Читать книгу The State-Building Dilemma in Afghanistan - Haqmal Daudzai - Страница 14

Max Weber’s (1946) definition of the state as ‘a human community that (successfully) claim[s] the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ is one of the most cited definitions in political science literature. Simeon Mitropolitski analyses Weber’s definition into contemporary political science disciplines. According to Mitropolitski (2011), the concepts; monopoly, legitimacy, and force are the ‘three main’ features, and human community and territory are two sub or ‘secondary’ features through which political science could well understand the state. He interprets the concept of ‘monopoly’ as political power, ‘legitimacy’ as ‘the type of cultural acceptance’ (e.g., Islamic, authoritarian or democracy) of a regime, and ‘physical force’ as ‘the main technique of governance’ (e.g., centralized vs decentralized political systems) in a society (Mitropolitski, 2011). Among contemporary political science scholars, Bob Jessop (1990) is very reluctant to settle on a specific definition of the state and specifically, disagrees with Weber’s definition. According to Jessop (1990), the state is a ‘form-determined social relation’ rather than an ‘abstract and formal object’ which varies, in real-world politics, from one state to another. Jessop (1990) asserts that:

the core of the state apparatus comprises a distinct ensemble of institutions and organizations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society in the name of their common interest or general will. (p. 341)

In other words, it is a ‘macro-political organization’ with ‘social bases,’ projects, and big national goals (Jessop, 1990). According to Jessop, most state-centric theories agree that the ‘state’ is ‘just one institutional ensemble among others (e.g., civil society, media, market, interest groups, and so on.) within a social formation’, yet it is seen as responsible for providing ‘cohesion’ to all other institutions and for fixing their problems. (Jessop, 2015). Jessop (1990) asserts that in order to understand the nature of the state, [47] it is important to understand the ‘complex forms of articulations among the state institutions and between the state and non-state institutions’ (p. 340). In another place, he states, that ‘structural power and capacities’ of a state can be understood in its particular ‘strategic-relational’ context (Jessop, 2015, p. 18). John Martinussen (1997) defined the state from a socialist point of view as an ‘independent institution that functions in accordance with the decision of rational decision-makers’ (pp. 220-221). Whereas the economic theory dethrones the state as an independent institution and makes it dependent on the ‘interests of international capital’ (Martinussen, 1997). However, Martinussen (1997) cautions that most of the theories on the state are derived from the western developed or industrialized context which could be misleading for the Third World countries’ context. Thus, for him as well, the state is one institution among many, nevertheless in the Third World context with the following four main characteristics. (1) It is ‘a product of conflicting interests and power struggles’; (2) ‘a manifestation of structures’ which holds certain powers and functions, and determines the roles, relations and behaviors of state and non-state institutions and individuals; (3) ‘an arena’ or a political sphere where different social forces interact and compete for their interests, and (4) ‘an actor’ which through its autonomous power and capacities influences processes and events in a society (Martinussen, 1997). Parts of the above-listed dimensions of a state will be contextualized in this dissertation’s case study in the coming chapters, for which it was necessary to understand what a state is.

It is also essential to draw on what differentiates western from non-western statehood. Western or Weberian-type states refer to all ‘stable liberal democracies based on an industrialized market economy’ namely OECD countries (Boege et al., 2009, p. 18). The main concept under the Weberian state model is the ‘clear distinction between public and private spheres’ in which its people accept the state as the only ‘legitimate’ and the ‘highest authority’ having the ‘monopoly’ of power ‘over a territory and population.’ In return, it provides public services to its citizens including security, health, education, law and order, and economic opportunities (OECD, 2010) & (Marquette & Beswick, 2011) On the other hand, hybrid or non-western states are characterized with more than one ‘legitimate actor’ or source of power in a defined territory in which ‘the state’ shares both the legitimacy and authority with other informal actors (e.g., clan or tribal elders, community and religious figures and representatives of village councils, strongmen and warlords, [48] etc.). In this case, the state is engaged with citizens partly through other than formal mechanisms including religious, customary, and traditional laws and codes of conduct (Boege et al., 2009). Patronage networks and personal relations are the prime sources of attaining political representation and economic opportunities in hybrid political orders (OECD, 2010). According to Boege and others (2009), the ‘mainstream’ practices and literature on state-building are mostly that of the western perspective, which is why it is unsuccessful in many cases. For a hybrid social and political society, a hybrid political order (mixture or a compromise of a modern state and traditional local structures) could prove more effective than a western cooked exported model (Clement et al., 2007). Boege and his colleagues also recommend a state-building approach which speaks to the ground realities and conditions, namely integrating and engaging informal/local actors in formal state structures, giving them a sense of ownership through transferring roles and responsibilities (2009). ‘Ownership’ is a new buzzword in donor development policies that means letting local actors set priorities and agendas. While this makes sense conceptually, in practice, if these ‘local actors’ are none-democratic, then local ownership does more harm than good. For example, warlords, drug-traffickers, and strongmen who hold official positions in Afghanistan’s government, particularly in peripheries, further eroded and complicated the situation for state legitimacy and stability (for more, see the chapter on warlords in Afghanistan). Beoge et al. (2009) also note that there is to be a distinction between local-spoilers; warlords and drug-traffickers who only seek their personal interests, and local-cooperators; e. g. clan-chiefs, tribal elders and informal council representatives who are motivated, not only by personal and group incentives but also by legitimacy concerns, when it comes to building a state in a hybrid manner.

One concept crucial to understanding the state and its formation is legitimacy, a process as necessary for maintaining the authority of local power brokers as it is for the state.

OECD defines legitimacy as the acceptance of ‘a political order,’ an ‘institution,’ or an ‘actor’ by a group of people as a legitimate form of rule, without questioning its correctness of ‘how’ and ‘why’ (2010, p. 15). Legitimacy is not a directly measurable concept. The classic understanding of state legitimacy could be listed under functions and concepts including nationalism, religious identity, public service delivery, economic performance and development, democratic participation, and accountability (Fritz & [49] Menocal, 2007). However, both Fukuyama (2004/2005) and Brinkerhoff (2005) note that, since the end of the cold war, democracy and good governance are accepted as prime standards through which states’ legitimacy could be universally measured. However, it is significant to note that field experience shows that developing, war-torn, and (some) Muslim countries have a different measurement of legitimacy and democracy⁸. As March and Oslen (2008) wrote, “Legitimacy depends not only on showing that actions accomplish appropriate objective, but also that actors behave in accordance with legitimate procedures ingrained in a culture” (p. 8).

Theories that support state-building and its relevant concepts and agendas are reviewed in the following chapter.