Читать книгу The State-Building Dilemma in Afghanistan - Haqmal Daudzai - Страница 18

Ostensibly, the contemporary OECD state-building policies and projects are either part of the preventive, or extended mission of the primarily humanitarian intervention, halting weak, failing, or post-conflict states sliding into human catastrophes. The spectrum of such intervention contains military and nonmilitary policy packages, including the provision of humanitarian assistance, security, ‘rule of law,’ ‘good governance,’ democracy, and institutionalization of the government apparatus (Veit & Klaus, 2012). Richard Caplan called this; ‘third-party’ state-building, which is different both in authority and legitimacy from that of ‘indigenous state-building’ (Caplan, 2004, p. 53). In both policy and practice, part of these state-building and humanitarian interventions is still highly inspired by the invalid classical modernization and political development theories discussed in detail above.

Humanitarian intervention is defined as the act of interference by a state, organization of a group of states (e.g., NATO), or an international organization (United Nations) in another state with or without using force, [66] aiming at ending ‘violent’ oppression and atrocities or other human rights violations committed by a ruling government regime on its own people (Heinze, 2009 ) & (Trim & Simms, 2011). Eric A. Heinze (2009 ) notes that humanitarian intervention takes its justification from the moral reasoning of the cosmopolitan theory. According to Heinze (2009 ), “a cosmopolitan morality suggests that state is rightfully the subject of external moral scrutiny for how it treats its citizens” (p. 16). In other words, since cosmopolitanism considers ‘human well-being’ and ‘individual autonomy’ as ‘the highest moral good,’ therefore, where human suffering occurs by a state on its people, international intervention is morally permissible (Heinze, 2009 ). Whereas according to the statism theory, states ‘have a legal and moral claim against outside interference’ and are ‘free’ to ‘create their own political community’ the way that is appropriate for them (Heinze, 2009 , pp. 16-17).

The statists are against any intervention in a sovereign state’s affairs, unless, and only if, a state government commits ‘widespread massacre or enslavement of their own people’ (Heinze, 2009 ). It is worth noting here that Henze’s humanitarian intervention perspective is primarily military intervention. According to Joseph Boyle (2006), based on the traditional just war theory, military intervention or intervention with force is ‘morally a kind of warfare.’

Nevertheless, there is a distinction between humanitarian action/assistance and intervention, in which the former requires the willingness and ‘cooperation’ of the installed government and the latter is carried out with force (Trim & Simms, 2011). Similarly, any military intervention is not considered humanitarian intervention, even if it is invited by ‘a party claiming de jure or de facto authority in that state’ (Trim & Simms, 2011, p. 5). Thus, military intervention is legal only under the condition of ‘self-defense’ and ‘prior authorization’ of ‘the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council’, based on Heinze (2009 ). Brendan Simms and D.J.B Trim (2011) note that, despite being ‘perfectly licit within the international law,’ humanitarian intervention with military force is seen as the very last option due to its ‘controversial’ drawbacks on ‘international relations’. Another primary justification or legitimization for intervention, besides human rights violations, is the right to self-defense and security. However, as Andrea Kathryn Talentino notes, the concept of security has not remained in its traditional form of a military threat, but in contemporary world politics, encompasses a larger area of concern of states, including economics, health, migration, drug trade, [67] terrorism, gender, and environmental issues (Talentino, 2005). In this regard Howard Adelman also writes:

In the global nation-states system, there is a compact among the states that each (state) has exclusive jurisdiction over the land and peoples within their respective territories. States assume responsibility for the security and well-being of their own people. But a state only exists as a fully developed state if there is sufficient control and power exercised over the body politic, and if the polity is capable of surviving on its own. As a body politic, there has to be both centralized coercive control and economy in place that will ensure survival. (2002, pp. 3-4)

It can be asserted from Adelman (2002) and Talentino (2005) that where a state fails to ensure the security and well-being of its own citizens –and where that may affect the security and stability of another state– intervention by the other state/s is permissible. In other words, international security and stability are dependent on the ability of individual states to provide security, economic opportunity, and law and order. Thus, it is at this juncture where the powerful states go beyond their primarily humanitarian intervention of providing security and aid to state-building engagement. The invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States after the 9/11 attack and its following state-building intervention could be a perfect example of such kind.

Although the intention and objectives of such interventions might be humanitarian and reformative, its operational policies and strategies might often result in disruptive rather than constructive outcomes. It is at this juncture where the humanitarian intervention with or without military force is controversial among the scholars. Heinze (2009 ) also believes that any humanitarian intervention is subject to moral, legal, and political justification questions. Another major point in the interventionist literature is the increasing responsibility taken by the strong western states for failing or failed states.

As David Chandler writes:

International state-building is no longer something that just happens after the event – western military intervention for humanitarian or security reasons (Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq) or post-conflict peacebuilding (Bosnia and East Timor) – but is increasingly seen as a vital package of policy measures designed to prevent states from sliding into economic and political collapse. A set of international policy prescriptions, the frameworks of good governance are seen as a ‘silver bullet’ capable of assisting states in coping with the problems of our complex globalized world: facilitating sustainable development, social peace and the development of democracy and the rule of law. (2010, p. 1)

[68] Chandler’s statements bring us a step nearer to the present debate of what an international state-building intervention is and how it happens.

Berit Beliesemann de Guevara writes, “…any powerful group struggling to institutionalize its power as a legitimate form of state rule can be framed as an agent of state-building” (2012, p. 5). That means the international community state-building intervention is a top-down, self-styled, and readymade strategy applied to third world countries. Whereas state-formation is the product of historical conflicting interactions and processes among different groups within a society (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012). Guevara (2012) analyzes state-building discourse from ‘the international state-builders’ and ‘the local recipients’ perspectives. According to him, international state-builders attempt to export modern ‘liberal peace’, democracy, ‘internationalization and depoliticisation’ policy and practices to non-western societies aiming at building states and (good) governance, yet ignoring historical contexts, social dynamics, and processes quite different from that of western societies (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012). The local recipients (powerful political elites) in their account, often question the legitimacy of such intervention and continue to struggle for their social and political survival, in some cases with revolt (e.g., warlords and the re-insurgency in the case of Afghanistan), which doom any reforming efforts to failure. Besides, since statehood is a complex interaction between local, national, and international actors and processes, the institutionalization of power as a legitimate rule/ actor, therefore, requires the utilization of ‘strategies and tactics’ (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012). The application of these strategies and tactics results in conflicting interests between various groups in a society, which leads to diverse ‘reactions’ including ‘resistance, cooperation, and manipulation’ (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012).

Moreover, the internationalized conditions for state-building made many post-conflicts states dependent on their international partners for finances, security, the rule of law and legitimacy (Chandler, 2004) & (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012). The primary state-society relation –provision of services and the monopoly of force by the state and in return collecting taxes and earning legitimacy from its population– is distorted and replaced by ‘clientelistic networks sustained’ by political and economic ‘rents’ (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012). For example, the flow of financial and military aid by the U.S. and NATO forces to warlords and tribal elites created powerful parastate actors in Afghanistan. By providing economic and political rents to its [69] local subordinates and tribal networks, these once unpopular powerbrokers not only gained local loyalty but also managed to occupy key government decision-making positions, soon misused for farther personal gains. The government office further facilitated access to illicit income opportunities including the drug-trade and widespread corruption. Meanwhile, these powerbrokers became so strong and influential that any attempt at reform that might cause their income sources to dry-up would lead to political instability and even to the threat of collapse of the political regime. This is in no small extent happening at the current Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah national unity government. In contrast to ex-president Hamid Karzai, President Ghani stopped paying powerful Mujahidin commanders which resulted in their withdrawing support from the regime and even planning plots to remove Ghani.

In addition to direct state military interventions, the United Nations (U.N.) and the OECD countries’ national development organizations are among the key players of soft-skill state-building strategies and policies in developing and post-conflict countries. Here too, the independent academia has a quite critical viewpoint of the parties implementing these projects. For instance, Chandler (2010) believes that the international ‘fictional policy narrative’ of ‘universalizing’ western liberal democracy and market economics is ignoring ‘the needs and interests of those subject to intervention’ which not only disrupts the state-formation processes but also undermines the reform objectives of the interventionists. Florian P. Kühn (2012) affirms the international state-builders for their ‘contradictory logic’ of disturbing the natural, social, and political interactions and processes by injecting western ‘ideal’ state models in non-western societies.

In the case of Afghanistan, majority of the aid is directly spent by the individual donor institutions based on their own institutional mandates and conditions. Therefore, it often not only fails to help the state-building process but also undermines the minimum state institutions. Lack of cooperation and coordination among these international players in applying contradictory, self-styled reform strategies, and projects are another major dilemma ahead of state institutionalization for intervened countries. The creation of several duplicated local development councils at the village, district, and provincial levels in Afghanistan for instance, impaired the existence of the elected provincial and traditional village councils.