Читать книгу Fateful Triangle - Tanvi Madan - Страница 18

Feeling burned by the American attitude and recognizing the adverse impact on the aid debate in Congress, Delhi had limited its intermediary role in the Korean War in spring 1951. Bajpai told Pandit, “Both China and the USA are determined to fight it out, and any third party that tries to come between the two is likely only to hurt itself.” There was criticism in parliament of such a role as well. Jivatram Bhagwandas (J. B.) Kripalani, whom Nehru had backed to be president of the Indian National Congress, said that thanks to India’s positions, “[India had] no friend left in the world.”²³⁸ Furthermore, the experience was frustrating. China and the US mistrusted each other’s intentions. Each side told Indian officials they doubted the other’s peaceful intentions and, therefore, insisted that the other provide reassurance first.²³⁹

Nonetheless, in summer 1951, Indian officials did become involved in efforts in Beijing and Delhi—quietly coordinating with British and Swiss representatives—to secure the release of American prisoners being held in China.²⁴⁰ India was reprising a role it had played in 1949 when it had tried to secure the release of American consul Angus Ward.²⁴¹ Differing US and Indian perceptions of China were again evident. In the early stages of talks on the prisoners, Panikkar felt Chinese premier Zhou Enlai’s responses were positive. Washington, however, took more seriously the views of British officials, who did not share the Indian ambassador’s optimism.²⁴² There were also differences on tactics. American officials thought that Indian public representations on behalf of the US would convey to Beijing the widespread disapproval of its attitude toward foreign nationals. Indian officials, on the other hand, believed that explicit association with the US or others would reduce Indian influence in Beijing.²⁴³

Frustration with Washington deepened when India became involved as an intermediary on the Korean issue again, even as China and the US undertook armistice talks after summer 1951 in Kaesong and then Panmunjom. After China backtracked in July 1952 on its in-principle acceptance of an India-UK prisoner repatriation formula that could have led to a settlement, an exasperated Nehru said that both sides “express their desire for settlement, but neither is prepared to give in … and wants the other to do so.” He was unhappy that Beijing had not been “straight” with India. But he found the American military approach—and continued bombing in the midst of peace efforts that only made Beijing more intransigent—to be “outrageous.” On balance, he blamed American policy in the Far East, which had “come in the way of a peace effort.”²⁴⁴

India was not, however, only frustrated with the US. Panikkar, for example, became so annoyed with the lack of Chinese action on American prisoners that he dropped his opposition to public pleas.²⁴⁵ Like their US counterparts, Bajpai and other Indian officials also questioned whether China was feeding India wrong or exaggerated information to pressure the US into negotiations on Chinese terms.²⁴⁶ Furthermore, China kept vacillating about its preferred policy options. After Beijing’s July 1952 U-turn, Nehru expressed “extreme displeasure and embarrassment” internally.²⁴⁷ He lamented, “The situation at the China end is more difficult than we have imagined.”²⁴⁸ Nehru insisted that any future Chinese proposals should be conveyed in writing rather than just verbally.²⁴⁹ He was again disappointed when Beijing rejected another Indian proposal in November 1952. Moreover, China criticized India’s attempts to be the “voice of Asia” and dismissed it as a tool of the US. Nehru wondered if these rejections stemmed from Moscow’s influence or a belief that India had leaned too much toward the UN/US side.²⁵⁰

Despite concerns, Delhi believed its mediatory role and neutrality made it somewhat useful—and therefore important—to Beijing. As long as this was the case, Bajpai noted that China would not trouble India. Rather, it had given India assurances regarding the Sino-Indian border, with Zhou indicating that China “had no intention [of] making claims to or raising questions about boundary” and asserting that China wanted “cultivation [of] friendship” with India and Burma.²⁵¹ Acheson, too, observed that China was not taking military action against Burma since it would upset India at a time when it was important for Beijing to stay on Delhi’s good side.²⁵² But in summer 1952, when China had reneged on commitments to India on Korea, Nehru’s concern about broader implications was evident—against Panikkar’s advice, he thought India should explicitly raise the boundary issue with China.²⁵³ Even beyond China, Krishna Menon believed that India’s role as intermediary increased its global influence and importance.²⁵⁴

American officials had mixed feelings about the Indian role. Henderson, for example, believed India could be an “ameliorating influence” on Beijing.”²⁵⁵ Bowles, his successor, believed that even if US messages via India were not passed on to—or heeded by—China, using the India channel would help convince Delhi that, unlike Beijing, Washington was doing its part to seek peace.²⁵⁶ Dean Rusk, assistant secretary of state for Far East Asian affairs, found Indian contacts with Chinese officials useful for conveying warnings of potential US retaliation if China escalated.²⁵⁷ For Acheson, as long as the US had multiple channels, India’s good relations with China and its standing with other Asian countries made the continued use of this channel worthwhile.²⁵⁸

However, there were also serious doubts about India as a conduit.²⁵⁹ There were questions about India’s reliability and its officials’ judgment as to China’s intentions. The US Army chief believed Beijing was manipulating India.²⁶⁰ In addition, there was unease that Panikkar was proposing ideas or interpretations to Chinese officials that the US had not approved, while suggesting to Beijing that the proposals had resulted from close contact with Washington.²⁶¹ There were also doubts about whether roving Indian envoys like Krishna Menon were even keeping Delhi in the loop on US views. Furthermore, there was concern that US officials did not know what Delhi was actually saying to Panikkar and what he was conveying to Chinese officials.²⁶²

Other officials worried that India would compromise principles and ignore US red lines in order to achieve any settlement.²⁶³ In Congress, Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ)—usually a moderate on India—worried that Delhi would try to force the US to make concessions to China in order to enhance Nehru’s image and influence in Asia.²⁶⁴ In discussions with Panikkar and Krishna Menon, American officials felt there was a lack of clarity about whether they were hearing those officials’ personal views or Chinese ones, or Indian preferences rather than Chinese ones.²⁶⁵ There were only more doubts when Chinese actions did not reflect Beijing’s apparent attitudes as assessed by Panikkar.²⁶⁶

These doubts about India as an intermediary led Washington to try to limit its role at times, which Indian officials resented. While Zhou indicated that China wanted India to be included in some negotiations, the US showed little desire to include India in groups like the Good Offices Committee (India, on its part, showed little desire to serve on the latter).²⁶⁷ And despite British urging, the US resisted consulting India on a sixteen-nation statement on Korea.²⁶⁸ The US also opposed Indian involvement in any Korean armistice conference, despite British and Canadian recommendations.²⁶⁹ In the case of prisoner repatriation, the US turned to the Indian channel because there were few, if any, alternatives.²⁷⁰ But, even in this case, US officials continued to pursue other viable alternate channels.²⁷¹ They also tried to work around the Indian diplomats they neither liked nor trusted (Krishna Menon, Panikkar) and work with the ones they did (Narayanan Raghavan [N. R.] Pillai and Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit).²⁷² These efforts to restrict India’s role and influence would continue after the Truman administration.