Читать книгу The State-Building Dilemma in Afghanistan - Haqmal Daudzai - Страница 9

Of course, the constitution is a document that can be amended. The constitution shall be respected. Its implementation is essential and requires a strong determination by the nation. However, the constitution is not the Quran. If five or ten years down the line we find that stability improves, proper political parties emerge, and we judge that a parliamentary system can function better, then a Loya Jirga can, at a time of our choosing, be convened to adopt a different system of government. (Hamid Karzai, January 4, 2004)

The above statement is part of the closing speech by Hamid Karzai – a then interim president of Afghanistan – to the participants of the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) in January 2004. At the CLJ meeting, Karzai acknowledged that the bulk of his non-Pashtun (mainly Tajiks, Hazara, and Uzbek) countrymen were unhappy with the adoption of a heavily centralized presidential system. To calm down the non-Pashtun opponents of Presidentialism, Karzai assured the possibility of adopting a parliamentary system through amending the constitution.

The well-known scholar on Afghanistan, Barnet Rubin, who was also actively involved at the Bonn state-building process for Afghanistan, highlights from his notes from the CLJ that “nearly all Pushtun delegates, joined by some members from other ethnic groups, came out for a presidential system. A bloc of non-Pushtun delegates, however, strongly supported a parliamentary system. Both sides made cases that mixed genuine public considerations with ethnopolitical ambitions” (Rubin, 2004, p.12). Although the 2004 constitution adopted a heavy unitary centralized state system, the government formed a de-facto ethnopolitical elite coalition, sharing power with various local power-holders. While Karzai, a Pashtun, became the president, the two vice-president posts and other vital ministerial posts were given to the Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek Northern Alliances parties. At the subnational government level, the provincial and district governor positions were also handed over to those local warlords who already controlled the areas.

Historically as well, Afghanistan has always remained a unitary centralized state in theory, while in practice, the central government rulers had to either conquer or compromise with the local ethno-tribal elites.

[22] Following the fraudulent and disputed presidential elections in September 2014, the U.S. Secretary of State’s John Kerry mediated a power-sharing arrangement, known as the National Unity Government (NUG) between the second round two leading candidates, Ashraf Ghani, and Abdullah Abdullah. The NUG agreement formally recognized the ethnopolitical power-sharing government through a unique style of semi-Presidentialism arrangements by creating a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) post – somewhat like a prime minister position – for Abdullah. The agreement also called on “convening of a Loya Jirga to amend the 2004 constitution and considering the proposal to create a post of an executive prime minister” within two years of its deal (The ‘government of national unity’ deal, 2014). While the NUG government is soon to enter its final year of the five-year period, the constitutional Loya Jirga has not taken place so far. Furthermore, the deal also insisted on the equal distribution of ‘senior officials’ of the government at national and local levels (The ‘government of national unity’ deal, 2014).

Although the prerequisites’ stability and the emergence of proper political parties, noted by Karzai in 2004, are not yet in place, the NUG arrangements revived the ethnopolitical divide over the state, which stemmed from the Bonn state-building discourse in 2001. If it ever happens that the Afghan political elites reach a consensus on amending the constitution, the question, which alternative state governmental form would suit better the Afghan context, would be a matter of discourse. Hence, the outcome of this research would not only add to the academic discourse of the post-conflict and ethnopolitical fragmented democracies but also serve as a policy proposal for the case of Afghanistan.

As discussed in detail below, the state-institutional design is a significant component of the state-building process. According to Stefan Wollf:

The underlying assumption of the state-building literature, in other words, is that peace can be facilitated through an institutional bargain that establishes macro-level structures through which micro-level rewards are provided to elites (and their supporters), giving them incentives to resolve their differences by democratic political, non-violent means. (Wollf, 2011, p. 1779)

Wollf’s observation leads us to one of the critical hypotheses of this dissertation. I argue that ignoring peace-making – as one the most significant precondition for state-building, at the 2001 Bonn conference, resulted in the return of the Taliban insurgency and prolongation of the Afghan conflict. Based on the state-building interventionist theory, chapter three of this thesis [23] briefly analyses the cause and consequences of the U.S. intervention, its peace and the state-building failure in Afghanistan. The first hypothesis is tested in chapter four.

The second hypothesis of this dissertation is that the Afghan ethnopolitical elites are divided over the state-institutional design – in which the Pashtuns resist for a unitary centralization, whereas the non-Pashtuns advocate for a parliamentary decentralization. The second hypothesis is tested in chapter four and five.

Besides testing the above-stated hypothesis, the present research studies state-building in Afghanistan, mainly from the perspective of state-institutional design (unitary centralization vs. parliamentary decentralization) at the national level. Based on the field research, the dissertation also attempts to find the role of the 2005 elected provincial councils at the sub-national administration for a possible decentralization. Following are some of the critical questions this dissertation aims to undertake in the discussion.

1. How far are the Afghan ethnopolitical elites divided over state-institutional design?

2. Taking the ethnopolitical divisions of the Afghan elites and the present security, sociopolitical, and economic conditions of the country into consideration, is the current presidential system appropriate or is there a need for an alternative model?

3. The Afghan democratic provincial councils (PCs) are completing their third successive term in March 2019. What role do they play at the subnational administrations? What has been improved in their role, authority, and performance since their establishment?

4. Taking the elected PCs as a prerequisite for local democracy, good governance, and decentralization, is Afghanistan ready to transform into a decentralized government administration? If yes, which kind of decentrallization fits into the Afghan context?

The first question attempts to test the hypothesis by finding out how far the Afghan political elites are divided over state-institutional design. It follows the post-Bonn constitutional discourse over the state-governmental design, in which Pashtun political elites opted for a presidential centralization, the non-Pashtun for parliamentary decentralization, and a few of whom demanded Federalism. I argue that the U.S., as the key architect of the Bonn processes, [24] through its threat and incentive policy, made the non-Pashtun Afghan elites compromise over the present unitary centralized system in Afghanistan.

Based on the theoretical foundation for existing classical democracies around the world including Juan J. Linz’s (1990) Parliamentarism, Donald L. Horowitz’s (1990) Presidentialism, Maurice Duverger’s (1980) semi-Presidentialism, and Lijphart’s (1977 & 2002,2003) consociational democracy, the second question seeks to find out which system would fit best the Afghan context. The first two questions are mainly concerned with state-building and its institutional design at the national government level.

Any alternative proposal to the present presidential centralization brings the sub-national government institutions into the discussion, which leads us to our third and fourth questions. The third question aims to study the elected provincial councils’ role, functions, and capacity since its first-time establishment in September 2005. Strong local democratic institutions are considered as the prerequisite for decentralization in the academic literature. Hence, taking the present status and capacity of the PCs, question four tests the applicability for a possible decentralization in the Afghan context.

Although, I briefly evaluated the historical context for the sociopolitical background knowledge for the readers, the Bonn process in 2001 until the establishment of the NUG government in 2014 is considered as the main timeframe for this dissertation.

The focus of this study is primarily on the Afghan state central institutional design and is also democratic provincial councils centric. I am aware that the sub-national state and its actors are not the only players involved in contemporary state-building and its reform agenda. Nevertheless, owing to the time and scope of this research project, the focus is on the elected provincial councils and their role and impact on a broader state-building reform project in Afghanistan.