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Threats and Counter-Threats Along the Niagara River,

July to October 1812

According to Secretary of War Eustis’s original plan to conquer the Canadas, diversionary attacks upon the Detroit and Niagara frontiers would draw British reserves away from Montreal and Quebec, thus allowing the main American thrust to enter Lower Canada through Vermont against reduced opposition. In reality, the failure of government recruiters to raise any significant military units in New England, coupled with the debacle of General Hull at Detroit, effectively derailed the 1812 American war effort. Desperate to create some kind of military success, the administration pressured General Dearborn to produce positive results on the Niagara front to counter their failures elsewhere. For Dearborn, this came as an unwelcome surprise, for he was hardly aware that the Niagara region came under his jurisdiction, while the quality of the region’s commanders had hardly risen to the challenge of the moment. In fact, although it had only been a month since war had been declared, the troops on the Niagara frontier had already been under the command of both Brigadier General William Wadsworth and Major General Amos Hall. On July 13, 1812, they gained their third new commander in the person of Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer.

A member of an influential New York State family, Van Rensselaer had been politically opposed to the prospect of war, but had been manoeuvred into accepting command of the “Army of the Centre” by his political opponent, the incumbent governor, Daniel D. Tompkins. For Tompkins, this seemingly contradictory act actually held political merit, for although a military victory would bring Van Rensselaer fame and honour, declining the post would brand him as failing to support his country in time of war. Furthermore, accepting the post would handicap Van Rensselaer’s ability to mount a political campaign against Tompkins, and any military defeat would seal Van Rensselaer’s political fate entirely.

General Stephen Van Rensselaer, artist unknown. Manipulated into a command he did not want, he later became the scapegoat for the American defeat at Queenston.

Library and Archives Canada, C-007796.

New York State Governor, Daniel D. Tompkins. Political opponent of General Stephen Van Rensselaer, he used the general’s defeat at Queenston to win re-election.

From the Conger Goodyear Manuscript Collection, Vol. 9. Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society Research Library, Buffalo, NY.

During the remainder of the summer, once he saw the task before him, Van Rensselaer was in a constant state of alarm that Brock would take the initiative and attack across the Niagara River, a circumstance for which he believed there was no effective defence:

Sir … At this hour I have received no reinforcements of men, no supplies of ordnance, tents nor ammunition. There are not ten rounds per man on the Niagara frontier, nor have we lead to make cartridges. We are extremely deficient of medicine and hospital stores; of lint and bandage cloth we have none, nor any surgical instruments…. The company lately under the command of Captain Jennings in Lieutenant Col. Swift’s regiment had become so clamorous for pay, and contended so strenuously that their time had expired, that I have ordered them to be dismissed.[1]

— Major General Van Rensselaer to Major General Dearborn, September 1, 1812

Under these circumstances, orders that had previously been issued to the various posts not to stir up any unnecessary trouble were reissued, a command that at least one detachment of over-enthusiastic young volunteers serving at the newly constructed Fort Tompkins, near Black Rock, found themselves unable to obey, with inevitable consequences.

I commanded the gun that threw the first ball at the enemy [on August 13, 1812] … until now we had not been permitted by our superiors to get up any quarrel with our neighbours, and were not allowed to fire a gun except with blank cartridges for the purpose of practice, and we were tired of lounging and doing nothing. So accordingly the British came near the river and commenced building a battery with some 30 or 40 men. Now the question was, should we permit them to do it? We could do nothing unless slyly done, orders being against us. However, it seemed most too much to allow our enemies to erect machines immediately under our noses to kill us with. We accordingly consulted as to whether we were able to get a ball to the gun unknown to our officers…. After waiting for a favourable opportunity, the ball went in, unknown to any except those engaged in it. Our next business was to gauge the range with the view to have the ball fall short of them, as we did not desire to kill them, but merely to drive them away. All things being ready, the match was applied, BANG! went the gun. The ball struck where we intended. The British were so completely enveloped in smoke and dust that not one of them could be seen, but as soon as they could be, we found them running in every direction…. To complete the mortification on their part, we took off our chapeaux and gave them three cheers. When our officers made inquiries who had disobeyed orders, no one knew anything about it. They did not try very hard to find out…. Now as each party was waiting for the other, the restraint was removed. The next morning, the British opened upon us with long guns. The balls that went over our battery would take out our barracks, which were in the rear. They were built of poles, and before night not one pole was left upon the other….[2]

— Lieutenant Archer Galloway, New York Militia Artillery

The upper (southern) end of the Niagara River as it flows out from Lake Erie and the various military positions established in 1812.

Fortunately for the Americans, Prevost’s directives on maintaining a defensive posture, the temporary armistice, and the limited number of troops at his disposal compelled Brock to remain on his own side of the river, thus giving Van Rensselaer time to receive substantial reinforcements.*[3] Upon arrival, however, these new units found the local command structure in a shambles, as were the arrangements for accommodations, supplies of food, ammunition, weapons, and almost every other necessity of campaign life. As a result, increased levels of insubordination and dissatisfaction led to desertions and outbreaks of mutiny within the various regiments.

Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, the self-proclaimed military “expert” who made considerable contributions to the failures experienced by the American military on the Niagara frontier in 1812.

From the Conger Goodyear Manuscript Collection, Vol. 9. Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society Research Library, Buffalo, NY.

Nor were things better at the top of the command structure as Quartermaster General Peter B. Porter and the local representative of the governor, Nicholas Gray, (both of whom were War Hawks and held political and personal animosity toward Van Rensselaer) repeatedly sought to undermine his authority. This schism was further widened when Brigadier General Alexander Smyth arrived at Buffalo in late September, with over 1,600 regular troops. Technically, Smyth was under the command of Van Rensselaer, and should have reported his arrival in person to his commanding officer. Instead, Smyth’s ego refused to acknowledge the authority of a militiaman over a regular and he defiantly set up a rival command headquarters of his own at Buffalo.

I had intended to have reported myself personally; but the conclusions I have drawn as to the interests of the service have determined me to stop at this place for the present … I am of the opinion that our crossing should be effected between Fort Erie and Chippawa. It has therefore seemed to me proper to encamp the U.S. troops near Buffalo, there to prepare for offensive operations.[4]

— Brigadier General Smyth to Major General Van Renssalaer, Buffalo, September 29, 1812

In the days that followed, Smyth repeatedly ignored Van Rensselaer’s calls for a conference with the other military commanders so as to decide how the campaign would be prosecuted, citing as his justification the superiority of his own judgement as to where the proposed invasion should occur. Nor was Van Rensselaer receiving any support from General Dearborn, who wrote several communications stressing the political expectations of Washington for a victory, while at the same time leaving no doubt that additional military assistance could not be expected in the near future. He also added the codicil that in the event of a British attack, Van Rensselaer should “be prepared to make good a secure retreat as the last resort.”[5] Little wonder then that Van Rensselaer replied with the following communication less than a week before the planned attack:

Our best troops are raw: many of them dejected by the distress their families suffer by their absence, and many have not necessary clothing…. The blow must be struck soon or all the toil and expense of the campaign will go for nothing; or worse than nothing, for the whole will be tinged with dishonour. With my present force it would be rash to attempt an offensive operation….[6]

Whether he thought an attack was rash or not, however, Van Rensselaer was left with little alternative but to continue planning his offensive and put on a brave face to his troops and commander. His initial plan was to

… immediately concentrate the regular force in the neighbourhood of Niagara, and the militia here; make the best possible dispositions, and, at the same time that the regulars shall pass from the Four Mile Creek to a point in the rear of Fort George, and take it by storm; I will pass the river here [Lewiston] and carry the heights of Queenston. Should we succeed, we shall effect a great discomfiture of the enemy, by breaking their line of communication, driving their shipping from the mouth of the river, leaving them no rallying point in this part of the country, appalling the minds of the Canadians, and opening a wide and safe communication for our supplies….[7]

However, this plan never progressed beyond the proposal stage as Smyth’s continued insubordinate attitude and refusal to submit to Van Rensselaer’s authority effectively restricted the planned expedition to that segment proposed for Queenston.

As the days passed, pressure mounted on Van Rensselaer, especially when news arrived from Buffalo of a small but significant American military success made on the night of October 8–9 by the capture of two British brigs, the Detroit (formerly the Adams, captured from the Americans at Detroit) and the Caledonia, both of which had just moored off Fort Erie, laden with weapons and prisoners from Brock’s victory at Detroit. The American boarding parties consisted of a combined force of regular soldiers (Fifth Regiment), volunteers from the Second Artillery Regiment, volunteers from the local Buffalo militias (under Dr. Cyrenius Chapin), and seamen (led by Lieutenant Jesse Elliot, USN).*[8]

The lower (northern) half of the Niagara River.

Around eight o’clock in the evening of the 8th, the boats, manned by the naval volunteers, left the Scajaquada Creek* and rowed upriver under the cover of the American shoreline and into the Buffalo Creek, where the volunteer troops embarked. However, upon setting off, the now heavily laden boats were unable to pass over the sandbar at the entrance of the creek. The only recourse was for the majority of the men to strip off their equipment and climb over the side, wade alongside the boats, and push them into the deeper water so they could re-board. Soaking wet and shivering with the cold, the only way the men were able to keep warm was by rowing for the next few hours as the boats slowly edged out into Lake Erie and passed entirely around the enemy vessels in order to come at them from the Fort Erie side of the lake. Approaching the Detroit and Caledonia in silence, the Americans were challenged and then fired on by the British crews. Rapidly coming alongside, the American troops swarmed aboard and, after a brief but intense hand-to-hand fight, overwhelmed the two ship’s crews. According to the later recollections of Lieutenant Roach (Second Artillery), a member of the boarding party attacking the Detroit:

In five minutes we were in possession and our prisoners driven below, and the hatchways secured. Some hands were sent aloft to loose the Topsails whilst I examined the Brig’s guns and found them loaded … I ordered them all hauled over to the starboard side … to be ready for an attack from the shore.[9]

*Also referred to in original documents by the name: Scoijoiquoides, Scajaquadies, Scadjaquada, Conjocketty, Conjecitors, Conguichity, Conjocta, and Unnekuga Creek.

Onshore, the crews of the shore batteries heard the firing and, once the noise subsided, hailed the vessels, demanding to know what had happened. Upon receiving no response, they assumed the worst and opened fire.

Whiz comes a shot over our heads. John Bull always aims too high. This went about 20 feet over us, ricocheh’d and as our shore was lined with friends anxiously waiting … killed Major Cuyler of the Militia whilst sitting on horseback … Bang! Went my battery of 6 pounders, Up Helm Boys! Stand by that cable with the axe.[10]

After cutting the anchor cables, the prize crews steered the two vessels toward safety at Buffalo. Unluckily, as they manoeuvred the prevailing wind died and the two ships were caught and dragged downstream by the Niagara River’s strong current, thus coming under additional heavy fire from the British artillery batteries lining the shore. In attempting to break away from this damaging barrage, the Detroit ran aground on Squaw Island, giving the British the opportunity to send a boatload of troops to recapture the vessel, but without success. After much cannonading by both sides and repeated attempts to possess the vessel made by parties from both armies, the Americans finally set it on fire, leaving it a gutted wreck. Similarly, while the Caledonia was towed under the cover of Winfield Scott’s artillery battery at Black Rock, preventing its recapture, it came under a heavy cannonade from the British guns and suffered significant damage while tied up at the dock, making it unseaworthy for the foreseeable future.

Hearing of this success, Van Rensselaer’s subordinates called on him to match the events at Buffalo; threatening that unless their men received orders to go into action they would desert and that he could find himself under suspicion of deliberately sabotaging the American war effort.[11] Consequently, Van Rensselaer ordered the invasion for the night of October 11–12.*[12] Leaving their respective encampments around Fort Niagara under conditions of freezing rain, gale force winds, and hail, the troops marched in strict silence along the single mud-choked trackway that led to Lewiston. Upon arriving at the embarkation point, however, they learned that the officer in charge of the boats had disappeared, supposedly taking with him a boat and all the available oars for the flotilla. Left with no means of propelling themselves across the river, the men were forced to endure a further gruelling march back to their encampments before attempting to dry off and await further orders. Despite this debacle and fearing that further delays would result in the complete disintegration of his military force, Van Rensselaer determined to mount his attack the following night — once some oars had been found.

Meanwhile, on the British side of the river, Major General Brock was well pleased with his level of preparedness in case of invasion. Following his victory at Detroit, much of the pro-American element of the Upper Canada population had been temporarily silenced, and numbers of the more vocal critics of Brock’s administration had deemed it prudent to leave the province altogether. At the same time, the local militias and Native allies were heartened by the victory and expressed an increased willingness to join the affray. Brock also ensured that his limited number of regular troops were disposed to those points deemed under threat and additional defensive positions were prepared at strategic points along the riverbank.*[13]

Since the beginning of the month, reconnaissance reports had noted substantial increases in the size of the American troop encampments on the opposite shore. There was also evidence of preparations within Fort Niagara, where the sloped roof of the old three-storey “Mess House” had been removed and the top floor converted into a raised artillery platform. Elsewhere, several new gun batteries were being constructed between Fort Niagara and a position that stood on top of the escarpment overlooking Lewiston (Fort Gray). Initially expecting that any American landing would take place at the mouth of the river and under the cover of the guns at Fort Niagara, the attack at Queenston was uncovered by Major Thomas Evans (8th [King’s] Regiment), whilst delivering a message from Brock under a flag of truce.

(Above) Fort Niagara, J.E. Woolford, artist, circa 1821. Fort Niagara, as seen from alongside a Canadian battery position located at Newark. (Below) The same view in 2012.

Library and Archives Canada, C-99561. and Library and Archives Canada, C-42570.

Initially considering Evans as an alarmist, General Brock later decided to take no chances and ordered the various positions around Queenston to be fully alert for an imminent attack. He also sought to increase his militia forces, although he had little confidence in their military value due to American sympathizers within their ranks:

The vast number of troops which have been added this day to the strong force previously collected on the opposite side convinces me, with other indications, that an attack is not far distant. I have in consequence directed every exertion to be made to complete the militia to two thousand men, but I fear I shall not be able to effect my object with willing, well-disposed characters. Were it not for the number of Americans in our ranks we might defy all their efforts against this part of the Province.[14]

— Major General Brock to Sir George Prevost, October 12, 1812

(Above): Fort Niagara, H. Slade, artist. This postwar view of Fort Niagara shows the garrison as it appeared during the war, with the roofs of the “French Castle” and blockhouses removed to facilitate the mounting of artillery. The main (riverside) gate of the fort from 1812–15 can be clearly seen, as can the (by then collapsing) perimeter picket walls. (Below) The same view in 2012.

From the American perspective, preparations for the crossing were not proceeding smoothly. First, although the invasion force of regulars had been supplemented with several regiments of New York State militia,*[15] the reality was that the Sixteenth N.Y. (Lieutenant Colonel Farrand Stranahan) and Seventeenth N.Y. (Lieutenant Colonel Thompson Mead) were almost entirely without ammunition, or even cartridge boxes to carry any ammunition. Furthermore, detachments of men from the Eighteenth N.Y. (Major John Morrison) and Twentieth N.Y. (Lieutenant Colonel Peter Allen) regiments were standing on their constitutional rights not to be used outside of the boundaries of the state, and refusing to cross into Canada. Second, while over sixty boats were within transportation range, only thirteen, each able to carry around twenty-five men, had been assembled to carry the troops across the river. In consequence, a shuttle service would be required to ferry the troops in waves, thus weakening the assault capability of the attackers. Third, what were conspicuous by their absence were the regular troops of Brigadier General Smyth. These units had begun their movement toward Lewiston, but had been turned back when the initial landing was cancelled. Now they were ordered by Smyth to remain at Buffalo. Finally, although a plan of embarkation had been devised, and was under the supervision of Lieutenant Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer (a cousin to Stephen Van Rensselaer), the need for silence, coupled with the confusion of multiple units arriving in the darkness, led to a situation where the men of several companies from the Thirteenth Regiment simply loaded en masse, pushing aside many of the militia actually scheduled for the initial embarkation. Despite these fundamental flaws in operational planning, the loading of the boats took place and in the blackness of the night, the initial wave pushed out for the opposite shore — the invasion had begun.

Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer (artist unknown). Cousin to General Simon Van Rensselaer and military commander of the initial American attack at Queenston.

From Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812.