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China was a key subject of discussion between American and Indian policymakers during Nehru’s visit. He outlined both his perception of and his preferred policy toward China. He felt Guomindang mismanagement had created the space for the communists. Communism, he believed, was “alien to the Chinese mind.” “Foreign domination” would be disliked, and nationalism, growing everywhere in Asia, would eventually return as the “governing force” in China—and, meanwhile, serve to limit Sino-Soviet cooperation. Nehru gave Acheson the impression that India was “leaning toward early recognition,” explaining that “India’s proximity to China” made it view this issue differently.⁶⁴ Acheson did not believe that early recognition would give India any advantage. Moreover, it was not clear that the communists controlled all of China or that they had the backing of the Chinese people—both necessary elements before the US would even consider recognition. Furthermore, he worried about the impact of recognition on those still resisting the communists. Finally, he felt the Chinese government needed to outline its “international obligations” before expecting recognition.⁶⁵

American policymakers had been aware of Nehru’s attitude toward China and the gap between US and Indian perceptions. Even before the visit, some voices within the administration had noted, “There is little hope that Nehru will dramatically announce that he has seen the light.”⁶⁶ Henderson had noted that a survey of elite Indian opinion on China had shown that the majority of the leadership shared the prime minister’s views.⁶⁷ Furthermore, reports from American diplomats in Delhi and Nanking had made evident that American and Indian attitudes toward the Chinese communists did not fully overlap.⁶⁸

Nehru’s visit, with public hints that Delhi was close to recognizing the communist regime in China,⁶⁹ made clear to the American public what had been apparent to some observers within the administration: the US might have assigned India a role in its strategic script, but India was not willing to play that role in the way the US wanted.⁷⁰ As the British ambassador in Washington noted, the visit “made abundantly clear to the American public that they could not look to India as a ready-made replacement for China [in] the cold war against Communism.”⁷¹ Speaking to the US Congress, Nehru had asserted, “Where freedom is menaced … or where aggression takes place, we cannot and shall not be neutral.”⁷² But as the New York Times lamented, Nehru “declined to encourage the slightest hope” that the US would have an ally in India.⁷³ The “fall” of China had created a constituency for India in Washington among the public and Congress; Nehru’s visit limited its hopes and size.

Within the administration, the visit cemented the view that India was not necessarily the answer to its China problem—certainly not one that would justify half a billion dollars of aid at a time when resources were limited, congressional support was uncertain, and the Truman administration’s focus and the public’s attention remained on Europe.⁷⁴ There was also a developing change in emphasis in US policy from economic to military assistance. Thus, in the week after Nehru’s visit, Henderson’s proposal for a large aid package to India was set aside.⁷⁵

Overall, Nehru’s visit limited the US view of India’s importance. The shift in the administration’s attitude was evident in the National Security Council staff’s December 1949 draft position paper on Asia policy (NSC 48/1). It stressed that since communism was global, rather than regional or local, the solution was not necessarily regional or local. Thus it would be “unwise” for the US to look toward India as a bulwark against communism in Asia.⁷⁶ At a meeting of US chiefs of mission in East Asia, officials also expressed doubts about the desirability and feasibility of building up Japan or India as dominant powers to counter China and the Soviet Union. India had not shown “constructive leadership,” and it was preoccupied with internal matters. Moreover, any such assigned leadership would stir up countries like Pakistan or Sri Lanka.⁷⁷

The evolving American strategic framework did, nonetheless, have a place for South Asia more broadly. This affected US policy in two ways that led to disagreements with Delhi. First, American policymakers put an even higher premium on stability in South Asia. While Indian policymakers would not have argued with this objective, the American assessment that the Kashmir dispute was one of the key threats to that stability—and required greater US involvement—came to be a major source of tension between the US and India.⁷⁸ Second, even though India was the bigger prize in most American policymakers’ eyes, as NSC 48 outlined, it also became important to prevent Pakistan from falling to communism. And, in spring 1950, Pakistani prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan made clear that, while India might resist playing a role in the American script for Asia, his country was ready for a role.⁷⁹

There was one area of US-India agreement on China, but it did not lead to convergence because of differences over means. The New York Times reported that one aspect of Nehru’s prescription—pursuing a wedge strategy—had impressed the State Department.⁸⁰ Even before his visit, China watchers at State had argued against assuming Soviet control of the Chinese communists and stressed that Mao could act independently. Like Nehru, the American embassy in Moscow thought that US recognition of the communist Chinese government could help create a wedge between Beijing and Moscow. Acheson, in turn, believed that attempting to detach China from the Soviet Union would not constitute appeasement.

By the end of 1949, NSC 48/2 endorsed the idea of exploiting “rifts” between the communist giants.⁸¹ But, while this US objective was defined, the means to achieve it were not as clear. Kennan recommended a hands-off American policy. Truman and Acheson, on the other hand, contemplated cautiously detaching Beijing from Moscow, but not until the Chinese communists stopped “active abuse of us.”⁸²

This question of whether China or the US should take the first step would become a continuing point of difference with India. Furthermore, the Truman administration publicly continued to treat and condemn international communism as a monolith. To Nehru, as he had told the American leadership, this approach was counterproductive to the objective of facilitating a Sino-Soviet split.