Читать книгу Las reestructuraciones de las sociedades de capital en crisis - Aurora Martínez Flórez - Страница 47

Since the original recommendations of the EU Commission did not lead to the expected result,53) the Commission proposed a new directive on restructuring efforts outside the insolvency procedure (Restructuring Directive)54) which was finally adopted in the trilogue process at the end of 201855). As this article does not aim at analysing the new directive in detail56) rather than concentrating upon the role of directors, I will just outline the main interesting features of the directive which are of relevance for duties (and potential liability) of directors:

The directive lays down rules on “preventive restructuring frameworks available for debtors in financial difficulty when there is a likelihood of insolvency with a view to preventing the insolvency and ensuring the viability of the debtor” [Art. 1 a)]. The new directive aims at making restructuring arrangements outside insolvency procedures easier, in particular to overcome blocking behaviour of creditors by introducing several rules for voting of class of creditors and cross-class cram-downs (Art. 10, 11, 13). According to Art. 4 (1b) “Member States may maintain or introduce a viability test under national law, provided that such a test has the purpose to exclude debtors which do not have a prospect for viability and can be carried out without detriment to the debtors’ assets”. This viability test comes very close to the going concern prognosis required under German insolvency law57). Structure, actions or content of the restructuring plans are not part of the directive and left to the member states, Art. 8. The directive also provides for a temporary stay of enforcement of claims (Art. 6) and in some cases a mandatory appointment of a practitioner for assisting the debtor (Art. 5).

Concerning directors, the central provision of Art. 18 states, that

“1. Member States shall ensure that, where there is a likelihood of insolvency, directors, as a minimum, have due regard to the following:

(b) the interests of creditors, other stakeholders and equity holders;

(c) the need to take steps to avoid insolvency; and

(d) the need to avoid deliberate or grossly negligent conduct that threatens the viability of the business58).”

Nevertheless, the final compromise reduced the quality of Art. 18 significantly in contrast to the initial proposal of the EU-Commission. This required:

“Member States shall lay down rules to ensure that, where there is a likelihood of insolvency, directors have the following obligations:

to take immediate steps to minimise the loss for creditors, workers, shareholders and other stakeholders;

to have due regard to the interests of creditors and other stakeholders;

to take reasonable steps to avoid insolvency;

to avoid deliberate or grossly negligent conduct that threatens the viability of the business.”

The wording is quite different as the Commission required member states to introduce obligations for directors – which then could also be qualified as obligations to creditors. In contrast, the final compromise just provides for an “obligation” for directors to consider interests other than those of shareholders (“have due regard”). Even more, the final compromise does not demand directors to “take immediate steps” to minimise the loss for creditors. Hence, the new Art. 18 does not introduce new obligations for directors other than those already known by national law59).

However, a slight modification might be necessary concerning internal obligations of directors, i.e. to the company. Here the notion of likelihood of insolvency turns out to be one of the crucial ones in order to determine the range of obligations of directors. Unfortunately, the directive leaves the definition of this notion explicitly to the member states (Art. 2 (1a) as well as the notion of insolvency. Recital 17 and 17c remain opaque concerning the criteria for the likelihood of insolvency. What should be clear is that the likelihood of insolvency cannot be the same as –from the German perspective– the negative prognosis of going concern. This criterium already triggers the obligation to file for an insolvency procedure –whereas the directive aims at easing restructuration for the debtor before insolvency procedures are started. Thus, if insolvency becomes likely, directors are obliged to be more considerate more intensively than as in the usual business restructuring actions; more intense monitoring may be required etc.– which, however, does not turn into direct obligation to creditors that can be claimed (in case of failing restructuring) towards from directors.

1

Trilogue compromise finally of 17.12.2018, interinstitutional file: 2016/0359(COD).

2

See already before financial market crisis BGHZ 119, 201 (214); 129, 136 (153 f.) in view of GmbH and AG; Kölner Komm AktG/Mertens/Cahn Anh. § 92 Rn. 12; Hüffer/Koch/Koch § 92 Rn. 16; FK-InsO/Schmerbach InsO § 19 Rn. 14 ff.; Fromm GmbHR 2004, 940 (943); Dahl/Schmitz NZG 2009, 567 (567); Holzer ZIP 2008, 2108; for a general and basic review see Lutter ZIP 1999, 641 (642); K. Schmidt AG 1978, 334 (337); Holzer, Wege zum Insolvenzrecht der Unternehmen, 1990, 50 ff.; regarding the GmbH: Scholz/K. Schmidt/Bitter GmbHG Vor § 64 Rn. 17; Rowedder/Schmidt-Leithoff/Schmidt-Leithoff/Schneider GmbHG Vor § 64 Rn. 112.

3

BGH WM 2001, 959 (960); Götz KTS 2003, 1 (39); Großkomm AktG/Habersack/Foerster § 92 Rn. 70 f.; Hüffer/Koch/Koch § 92 Rn. 17; Hölters/Müller-Michaels § 92 Rn. 19; Spindler/Stilz/Fleischer § 92 Rn. 58; K. Schmidt/Lutter/Krieger/Sailer-Coceani § 15a InsO Rn. 8; regarding the GmbH: Roth/Altmeppen/Altmeppen GmbHG Vor § 64 Rn. 26; Rowedder/Schmidt-Leithoff/Schmidt-Leithoff/Schneider GmbHG Vor § 64 Rn. 126.

4

Kölner Komm AktG/Mertens/Cahn Anh. § 92 Rn. 13; MüKoInsO/Drukarczyk/Schüler InsO § 19 Rn. 72 f., 76; Hüffer/Koch/Koch Rn. 14.

5

BGH NZG 2017, 468 Rn. 12, 17 explicitly giving up previous jurisdiction; partly critical: Frystatzki DStR 2017, 1494 (1500).

6

For further details see Spindler AG 2006, 677 ff.

7

Earlier BGHZ 119, 201 (214) = ZIP 1992, 1382 (1386); this assuming for the reform of the insolvency law: BT-Rechtsausschuss BT-Drs. 12/7302, 157 to § 23 Abs. 2 InsO-RegE; now explicitly in the same way OLG Naumburg GmbHR 2004, 361 (4. Ls.); Baumbach/Hueck/Haas GmbHG Vor § 64 Rn. 33.

8

BGH ZIP 2006, 2171 = WM 2006, 2254 = NZI 2007, 44; Nerlich/Römermann/Mönning InsO § 19 Rn. 19; Braun/Bußhardt InsO § 19 Rn. 19; Henssler/Strohn/Arnold InsO § 19 Rn. 6; MüKoGmbHG/Müller GmbHG § 64 Rn. 25; Rowedder/Schmidt-Leithoff/Schmidt-Leithoff/Schneider GmbHG Vor § 64 Rn. 119; for the loyalty of the shareholder majority in restructuring cases see Reichert NZG 2018, 134.

9

BGHZ 119, 201 (214); Gehrlein WM 2018, 1 (6); Großkomm AktG/Habersack/Foerster § 92 Rn. 64; Hüffer/Koch/Koch § 92 Rn. 14; Henssler/Strohn/Arnold InsO § 19 Rn. 6; Uhlenbruck/Mock InsO § 19 Rn. 218; FK-InsO/Schmerbach InsO § 19 Rn. 37; Hess/Weis/Wienberg/Hess InsO § 19 Rn. 25.

10

So BGHZ 119, 201 (210, 214); similar, OLG Naumburg GmbHR 2004, 361 (362) “mittelfristige Überlebensfähigkeit”; also, KG Berlin GmbHR 2006, 374 (376); Fromm GmbHR 2004, 940 (943); Bork ZIP 2000, 1709 (1710); Drukarczyk/Schüler DStR 1999, 646 (647); Baumbach/Hueck/Haas GmbHG Vor § 64 Rn. 33; MüKoInsO/Drukarczyk/Schüler InsO § 19 Rn. 85, 87; Scholz/Schmidt/Bitter GmbHG Vor § 64 Rn. 28; Hess InsO § 19 Rn. 28, 30, each with further references.

11

BGHZ 119, 201 (214) = ZIP 1992, 1382; Luttermann/Vahlenkamp ZIP 2003, 1629 (1633).

12

BGH ZIP 1998, 248 (249 f.); OLG Naumburg GmbHR 2004, 361 (362); KG Berlin GmbHR 2006, 374 (375 f.); K. Schmidt InsO § 19 Rn. 47.

13

BGHZ 129, 136 (155) = ZIP 1995, 819 (825); see further Müller ZIP 1995, 1416; Marsch-Barner ZIP 1996, 853; Flume ZIP 1996, 161; also, OLG Naumburg GmbHR 2004, 361 (361 f.).

14

BGH ZIP 1995, 124 (125 f.).

15

BGH ZIP 1997, 1648 (1649 f.).

16

OLG Naumburg GmbHR 2004, 361 (362).

17

IDW Prüfungsstandard PS 270, 9. Oct. 2010, printed in WPg 2010, 1 ff.; conversely, a negative continuation prognosis can exclude valuation according to going concern values, see BGH NZG 2017, 468 Rn. 17; in addition Frystatzki DStR 2017, 1494; Braun/Bußhardt InsO § 19 Rn. 13.

18

IDW PS 270, 9. Oct. 2010, Rn. 9; BGH NZI 2017, 312 Rn. 27 ff. with comments, Schädlich.

19

With a different view, LG Frankfurt a. M. ZIP 2015, 1358 = BeckRS 2015, 11079; for the classification of the prospect of third party contributions to the restructuring in the restructuring concept, Andersch/Philipp NZI 2017, 782.

20

Art. 25 para. 1 EUInsVO (old version) still distinguished between the solvent SoA and the insolvent SoA; in the meanwhile both forms do not fall under the EUInsVO.; see also the previous legal situation, MHdB IntGesR/Steffek § 39 Rn. 43 ff. with further references.

21

Sax/Swierczok ZIP 2016, 1945.

22

Sax/Swierczok ZIP 2016, 1945 (1946 f.); critically Hoffmann/Giancristofano ZIP 2016, 1151 (1154).

23

Groß/Amen WPg 2002, 225 (230); FK-InsO/Schmerbach InsO § 19 Rn. 36 f.; MüKoInsO/Drukarczyk/Schüler InsO § 19 Rn. 53, 56.

24

Groß/Amen WPg 2002, 225 (230); MüKoInsO/Drukarczyk InsO § 19 Rn. 54; Nerlich/Römermann/Mönning InsO § 19 Rn. 19; Großkomm InsO/Müller InsO § 19 Rn. 38; in detail to the financial plan Uhlenbruck/Mock InsO § 18 Rn. 27 ff.; Uhlenbruck/Mock InsO § 19 Rn. 211 ff. with further references.

25

MüKoInsO/Drukarczyk/Schüler InsO § 19 Rn. 54; Uhlenbruck/Mock InsO § 18 Rn. 27 ff.; Uhlenbruck/Mock InsO § 19 Rn. 211 ff. with further references; see also Steiner BFuP 1986, 420 (428).

26

Groß/Amen WPg 2002, 225 (226); Heim/Kless DStR 1999, 387 (390 ff.); Nonnenmacher FS Moxter 1994, 1315 ff. (1324 f.); Großkomm InsO/Müller, 2003, InsO § 19 Rn. 38; with an example of a plan: MüKoInsO/Drukarczyk/Schüler InsO § 19 Rn. 54, 58 ff., 72 ff., 83.

27

IDW Fachausschuss Recht 1/1996 “Empfehlungen zur Überschuldungsprüfung bei Unternehmen” WPg 1997, 22; for more information see Uhlenbruck/Mock InsO § 19 Rn. 212.

28

IDW PS 270, WPg 2010, 1 (10); Steffan/Solmecke ZInsO 2015, 1365 (1373).

29

OLG München GmbHR 1998, 281; OLG Schleswig GmbHR 1998, 536; OLG Celle NZG 1999, 1064 (1065); Bork ZIP 2000, 1709 (1710); Uhlenbruck/Mock InsO § 18 Rn. 25.

30

BGHZ 126, 181 (199); agreeing BAG NJW 1999, 2299 (2300); OLG Frankfurt a. M. NZG 2001, 173 (174); OLG Düsseldorf NZG 1999, 944 (946); Goette DStR 2016, 1752 (1754); Fischer NZI 2016, 665 (667 f.); Haas NZG 1999, 373 (374); Goette DStR 1998, 1308 (1313); Bork ZGR 1995, 505 (520) in connection with Flume ZIP 1994, 337 (340); Goette DStR 1994, 1048 (1053). In some cases, it is also granted an estimation measure when monitoring the performance of assets and liabilities, see Medicus DStR 1995, 1432 (1434).

31

OLG München NZI 2013, 542 (544); Fischer NZI 2016, 665 (667 f.) with further references; critically Goette DStR 2016, 1752 (1754).

32

Fischer NZI 2016, 665 (667f.); granting a corresponding margin of judgement, for example HmbK-InsR/Schröder InsO § 19 Rn. 16a.

33

Particularly regarding the GmbH, BGHZ 143, 184 (185 f.); BGH NJW 2001, 304; BGHZ 126, 181 (199): obligation to continuously monitor and establish asset status in the event of signs of crisis; BAG NJW 1999, 2299 (2300); OLG Hamburg NJW-RR 1995, 1506 (1507); OLG Düsseldorf GmbHR 1999, 479 (480 f.); Fleischer/Fleischer VorstandsR-HdB § 20 Rn. 33; Spindler/Stilz/Fleischer § 92 Rn. 68; K. Schmidt/Lutter/Krieger/Sailer-Coceani Anh. § 92: InsO §15a Rn. 10; MHdB AG/Wiesner § 25 Rn. 117; Bayer/Schmidt AG 2005, 644 (651 f.); MüKoGmbHG/Müller GmbHG § 64 Rn. 67; Lutter/Hommelhoff/Kleindiek GmbHG § 64 Rn. 30; see already K. Schmidt ZIP 1988, 1497 (1500); Medicus DStR 1995, 1432 (1434); Wimmer NJW 1996, 2546 (2547); Uhlenbruck GmbHR 1999, 313 (320 f.); differentiated consideration Ransiek Unternehmensstrafrecht, 1996, 161 f.: negligence with regard to the elapse of the deadline despite the fact that the crisis was recognisable.

34

BGHZ 143, 184 (185 f.); BGH NJW 2001, 304; Hüffer/Koch/Koch § 92 Rn. 22 ff.; see also: BGHZ 126, 181 (200).

35

Begr. RegE BT-Drs. 12/3803, 81, 85; Hüffer/Koch/Koch § 92 Rn. 24; Spindler/Stilz/Fleischer § 92 Rn. 69.

36

Begr. RegE BT-Drs. 12/3803, 81, 85.

37

Regarding the GmbH: BGHZ 126, 181 (199); BGH NJW-RR 1995, 669 f.; OLG Oldenburg GmbHR 2008, 1101 (1102); OLG Koblenz ZIP 2007, 120; OLG Celle GmbHG 2004, 568 (569); OLG Koblenz OLGR 2001, 228 f.; OLG Celle GmbHR 1997, 127 (128); agreeing B. Kübler ZGR 1995, 481 (499 f.); Spindler/Stilz/Fleischer § 92 Rn. 75; K. Schmidt/Lutter/Krieger/Sailer-Coceani Anh. § 92: InsO § 15a Rn. 10; Uhlenbruck/Hirte InsO § 15a Rn. 14; Gottwald/Haas InsR-HdB § 92 Rn. 66.

38

Uhlenbruck/Hirte InsO § 15a Rn. 31.

39

Regarding the GmbH: OLG Celle NZG 2002, 730 (732).

40

Rowedder/Schmidt-Leithoff/Schmidt-Leithoff/Baumert GmbHG, 4. Aufl. 2002, § 64 Rn. 9.

41

OLG Celle GmbHR 2004, 568 (569); Goette ZInsO 2001, 529 (530); Haas `Die Haftung des GmbH-Geschäftsführers in der Krise der Gesellschaft’, Unternehmen in der Krise, eds. Heintzen, Markus, Kruschwitz, Lutz, 2004, 73, 75.

42

BAG NZA 1999, 39 (42); see also Lutter/Hommelhoff/Kleindiek GmbHG Anh. § 64 Rn. 51.

43

Regarding the director Goette ZInsO 2001, 529 (530); Roth/Altmeppen/Altmeppen GmbHG Vor § 64 Rn. 73; Uhlenbruck/Hirte InsO § 15a Rn. 32.

44

BGH DStR 2012, 1286 (1287); BGH ZIP 2007, 1265 Rn. 17 f.

45

But so still BGHZ 56, 81 (83); BGH WM 1987, 1431 (1432); NJW 1986, 586 (587).

46

Kölner Komm AktG/Mertens/Cahn Anh. § 92 Rn. 36; Spindler/Stilz/Fleischer § 92 Rn. 73; Wälzholz DStR 2007, 1914 (1915); K. Schmidt GmbHR 2007, 1072 (1078); Poertzgen ZInsO 2007, 574 (575); BeckOGK BGB/Spindler BGB § 823 Rn. 349 f.

47

BGHZ 29, 100 (102 f.); 126, 181 (190) (regarding the GmbH); Großkomm AktG/Habersack/Foerster § 92 Rn. 107 f.; Hüffer/Koch/Koch § 92 Rn. 27; K. Schmidt/Lutter/Krieger/Sailer-Coceani Anh. § 92: InsO § 15a Rn. 12; HK-InsO/Kleindiek InsO § 15a Rn. 31; Henssler/Dedek FS Uhlenbruck, 2000, 175 (176); MHdB AG/Wiesner, 3. Aufl. 2007, § 26 Rn. 36; BeckOGK/Spindler BGB § 823 Rn. 353; G. Wagner FS Gerhardt, 2004, 1043 (1061); Goette ZInsO 2001, 529 all with further references.

48

Großkomm AktG/Habersack/Foerster § 92 Rn. 107; Großkomm InsO/Müller InsO § 15 Rn. 103; Spindler/Stilz/Fleischer § 92 Rn. 81; more detailed: Scholz/K. Schmidt GmbHG Anh. § 64 Rn. 49 ff.; Rn. 32; in principle against the assertion of individual creditors' claims, even if the opening is rejected for lack of assets W. Schulz, Die masselose Liquidation der GmbH, 1986, 188.

49

See BGH NJW 1997, 3021; Großkomm AktG/Habersack/Foerster § 92 Rn. 108; Kölner Komm AktG/Mertens/Cahn Anh. § 92 Rn. 39 f.; Spindler/Stilz/Fleischer § 92 Rn. 77.

50

BGHZ 164, 50 = BKR 2006, 19 = ZIP 2005, 2144; BGHZ 126, 181 (197 ff.); 138, 211 (215) [In so far deviating from BGHZ 29, 100 (104 ff.)]; see also before: BGH ZIP 1993, 763 (766 ff.); 1995, 211 (212); 1995, 124 (125); confirmed in BGH DB 1998, 978 f.; OLG Naumburg GmbHR 2004, 361 (363); OLG Köln NZG 2001, 411; agreeing with the BGH: Spindler ZGR 2004, 437 (450 f.); Reiff/Arnold ZIP 1998, 1893 (1894); Dauner-Lieb ZGR 1998, 617 (628); Hirte NJW 1995, 1202 (1203); Bork ZGR 1995, 505 (512 ff.); Karollus ZIP 1995, 269 (270 f.); Goette DStR 1994, 1049 (1052 f.); Wellkamp DB 1994, 869 (873); Flume ZIP 1994, 337 (339 ff.); Lutter DB 1994, 129 (135); Wilhelm ZIP 1993, 1833; Schanze AG 1993, 376 (380); U. Haas, Geschäftsführerhaftung und Gläubigerschutz, 1997, 95 ff., 103 f.; Großkomm AktG/ Habersack/Foerster § 92 Rn. 109, 112; Bürgers/Körber/Pelz § 92 Rn. 31; Kölner Komm AktG/Mertens/Cahn Anh. § 92 Rn. 41; Spindler/Stilz/Fleischer § 92 Rn. 78; BeckOGK/Spindler BGB § 823 Rn. 354; Lutter/Hommelhoff/Kleindiek GmbHG Anh. § 64 Rn. 74 f.; in this direction already before Stapelfeld, Haftung des GmbH-Geschäftsführers für Fehlverhalten in der Gesellschaftskrise, 1990, 166 ff.

51

LAG Hessen MDR 2001, 350 (351); agreeing Haas DStR 2003, 423 (428 f.) with further references; with a different view LAG Rheinland-Pfalz BeckRS 2016, 73703 Rn. 26; LAG Hamm EWiR 2001, 871.

52

BGHZ 164, 50 (61) = ZIP 2005, 1734 (1737).

53

COM(2014), 1500 final; see also explanatory memorandum COM(2016), 723 final, p. 16.

54

COM(2016), 723 final.

55

See above Fn. 1.

56

See for options how to implement the directive into German law Madaus DB 2019, 592 (592 ff.).

57

Cf. above 1.4. Time frame and duties; see also Lange/Swierczok BB 2019, 514 (515).

58

It seems that the lacking “a” is a redactional failure in the compromise text.

59

See also Lange/Swierczok BB 2019, 514 (520).