Читать книгу The State-Building Dilemma in Afghanistan - Haqmal Daudzai - Страница 15

Nigel King and Christine Horrocks correctly note that when we let “theory guide us in research; it can sometime help define the problem, offer insight and show us possible solutions” (2010, p. 10). The theories discussed in this section are introduced with the intention of following the above-quoted rationale. As discussed above, state-building is concerned with the problem of forming ‘new’ or strengthening and reforming existing institutions. The attempt in the following pages is to review theories which support similar concepts and process. In the meantime, efforts are made to look for theories that are more Third World-centric and to contextualize and analyze the problem through a case study of state-building in Afghanistan. Since this study is intended to study state-building at the national –in the form of a suitable political regime or government system– and at the local level, decentralization, aiming at political stability which is significant for sustainable peace and development. Therefore, to provide a source for empirical argumentation, a mixture of theories and schools of thought are reviewed comparatively. However, the objective is not only to find a firm theoretical background, which is a challenging job for this case study but also to testify to the validity of these theories, leaving an analytical footprint for future researchers and students of political science and development studies.

The state-building agenda applied in war-torn and post-conflict countries, as well as the so-called Third World failed states, relies strongly on the early 1950s classical modernization, on 1980s new-institutionalization, and on the post-cold war humanitarian interventionist theories of the 1990s. This will be reviewed here briefly. According to Törnquist (1999), the contemporary new institutionalization theories “are not based on grand substantive theories … rather they are broad analytical frameworks that permit us to borrow valuable insights and hypotheses from earlier schools” (p. 86). He adds that many of the 20th-century democracies are studied based on revised modernization and similar categories of theories (Törnquist, 1999). Therefore, a review of the modernization theories is also an attempt to get valuable insights and concepts [52] which are relevant to creating a theoretical framework for the empirical research of this dissertation.

To begin with, Samuel P. Huntington (1971) notes that the pioneers of modernization theory, Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, and Frank Sutton embraced a change in political sciences through their ‘theory of action.’ According to Huntington (1971), these pioneers divided the post-World War II Europe as ‘modern industrialized society’ and the rest of the developing world as ‘agricultural society’ that laid the foundation for the classical modernization theory. In the meantime, Joseph R. Gusfield (1967) writes that the bases of the modernization theory rest on Max-Weber’s economic theory of rational and traditional behavior. Olle Törnquist (1999) also cites that followers of the Max Weber’s school of thought “distinguished traditional from modern, or development-promoting attitudes and values” (1999, p. 45). According to Huntington (1971) and Törnquist (1999) in modernization theory –which is primarily economic and social development-driven– a ‘modern man’ was seen as development-oriented, ‘independent’, able to plan, ‘efficient’, flexible to change, and having the ability to control change, while a ‘traditional man’ was ‘passive’, ‘conservative’, unable to plan, and lacking the ambition to change or control the change.

John Martinussen (1997) also asserts that the central point of modernization theory lays in the differentiation between the modern and the traditional, and that modernization theory has to do with “how the traditional values, attitudes, practices, and social structures break down and are replaced with more modern ones” (p. 56). The modernist also believed that the Western societies (Northern America and Western Europe) and their institutions were modern and progressive and that Third World societies were traditional and backward (Martinussen, 1997) & (Törnquist, 1999). According to Martinussen (1997) and Törnquist (1999), the modernization theory came into existence as a result of the ‘positive assessment’ of the history of Western colonization and imperialism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. For the western modernist scholars, colonization was not the cause of backwardness but a positive impact on the colonies due to the replacement of the old and traditional structures with new and modern ones (Martinussen, 1997) & (Törnquist, 1999). Modernism theorists also recommended that, if the developing countries of the Third World wanted to catch up with the progressiveness of the industrialized societies, they be required to build economic and other ties with the Western nations. This would make it possible [53] for them to learn and simply copy and paste the developed institutions and structures of the West into their countries (Martinussen, 1997).

In the meantime, the anti-colonization uprising coupled with the Marxist-communist ideology contended that the Western imperialistic approach to modernization was itself the cause for the ‘backwardness’ of the Third World countries (Törnquist, 1999). However, both blocks assumed traditionalism to be the main cause of the underdevelopment and were obsessed to push the developing countries of the Third World into modernity, each defining modernity based on their own socio-political ideologies, namely Western imperialism, and capitalism versus Soviet Marxist-socialism (Törnquist, 1999). According to Törnquist (1999), the political modernization or development theory arose as a consequence of social, cultural, and economic modernity and change, which meant a transformation to a more complex and advanced government apparatus, including democratic elections, political parties, interest-groups, parliament, specialized administrative bureaucracies, mass media and so on (pp. 47-48). Before long, however, the modernization theory came under strong criticism due to its North-West-centric approach and a lack of ‘empirical justification,’ and for being ‘much too optimistic and characterized by wishful thinking’ (Törnquist, 1999, p. 54) & (Martinussen, 1997, pp. 167-168). Several revisions have attempted to overcome the shortcomings of the classical modernization approach and thus ended up introducing a variety of new concepts and theories.

In the 1960s, Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, through empirically studying some non-Western countries, brought significant perceptional change to modernization and political development studies. Reducing the modernization theory to an approach, Almond (1960) stated that both Western developed and non-western developing (or underdeveloped societies) have political structures, perform similar functions, are multi-functional, and are culturally mixed. In another place, he writes that all political systems have a dualistic nature of formal and informal structures and cultures (Almond, 1960). Almond (1960) concludes that “the universe of political system is less tractable to simple contrasts (between modern or traditional) than we have supposed” (p. 25). He furtherly adds “we need dualistic models rather than monistic ones, and developmental as well as equilibrium models, if we are to understand differences precisely and grapple effectively with the process of political change” (Almond, 1960, p. 25)

[54] Another revised version of the classical modernization theory, according to Martinussen (1997) is the ‘dialectical modernization theory’ which is mainly based on the social change theory rather than political development and is nevertheless very significant for ‘affecting state-building, the form of regime, and political change’ (p. 172). Introduced by Joseph R. Gusfield, the dialectical or clientelism theory is based on a study of India’s traditional, diverse religious, caste-based society. Gusfield (1967) brings forward the notion that traditional values and structures are not ‘necessarily in conflict’ but rather in many cases make the foundation for ‘supporting modernizing frameworks’ (p. 352). He notes that traditions are not ‘static,’ but they evolve over the course of historical events (Gusfield, 1967). According to Gusfield, tradition was exposed to development and change even before the Western dual characterization (new and modern versus old and traditional) of development and their proposed change in the developing counties (1967). Two other pioneer scholars, Lioydl I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph enriched the dialectical modernization theory based on the empirical research of political development in Indian concerning its caste system. Both Rudolphs (1967) assert that modernization scholars not only ‘underestimated the potentialities’ of the tradition for development but they also misunderstood modernity by ‘excluding’ valuable structures and symbols which could play a vital role for social and political change in a society –pointing to the Mahatma Gandhi’s nonviolence freedom movement formed based on the existing social and religious informal institutions.

In another place, Gusfield (1967) also notes that “the role of traditional values in the form of segmental loyalties and principles of legitimate authority are of great importance in understanding the possibilities for the occurrence of unified and stable politics at the national level” (p. 357). This understanding is highly relevant to the sociopolitical context of Afghanistan and speaks powerfully to the present impasse in the country. The political legitimacy and stability in Afghanistan are often challenged by the patronage clans and tribal structures in scattered rural areas and their divided loyalties. The decades of war and internal conflict which intensified the ethnolinguistic fragmentation of Afghan society even farther complicated the political atmosphere for stability at the national and local level. In the meantime, the US post 9/11 military intervention and its subsequent imported state-building agendas have been wrestling with the so-called primitive traditional and tribal settings [55] for more than one and half decades. This will be discussed in much detail in the empirical part in coming chapters.

Supporting Gusfield theory, Martinussen (1997) asserts that it is the developing countries ‘traditional and tradition bound institutions and practices’ which form the bases for the ‘modernization and development processes.’ This can be done most effectively by empirically studying the social, political, and cultural structures, and in particular, ‘networks including patron-client relations, ethnicity and religion’ within developing countries independently rather than in comparison to western world values of development. In other words, modernization in non-western societies should happen based on their own social, religious, ethical, tribal characteristics, and sociopolitical cultural potentials.

Gusfield (1967) adds that stressing the significance of tradition does not mean that it should oppose new values and reformed institutions. According to Gusfield (1967), Mahatma Gandhi’s successes ‘in social reform and political union’ also rest on his use of tradition and its potential force in mobilizing the Indian society. The decentralization of governance in India, for example, is based on the already existed traditional village democracy of Panchayati Raj⁹ (Gusfield, 1967). Initially, in the 1920’s, Gandhi aimed to tackle poverty and foster his independent movement by reviving these local self-governing assemblies (Ananth, 2014). Later in 1993 the Panchayati Raj were embedded in the Indian constitution with more power and authority as a decentralization reforming strategy known as ‘The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act’ (Ananth, 2014).

The Indian local self-governance reform brought forward by Gusfield has a parallel in the Afghan sociopolitical culture. The incorporation of the Panchayati Raj or traditional village assemblies into the formal Indian government format is comparable to the newly elected provincial councils and expected district and village councils, which existed informally before modern day Afghanistan as the village councils, or Jirga/Shuras. The hypothesis of this dissertation is that if the local informal Jirgas/Shuras are integrated into the formal government format, of course with more defined mechanisms, power, and responsibility, and required financial resources, they [56] will serve as the foundation for citizen participation, security, democracy, development, and eventually political stability at the national level. This is discussed in more detail in the following empirical chapters. Gusfield (1967), Rudolph and Rudolph (1967) agree that the use of traditional structures and institutions can smooth the course of development while the marginalization of those institutions would result in a lack of indigenous backing of political systems (1967, p. 362). Gusfield concludes that “…the past (traditional structures) serves as support, especially in the sphere of values and political legitimation, to the present and the future. We need a perspective toward change which does not deny the specific and contextual character of events.” (p. 362).

According to Martinussen (1997), through studying the sociopolitical culture of the developing countries, the classical political modernization and development theorists were concerned mainly with four questions: (1) ‘state-building’: ‘creating bureaucratic or other structures’ that can ‘ensure the required support needed for political stability;’ (2) nation-building: ‘creating a political community and promoting the citizens’ transfer of loyalty from smaller groups, like tribes and local communities, to the larger political systems’; (3) democracy-building: active citizen participation in ‘political life’, and (4) Trust-building: by equal distribution of goods and services for the well-being of citizens on one hand and gaining political support of the ‘government in office’ on the other (1997, p. 171).

Martinussen (1997) asserts that there is an ‘increasing understanding’ among state-building scholars and policymakers that:

(a) That western institutions and the state-building strategies pursued by the industrialized countries cannot simply be transplanted to the developing countries; (b) that the developing countries are so different that different strategies must be applied; and (c) that the public administration must accept ‘the people’ as partners in the developing process – not just as clients or a passive target group of intended beneficiaries (p. 175).

Nevertheless, it is worth noting here, that the central critique of the dialectical or clientelism theory rests on the corruption and inequality outcomes which result from the client-patron relationship in developing countries. Törnquist (1999) writes that the “patron-client relations are based on mutual personal exchange of goods or services between unequal actors” (p. 57). ‘In a wider political context’, this leads to an unhealthy or corrupt relationship between political elites and ‘businessman and large land-owners’ –in which the latter [57] receives business relevant ‘treatment’ in return for financial and political (vote) support (Törnquist, 1999). The patron-client political culture noted in developing countries by Törnquist is not much different from that of the lobbying of the large industrial companies and corporations in developed countries. Nevertheless, the patron-client culture leads to social and political instability when politicians instrumentalize cultural, religious, and ethnolinguistic cleavages. This is the basis for another major hypothesis of this research. The warlords and tribal elites utilize the ethnolinguistic (Pashtun vs. non-Pashtun) and some case religious (Shira vs. Sunni) differences in order to gain political support in Afghanistan. This is also discussed in the empirical and historical analyses of the five large provinces in Afghanistan.