Читать книгу Fateful Triangle - Tanvi Madan - Страница 16

While there had been debate in India about the timing and nature of a Chinese takeover of Tibet,¹⁴⁷ the invasion itself was not unexpected. A year before, in September 1949, Nehru had predicted that China would invade Tibet, possibly within the year, bringing it to India’s doorstep.¹⁴⁸ Many were aware of the consequences. Even Panikkar noted it would bring unprecedented “pressures” on India, though he did not think China would have the ability to intervene directly in India for another decade.¹⁴⁹ Over the next year, Indian officials had continued to expect matters to “come to a head” in Tibet.¹⁵⁰ They tried to delay this eventuality to “gain time for India” and keep the Chinese and communist influence at bay.¹⁵¹

Indian policymakers had crystallized their Tibet policy and conveyed it to American officials by January 1950. It basically involved “leav[ing] the matter alone.” K. P. S. Menon worried about China exporting communism via Tibet when they took over and about the status of the India-Tibet boundary.¹⁵² But he told the American political counselor that India would not take the initiative on Tibet with China. If Beijing accepted Tibetan autonomy, Delhi would recognize Chinese authority over Tibet. In the meantime, India would continue and possibly expedite its sale of small arms to Tibet and even train Tibetan officers, but it would not welcome the establishment of a Tibetan liaison office in India. Menon also emphasized that India would not take military action if China attacked Tibet.¹⁵³ Delhi also resisted Anglo-American pressure to increase aid to Tibet. Finally, Menon discouraged American involvement—and particularly any discussions in Delhi—on the grounds that it would convince Beijing of a US-India anti-China conspiracy. This could expedite a Chinese takeover of Tibet.¹⁵⁴

The US was not particularly eager to spring to Tibet’s defense. Acheson had wanted to use the threat to Tibet to convince India to move away from its “unrealism [and] semi-detached attitude” toward the Chinese challenge.¹⁵⁵ But the US had had no desire to become embroiled alone (i.e., without India and/or the UK) by holding out the prospect of aid to Tibet. Henderson had clarified to K. P. S. Menon that the US did not want to provoke a Chinese invasion or make it harder for the Indian government to persuade Tibetan officials to accept autonomy.¹⁵⁶ Subsequently, Washington had looked for signs of change in India’s attitude and solicited Delhi’s views on potential US-UK-Indian coordination to meet Tibet’s defense requirements. But for Acheson, ideally India had to “bear primary responsibility.”¹⁵⁷

Delhi, on its part, had continued to eschew any covert or overt actions that Beijing might see as provocative or as part of a joint US-India effort to counter China.¹⁵⁸ Officials did not believe that India could offer effective resistance because of Tibet’s inaccessibility and Delhi’s limited resources. There were also serious doubts about Tibetan willingness to resist. Thus the Indian government had encouraged Tibetan officials to negotiate with China.¹⁵⁹

The outbreak of the war in Korea had increased American interest in supporting Tibet. While clarifying that assistance would not extend to direct involvement if China invaded Tibet, US officials had suggested that Tibetan officials ask India to facilitate American aid.¹⁶⁰ But the war had not made India any more likely to help. Nehru did not think it could deter a Chinese invasion of Tibet, though officials had tried to delay it.¹⁶¹ They had pursued the issue on “firm [but] friendly lines” in Beijing. Bajpai had given the British high commissioner and Henderson the gist of India’s message to China: that India had gone out of its way to establish friendly relations with China even though this had been detrimental to its other bilateral relations; a Chinese invasion of Tibet might make India reassess its view of Chinese intentions, as well as its support for Beijing’s entry into the UN.¹⁶²

After the invasion in October 1950, Henderson blamed India, believing that Tibet had “lost heart” because of Delhi’s reticence.¹⁶³ Nonetheless, while urging India to do more and offering to be helpful, Acheson did not want to pressure India lest Delhi blame Washington for any consequent Sino-Indian complications. He did hope that, along with Chinese “duplicity in dealing with GOI [the government of India] re Korea,” developments in Tibet would make India “reassess its views re character” of the regime in Beijing.¹⁶⁴

Henderson warned Washington against giving the impression that it was trying to use the Tibet situation to sell India on alignment with the US. He further asserted, “If [a] rift should come [between China and India] … it should clearly come through force of events and not with help of outside powers.”¹⁶⁵ Acheson subsequently instructed American officials not to appear to be trying to create a wedge between China and India.¹⁶⁶

The Chinese invasion might not have caused a Sino-Indian split, but it did have an impact within India. A diplomat later noted the “deep anger” it generated.¹⁶⁷ In parliament, there was also anxiety about Chinese intentions and Indian preparedness on both the opposition and treasury benches.¹⁶⁸ Even some socialist politicians became disillusioned with China.¹⁶⁹ Within the government, officials like Bajpai altered their assessments—the invasion of Tibet showed that China did not really care about India’s sensitivities. With Nehru’s approval, Bajpai instructed Panikkar to tell Beijing that its use of force was harmful for Sino-Indian relations, as well as China’s international position. Suggesting that China had misled it, India also sent an official note calling the Chinese action “deplorable.”¹⁷⁰ After India received an accusatory response from China, Delhi responded defensively, denying that it had any ambitions in Tibet, but asserting that it had certain rights there.¹⁷¹

The invasion further fueled the Indian government’s internal debate about China. The different perceptions of and proposed strategies toward that country were evident in a letter from Patel to Nehru and in the latter’s subsequent note on Tibet. In Patel’s view, which was closer to the dominant assessment in the US, the invasion showed that China represented both an internal and external threat to India. He asserted that Beijing was hoodwinking Delhi. Furthermore, China did not see India as a friend despite Delhi’s recognition of the communist regime and its efforts to facilitate Beijing’s seating at the UN. Patel argued that nothing India did to convince China of its good intentions would change the Chinese leadership’s hostility toward India. Finally, he viewed China’s behavior as that of a “potential enemy,” one that was no longer separated by a Tibetan buffer and that in fact had territorial ambitions that included parts of India’s northeast and Burma.

Patel was critical of the government’s response to the invasion, seeing it as too placatory and weak. The deputy prime minister thought that Beijing would see accommodation as a sign of weakness, and that complacency and vacillation would increase the threat from China. Instead, Patel advocated “enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy.” He called for a threat assessment; analysis of India’s existing and required defense capabilities; reconsideration of Delhi’s support for Beijing at the UN; strengthening of India’s northeast and of Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim; internal security measures in India’s border states; improvement of transport and communication lines to the border; manning of key border posts; reassessment of India’s Tibet presence and its position on the McMahon Line; and, finally, re-examination of India’s external relations—including with the US.¹⁷²

Despite Patel’s stature, Nehru was the ultimate decisionmaker on foreign policy. Initially after the invasion, a disappointed Nehru questioned broader Chinese intentions.¹⁷³ But, as Henderson had predicted,¹⁷⁴ the prime minister decided to stay the course after receiving what he interpreted as a less antagonistic note from China in mid-November. The missive, coupled with a Chinese military pause at the Xinjiang-Tibet border, seemed to leave the door open for Sino-Tibetan negotiations.¹⁷⁵

Nehru stressed the long-term perspective: India needed a working relationship with a Chinese communist regime that was here to stay. He believed that Beijing desired India’s friendship and that Delhi should respond. This view was probably encouraged by Panikkar’s report earlier that year that Mao had told him, “India and China cannot afford to have war.” And the chairman’s outline of the two Asian nations’ similar problems would have done nothing to discourage the prime minister’s mirror imaging.¹⁷⁶

In a November note, Nehru also interpreted the lack of a Chinese demand for complete withdrawal of Indian interests in Tibet as significant. He reiterated that India lacked the military capacity to prevent the takeover of Tibet. Any attempt at stopping the Chinese advance would likely fail and would lead to Chinese hostility toward India and constant insecurity at India’s borders. Nehru instead sought Tibetan autonomy, arguing that the limited but more feasible goal would be harder to attain if Sino-Indian relations were bad.

Nehru did not think there would be any real Chinese military invasion of India in the “foreseeable future.” For one, this would likely spark a world war. Also, Beijing needed to defend its other borders and would hardly be able to divert the troops required for a major attack on India. However, “gradual infiltration” across the border and Chinese occupation of disputed territory was possible—and indeed a risk. This required improving connectivity to India’s tribal areas in the northeast, which were not well integrated with the country, and preparation to prevent any Chinese infiltration. Furthermore, India needed to tackle the other real threat from China—the “infiltration of … ideas”—with ideas of its own.

The Indian prime minister believed that visible military strengthening on the scale that Patel envisioned was neither desirable nor feasible. Any attempt to build up India’s military on the Sino-Indian border would likely reinforce Chinese insecurity and be counterproductive—such preparation would serve as a provocation rather than a deterrent. Furthermore, Nehru asserted that India did not have the financial and military resources to prepare for an unlikely attack. Diverting significant resources to the Sino-Indian border would also undermine Indian defence vis-à-vis Pakistan, which he saw as the major potential threat. He believed, additionally, that Pakistan would take political or military advantage of Sino-Indian tensions. Even if India enhanced its defense capabilities or looked abroad for military supplies, it would then be left in a strategically “unsound” position with two major enemies.

Nehru did not rule out the possibility that the Chinese communists would be expansionist, but he did not believe this was inevitable. It depended on a number of factors, including the development of both countries and the extent to which China adopted communist characteristics. Sino-Indian conflict would be mutually destructive and would allow external actors to take advantage. Given this assessment and the level of India’s capabilities, while Delhi should prepare for contingencies, Nehru continued to believe that the best approach was reaching “some kind of understanding” with China, as long as Beijing desired the same.¹⁷⁷ This belief underlay India’s subsequent Tibet and China policy.

Postinvasion, Acheson had hoped that, at the very least, India would participate in proposed UN action on Tibet—seen as having a propaganda purpose. The exercise might lead Delhi to realize how difficult it was to deal with Beijing and Moscow. This could make India “less neutral and more realistic about Communism,” facilitating better US-India relations.¹⁷⁸ But, despite indicating that it would participate,¹⁷⁹ India demurred after receiving the more conciliatory note from Beijing and interpreting other Chinese steps as friendlier (e.g., release of some American prisoners of war in North Korea).¹⁸⁰ Bajpai was “suspicious and cynical” about the note, but he agreed that a UN debate would not be helpful at that time.¹⁸¹ It would jeopardize simultaneous Indian efforts for a ceasefire in Korea.¹⁸² Patel’s death in December 1950 only made Nehru’s voice more dominant on Tibet. By January 1951, Bajpai was telling Henderson that with Tibet likely beyond saving and other issues intervening, India was “giving little thought to Tibet.”¹⁸³

Henderson, who had previously detected little Indian interest in the State Department idea of joint US-UK-India action to stall China in Tibet,¹⁸⁴ urged UN action that could highlight China’s “aggressive attitude.” But he found Indian assessments to be “wishfully warped” to fit their “inclination to do nothing which might offend China.”¹⁸⁵ While some US officials argued that such joint support would buoy Tibetan spirits, Indian officials made clear their belief that the Tibetans were merely trying to postpone—rather than resist—a Chinese takeover.

Indian officials were not disinterested, but they had different moves in mind. They were, in fact, chagrined about the idea of China taking over Tibetan border defense.¹⁸⁶ Bajpai acknowledged that the Sino-Tibetan agreement signed in May 1951 would affect India’s position vis-à-vis Bhutan, Burma, Nepal, and even Korea. Delhi had already taken some steps to protect its interests. It had devised its own version of what came to be called pactomania in the Eisenhower administration in the US. It signed treaties with neighbors Bhutan (1949), Nepal (1950), and Sikkim (1950, making it a protectorate) that gave Delhi a crucial say in their foreign and security policies.

There was also an effort to strengthen and integrate India’s northeast. After China’s initial invasion of Tibet, a defense committee assessed the impact of losing the buffer state. It recommended strengthening border posts and infrastructure for transport and communications as well as alleviating the neglect of the area and its residents. But there were limits, Bajpai stressed to Henderson, to what India could do militarily.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, to key decisionmakers in Delhi, the missing buffer made it more necessary to keep China in good humor.¹⁸⁸

The American embassy in Delhi remained concerned that Tibet would be “lost by default,” and that China could “constantly menace” India from there.¹⁸⁹ The chargé argued that the US should convince India that the Sino-Tibetan treaty was not in its interests and that Delhi should encourage the Dalai Lama to reject it and flee to India.¹⁹⁰

But, while Washington was willing to encourage Tibet’s leaders and its autonomy in spirit, it was unwilling to act alone to provide military or financial assistance or appoint official representatives to Tibet. Acheson maintained that India had the primary responsibility to help Tibet.¹⁹¹ In addition, the US had no desire to upset Jiang by announcing support for Tibetan sovereignty.¹⁹² Furthermore, like Britain and India, the US was concerned about any spillover impact on the Korean situation—the reason why it would not promise a specific response to a potential Tibetan appeal to the UN.¹⁹³ Finally, any unilateral American action in Tibet would only serve to push India toward China; instead there was hope that Indian resentment would grow as the Chinese consolidated their hold over Tibet.¹⁹⁴

By the fall of 1951, the Truman administration accepted that Tibetan officials were unlikely to reject the Sino-Tibetan agreement. The Far East Asia desk at the State Department advocated using “Tibet as a weapon for alerting GOI to the danger of attempting to appease any Communist Govt and, specifically, for maneuvering GOI into a position where it will voluntarily adopt a policy of firmly resisting Chinese Communist pressure in south and east Asia.”¹⁹⁵ There were still some attempts to get India to assure the Dalai Lama that he would be given asylum. But with Delhi unwilling to take the initiative and a new US ambassador in Delhi—Chester Bowles—who was less enthusiastic about pressuring India on this issue, such efforts faded. So did hope that India would change its China policy.