Читать книгу Fateful Triangle - Tanvi Madan - Страница 11

Nehru’s assessment of the consequences of the Second World War would partly shape his answer to that question. For many American policymakers, a key lesson had been that aggressors should be confronted, not appeased. For Nehru, who dominated Indian foreign policymaking as prime minister and foreign minister, other aspects resonated more, including the way India had become entangled in a war not of its choosing and the war’s adverse impact on the economies of India and other countries. Furthermore, he believed that the World Wars had not resolved the global situation and indeed had generated some new problems.²⁶

Focused on nation building, India’s newly independent leaders did not need more problems—they needed peace. As tensions rose globally in the late 1940s, G. S. Bajpai, foreign ministry secretary-general and the former Indian agent-general in the US, expressed concern that “some stray spark may ignite the gunpowder that is lying about.”²⁷ Nehru and Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit believed that any major conflict would inevitably entangle India, or at the very least affect the country, given its integration with the world and its potential power and influence. And if war broke out again, Indian plans for progress would be significantly set back.²⁸

This framework linking India’s external objectives with its domestic imperatives also shaped India’s perception of and policy toward China. Near the end of 1948, officials expected China to split up. Nehru did not think a communist victory in China would have an immediate impact on Asia.²⁹ Indian deputy prime minister Vallabhbhai Patel was more concerned, lamenting that “the only bastions of security” left were India and Japan.³⁰ However, as the Chinese communists consolidated their gains, the Indian prime minister reassessed the consequences. A communist Chinese victory, he believed, would have “far-reaching results all over South East Asia and ultimately in the world. India will naturally be affected by it, though there is no reason to fear any direct conflict. The future of Tibet may become a subject for argument.”³¹ As the GMD’s collapse became imminent, Nehru argued that India could not continue with the status quo merely because of his friendship with GMD leader Jiang Jieshi. His diagnosis of the GMD’s failure echoed that of Acheson, and at least the overall prescription seemed to match as well: “We have to take facts as they are.”³²

The Indian prime minister believed Delhi had to deal with the government in Beijing that existed, not the one it wished existed. In addition, if the Indian government “stood up for the bankrupt government in China now … this would give a fillip to communism in India.”³³ He also believed that rather than isolating communist China, it was important to integrate and bind it with the international community.

Nehru’s view of China flowed to a degree from mirror imaging, which would continue to affect his perception of China over the next half-decade. He and officials like Bajpai believed nationalism was the key driving force in China, as it was for India.³⁴ Nehru asserted that, much like his own government, a communist Chinese government would focus on internal issues—and it would do so in a pragmatic, rather than an ideological, way. Therefore, it would seek peace in its periphery. The Indian premier would consistently underestimate the effect of ideology on Chinese policymakers, despite the contention of Kavalam Madhava (K. M.) Panikkar, India’s representative in China, that the Chinese Communist Party leadership was “fanatically imbued with a sense of mission to refashion society.”³⁵

India’s limited defense capabilities also shaped the prime minister’s view of China and policy options toward it. Nehru did not appear open to contemplating contingencies like a military threat to India if China took over Tibet because it would “affect the balance we are trying to create in India.” That balance was in terms of both the defense-development balance and the civil-military balance.³⁶

While Nehru was uncertain about China’s external intentions, he was certain that India could not afford to provoke its northern neighbor. Thus it was the premier’s view that “our general attitude to the new China should be a friendly expectation and waiting to see what happens.”³⁷ Nehru’s concern about provoking Beijing showed in his furious reaction to an article that led to Chinese communist press criticism of Indian interest in Tibet.³⁸ It was also evident in his negative reaction to discussions about a US-sponsored Pacific Pact, which envisioned including India, to counter China’s potential “loss.”

Nehru saw pacts as provocative. He believed that the World Wars had demonstrated that pacts did more to exacerbate conflict than to prevent it. Furthermore, entangling alliances restricted freedom of action. Not everyone shared this perspective. His sister, Pandit, believed that at the very least, “inevitably one finds oneself aligned on one side or the other.”³⁹ Nehru had expressed interest in developing a “regional understanding on a broad basis” with Australia, New Zealand, and Southeast Asia.⁴⁰ But he had no desire to include India in any grouping based on anticommunism. It was important for India to leave the door open to “normal friendly relations” with the Chinese communists. And any suggestion of Indian participation in an anticommunist grouping could “only rouse suspicion and hostility of new China.”⁴¹ Panikkar encouraged this approach, noting that Nehru’s refusal to join the pact had somewhat reduced hostility against India among the communist Chinese, who had been accusing Nehru of being complicit in US policy toward Asia.⁴²

Nehru had no interest in a pact, but he welcomed the other option American policymakers were considering to support India vis-à-vis China: economic assistance. He perceived India’s main vulnerability as internal, its primary challenge as economic.⁴³ If his government did not solve this problem “effectively and fairly rapidly,” it would threaten both India’s stability and its political system.⁴⁴

Developments in China had been instructive; they did not leave Nehru unaffected as some have argued.⁴⁵ He felt that, “in Asia at any rate, communism flourished only where the economic standards of the people were indefensibly low”⁴⁶ and where governments “could not deliver the goods.”⁴⁷ In China, the GMD had failed to deliver and lost the faith of the people.⁴⁸ There were communists in India too, who were susceptible to external influence and seeking to “create trouble in every direction.”⁴⁹ The crackdown Nehru approved against them was only part of the solution; his government had to show results. Patel, too, stressed the importance of India preventing its own China-like situation from developing.⁵⁰

Nehru and Patel realized that their government could not deliver alone. Rapid and efficient development required foreign assistance, which the government welcomed despite some domestic opposition.⁵¹ For this, Patel thought one country was key, saying to Nehru, “we have to depend on the USA for our progress.” The prime minister thought developments vis-à-vis Britain, the Soviet Union, and the US would be crucial. He agreed that the latter was “of course, most important.” India needed to “take full advantage of [its] friendship” with the US both for economic assistance and to develop India’s military-industrial base.⁵² Given global uncertainty, he told Pandit that India needed this base and military equipment, and therefore needed cooperation with others to ensure that India did not “remain weak.” And the only countries that could help at the time were the US and UK.⁵³ Close confidant V. K. Krishna Menon later recalled him saying, “Why not align with the United States somewhat and build up our economic and military strength?”⁵⁴

In 1948, Indian policymakers used China to elicit support for aid to India. Chaos in China had created an opportunity. Nehru told Patel that because China would be unlikely to “play an effective part for a long time,” many countries would recognize that India was “the only other country” in Asia able to do so, and they would thus want to cultivate a relationship with it.⁵⁵ An Indian diplomat, Rajeshwar Dayal, outlined for Delhi a way to capitalize on developments in China: “The China situation will alter the balance in Asia and it seems to me that this is a good time to take up seriously the question of opening trade talks with the USSR. One result will be to stir up the Ang[l]o-Americans who have been treating our requests for capital goods rather cavalierly.”⁵⁶

The use of this tactic could be quite blatant. For example, in a pitch to Secretary of State George Marshall, Nehru noted that “in working for itself India was working for all of Asia, especially in view of the tragic course in China.” India’s UN representative implied to Commerce Secretary Charles Sawyer that developments in China had increased concerns about the potential spread of communism in India, and only economic development could stem its appeal. Bajpai indicated to American interlocutors that “following the collapse of China,” US aid was indispensable to maintain India as the “chief stabilizing influence in Asia.” Using similar logic, he had also broached the subject of military assistance with the acting secretary of state Robert Lovett.⁵⁷

American aid was crucial both because the US had the technical and financial ability to help India’s development plans and because the Soviet Union was not an available source.⁵⁸ In the initial years of Indian independence, Nehru had reached out to Moscow, seeking to diversify India’s relationships—and thus any potential dependence—and maximize the country’s aid options.⁵⁹ But, although there was a debate in Moscow about India policy, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin saw India as an Anglo-American stooge, which Nehru resented. There were other irritants as well. The Indian prime minister believed Moscow was guiding the Indian communist party’s increasingly hostile approach.⁶⁰ Nehru was also critical of “Russia’s active expansionism” and “apparent lack of any sense of ethics in international affairs.”⁶¹ In addition, Soviet offers and terms of assistance had fallen short.⁶² It was also harder to deal with differences since Indian policymakers had few avenues to communicate with officials from the Soviet Union or its satellites.⁶³ It was in this context that Delhi looked to Washington, and Nehru traveled to the US in October 1949.