Читать книгу The State-Building Dilemma in Afghanistan - Haqmal Daudzai - Страница 6
Table of Content
ОглавлениеPART ONE: INTRODUCTION, CONCEPTS AND THEORIES
1.1 Research Hypothesis, Questions and Significance
1.3 An Overview of the Literature
1.4 The Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 2: Statebuilding Concepts and Definitions
2.1 Statebuilding and Its Relevant Concepts
Chapter 3: Statebuilding Theories
3.1 Classical and Dialectical Modernization Theories
3.2 The Political Development Theory and the State-building Strategy
3.3 ‘New’– Institutionalism Theory and the Political Institutional Approach
3.4 Humanitarian Intervention Theory and State-building
Chapter 4: Statebuilding Components
4.1 State Institutional Design: Presidential versus Parliamentary Democracies
4.2 Consociational Democracy in Divided Societies
4.5 Administrative Decentralization
4.6 Political Decentralization
PART TWO: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Chapter 5: A Historical Overview of the Statebuilding in Afghanistan
5.1 State, Society, and Politics in Afghanistan
5.2 The Emergence of an Ethno-Confederation Afghanistan (1747-1880)
5.3 State Modernization Attempts (1880-1963)
5.4 The First Afghan ‘Democracy’ (1964-1973)
5.5 The Formation of First Afghan Political Parties
5.6 The Radical Shift from Monarchy to Republicanism, and the Failed Attempt of Communism
5.8 The Afghan Resistance and the Failure of Political Islam
5.9 The Islamic Emirate of Taliban (1994-2001)
Chapter 6: A Critical Analyses of the U.S. Post-Taliban Intervention in Afghanistan (2001-2014)
6.1 The U.S. Post-Taliban Nation and Statebuilding Intervention
6.2 The Bonn Agreement and Its Unfixable Flaws
6.3 Ignoring Peace-Making in Afghanistan: A Prerequisite for Nation and State-Building
6.4 The Re-Emergence of Taliban: A Major Obstacle to Peace-and State-Building Process
6.5 Conflicting Regional Interests in Afghanistan
6.6 The Installation of Ethnopolitical Elites and Warlords into State-men
6.7 The Case of Balkh: The Kingdom of ‘Ustad’ Atta Mohammad Noor
6.8 The Case of Bamyan: The De-facto Capital and Power-base of Hazara Elites
6.9 The Case of Herat: The Fiefdom of Ismail Khan
6.10 The Case of Nangrahar: Divided between Pashtun and Pashayie Ethnic Warlords
6.11 The Case of Kandahar: Divided between Tribal Warlords and Elites
PART THREE: KEY ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Chapter 7: State Governmental Design and the Afghan Discourse
7.1 The 2004 Afghan Constitution: An Unresolved Controversial Document
7.5 Ethnic Identity vs. National Identity
7.6 The Afghan Presidential Vs. Parliamentary State Institutional Design Discourse
7.7 The Afghan Perception of Democracy
7.8 The Afghan Perception of State Governmental Form
7.9 The Proponents of Presidential Centralization
7.10 The Advocates for a Sort of Parliamentary Decentralization
Chapter 8: The Afghan Sub-National Administration
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Sub-national Formal and Informal Government Institutions
8.3 Provincial Governor & Administration
8.5 Informal Governance of Jirgas and Shuras
Chapter 9: The Afghan Elected Provincial Councils and Their Role in the Sub-National Governance
9.1 The Afghan Elected Provincial Councils
9.2 The Oversight Authority of the Afghan PCs
9.4 De-Facto Service Delivery: The Catalytic Role at Local Bureaucracy
9.5 The Bridge between the People and Government: Building on State Legitimacy
9.6 The Increasing Role of Afghan Female PC Representatives
9.7 The Changing Face of Local Power: The Power of the Gun Leaves its Place to the Power of the Vote
9.8 Lack of Enough Financial Means to the PC Led to Corruption
Chapter 10: Conclusions and the Prospects for a Future Research
10.1 Few Possible Alternatives to the Afghan Unitary Centralism
10.2 Federalism for Afghanistan
10.5 The Afghan Sub-National Governance Institutions: Challenges and Opportunities
10.6 The Afghan PC, a Potential Institution for a Moderate and Gradual Devolution
10.7 Future Research Prospects
Annex 1: Expert Interview’s Questionnaire
Part One: Demographic Questions
Part Two: Background Questions
Part Three: Focus group, the provincial government elected and appointed members
Annex 2: The Dari Version of the Presidential Decree on PC Oversight Power