Читать книгу The State-Building Dilemma in Afghanistan - Haqmal Daudzai - Страница 17

In the earlier section, we discussed that political modernization and development theories are based on rational choice and individual behavior theories. The contemporary ‘new-institutionalization theory’ brings in institutions as the game-changer in political science studies. As B. Guy Peter (2005) writes: “the success of these two disciplinary revolutions (behaviouralism and the rational choice) is the backdrop for which the ‘new institutionalism’ came into existence.” (p. 16). The ‘new’-institutionalization theory, introduced by James G. March and John P. Oslen in the late 1980s, is a shift of focus from [59] individuals to institutions, which according to Peters (2000) are ‘arrangements of rules and incentives’ and are independent variables influencing individuals’ attitudes and choices. March and Oslen (1989) defined institution as a set of ‘rules,’ ‘routines’, and forms that are constructed along the historical experiences in a society and ‘persist beyond the historical moments and conditions’ which influence individual behaviors and vice versa (pp. 167168). According to Sven Steinmo, institutions are ‘formal and informal rules’ which constitute the bases for political behavior (2001). He adds, formal institutions are embedded in constitutional forms and the informal in cultural norms, and with their (both formal and informal) absence ‘there could be no organized politics’ (Steinmo, 2001).

The ‘new-institutionalism’ theory is also dispersed into various subcategory approaches among political science and sociology scholars. In his book Institutional Theory in Political Science, Peters (2005) lists them under six significant approaches including rational choice, empirical, historical, sociological, institutions of interest representation, and international institutionalism. Edwin Amenta and Kelly M. Ramsey reduced them to three categories: historical, sociological, and political institutionalism (2010). Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Tylor (1996) also divided them into three main approaches: historical, rational choice, and sociological institutionalism.

However, the pioneers of the normative institutionalization approach March and Oslen (2008) note that institutionalism “connotes a general approach to the study of political institutions, (which are) a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses concerning the relations between institutional characteristics and political agency, performance, and change” (p. 2). In another place, Peters (2008) also writes: “Although there are several approaches to institutionalism, they all focus on the central role of structures in shaping politics and also in shaping individual behavior” (p. 48). Since institutionalism in a broader sense is concerned with rules, routines, structures, and processes in an institution in society, with their impact on individuals and vice versa, and with the notion that they are all in constant change, therefore, it is appropriate to choose this theoretical approach for analyzing the state-building project in Afghanistan at both the local and national level. This research is primarily relying on the normative or political institutionalization theory of March and Oslen for its theoretical framework. Based on this, I will review the formal and informal institutions, and their controversial relations and social and political impacts on national and local level governance. [60] However, to project a precise picture of the matter and for the purpose of analysis, some necessary concepts and terms are borrowed from other approaches too. For example, the study of how warlords and tribal elites emerged as influential political leaders in the Afghan government context requires a historical review, for which one needs the historical institutionalism framework and approach.

Fortunately, institutional approaches are all relevant to and dependent on each other. Amenta and Ramsey (2010) note that “political institutionalism has become more historical and focused on historical processes and focuses theoretical attention on the interaction of actors at a medium-systemic, interorganizational, or meso-level” (p. 27).

Moreover, in respect to whether institutions could have a formal and informal format and be in national and local levels, Peters (2005) says, “… in political science…everything from formal structure like a parliament to very amorphous entities like social class, with other components of the sociopolitical universe …(are) also being described as institutions” (p. 29). Theda Skocpol (2010) also writes, “institutions may be formal organization or informal networks” (p. 105). In another place, Peters (2008) writes that it is the ‘continuous interaction’ of ‘a range of institutions, actors and ideas’ that ‘provide’ the foundation for governance in a society. If institutions encompass both formal government and informal traditional structures and norms, then institutionalism can be used as a theoretical framework for this empirical research. The problem statements and research questions of this dissertation explore the state formal political (particularly provincial councils) and the traditional informal (warlord networks and tribal councils) institutions, their routines, orders, roles, inter-interaction, and the changes which occur as a result of the impacts on each other. This approach will help us know how politics work and what causing factors and consequences lead to instability or stability in the Afghan sociopolitical context. However, before going into detail, March and Oslen (2008) highlight a very relevant point which appeals to the issue this thesis is concerned with:

Another core assumption (in new institutionalism) is that the translation of structures into political action and action into institutional continuity and change, are generated by comprehensible and routine processes. A challenge for (the) student of institutions is to explain how such processes are stabilized or destabilized, and which factors sustain or interrupt ongoing processes (p. 3).

[61] This research analyses political institutions (both formal and informal) and their processes and consequences for the sake of stable and democratic state institutional design at the central and subnational levels in the Afghan context. It will be a challenge to propose a concrete prescription as March and Oslen cautioned above. Nevertheless, the attempt is to learn about these institutions, their structures, and processes, and possibly find improved alternatives for both political scientists and policymakers.

Now that institutions and what they constitute have been clearly defined, the next questions would be, where do they come from or how do they form? The answers to these questions are important for the informal institutions and structures discussed in the Afghan sociopolitical context in the later chapters. Peters (2005) writes that ‘the rules and norms that are argued to shape institutions’ crystalize from collective behaviors of individuals viewed as appropriate in society. He adds that once ‘some common norms’ in the form of ‘reciprocity, honesty, and cooperation’ are practiced in a society, they turn into routines ‘in proto-institutional settings’ which create meaning, values, and the motivation for membership (p. 33). In Peters’ words, “an institution is created when a formal structure has meaning for the members, and when those members begin to believe that the structure is something more than a means to an end” (2005, p. 33). According to Peters (2005), it is this ‘logic of appropriateness’ that moves people to participate and get membership in an institution, including in a political one. In another place, he notes that political parties and networks come into existence as a result of ‘political dynamics’ in a state, which he called this ‘institutions of interest representation’ (2005).

Regarding what institutions produce, what role they play in shaping, and changing the political behaviors of political actors, March, and Oslen (2008) write:

Within an institutional perspective, a core assumption is that institutions create elements of order and predictability. They fashion, enable, and constrain political actors as they act within a logic of appropriate action. Institutions are carriers of identities and roles and they are makers of a polity’s character, history, and vision. They provide bonds that tie citizens together in spite of the many things that divide them.” (p. 3).

Alternatively, in another place they note:

“institutions are imagined to organize the polity and to have an ordering effect on how authority and power is constituted, exercised, legitimated, controlled and redistributed. [62] They affect how political actors are enabled or constrained and the governing capacities of a political system. Institutions simplify political life by ensuring that some things are taken as given. Institutions provide codes of appropriate behavior, affective ties, and a belief in a legitimate order. Rules and practices specify what is normal, what must be expected, what can be relied upon, and what makes sense in the community; that is, what a normal, reasonable, and responsible (yet fallible) citizen, elected representative, administrator, or judge, can be expected to do in various situations (p. 6).

To contextualize the characteristics mentioned above, dynamics and consequences of institutions, the empirical questions, and hypotheses of this dissertation are briefly brought into the discussion here. Do the Afghan elected provincial councils (PCs), as quite new political institutions (though weak, however, embedded in the constitution) constitute, exercise, legitimate, control and redistribute authority and power? What impact had these new institutions (PCs) on the political behavior of the Afghan tribal and warlord political elites? Moreover, how much have these new institutions (PCs) made and changed the ‘political character’ and ‘vision’ of these political actors so far? In other words, has the formation of PCs in the Afghan sub-national political context been able to ‘provide codes of appropriate behavior, affective ties, and a belief in a legitimate order’? According to the findings of this research study, a majority of the provincial council representatives are sponsored by, or themselves are warlords, drug mafia and powerful tribal elites who not only run and shape local politics, but also influence national agendas through violent and illegal means. These local power brokers are used to doing politics in a more traditional patron-client manner, in which rules are established by an informal code of conduct rather than by a constitution and its embedded laws. If these formal institutions (PCs) yet have not built this capacity and ‘vision’, is there any tendency for building it in the future or is it opposite?

Moreover, what impact did the new constitutionally defined formal institutions (PCs) have over the old traditional informal institutions (namely Shuras/Jirgas)? The answers to the above questions would lead us to one part of our main subject namely, the potential of the sub-national institution in a stable and democratic institutional design. In other words, this thesis will highlight whether the PCs are institutions capable of taking the load and responsibility for a possible decentralization of Afghan state institutions.

Another significant matter, which March and Oslen are concerned about is the ‘order’ and ‘change’ in political institutions. To put it differently, what [63] orders do institutions produce? And whether, and when, institutions change from one form to another. In this respect March and Oslen (1989) describe:

Although they (Institutions) provide important elements of order in the changing scene of politics, political institutions themselves also change. The processes of change include the mundane, incremental transformations of everyday life as well as the rarer metamorphoses at breaking points of history – when a society’s values and institutions are challenged or shattered. These are situations where citizens are more likely to become aware of the values, concepts, beliefs, and institutions by which they live. Typically, in such situations the political institutions and the ways in which they organize the relations between citizens, elected representatives, bureaucrats and experts, and organized interests are reexamined, and possibly modified, transformed, or replaced. In general, changes are produced through some kind of encounter between the rules (or action based on them) and an environment, partly consisting of other rules. The dramatic version is war or civil war which may replace one definition of appropriateness with another. The less dramatic version is an ongoing tension among alternative institutional rules – and an ongoing debate or struggle over the matching of institutional principles and actual situations and spheres of activities. (March & Olsen, 1989, pp. 166-167)

March and Oslen’s description speak very well to the conditions of both informal and formal political institutions in Afghanistan. From the establishment of modern-day Afghanistan until contemporary political developments, the informal social institutions, and networks (e.g., tribal councils and patronage networks) often played a game-changing role in overthrowing one regime and bringing another in power. The more than three and half decades of war and conflict brought considerable changes in its format, norms, and values. For example, the 1920s modernization, the 1970s communism and the 1990s radical Islamization years including civil war and ethnic conflicts shaped and reshaped the norms, values, and structures of these institutions. One of the recent developments is that the establishment of new democratic institutions, the provincial councils (PCs), in sub-national governments is replacing the traditional councils. If the bulk of the population still wishes for a traditional Islamic-Sharia system, a majority of the younger population believe in democracy and people’s participation. As deliberately explained in part 3 of this dissertation, Afghans (as voters and candidates for political positions) are aware of their vote value and believe that they could influence local politics by merely electing someone who is more responsive to their demands. Therefore, the informal patronage and elite institutions and actors, according to the hypothesis of this research, are moving toward more formal settings and institutions.

[64] Furthermore, Amenta and Ramsey (2010) state that its ‘medium-systemic, interorganizational, or meso-level’ approach to political institutionalism is mainly macro state-centric. Concerning how national political institutions and systems influence local politics, Amenta and Ramsey (2010) write:

The main theoretical framework (of political institutionalism) is that macro-level political institutions shape politics and political actors, who act under constrains that may influence their impact on state and policies, refashioning political institutions in the process, and so on (p. 29).

In another place, Amenta (2005) notes that questions surrounding the state and its formation, structures, and processes makes the core of the political institutionalism. Peters (2008) writes that through ‘new institutionalism’, political science scholars build new comparative analysis and approaches over the differences between the parliamentary versus presidential and between federal versus unitary states. According to him, political stability in presidential institutions is one of the main subjects matters some political scientists are concerned with, in less developing political contexts (2008). In differing between ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutionalism in another place, Peters (2005) says:

… the old institutionalism argued that presidential systems are significantly different from parliamentary systems, based upon the formal structures and rules. The ‘new institutionalism goes further and undertakes trying to determine if these assumed differences do indeed exist, and if so in what ways those two alternative ways of organizing political life differ, and what difference this makes for performance of the systems (p. 2).

This point opens another significant discussion over which government system (parliamentary or semi-presidential, decentralized, or unitary centralized) better accommodates the sociopolitical needs of the Afghan context. The Afghan centralized unitary constitution restricts all power and authority to the central line ministries, leaving subnational democratic institutions with advisory and conflict resolution roles. The central government that is a de-facto power-coalition of all major ethnic minorities is often divided and in conflict, each group perusing their own regional and ethnolinguistic interests. The major ethnic groups are divided between the Pashtuns, the proponents of the currently installed unitary centralized state system, and the Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek who advocate a change to decentralized parliamentarism, and some even prefer federalism. Therefore, [65] the new institutionalism theory, particularly political institutionalism, supports the key questions in this thesis. It empirically studies the constitutional parliamentary versus Presidentialism discourse in the Afghan national politics on the one hand and the decentralization process through elected provincial councils and its implication in formal and informal governance institutions, on the other. In the informal governance format, warlords and tribal elites directly influence and shape the local and national government politics.

To know why the current political system (unitary centralized) is not suitable to follow the line of argument of its opponents, or very much suitable to follow the line of argument of its proponents, we need to review both classical government systems of Parliamentarism vs Presidentialism, as well as other alternative systems, including semi-presidential and consociational democracy.

Furthermore, decentralization is reviewed as a possible strategy for prevailing democracy with good governance, sustainable development, and political stability in Afghanistan.