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Beating the Drums for War

For Great Britain, the first years of the nineteenth century were extremely turbulent and troubled. The kingdom had been at war with France since February 1793 (except for the illusory Peace of Amiens of 1802–3); and this “Long War,” as it was called, had, by 1812, brought the nation to the brink of bankruptcy as it sought to pay for its on-going military policies. These included:

 Constructing, maintaining, supplying, and crewing the world’s largest navy in order to dominate and control the world’s shipping lanes.

 Expanding its army to some 207 battalions of full-time “Line” regiments. On top of which were the seven battalions of The Brigade of Guards, three regiments of The Household Cavalry, forty-three corps of “Heavy” (Hussar) and “Light” (Dragoon) cavalry, ten Royal Artillery battalions, The Royal Horse Artillery, three battalions of The Royal Marines, The Rocket Troop, The Corps of Royal Artillery Drivers, The Field Train of the Ordnance, The Royal Engineers, The Royal Sappers and Miners, The Commissariat Corps, The Royal Waggon Train, thirteen “Royal Veterans” battalions, nine “Garrison” battalions, and more than twenty foreign “Allied” regiments. Plus an entire additional strata of military formations, under the auxiliary militia system that raised and maintained an uncounted number of “Colonial,” “Fencible,” and “Yeomanry” militia regiments or battalions, “Volunteer” corps or companies, “Armed Ward Associations,” “Sharp Shooter,” and “Independent” companies of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. To name but a few.

 Undertaking the construction, repair, maintenance, garrisoning, and supplying of a worldwide inventory of more than ten thousand military depots, fortifications, camps, and posts of various sizes and function.

 Fighting in a series of military campaigns of dubious strategic value that frittered away vast stocks of weapons and military supplies, not to mention the lives of tens of thousands of its soldiers, before finally concentrating upon evicting Napoleon’s armies from Portugal and Spain in 1808.

 Spending huge fortunes to subsidize its wavering European allies in a succession of military coalitions, initially against France’s Revolutionary governments and latterly against Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte’s goal to create a European empire.

As if this was not enough, Britain’s domestic economy was also in a state of crisis, the combined effect of a multi-year economic depression and a succession of agricultural crop failures. This had resulted in rampant price inflation and widespread food shortages throughout the nation’s increasingly urbanized population, which in turn created widespread social unrest. Compounding this already volatile situation, Britain’s industrial sector was in the midst of an ideological (and sometimes actual) conflict between its factory owners, who saw the future being dominated by the introduction of increased levels of mechanization into their industries, and their workforce, who saw their economic security, traditional working lifestyle, and their individuality being forcibly stripped away by the soulless “factory” system. Inevitably, without compromise and cooperation, both sides eventually resorted to extremes of action. The owners by invoking the “law” to call out the judges and local militias to arrest or actively (violently) suppress the protesting workers. The workers by forming raiding parties to sabotage and destroy the hated machines under the collective disguise of being the “Luddite army” or “Luddites,” led by the fictitious General Ludd. As a result, the British government was already fully occupied in its own affairs at home and in Europe, and took little time to take notice of new, serious problems developing in its relationship with the United States.

The westward expansionist policies of the U.S. government had allowed white settlement into the previously off-limits treaty lands held by the Native tribes of the Ohio, Michigan, and Kentucky regions. These treaty-breaking incursions had inevitably been met with hostile resistance from the Natives, resulting in the sending in of U.S. military units to suppress the “savages.” The only problem being that these same Native tribes were regularly winning these encounters! Since it was unthinkable that any “modern” army could be defeated by these “primitive” tribesmen, there had to be another reason. And as far as Mr. Grundy, the congressional representative for Tennessee and member of the Foreign Relations Committee, was concerned, the answer — and solution — was obvious.

It cannot be believed by any man who will reflect that the savage tribes, uninfluenced by other powers, would think of making war on the United States. They understand too well their own weakness, and our strength. They have already felt the weight of our arms; they know they hold the very soil on which they live as tenants at sufferance. How, then, Sir are we to account for their late conduct? In one way only; some powerful nation [Great Britain] must have intrigued with them and turned their peaceful disposition towards us into hostilities … I therefore infer that if British gold has not been employed, their baubles and trinkets and the promise of support and a place of refuge if necessary have had their effect…. This war, if carried on successfully, will have its advantages. We shall drive the British from our Continent — they will no longer have an opportunity of intriguing with our Indian neighbours … that nation will lose her Canadian trade, and, by having no resting place in this country her means of annoying us will be diminished.

(November 1811)[1]

For other American politicians and hardline nationalists, this viewpoint simply stated what they too had believed for some time. That the continued existence of a British colonial influence on the continent of North America was a stain on American pride that cried out for immediate correction. Their ultimate goal was to establish a single unified country, stretching from the frozen northern wastes to the tropical beaches of the Gulf of Mexico. Less often mentioned, however, were a number of financial considerations that also held considerable influence in the drive to expel the British from North America.

Under Napoleon Bonaparte, France’s armies had occupied or gained control over most of the European landmass, while the British literally “ruled” the waves, thanks to the might of its Royal Navy. Because neither side could then decisively defeat the other militarily, both combatants chose to use economic warfare as an alternate weapon. The French made the first move by imposing their authority and intimidating the small Baltic states to cut off the vital timber resources of that region to the British navy. In response, Great Britain began to develop the St. Lawrence River corridor as a new and reliable source of timber from the seemingly infinite stocks of Canada’s wilderness. This, in turn, represented an economic threat to the established mercantile interests on the American east coast. Within that circle it was argued that rather than seeing a competitor flourish, bringing those valuable economic resources and raw materials under direct American control would be a desirable and profitable outcome.

Matters intensified further when Napoleon Bonaparte tried to extend his economic war on Great Britain by issuing imperial decrees at Milan (1806) and Berlin (1807). By the terms of these declarations, Great Britain was banned from trading directly with any of France’s allies and subjugate countries in Europe. In retaliation, Great Britain’s Royal Navy effectively swept the French merchant marine from the seas before establishing a total naval blockade of French-controlled European ports. To circumvent these actions, both sides began to use intermediary and neutral shipping — a profit-making situation the Americans were quick to exploit.

Having gained control of most of the trans-Atlantic shipping trade and reaping huge profits from both sides of the European conflict, the Americans found their effective monopoly threatened by the subsequent actions of both Britain and France to tighten the economic “noose” on their enemy. Inevitably, the domestic pressure to maintain their new economic advantage, coupled with a political determination not to bow to any foreign decrees, led the American government into direct confrontation with both countries. However, while the actions of both combatants had severe economic impacts on the United States, the American newspapers repeatedly highlighted those incidents that involved British interests, leading to strident demands for retribution by the more extreme members of the American government.

In an offshoot to this situation, the huge growth in American mercantile traffic created an increased demand for experienced sailors to crew the ships. American merchant navy pay rates rose dramatically, leading to an increase in the numbers of men deserting from the brutality of the Royal Navy to the relatively lenient American trading vessels. Determined to recover these deserters, and rejecting the concept of any British citizen having the right to ever relinquish or change his nationality, the Royal Navy strained maritime legalities to breaking point by stopping and boarding American vessels to search for and seize what they deemed to be British nationals. The intimidation finally reached its climax when the HMS Leopard fired broadsides into the USS Chesapeake (June 22, 1807) to compel her to heave-to and submit to being boarded for the purpose of being searched.

War was now a distinct possibility, and the fact that legitimate American complaints (of U.S. citizens being “pressed” into British service) were being met with blunt indifference from the British government did nothing to ease tensions. President Thomas Jefferson, faced with the difficult choice of declaring war or submitting to the demands of both France and Great Britain, chose instead to enact a series of draconian and economically catastrophic Embargo Acts that effectively quarantined the United States from all trade and business dealings with Europe. Faced with the outright ruin of their lucrative shipping industry and wholesale unemployment across all sectors of the economy, the New England region soon became the centre of a massive system of coordinated smuggling with its neighbouring Canadian maritime colonies. American customs officials were threatened and even attacked by their own citizens, as were the troops sent to enforce the new regulations. This unexpected turn of events temporarily ended the call for war, as American anger was turned inward on their own government. Although the hated Embargo Acts were replaced in 1809 with the Non-Intercourse Act (forbidding American trade with Great Britain or France until either country revoked their own decrees), it did little to mollify the anger and concerns of the east coast merchants and shipping owners.

Meanwhile, the unremitting westward expan-sion by white settlers prompted the affected Native nations to unite in a common political and military confederacy under the leadership of a charismatic Shawnee chief, Tecumseh (Leaping Panther), and his brother Lolawauchika (Open Door), otherwise known as “The Prophet.” In response, Governor William H. Harrison of the Indiana Territory instigated a military campaign that resulted in the defeat and destruction of the Native alliance at the Battle of Tippecanoe (November 7, 1811). From this point on, many of the surviving Native tribes became the deadly enemy of the United States and saw any potential enemy of the new republic as an ally to be secured.

The Shawnee War Chief, Tecumseh (Leaping Panther). Artist unknown. The lynchpin of the Native alliance opposing the westward expansion of the Americans in the pre-war period, he was also a crucial element in Upper Canada’s defense during the War of 1812. He was killed in action against the Americans at Moraviantown, Upper Canada, in October 1813.

From Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812.

The potential for conflict between Great Britain and the United States deepened in 1810, when American congressional elections resulted in the election of several vehemently anti-British representatives. Later styled “War Hawks,” these politicians quickly gained control of several prominent administrative committees. They also pushed through a series of measures that could be interpreted as being deliberately aimed at creating an atmosphere of crisis that would bring about a declaration of war against Great Britain. Using the claim of “Free Trade and Sailors Rights” as their basis for complaint, they manipulated public opinion by making inflammatory speeches and publishing vitriolic editorials in the nation’s press. At the same time, if anyone questioned or opposed their position, they were immediately stigmatized with accusations of being subversive or even traitorous in their actions. As a result, the War Hawks successfully marginalized the conflict issues with France and characterized Britain, led by Spencer Perceval (holding the dual roles of prime minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer), as a villainous bully that needed to be taught a lesson.

Such was the depth of anti-British rhetoric within the American legislative assembly that

Peter B. Porter, a leading War Hawk from Buffalo, New York, and chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations, was able to openly state on December 6, 1811:

The Committee … were satisfied … that all hopes of accommodating our differences with Great Britain by negotiation must be abandoned … the Orders in Council … ought to be resisted by war…. That we can contend with Great Britain openly and even handed on the element where she injures us, it would be folly to pretend. Were it even within our power to build a navy which should be able to cope with her, no man who has any regard for the happiness of the people of this country would venture to advise such a measure … but, Mr. P. said, there was another point where we could attack her, and where she would feel our power more sensibly. We could deprive her of her extensive provinces lying along our borders to the north. These provinces were not only immensely valuable in themselves, but almost indispensable to the existence of Great Britain, cut off as she now is in a great measure from the north of Europe…. In short, it was the determination of the committee to recommend open and decided war — a war as vigorous and effective as the resources of the country and the relative situation of ourselves and our enemy would enable us to prosecute.[2]

However, despite every effort to create a unified national cry for war against Great Britain, the War Hawks found that when matters finally came to a formal vote for the declaration of war in 1812, the United States was still anything but united in its position. Divided by party politics, there were also strong regional opinions for and against a war. For example, the northeastern seaboard states (Massachusetts [including Maine], Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and Delaware), rejected war in the Congressional vote of June 4, 1812, and submitted formal petitions of objection to the president. On the other hand, the inland states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio voted in favour, backed by New Hampshire, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Similarly, the Senate was divided in its vote of June 17, 1812. Faced with this national division, President James Madison initially hesitated to sign the bill. However, when news arrived that a lone gunman had assassinated Prime Minister Spencer Perceval in the House of Commons on May 11, and that the British government was consequently in a state of turmoil, President Madison moved quickly and signed the declaration of war on June 18, 1812.

U.S. President James Madison (artist unknown) signed the declaration of war against Great Britain on June 18, 1812.

Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society Research Library, Buffalo, NY.

If the American nation was not politically united in its desire for war, neither was it militarily ready to press its point by force of arms. Despite the fact that Congress had taken the president’s earlier request for the raising of 10,000 regulars and 50,000 militia (November 1811) and expanded it to read 25,000 regulars, 50,000 militia, and additional funding of $10 million, it could not simply make these troops appear on the battlefield. Grandiose claims of an instant victory once war was begun were made by people like Congressman Henry Clay, “… it is absurd to suppose we shall not succeed in our enterprize against the enemy’s provinces … I am not for stopping at Quebec, or anywhere else, but I would take the whole continent from them and ask them no favors…. I wish never to see a peace till we do,”[3] and Secretary of War William Eustis, “We can take the Canada’s without soldiers; we have only to send officers into the provinces, and the people, disaffected towards their own government, will rally round our standard,”[4] were flights of fancy, geared to grab the newspaper headlines. In reality, despite the prospect of war having been prophesied and called for since 1807, the U.S. military supply and distribution system was a total shambles and completely incapable of making or moving the vast amounts of materiel required on the frontiers to prosecute a successful offensive campaign:

The keeper of the stores will not part with cannon, muskets, ammunition, or other articles, without the order of his superior officer. General Dearborn has requested me to order out the Militia … and informs me that the Quartermaster General will supply camp equipage for them. Upon application to the Quartermaster General, who is now in Albany, I find there is no camp equipage except a few tents and about sixty camp kettles which have been in our arsenal at this place for several years. For the delivery of even these I cannot obtain a written order. The Deputy Quartermaster General will not give an order for their delivery without written directions from the Quartermaster General and the Quartermaster General does not seem willing to give such written directions … although he is perfectly willing I should have the articles. Under such circumstances, I shall presume to take possession of them at my own hazard and shall accordingly forward them to-morrow morning, hoping that my proceedings on the emergency will be approved and confirmed.[5]

— New York State Governor, Daniel D. Tompkins to Secretary of War William Eustis, June 27, 1812

The official account of having some twenty-five regiments of regular infantry, four of artillery, two of cavalry, and one of rifles, for an impressive total of over 35,000 regular troops, translated into a reality of nearer 13,000 men, scattered across the entire country and made up primarily of untrained and barely outfitted raw recruits. Similarly, the springtime call for the mustering of the state militias had been a resounding failure, with many units fielding more officers than men. Furthermore, even where units had assembled, few were in a position to conduct a war in any coherent fashion as long as they were led by officers who saw their military service principally as a platform for their own political advancement (and, conversely, as an opportunity to undermine any officer who was also a political rival). Finally, since senior appointments to the command and staff of the army were the individual prerogative of the president, he chose to rely heavily upon aging and sometimes infirm veterans of the revolution to lead the army. For example, the “first major general” of the United States Army, Henry Dearborn, was no less than sixty-one years old, while his fellow generals averaged fifty-five years of age. Nor were matters much better at the level of district and regimental commanders, as most had little or no actual military experience other than their ceremonial and depot duties in the pre-war period.

General Henry Dearborn, (artist unknown) the senior American general at the commencement of the war. He was a veteran political appointee and relic of the Revolutionary conflict of nearly forty years previous.

Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society Research Library, Buffalo, NY.

Sir … I take the command of the troops at Black Rock and its vicinity in obedience to Your Excellency’s order with the greatest diffidence, having no experience of actual service. My knowledge of the military art is limited; indeed, I forsee numberless difficulties and occurrences which will present to which I feel totally inadequate. I have been ambitious that the regiment and brigade which I have commanded should be distinguished at their reviews, but I confess myself ignorant of even the minor duties of the duty you have assigned me, and I am apprehensive that I may not only expose myself but my Government. Any aid which Your Excellency may think proper to order will be received with thanks. A military secretary intimately acquainted with the details of camp duty would be of great service to me …[6]

— Brigadier General William Wadsworth to New York State Governor Tompkins, June 28, 1812

On the other hand, if the United States was in no position to begin a war, the Crown colonies of British North America were in no better shape to defend against one. Canada, except as a name, did not exist, while British North America was not a unified country. Instead, it was a collection of individual colonies, each with its own governmental body and different attitudes toward the prospect of conducting a war with the United States. Furthermore, its population was not only dispersed over a huge geographical area, but was also far smaller than that of the U.S. Estimates place the population of the combined colonies of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Lower and Upper Canada at less than 500,000, while that of the United States was in excess of 7.5 million. Of this 500,000, Upper Canada had less than 77,000 settlers, of which only around 9–10,000 were on the Niagara frontier. Secondly, in the event of war, while the British army had an official complement of some 10,000 regular and provincial or “Fencible” troops stationed within British North America,*[7] the dominance of defensive military thinking meant that securing Halifax, Quebec, and Montreal used up almost 80 percent of the available troops, artillery, ammunition, and supplies. By contrast, Upper Canada was defended by little more than 1,200 officers and men, scattered along a defensive frontier of over 1,000 miles. Repeated pleas for additional manpower and supplies for the defence of Upper Canada, sent by Upper Canada’s senior military commander, Major General Isaac Brock, were refused or excused away by his superior, Sir George Prevost, as being impossible to accomplish or threatening the security of the Lower colonies.

Instead, following the directives emanating from England to maintain a defensive posture and minimize the need for troops and supplies in the Canadian colonies, Prevost withheld these vital resources from Upper Canada and considered the region as expendable to the greater war effort. He also handicapped his military commanders with the following instructions:

My sentiments respecting the mode of conducting the war on our part … [must be] suited to the existing circumstances, and as they change so must we vary our line of conduct, adapting it to our means of preserving entire the King’s Provinces … Our numbers would not justify offensive operations being taken, unless they were solely calculated to strengthen a defensive attitude … I consider it prudent and politic to avoid any measure which can in its effect have a tendency to unite the people in the American States…. Whilst division prevails among them, their attempts on these Provinces will be feeble, it is therefore our duty carefully to avoid committing any act which may, even by construction, tend to unite the Eastern and Southern States, unless by its perpetration we are to derive a considerable and important advantage….

— Sir George Prevost, Montreal,

July 10, 1812.[8]

Major General Sir Isaac Brock K.B., G.T. Berthon, artist, circa 1883. In 1812, Isaac Brock held the cumulative titles of senior military commander for Upper Canada, lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada and president of the Upper Canada Executive Council. News of his knighthood only arrived in Canada following his death.

Archives Ontario, Acc. 694158.

Sir George Prevost, S.W. Reynolds, artist, date unknown. Appointed governor-in-chief and commander-in-chief of the British forces in British North America in 1811, Sir George proved to be an able civil and political administrator. Unfortunately, his on-field military command capabilities were not as strong. Following flawed decisions made during the Plattsburg campaign of 1814, he was recalled to England at the end of the war to face a court martial inquiry. He died a month before the inquiry began.

Library and Archives Canada, C-19123.

A constraint that Brock fortunately chose to interpret with a large degree of flexibility when it came to his course of action over the next few months.

Nor did Brock receive any significant assistance from the local provincial legislature, which was salted with several actively pro-American sympathizers. This situation had arisen during the period following the colonial rebellion of the American eastern seaboard states in 1776. At that time the population of the thirteen colonies had become divided into what were termed “Rebels” (who sided with those fighting for independence in what became known as the American Revolution), and “Loyalists” (who had fought for the king). With the victory of the rebels and the creation of the United States of America, the postwar punitive measures (including property seizures and revocation of civil liberties, rights of property, employment, and legal standing, not to mention mob violence and lynchings) that were heaped upon the Loyalists forced huge numbers of individuals and families to become homeless refugees. For the British government, the plight of the Loyalists required some form of recompense. In response, large tracts of land were granted to Loyalists in the undeveloped regions of its Canadian colonies, including Upper Canada, in particular along the Niagara frontier. As a result, during the last decade of the eighteenth century, while many waterside areas saw varying degrees of clearing and settlement by these transplanted refugees, the interior of the region still remained relatively untouched. However, during the following years, increasing numbers of Americans also arrived and took up residence, bringing with them their republican sentiments. This new pro-American influx naturally generated resentment within the established communities of the old Loyalist families and their descendants, and effectively split the population into rival political camps. It also created security problems for the limited number of British regular military forces detailed to defend the border against any future American aggression. Numerous letters and reports by successive lieutenant governors of Upper Canada recorded their unease at the increasing influence and dissenting opinions of that sector of the population who maintained that their allegiance was to the United States, not the king, and who considered the annexation of Upper Canada by the United States as merely a matter of time, or opportunity.

Now, with war in the offing, these near-traitors, in the opinion of Brock and his military subordinates, were taking every opportunity to block any legislation or expenditure designed to improve the defences of the colony. In a letter to Sir George Prevost, penned on February 25, 1812, Brock commented:

I had every reason to expect the almost unanimous support of the two branches of the Legislature to every measure the Government thought necessary to recommend; but after a short trial I found myself egregiously mistaken in my calculations…. The great influence which the vast number of settlers from the United States possess over the decisions of the Lower House, is truly alarming, and ought by every practical means to be diminished….[9]

Similarly, the Upper Canada militias, which although officially listing some 11,000 men of eligible age for military duty in the event of war, were of such a poor quality and in some cases of dubious loyalty that Prevost stated, “… it might not be prudent to arm more than 4000.”[10] Instead, it was recognized that the future security of Upper Canada might depend upon the tenuous alliance of the Native tribes to the British cause. Unfortunately, here too there was a lack of unity amongst the Native nations on the desirability to aggressively pursue a war. In the upper lakes region the western tribes of the Sioux, Winnebagos, and Menominis were fervent in their desire to revenge themselves for the recent incursions of Americans into their territories. On the other hand, on the Niagara frontier the bands of the Six Nations around the Grand River were far more reluctant to go to war, and even withheld any official promise of future assistance to the British cause if the Americans attacked. Their only offer of support came by approving the use of individual warriors volunteering to act with their British allies.