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Confusion in the Darkness:

The Battle of Stoney Creek, June 6, 1813

Following what was later criticized as an inordinate delay, the American pursuit of the retreating British on the Niagara frontier finally began at dawn on June 1, 1813. Commanded by Brigadier General Winder, the original plan had been for Chauncey’s fleet to sail down the lake in conjunction with this land force, but with its abrupt departure, it left the army without the navy’s logistical, transport, and firepower support for the remainder of the campaign. In addition, by failing to order a proper reconnaissance that would have quickly revealed that the British rearguard only consisted of a detachment of Provincial Light Dragoons, Winder’s force made a cautious advance down the main Black Swamp trail that ran across the plain below the escarpment. This also put him under constant observation by parties of Native warriors, Incorporated Militia, and Embodied Militia on the commanding heights to the south. Nor did the weather co-operate, as a succession of rainstorms reduced the main road into a mud-choked quagmire, slowing the already slow American advance to a crawl that eventually reached the Forty Mile Creek on the morning of June 2nd, whereupon it halted and established an encampment.

At the same time, General Dearborn revised his plans yet again by ordering Brigadier General Chandler to march with an additional brigade to join Winder. Departing Fort George on June 3rd, Chandler reached the Forty Mile Creek on the morning of the 5th, fully expecting that Winder’s force would have already departed and was actively engaged in pressing the British towards Burlington Heights. Instead, he found it sitting idly awaiting his arrival. Uniting the forces and taking overall command, Chandler ordered that the advance continue without further delay. After skirmishing throughout the afternoon of the 5th, with an augmented British rearguard made up of the Light Dragoons and a detachment of the 49th Regiment, supported by the units of militia and Native warriors from the escarpment, the American advance guard had almost reached Burlington Heights. However, with night drawing on, it was recalled to join the main body of some 3,200 troops in the area now defined as Stoney Creek. Despite the known proximity of the British base, the American troops were positioned along an extended line that stretched from the escarpment to the lake, a front of around two miles (3.5 kilometers). Inevitably, gaps and weak spots in the defensive perimeter developed. Even within the main body of troops that encamped in the fields of the William and James Gage farmsteads, no directives on regimental alignment or rallying points came from either of the commanding generals, as it was anticipated that if the British made any stand it would be during the following day, once the Americans approached Burlington Heights. Instead, the individual regimental placements were left to the discretion of their commanding officers, which, according to their individual levels of military skill, varied from sensible to foolhardy.

A British map of the defences established at the strategic transportation and supply hub of Burlington Heights (Hamilton).

Library and Archives Canada NMC, C-3847.

The result was that the American force became dispersed across the undulating and broken ground below the dominating escarpment. It also failed to make more than a rudimentary plan of defence that centred along the line of a low, split-rail fence, topping a brush-covered ridge of ground that ran north-south to the east of the James Gage farmstead and intersected with the main east-west road to the north of the house. The clear field of fire created by the road and a stretch of low open ground was seen as the optimum location to deploy part of Towson’s artillery and pitch the general’s headquarters tent. Otherwise, camp discipline was so lax that the Twenty-Fifth Regiment set up its camp in front of the American line, directly obstructing Towson’s field of fire. This regiment further ignored established camp regulations by starting cooking campfires within their tent lines. On the other hand, some regimental officers sought to take precautions against a possible nighttime harassing probe by the enemy. For example, when Lieutenant John Kearsley (later major, Fourth U.S. Rifle Regiment) was instructed to establish a picket line at a small Methodist chapel, located about 500 yards (300 meters) in front of the American lines with men of

Maj. Forsyth’s riflemen, two companies of the 22nd Infantry and four companies of the 2nd Artillery … [he] … remonstrated against selecting these troops; first because they were exceptionally fatigued from the severe duties and fighting during the day, to which the other troops had not been exposed; and more especially because the Riflemen of Forsyth had never been disciplined to picket guard duty, and would therefore, probably, wherever they might be stationed, lie down and go to sleep. The Brigade Major, Captain Roger Jones, however persisted in his demand and Maj. Kearsley personally visited Genl. Chandler and remonstrated against … confiding the army to the keeping of troops who, in the language of Maj. Forsyth, “had never performed guard duty in their life.” Gen. Chandler however replied “that his arrangements for the night had been made and could not be changed”…. A company of the Riflemen under Capt. Van Swearengen … took up their quarters in the church and went comfortably to sleep in the pews thereof.[1]

At the same time, Major Joseph Smith (Twenty-Fifth Regiment) was having second thoughts about his unit’s relatively exposed location and despite having his tents pitched, his men settled and many already asleep, he requested a repositioning of his regiment. Assured by his commanders that no threat existed, Smith badgered Chandler and Winder until they relented and let him relocate his troops to a position alongside Towson’s artillery, leaving behind most of the tents and cooking fires to the supervision of a detachment of cooks and guards; a move that was to have significant consequences later in the night.