Читать книгу The State-Building Dilemma in Afghanistan - Haqmal Daudzai - Страница 13

State-building is a multidisciplinary theme, borrowing its theories and concepts from broad social sciences including anthropology, political science, security studies, conflict management, comparative politics, economic development, and international relations –to mention but a few (Scott, 2007), (Wollf, 2011), & (Marquette & Beswick, 2011). The state as a ‘human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ by Max Weber (1946), and the thesis of ‘war made states’ by Charles Tilly (1975) serve as the foundation for debates on the nature and formulation of state-building. However, the contemporary state-building discussion can also be traced in several theories, among them modernization, political development, intervention, institutionalization, and new-institutionalization are discussed briefly in the following sections. This varied inter-disciplinary approach to the state-building topic adds to the complexity, diversity, and ambiguity of both its concepts and practices. It certainly leads to an exciting yet blurred discussion in the literature.

The implicit rationale of state-building, according to Francis Fukuyama, goes something like this: “When a state is so weak or fragile that its institutions fail to deliver the expected services (for example security, health, education, construction and the rule of law) to its citizens, then it needs to be reformed or built from scratch.” (Fukuyama, 2004). Conceptually, the term ‘failed states’ was first used in the early 1990s to list of countries which were prone to social, economic, and institutional instability, and to fragmentation due to poverty, sectarian wars, and civil conflicts (Nay, 2012). Another very broad notion, ‘fragile states,’ refers to the categories of state institutions which lack legitimacy, authority, and capacity, and as a result are unable to provide basic public services and governance to its citizens (OECD, 2010). Nevertheless, Olivier Nay (2012) notes that ‘fragile states’ is a relatively new, blurry, and controversial concept in the literature, government policy papers, and donor evaluation reports (p. 2), entailing a long list of ‘notions’ including [42] weak, failing, failed, collapsed, post-conflicted, divided, and other crises contexts.

For Fukuyama (2004), state-building is concerned with a state’s ‘institutional building’ or with improving its ‘capacity’ and functionality. Public administration, political institutional design (e.g., parliamentary, presidential, centralization, decentralization), legitimacy or democratic participation, good governance, and cultural values with respect to the formal and informal social structure of a particular country are the significant components in a state-building strategy, notes Fukuyama (2004). For the Max Plank 2005 publication, state-building “means the establishment, re-establishment, and strengthening of a public structure in a given territory capable of delivering public goods” (Bogdandy et al., 2005). According to Maley William (2013), Statebuilding ‘refers to attempts to create’ ‘key political and administrative structures’ within ‘territorial units’ of a state or to ‘re-create them when they have either broken down or been severely disruptive.’ Derick W. Brinkerhoff sees state-building more as reforming and strengthening governance or as he called it ‘rebuilding governance’ with regard to ‘legitimacy, security, and effectiveness’ in post-conflict and failed contexts both through national actors and international interventions (2005). In another place, for Brinkerhoff (2005) state-building in a post-conflict context means, providing security through Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), promoting inclusion and participation of citizens in the political process, providing public services and economic opportunities, and implementing the rule of law and good governance. Taking the DDR and security conditions into consideration, Brinkerhoff (2005) sees state-building as identical with peacebuilding (2005).

Nevertheless, there are contradictory and blurred viewpoints concerning whether peacebuilding and state-building are converging concepts. In his statement, ‘An Agenda for Peace’, the 1992 United Nation’s Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali, defines post-conflict peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” ( 1992, Chapter II, Article 21). OECD writes that “peacebuilding is about ending or preventing violent conflict and supporting sustainable peace, while state-building is about establishing capable, accountable, responsive and legitimate states” (OECD, 2010, p. 21). However, in an interesting analytical paper by the German Institute for Development, state-building and peacebuilding are [43] noted as ‘congruent’ concepts which ‘ultimately address a common purpose from different perspectives and ‘generate compatible or complementary approaches of engagement’ (Grävingholt et al., 2009, p. 10). Nevertheless, if peacebuilding and state-building are congruent approaches and target the same goals, then peace-making process is considered a prerequisite by the United Nations. As Boutros-Ghali (1992) writes, “Between the tasks of seeking to prevent conflict and keeping the peace lies the responsibility to try to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means” (Chapter IV, Article 34).

Likewise, Brinkerhoff (2005) believes that conflict and post-conflict are ‘relative terms’ used interchangeably in peace-building studies. He notes that post-conflict does not only refer to the situation of ended violence in a defined terrain, but it could be stopped in some parts and still ongoing in others (Brinkerhoff, 2005). Therefore, state-building initiatives are not dependent on an absolute ceasefire and peace (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq). However, minimal security is a precondition for state-building in a post-conflict-conflict context, according to Wollf (2011). Wollf notes that democracy and lasting peace are the ultimate goals of a state-building project, yet minimal security is a precondition in post-conflict societies (2011).

Furthermore, the term ‘state-building’ is not identical to ‘nation-building’ in the literature. According to the Max Plank 2005 publication, “Nationbuilding is the most common form of a process of collective identity formation with a view to legitimizing public power within a given territory” (von Bogdandy et al., 2005, p. 586). Moreover, unlike peace-building (e.g., usually by the U.N.) and state-building (by third-party intervention), nation-building is an “essentially indigenous process which often not only projects a meaningful future but also draws on existing traditions, institutions, and customs, redefining them as national characteristics in order to support the nation’s claim to sovereignty and uniqueness” (von Bogdandy et al., 2005, p. 586). Hence, nation-building is the outcome of both peacebuilding and state-building processes in the long run.

Moreover, state-building initiatives have been driven by diverse factors and motives through the course of modern history. Fukuyama’s (2004/2005) well-known book, ‘State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st. Century’ classifies ‘modern’ (democratic) state-buildings into three main phases. According to Fukuyama, the first phase of the so-called ‘modern’ state-building agenda began in Europe after the World War II, and in Asia [44] (e.g., India) and Africa with the end of colonialization. However, it gained momentum during the second phase with the collapse of the communism in 1989, at which some countries in the developing world, including Latin America, embraced neo-liberalism by introducing the free-market economy and minimizing state functions. Because many of these states lacked the capacity and authority to enforce laws and regulate the market, this led to increased fragility and in some cases to failure. (Fukuyama, 2004/2005) & (Marquette & Beswick, 2011). Fukuyama’s (2004/2005) thesis of ‘the missing dimension of the stateness’ differentiates between the ‘scope’ of the state which encompasses a large list of functions or services (e.g., security, health, education, infrastructure, and so on) provided to its citizens, and the ‘strength’ or ‘capacity’ (e.g., the institutional capability to enforce law and order) through which a state ‘executes’ its public policy objectives transparently and with accountability. Nevertheless, his analysis of state-building is from an economic development perspective. (Fukuyama, 2004/2005, pp. 18-20).

The third, most recent phase of the state-building mission run by international intervention ostensibly aims not only at curving violent conflicts and civil wars (e.g., Bosnia, –Herzegovina, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan), international terrorism (e.g., Afghanistan), or dictatorial regimes (Iraq) but also at bringing western democracy and economic development to these third world countries (Fritz & Rocha Menocal, 2007). David Chandler (2010) notes that the international state-building went beyond its primary ‘humanitarian and security reasons’ of peacebuilding by ‘developing and exporting frameworks of good governance’ (p. 1). Based on Chandler (2010) though, the intention of the international state-building is that of bringing social, economic, and political stability and development, however problematic, the way these policies and strategies are formed and implemented may be. Lack of contextual understanding and difficulties in coordination are the two main problems in international state-building policy design and implementation as identified by Chandler (2010).

The state-building intervention of the developed world, particularly OECD countries, in developing countries tends to be western liberal democracy-centric both in policy design and in practice and is often criticized in the literature for this reason. Some scholars and pundits compare it with the 19th century’s European colonization of injecting western linear bureaucratic norms and values in developing a country’s hybrid social and political [45] settings. Nevertheless, the difference is that contemporary interventions are temporary and are carried out in a development assistance format (Marquette & Beswick, 2011) & (Skendaj, 2014). However, Albrecht & Wiuff Moe (2014) note that western and nonwestern state discourse is by no means about advocating hybrid political orders over stable democracies but is intended to deepen our understanding of the complexity of the contexts, which is key to the success of the state-building approach.

The term state-building and its policy approach encompass a wide variety of interdisciplinary concepts and perceptions aiming at bringing security, peace, institutionalization, democratization, legitimacy, good governance, and economic development.

The conceptual and literature-based practical controversies about state fragility and state formation require us to acknowledge that there can be no ‘one size fits all’ state-building policy or approach. However, it is essential to study various cases and their approaches, and identify the missing factors causing state fragility or other instability circumstances and then act accordingly.

Taking the above definitions, overlapping concepts, and discourse into consideration. We need to distinguish between state-building as the formation of institutions (democratic, functioning, and accountable) through various available institutional designs or forms of government (parliamentary vs presidential and centralization vs decentralization), and as a governance process (elections, the rule of law, good governance, and economic development) both at the national and local level. Both could be causes and consequences of a state sliding into fragility, failed and collapse circumstances. That means that a state with none or ill-functioning political systems and institutions could lead to poor service delivery, corruption, economic stagnation, and, conversely, poor service delivery, corruption, and stagnation could lead to a deterioration of political systems and institutions. Furthermore, formal, and informal state institutions are the prime concern of state-building literature.

In post-Taliban Afghanistan, we also witnessed the implementation of various state-building strategies aiming at ending the decades-long conflicts. The present stuttering democracy of the Afghan state is the outcome of the Bonn state-building process, which is built on the loss of hundred-thousands of human lives (these includes Afghan and international civilians and soldiers), and billions of US dollars in aid. If we wish to preserve these costly [46] state-building achievements and enter a stabilization period, the Afghan government must undertake an overall review and reform of its state-building agenda, both at the national and local levels.