Читать книгу Fateful Triangle - Tanvi Madan - Страница 17

In the fall of 1950, Acheson had told members of Congress that the Chinese going into Tibet made Delhi realize that the “force that is loose in China is a pretty difficult one to handle.”¹⁹⁶ The American hope that India would recognize Mao’s aggressive intentions in Asia only escalated when the Chinese subsequently intervened in the Korean War.

Even though its efforts in summer and early fall 1950 had met with little success, the Indian role as intermediary between China and the US had continued. Washington usually considered India’s nonalignment and its relations with China a liability, but, along with Panikkar’s access to Chinese officials, these were seen as assets when the US needed a channel to China. Britain also had a presence in Beijing. But American officials thought Nehru and India had more credibility in Asia and the nonaligned world, and India had been willing to take on this role. From the start of the war, Indian officials had briefed American officials on the messages they received from Panikkar.¹⁹⁷ In turn, India had passed on American messages to China, including warnings intended to deter Beijing.¹⁹⁸ But some US policymakers doubted India’s role as an honest broker. India was not an ally, and it followed an independent China policy that they believed was primarily designed to avoid provoking Beijing. This added to the strain in the US-India relationship.

American doubts about the messenger were partly responsible for skepticism about Chinese signals via Delhi in September and October that it would intervene directly in the war if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel dividing North and South Korea.¹⁹⁹ Some policymakers saw the accompanying Indian warning as driven by Nehru wanting peace at any cost. Skepticism of Panikkar affected others’ views.²⁰⁰ American officials thought he was not objective about the Chinese—a concern that Indian officials like Bajpai and Pandit shared.²⁰¹ Yet others, including Truman, believed that China was trying to influence a vote pending at the UN, and that the messages were either just Chinese propaganda or “a bald attempt to blackmail the UN.” Moreover, MacArthur had assured the president that China was unlikely to intervene.²⁰²

Allies, as well as some in American military and political circles, worried about potential Chinese escalation if the 38th parallel was crossed. But Truman was even more concerned about global and domestic credibility, and military demands.²⁰³ Thus, despite India’s and others’ warnings, he did not rescind his approval to cross the parallel. On October 7, US forces crossed the parallel. Twelve days later, Chinese troops started moving into Korea.

Expectations in Washington that the Chinese entry into the war would lead India to see the light assumed that Delhi would share Washington’s interpretation of Chinese actions. Instead, it increased Nehru’s frustration with the US rather than with China. Indian officials believed MacArthur’s move had provoked China into retaliation. This heightened the prospect of a larger war, which Nehru—dreading that India would be dragged into war at a time when it needed peace—had been trying to prevent.²⁰⁴ To avert even further escalation, India sponsored a UN resolution in January 1951, backed by Britain, that called for a ceasefire and negotiations. The US grudgingly supported the resolution, with Acheson hoping that China would reject it.²⁰⁵

Beijing did exactly that, leading to criticism in Indian newspapers and disappointment in the government.²⁰⁶ An Indian diplomat in Moscow reported back that Chinese “intransigence” was following “the Soviet line,” and Delhi should thus curtail hopes of an “Asiatic Tito” (i.e., a Mao willing to buck that line).²⁰⁷ But, publicly, the Indian government asserted that the Chinese reply was not an “outright rejection.”²⁰⁸

Parallel American efforts toward a General Assembly resolution blaming China as the aggressor proved to be another source of tension between the US and India. Nehru vociferously criticized it as another example of the US not facing facts. He argued that rather than Chinese aggression being responsible, “All the troubles in the Far East arise from the failure of the rest of the world to adjust itself to the changes which have taken place in Asia.”²⁰⁹ For Nehru, the US had erred in crossing the 38th parallel despite Chinese (and Indian) warnings, and “further complications ensued.”²¹⁰ With the resolution, it was only shutting the door to negotiations and compounding its mistakes.²¹¹

Truman disagreed, and bluntly and publicly said, “I believe in calling an aggressor an aggressor.”²¹² American commentators dismissed Nehru’s assertion that the isolation of China, rather than Chinese aggression, had led to the situation in Korea. Worse, he was playing into Chinese hands by “sowing confusion and mistrust.”²¹³ Beijing did not want a settlement, as Delhi and London believed. Rather, Chinese actions were designed to divide the noncommunist countries.²¹⁴

Once again, the different lessons learned from the Second World War played a role in shaping US and Indian views of the best approach. Henderson told Bajpai that collective failure to combat aggression would only lead to more belligerence, eventually resulting in a larger war.²¹⁵ A frustrated Acheson could not understand “what means India would propose [to] use to check aggression” instead.²¹⁶ Bajpai contended that the means would “depend upon form and character of aggression and upon effect which such means might have upon world peace.”²¹⁷

The differences over means, including the right balance between the use of force and diplomacy, were broader. NSC-68 and subsequent American policy reflected the belief that the need to counter an existential threat did not just make “all interests vital”; it also made “all means affordable, all methods justifiable.” But for Nehru, as the Australian high commissioner to India put it, “the end rarely justified the means.” In the US, moreover, the Korean War had only strengthened the view expressed in NSC-68 that active military resistance was more appropriate than passively waiting for the emergence of nationalist resistance—as Nehru seemed to prefer. These different views of the best means were perhaps partly influenced by the two countries’ capabilities. While there was a sense in the Truman administration that rather than divide the resource pie, one could expand it to justify larger defense spending, Indian policymakers, including Nehru, did not believe that was feasible for them given their limited resources.²¹⁸

Henderson hoped that differences over tactics would not overpower a common interest in peace and security.²¹⁹ But for Acheson, “it was not [Nehru’s] objectives so much as [the] way in which he said and did things which had caused us lots of trouble.”²²⁰ Nehru, too, subsequently acknowledged that the main difference between the US and India was “in the method of approach.”²²¹ For US policymakers “frustrating the Kremlin design” had become a goal in itself.²²² For Nehru, this blurring of means and ends—and the American emphasis on military instruments—made it harder to achieve the objective of peace.

The consequence of these differences, especially as the situation in Korea deteriorated after the Chinese intervention, was strain in the US-India relationship. Pandit expressed concern to Bajpai about the “considerable hostility” toward India in US government circles as a result of various China-related disagreements. Lamenting “the universality of the change in tone,” Bajpai felt as a consequence, “for the time being, at any rate, we are isolated, and that over Kashmir and other issues, Pakistan and our enemies will exploit our isolation to the full.”²²³

Beyond disillusionment, a more visible impact of the China-related friction was the reaction to India’s first major request for bilateral assistance from the US in December 1950. Delhi had asked for food aid. There was debate within the Truman administration—not so much on the desirability of aiding India economically, but on the feasibility given the cost and congressional attitude. While there were a number of US-India disagreements, Acheson told the Indian ambassador frankly that Congress would basically watch India’s approach on two matters: (1) Kashmir and (2) Korea, especially India’s response to greater Chinese involvement.²²⁴

India’s attitude toward the Korean War, where the US was directly involved, evoked a greater reaction in Congress than the subject of Kashmir. When Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee reached out to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Tom Connally (D-TX) to facilitate passage of an aid bill in January 1951, the senator bluntly noted that sentiments toward India, greatly affected by its China policy, would make the task difficult.²²⁵ He refused to move quickly on Indian food assistance, referring the question to a subcommittee.²²⁶ There, McGhee tried to argue that the grant would have a “strong conditioning effect” on Nehru’s policies and Indians’ sentiments. If, however, the US did nothing despite its resources and large numbers of people died, the Indian people “will know at that time that Mr. Nehru and we were on the outs over the question of Communist China, and an inference will be very strong to them that we denied this request because we did not like the political attitude Mr. Nehru expressed.”

But Connally retorted, “Nehru is out giving us hell at the time, working against us and voting against us” and was unlikely to change his approach. Senator Guy Gillette (D-IA) said he did not want to do anything to stabilize Nehru’s position. And Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AK) said that India should pay for the food. He added that he did not like what appeared to be blackmail, with India arguing, “Give it to us or we will go Communist.” McGhee argued that the US had already lost China and could not afford to lose India too, but when Fulbright asked if India, especially given its attitude, was “more important than the Ruhr and Japan,” the assistant secretary had to admit “strategically, no.”²²⁷

US officials told their Indian counterparts that their statements and actions, which were seen as defending the Chinese attack against UN forces, made the aid request harder to get through Congress.²²⁸ The New York Times predicted further delays, “probably … due to irritation caused by Mr. Nehru’s refusal to go along with the United States and its policy toward Communist China.”²²⁹ A former chairman of the Republican National Committee asserted that India’s “cooperation with aggressors” weakened the case for aid.²³⁰

With support from a bipartisan coalition, however, Truman went ahead with a request to Congress that February. His message made anticommunist, humanitarian, and democracy promotion cases for aiding India. Many members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee agreed that it was important to aid India.²³¹ In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to spur action, Acheson and Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ) noted Chinese and Soviet offers of grain to India on a barter or sale basis.²³² The bill, however, stalled in Congress for months as members debated whether to give India aid and whether to demand raw materials in return since Delhi was not going to support US foreign policy.²³³ The debate also gave members a forum to criticize India’s China policy repeatedly and vociferously.

The India bashing in Congress and the media resulting from Delhi’s China policy, and the linkage between Indian foreign policy and American food assistance, adversely affected Indian views of the US.²³⁴ As Nehru had noted, “We are a sensitive people and we react strongly to being cursed at and run down.… Our general reaction, whenever any pressure is sought to be applied upon us by any country, is to resent it and may be to go against it.”²³⁵ Anti-India rhetoric in the US generated louder self-sufficiency rhetoric in India. Nehru insisted publicly that conditional aid would not be welcome. His reproach, in turn, sparked further criticism on Capitol Hill, finally leading the prime minister to state that India would prefer a loan rather than a grant.²³⁶ In June, months after India had requested aid, Truman signed a food assistance bill. Thus the US eventually helped fill Indian stomachs, but in the process did little to win the battle for Indian hearts and minds.²³⁷