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5 PORTUGAL AND SPAIN: FROM LISBON TO LA CORUÑA, 1808–1809

‘I well remember what a fine looking soldier he was.

He was equal to his business too’1

Beresford was certainly very active while stationed in Lisbon. We have already seen his involvement with the implementation of the Convention of Cintra and his role in securing calm in Lisbon. Apart from his relationship with a number of Portuguese military personnel, it is clear that Beresford at this time began to forge contacts with the various members of the Regency Council. Dalrymple was using Beresford as a go-between with Forjaz and others during September and this continued under Burrard in October.2

In a move which may have had some bearing on subsequent events, Beresford studied the current state of the Portuguese army and sent a report on it to General Bernardim Freire de Andrade, commander of the Portuguese forces in the northern part of the country, as well as to the reconstituted Regency.3 Beresford had displayed an interest in the organisation of the Portuguese military while in Madeira, deliberately ignoring government instructions in order to do so. Now we see him exhibiting a keen interest in the means of defending Portugal. In the report, Beresford advocated that troops should be transferred away from their home towns in order to be trained, so that they could develop into a fighting unit.4 He also stressed the need for regular pay, proper equipment and ready supplies. Finally, he recognised the need to reform the officer corps. All of these recommendations were to play a part in the reform of the Portuguese army in the period after 1809, though Burrard, in sending a copy of Beresford’s ‘plan’ home in October 1808, expressed no great hopes for its implementation:

Major General Beresford gave in a plan to the Regency for the reorganization of the Portuguese army of which I send a copy, as I do not believe it has been transmitted home. I am afraid little has been done on it, but consultation and debate, and I must repeat that without a Minister here equal to the task of instructing, urging and conciliating the government and people I think nothing beneficial will ensue either to Portugal, Great Britain or the general cause of Europe.5

Beresford expressed his frustration at this time about both the inactivity of the British army and uncertainty as to who would command it, a frustration born perhaps of having missed the battles in August 1808. On 30 September he wrote to his old friend Edward Cooke referring to Dalrymple’s recall and expressing a desire shared by many: ‘who is finally to have command of this army is what we are all anxious to know, and we trust a speedy decision as we do not understand rotting here doing nothing, while our friends the Spaniards are, with such earnestness, demanding our assistance’.6

Beresford was soon given another task. No sooner had he handed responsibility for Lisbon back to the Portuguese when riots broke out in Porto, instigated it was widely believed by the Bishop, António de São José de Castro, who initially expressed the view that the Regency Council had no authority given their cooperation with the French.7 When appointed one of the Regency Council to replace those removed on the grounds of collaboration with the French, he feared that his influence might be threatened by that body.8 There is little room for doubt that this concern led the Bishop to avoid coming to Lisbon at this time. Beresford was directed to Porto with some 2,500 troops to put an end to the disturbances.9 Subsequently, some of the troops were intended to occupy Almeida, surrendered by the French on 2 October under the terms of the Convention of Cintra. The decision to send Beresford reflects his high standing at the time with Burrard writing to Castlereagh: ‘I trust Major General Beresford will be successful in putting a fortunate termination to insurrection, as he has been happy in conducting some very intricate and difficult affairs in this town.’10

Burrard directed Sir Robert Wilson, in command of the recently constituted Loyal Lusitanian Legion, to meet Beresford at Coimbra.11 When Beresford arrived there on 22 October he learnt that peace had been restored in Porto. Sending on the troops to garrison at Almeida, Beresford visited the Bishop personally in Porto on 31 October. He secured the agreement of the Bishop that the latter would go to Lisbon in about a month to join the other members of the Council. In the event it was April 1809 before he did so. Beresford clearly realised the Bishop was seeking to advance his own position, but he managed to avoid taking sides while remaining on good terms with the cleric. Because Beresford could combine a cold demeanour with a considerable temper when roused, his diplomatic skills have perhaps not been adequately acknowledged. These skills had already been evidenced at Buenos Aires and during his time as Governor of Madeira. Now they were being honed further, with his involvement in the implementation of the Convention of Cintra and his mission to Porto. While there were many disagreements with the Regency Council before the end of the war in 1814, it will become clear that Beresford, in conjunction with Forjaz and Wellington (and with the financial support of Great Britain), managed to motivate the Portuguese army in such a manner as to enable Portugal to play a vital part in what was to become an Allied success.

With the recall of Wellesley along with Burrard and Dalrymple, the British army came under the command of Sir John Moore. His instructions envisaged the British force providing auxiliary help to the armies of Spain. Spanish success at Bailén resulted in Napoleon going to the Peninsula to conduct the war, and by the end of 1808 in excess of 200,000 French troops were in Spain to quell the insurrection there. Moore felt that an invasion of Spain was justified in order to help the Spanish, but he soon found himself on the back foot when his army of over 30,000 was faced by superior French forces. Initially he was delayed by lack of resources, the subject of correspondence with Castlereagh.12 Logistics led Moore to direct the army from Portugal to Salamanca in three divisions marching by different routes. Moore’s forces entered Spain from Portugal in early November, with Moore reaching Ciudad Rodrigo on the eleventh of that month. A portion of his forces reached Salamanca two days later. Beresford’s brigade initially formed part of the 3rd Division under Lieutenant General Mackenzie Fraser, who took his troops from Coimbra via Viseu to Salamanca. Beresford’s Brigade was used as a flanking brigade on the march there and by 6 November was stated by Moore to be at Pinhel and Celorico and their environs.13 Two weeks later, Beresford confirmed to his half-brother, the 2nd Marquis of Waterford, that they had reached Salamanca where he was quartered in the Bishop’s house, mentioning that he had a very good cook with him but surprisingly there was a shortage of wine. He observed that Salamanca was somewhat like Oxford with its colleges and churches, though the difference being that the Spanish city had monasteries for men and women. The buildings he found beautiful and the cathedral decidedly so.14 The news from Spain was all bad, with the successive defeats of armies under Blake and Castaños at Espinosa de los Monteros and Tudela, causing Beresford to opine that there was no prospect of his meeting his half-brother before the passing of another winter. Following the French capture of Madrid, Beresford was to observe that the defence had been trifling ‘not from want of inclination of the people but there is little spirit in the upper classes, less energy, and if possible less knowledge, at least such as is suitable for the present times’.15

Moore received additional support with the arrival at Mayorga on 20 December of a further British force under Lieutenant General Sir David Baird from La Coruña. This force of approximately 16,000 men arrived off La Coruña on 13 October.16 However, because of Spanish concerns it was not allowed to disembark initially and only commenced doing so on 26 October, following receipt of approval from the government in Madrid, with the last units only getting ashore on 4 November. Baird’s initial puzzlement as to why he was in northern Spain was intensified when having advanced with his force as far as Astorga he was ordered back to La Coruña, with Moore having decided that he would retire with his own army to Portugal after receiving news of the defeat of the Spanish army under General Castaños at Tudela.17

In a further volte-face, Moore then determined to stay in Spain following news of what appeared to be determined Spanish resistance and to this end he ordered Baird forward again. Moore then learnt on 11 December of the fall of Madrid to the French on the 4th of the month. Captured communications led him to believe he might be able to attack a French army in León in northern Spain under Marshal Soult before Napoleon could come from Madrid to its support. On 20 December Moore and Baird linked up and began an advance on Soult’s position at Carrión. Following this junction of the two British forces, Moore reorganised his army but Beresford’s brigade continued to form part of the 3rd Division under Mackenzie-Fraser. Initially the British enjoyed some success with Henry, Lord Paget, commanding the 10th and 15th Hussars getting the better of General Debelle at Sahagún in a cavalry action on 21 December.18 However, before Moore could come up with Soult he learnt on 23 December that the main French army, with Napoleon in command, was moving north from Madrid at speed in pursuit of his own far smaller force. He therefore abandoned the envisaged attack on Soult and ordered the retreat which was to end at La Coruña.

The story of the difficult mid-winter retreat of the British army from Salamanca to La Coruña is well known, with substantial losses being suffered to both the advancing French and the weather. James Ormsby, a chaplain to the army, described the intense suffering of marching ‘over a stupendous high chain of mountains, which were deeply covered with snow, and as many of the troops had not received either bread or wine for the two preceding days, their sufferings were extreme’.19 Two days later, on 6 January 1809, he referred to men lying down in the snow never to rise again and an awful silence pervaded the ranks, only interrupted by the faint groans and fruitless exclamations of the dying. In a graphic description of what it was like for camp followers he wrote: ‘Here lies an infant upon a lifeless mother’s breast; it fondly labours to imbibe the wonted nourishment.’20

Discipline broke down in a number of regiments and there are many stories involving destruction of Spanish property and the appropriation of goods, particularly alcohol.21 It was not just the Spaniards who suffered. Even British officers were not safe from the depradations of their men. Lieutenant William Henry Sewell, recently arrived from England to serve as ADC to Beresford, had a gold watch, gold toothpick case and a silver essence box stolen from him at Lugo for which Private Charles Rankin of the 22nd Regiment was found guilty and sentenced to death by hanging.22

Lieutenant Colonel George MacGregor had his rum bottle stolen by a corporal to whom he had given it to fill, and his saddle bags stolen by, he suspected, men of another British regiment. He recorded a scene of complete desolation on the retreat from Villafranca to Lugo noting: ‘there was not a hundred yards of the road free from the carcasses of horses and other beasts of burden; which had given up and were shot by their owners.’ He went on to contrast the condition of the British soldiers with their French counterparts: ‘Nor was it all pleasant to observe the French, every one of them, provided with one of the blankets which had been thrown away upon the road in cart loads, together with the arms, the dollars and the shoes! – The enemy had no occasion for them. They were remarkably well clothed.’23 Many British soldiers under the influence of drink lost their lives to the inclement weather or the pursuing French when they were unable or unwilling to march.

Moore decided to split his force, sending some 3,500 under Generals Craufurd and Alten to Vigo to embark there while he took the main army to La Coruña. He reached La Coruña on 11 January 1809 to find that the British fleet had not yet arrived, and had no choice but to defend the town.24 In the ensuing battle, Moore was killed, and his second, Baird lost an arm.25 However, the French were repulsed and the bulk of the British forces successfully withdrawn.26 La Coruña was claimed by Soult a French victory, but Great Britain was also able to claim success.27 The British army had stopped the French with a successful strategic defensive action which brought it sufficient time to salvage its one standing army, albeit with substantial losses in terms of men and equipment.

Some reports suggest that Beresford’s brigade was part of the British rearguard in the retreat to La Coruña, but it would appear that it was just ahead of the rearguard, though called upon repeatedly to assist that rearguard under Paget. Beresford leaves us in no doubt that the retreat was difficult. Writing from Sobrado to his half-sister Anne on 5 January 1809, he stated:

I arrived here this day between Lugo and St Jago on my way to Vigo to re-embark, and to which all the army was making, but a counter-order has just arrived and tomorrow we measure back our steps to Lugo. We have had for the last twenty days the most extraordinary marching and the most intolerable weather. Most have lost their baggage from the latter cause and the roads, and I fear no good will arise from the counter-order. Our men are completely fatigued.28

The British Fleet under Rear Admiral Hood arrived with transports about 2 pm on 14 January and embarkation of the army began almost immediately. During that night and on the following day, the cavalry was dismounted and the sick and fifty-two pieces of artillery were loaded onto the fleet. Only twelve light guns were retained on shore. Fighting took place on 15 January and more intensively on 16 January, with Moore killed on the second day. By the latter date much of the baggage, the remaining horses and artillery and the reserve division had been embarked.29 The following day (17 January) the embarkation continued in worsening weather and under heavy fire from Soult’s artillery, which had begun shelling the harbour the previous day from the heights of St Lucía.30 The guns of the ships of war responded in kind and succeeded in silencing those of the French.

The embarkation was covered by Major General Hill’s brigade which was stationed on the promontory at the rear of the town and by Beresford’s brigade on the inland front of La Coruña directly facing the enemy.31 During the day (17 January) Hill’s brigade was embarked and all but Beresford’s brigade were on board.32 Spanish troops under the command of the Marquis de la Romana occupied the citadel. Beresford’s brigade, now reduced to about 2,000 men, covered the ongoing embarkation and that night his troops lit huge fires and kept them fully supplied with a view to deceiving the enemy.33

Early on the morning of 18 January, Beresford’s force embarked from behind the citadel, though he reported that his friends had despaired of his getting off and he thought himself fortunate to have escaped ‘my friends the French’. 34 As soon as this small force was embarked the fleet set sail.35 The Spanish, commanded by General Alcedo, the military and political governor of the town, only surrendered La Coruña to Soult on 20 January, when the British were safely out at sea. Lieutenant General Sir John Hope (who commanded the 2nd Division) had taken over the command on Moore’s death and he subsequently wrote most favourably of Beresford’s conduct:

Major General Beresford, with that zeal and ability that is so well known to yourself and the whole army, having fully explained, to the satisfaction of the Spanish governor, the nature of our movement, and having made every previous arrangement, withdrew his corps from the landfront of the town soon after dark, and was, with all the wounded that had not been previously moved, embarked before one this morning.36

Beresford wrote to his half-sister, Anne, back in Ireland to tell her he was safe after a great deal of fatigue and some anxiety. Like so many in the army he was relieved that there had been a trial of strength with the enemy:

who attacked us in our position near Corunna and got a most complete beating for his pains. We have however lost our Commander Sir John Moore who was killed and Sir David Baird lost his arm but is as yet doing as well as could be expected. The troops with the exception of my brigade embarked the night after the action, and the ensuing day I was left as the rear guard to cover and protect the embarkation of the army, and the enemy having driven among our transports during the day, I was given up at least as to be a prisoner, however, I completed the service and embarked my own Brigade and the wounded, and got on board at two o’clock this morning, and the enemy will be astonished. I can say no more than that I hope shortly to see my dearest Anne and I now long for your being in London …37

Beresford could, and clearly did, feel positive about his own contribution to the circumstances allowing for that evacuation.

Beresford and Moore had served together prior to the campaign in Spain ending with the retreat to La Coruña. At Toulon and in Corsica they had soldiered side by side and there is no evidence of other than cordial relations between the two men. That did not stop Beresford criticising Moore’s decision to retreat to La Coruña, calling it a most inglorious and unnecessary flight which had cost five times the numbers than would have been the case if they had stopped to oppose the enemy. He was not alone in his criticism of the retreat, with the now-deceased Moore being castigated both in England and Spain.38 Certainly, huge numbers were lost on the retreat but Moore’s achievement in enabling a large part of Britain’s Peninsular army to be brought home was considerable.39