rank he was to hold along with the salary he should draw in respect of that position.12 In response he was informed he should assume the position of Lieutenant-Governor at a salary of £3,000 per annum.13 His small staff included a number of those who had served with him in the 88th regiment and who were to serve again with him later in the war.14

Escorted by a fleet under Admiral Hood (comprised of four ships of the line, four frigates, one brigantine and fifteen transports), the force made up of the 3rd and 11th regiments left Plymouth on 29 November (ironically the day Junot entered Lisbon).15 It arrived off the island of Porto Santo, part of the Madeiran archipelago, shortly before Christmas 1807. The frigate Comus had been sent ahead to the island of Madeira to collect intelligence and its crew ascertained that the island had received news of the flight of the Portuguese court to Brazil and that no attack on the island was anticipated.16 On 24 December in mid afternoon, Beresford sent ashore Captains Nurse and Murphy of the 88th regiment demanding that the Governor, Pedro Fagundes Bacelar d’Antas e Menezes, surrender within thirty minutes.17 This was agreed and by nightfall the two regiments had been landed without resistance.

Overwhelming force, or at least the perception of it, must presumably have determined the Governor’s quick acquiescence to Beresford’s demand for it would seem that he was unclear regarding the arrangement made by his own government. He assumed perhaps that the occupation was to be of a similar nature to that of General Clinton in 1801, involving merely the taking over of military installations. It is not clear exactly when he realised that on this occasion the intent was to annex the island as a crown colony, but at the latest it would seem to have been following the landing of the troops. There was some delay in accepting the new situation, but within forty-eight hours the Governor had ceded both civil and military power by signing terms of capitulation on 26 December.

While the declared intention was to create a Crown Colony, with the British King enjoying ‘all the right and privileges and jurisdictions which heretofore belonged to the Crown of Portugal’, the Terms of Capitulation made it clear that the island ‘shall be evacuated and delivered’ to the Portuguese Crown ‘when the free ingress and egress to the Ports of Portugal and its colonies shall be re-established as heretofore; and when the sovereignty of Portugal shall be emancipated from the control or influence of France’. Thus there existed, at least on paper, an unequivocal statement that there was no intention to permanently annex Madeira. Instead the creation of a British colony may have been part of an elaborate charade designed not to imperil Portuguese neutrality by emphasising the forceful nature of British occupation. In the event, strategic considerations meant that the terms of capitulation were to be altered in a relatively short time, long before the liberation of Portugal.18

Beresford was now the Lieutenant-Governor of a crown colony and he installed himself in the palace of São Lourenço, at the same time procuring a private residence in the surrounding hills known as the Quinta da Achada, now the Quinta Jardins do Lago.19 The sovereignty of George III was proclaimed on 31 December. Beresford confirmed officials in the positions they had held previously subject to their taking the oath of allegiance.20 Beresford proceeded to act much as he had done in Buenos Aires with a view to securing local support. He guaranteed the safety of private property and the freedom to practice religion. Civil administration of the island under Beresford was vigorous as well as enlightened. He undertook a review of the island’s finances (it was a net contributor to the Portuguese State) and his report sent to Castlereagh at the end of January 1808 envisaged long-term occupation. He terminated the State monopolies on soap and tobacco trading; provided for the licensing of beggars and introduced a close season for the shooting of birds. He established a Court of Appeal on the island, since cases were no longer to be appealed to Portugal. In doing so he removed the existing Corregidor, Dom J.C. Pereira, from office, a move which was approved by the British government.21

French and Spanish citizens were sent to the Canary Islands. Beresford’s instructions provided for the sending of the Governor and the garrison of Funchal to Lisbon or Brazil and for the disarming of the militia (surrender with the honours of war, usually provided for those surrendering to march out with arms and to return home or at least leave the location of surrender). This was effectively part of the charade of military conquest. However, he deemed his orders to repatriate soldiers to Lisbon undesirable given that city was now occupied by the French; and given that the Portuguese court had made good its escape from French influence he determined to keep the regiment of Portuguese artillery on the island, pending further instructions, on the basis that it would assist with its defence and its maintenance would avoid creating disquiet.22

On finding that even the regular Portuguese regiments on the island were largely made up of islanders, and observing that the disarming of the local militia would cause discontent and be at odds with the policy of friendly cooperation that he was striving to implement, he sought to incorporate part of these forces in the defence of the island of Madeira. He took the precaution of storing the arms of the militia in Funchal in the fort of St Jago but military expediency presumably led to his decision to permit the militia in the outlying districts to keep their arms.23 In disregarding his instructions to repatriate trained soldiers, Beresford showed an understanding and feel for the situation on the ground as well as a degree of confidence in his own judgment. Beresford’s policy of working with the Portuguese in Madeira may have made him all the more acceptable as the appointee to reform the Portuguese army in 1809. He reported to Castlereagh that when the people of Madeira had discovered the British came as sole rulers of the island there was ‘a little sensation and fermentation’ but that it had soon subsided.24

The British troops were billeted for the most part in two monasteries, the Incarnation and the Jesuit College. This was in accordance with Portuguese custom and caused no difficulties. Indeed, not only did Beresford first obtain the permission of the Bishop of Funchal but he ensured the religious orders were financially compensated for this arrangement, a move which was unusual at the time. Further, he ensured that the payment of the troops was a burden on the British treasury and provisions for his force were purchased rather than plundered. Food was in short supply in January because the victuallers to the fleet had not appeared, but Hood ordered the landing of such supplies as the transports with the fleet could spare.25 Meat was brought in from the Azores and other provisions from Africa.26 However, medicines had to be sought from England as due to the speed of departure a considerable amount had been left at Portsmouth. Here, as throughout the Peninsula, British policy directing payment for provisions was in marked contrast to that of the French, which required its armies to live off the land.

The defences of the island, while they had been improved by the Governor prior to Beresford’s arrival, he found to be inadequate. This was particularly the case with the artillery (a common problem for the British in Portugal) which Beresford described as ‘unserviceable and much more dangerous to those that fire them than those they may be fired at’. Beresford told Castlereagh that if the island was to be properly defended guns must be sent from England.27

British policy, however, was undergoing change within weeks of Beresford’s arrival in Madeira. Britain was highly desirous of obtaining the right to trade directly with Brazil, a privilege previously reserved to Portugal, and the Portuguese made their agreement to granting such a right conditional on the ending of British sovereignty over Madeira. In mid February, Beresford was informed by Castlereagh that the emigration of the Portuguese court had materially changed the circumstances under which orders had been given to occupy the island and accordingly it had been resolved to adopt a system which would ‘remove suspicion from the Portuguese government that we occupy the island with any other view than to preserve the sovereignty of the Crown’.28 Accordingly the civil government would be returned to Portugal while the military command would remain with Britain which would be responsible for the defence of the island.

On 1 March 1808, Castlereagh wrote to Beresford formally informing him of the plan to return Madeira to the Regent, and this was announced on 26 March.29 The island’s former Governor was reinstated on 24 April just four moths after Beresford had landed at Funchal. Writing that day to Castlereagh, Beresford was able to inform him that he and the Portuguese governor enjoyed the ‘best of friendly relations’.30 However, the restoration of Portuguese authority led to the rescission of many of Beresford’s civil reforms.

Beresford, promoted to the rank of Major General in March 1808, was clearly hungry for action and very concerned that he would miss out in the enduring conflict with France.31 Shorn of his civil powers in Madeira he repeatedly sought a transfer from the island and was delighted when notified by letter of 16 July that he should transfer to Portugal. He was directed to take with him the 3rd regiment together with one company of artillery. If the British army was not employed there or in Spain, his orders were to proceed to Gibraltar.32 Beresford left the island on HMS Undaunted on 23 August for Portugal. His successor in Madeira was General Meade, and henceforth the British role in Madeira was confined to a military one. While the military occupation of Madeira did not end until 1814, it is noteworthy that the quality and number of the troops sent there was reduced. Not only was the 3rd Regiment sent to Portugal with Beresford in the summer of 1808, but the 11th Regiment was subsequently replaced by a regiment of veterans. This attitude probably reflected an assessment by the British government that French intervention was extremely unlikely due to maritime weakness.

The British citizens on the island obviously appreciated his time in the archipelago, for in 1810 the Factory authorised the presentation to Beresford of a sword and a piece of plate valued at £310.33 An entry in the books of Cossart Gordon and Company, the wine merchants in Funchal for 6 September 1808, refers to the arrival of General Meade and goes on to state: ‘His predecessor General Beresford rendered himself extremely popular with all ranks in the island and it was with extreme regret we parted with him.’34 One of Beresford’s achievements while on the island was to acquire the land which became the new burial ground for the Anglican church in Funchal, at the time as a military cemetery.35 In 1811 he was to repeat that success by persuading the Portuguese government and religious authorities to establish a military graveyard at Elvas following the battle of Albuera.