Читать книгу Rebel City - South China Morning Post Team - Страница 14

Lam’s journey to the brink of disaster and beyond began at 10am on January 29, 2019. Members of the Executive Council, Hong Kong’s top decision-making body, were given a policy paper outlining proposed amendments to the city’s extradition law. It was their last meeting before the Lunar New Year holiday.

Lam was moved to change the extradition rules in late 2018 after receiving emotional letters from the parents of a young woman who was found dead in Taipei, her body stuffed in a suitcase. The pregnant woman had gone there on holiday with her boyfriend, but he returned to Hong Kong alone. He was suspected of being the killer, but could not be sent to Taiwan to help with investigations because Hong Kong has no extradition arrangement with the island, which China regards as a renegade province.

Aides said Lam took the pleas of the dead woman’s family to heart and decided to act after discussing the matter with Secretary for Security John Lee Ka-chiu, the city’s first security chief promoted from the police force.

But their extradition bill went considerably further than making it possible to send a wanted man to Taiwan. It also sought to allow the transfer of fugitives on a case-by-case basis to other jurisdictions with which Hong Kong had no extradition arrangement, including mainland China.

Plugging that loophole would have fulfilled a long-standing wish of Beijing. For years, Hong Kong had been a refuge for corrupt officials and businessmen fleeing the mainland, as well as a transit stopover for political dissidents. Sources said Lam saw in the Taiwan case a unique opportunity to cross off an item on Beijing’s wishlist for Hong Kong.

Even though political crimes were not among extraditable offenses under the bill, the very idea that people in Hong Kong could be sent across the border to face possibly unfair trials in a less than robust legal system made many jittery. The pan-democratic camp sensed the anxious mood on the ground and went to work to capitalize on it even as Lam dismissed such concerns as irrational. Pro-establishment camp insiders said her confidence that the bill would be passed, coupled with Lee’s security background, resulted in an exercise that was hasty and rushed.

The government also shrugged off the need for a full consultation, giving the public only 20 days to submit views. They argued that time was of the essence for the Taiwan murder case, and believed – mistakenly, as it turned out – public sympathy for the dead woman’s family was on their side.

“Lee, with his police force background, only sees things from one perspective, to bring suspects to justice,” said a Beijing-friendly lawmaker. “Even some mainland officials we talked to said they had foreseen the political implications and possible backlash, but he and Lam failed to do so.”

Lee’s officials apparently saw no problems with the bill either. Every discussion paper on major policy initiatives submitted to Exco usually included an assessment of the possible impact on the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, as well as “mainland implications” and anticipated “public reaction.” A former minister said these comments sometimes required a full page.

However, the first paper on the extradition bill, prepared by the Security Bureau, included no hint of possible controversy or trouble ahead. “No red flag was raised in the ‘public reactions’ paragraph,” a source close to the government said. “The paragraph was quite short. It was obvious that the top echelons of the administration did not expect massive opposition.”

Some senior officials were also kept in the dark during the early stages of the drafting of the legislation. It was not sent to the high-level policy committee, comprising all ministers and chaired by Chief Secretary Matthew Cheung Kin-chung, before the Security Bureau revealed on February 12, that it intended to amend the law. “The Security Bureau, which took the lead in drafting and promoting the amendment bill, should be held accountable for not sounding out its plan at the policy committee meeting before announcing it,” a source said.

Another high-ranking government source said Security Bureau officials showed that they lacked political savvy on two counts. First, they did not anticipate opposition from Taiwan, which was deep in the throes of politicking ahead of elections. Second, they underestimated the depth of Hongkongers’ distrust of the mainland’s legal system. “Their lack of sensitivity may stem from the fact that all three political appointees in the Security Bureau are former police officers,” the source said, referring to Lee, undersecretary Sonny Au Chi-kwong and Lee’s political assistant Cassius Lau Fu-sang.

Although the government’s 20-day consultation exercise was brief, it might have served to bolster Lam’s resolve, as two-thirds of the 4,500 submissions supported amending the extradition law. But there were murmurings early on, and even Lam’s advisers in Exco had wind of them. The Exco members included those from Hong Kong’s finance and business elite, but they failed to convey the concerns of the sector.

“When I first heard Tommy Cheung Yu-yan mention the existence of this bill, I immediately sensed something was wrong,” recalled proestablishment Liberal Party leader Felix Chung Kwok-pan, whose colleague Cheung is an Exco member. Chung, who has been running a textile factory on the mainland since 1993, said: “Those who have not done business on the mainland would not be aware of our fears.”

Many businesspeople were worried they might inadvertently break the law on the mainland. Some pointed to the complicated tax system and the fact that “gifts” – which could be deemed bribes in some contexts – were an inevitable part of striking deals. They feared that the extradition bill, once passed, might be used to bring them to book there. Chung said these concerns would have been flagged to the administration early, if only Lam had fully engaged the pro-establishment bloc.

Instead, the lack of consultation meant that the city’s two leading pro-business parties – the Liberals and the Business and Professionals Alliance – were unusually vocal in opposing the bill, despite being Beijing-friendly. They urged the government to exempt white-collar crimes from the list of extraditable offenses. In 2019, Hong Kong’s 70-member legislature had 43 pro-establishment lawmakers who formed the majority and usually backed the government, even on critical issues. So, when they spoke up, trouble was clearly brewing.

The fears of the business sector resonated with the wider community. In March, the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) became the first group of foreign investors to voice objections to the bill, warning that it could deal a blow to the city’s reputation as a business hub.

When AmCham took a stand, the international ramifications were laid bare. Several Exco members told the South China Morning Post they had asked top security officials if the bill needed to be explained better, but their views were waved aside. “The government was confident the bill would be passed because the pro-establishment camp had an overwhelming majority in Legco,” a person familiar with the issue said.